This chapter deals with the prospects for the expansion of the current Pakistani nuclear power program, and the dangers to national safety and security such expansion entails due to rapid expansion, and the potential military or terrorist attacks against future nuclear power plants. In terms of organization, this chapter is divided into two parts. The first part, including the front two sections, summarizes the current status of the Pakistani nuclear power program, and the prospects for its expansion. The second part deals with the nuclear safety risks that the expansion of the Pakistani nuclear power program might entail, and the security risks related to military or terrorist attacks against nuclear power stations. A detailed conclusions section completes the presentation.

It is concluded here that Pakistan has maintained its currently small nuclear power program in a safe mode, though plant performance records are mediocre, given the limited integration of Pakistani plants into the global nuclear industry. That Pakistan provides many of the requisite plant maintenance and upgrade capabilities from its own resources attests to the potential for improved operations if Pakistan’s nonproliferation position could be resolved. Future expansion of the Pakistani program on the scale projected by the government depends on changes 278 in Pakistan’s nonproliferation stance that might be related to resolution of the proposed U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement. A similar agreement between Pakistan and China, if possible, might allow significant expansion of the Pakistani nuclear program. It is further concluded here that rapid expansion of the installed nuclear capacity might strain the regulatory agencies‘ capability to supervise safe construction and operation of the prospective new nuclear power stations. Fastrate capacity growth might strain Pakistan’s ability to train adequate numbers of station operating staffs, support infrastructure, and regulatory manpower. The combined effects of the above could lead to safety problems related to plant operations and supervision by poorly trained personnel with potentially severe consequences.

We make the point here that the overall security situation in Pakistan is unstable, with large numbers of terrorist groups allowed to operate within the country, with an armed insurrection ongoing in Balochistan, and with the government’s loss of control of several provinces to the Taliban and other Islamic and Arabic terror organizations. This generally unstable security situation is not conducive to stable long-term expansion of nuclear power capacity. An immediate problem may be the difficulty of security screening of all prospective nuclear stations and infrastructure employees, with the distinct possibility of terror supporters gaining access to power stations and providing insider support to putative terrorist attacks. Large multiunit nuclear power stations that likely will be constructed if the nuclear expansion plan is implemented would become vulnerable to terrorist attacks or attempted takeovers all supported by potential inside collaborators. Terrorist attacks against nuclear power stations could 279 be motivated by three factors:

1. the desire to obtain radioactive or fissile materials for the construction of radioactivity dispersion devices or nuclear weapons;
   
2. the intent to create significant damage to the station, nearby population, the environment, and the country as a whole as revenge for some government actions inimical to terrorist interests; or
   
3. the desire to force the government to accede to some terrorists demands and modify its policies accordingly.

In similar fashion, military action against nuclear power stations can not be ruled out, motivated possibly by the intent to change or reverse government decisions and policies to respond to military demands. Since the military already controls security at all nuclear facilities in Pakistan, military takeover of future nuclear power stations is that much simplified. We conclude here that installing large multiunit nuclear power stations is in the economic interest of any country, like Pakistan, projecting large scale nuclear capacity growth. However, given the less than stable situation in Pakistan such stations are vulnerable to future security threats against the government. Both economic and security trade-offs should be evaluated when considering large scale nuclear capacity expansion in Pakistan’s situation.

This book, completed just before Pakistani President Musharraf imposed a state of emergency in November 2007, reflects research that the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center commissioned over the last 2 years. It tries to characterize specific nuclear problems that the ruling Pakistani government faces with the aim of establishing a base line set of challenges for remedial action. Its point of departure is to consider what nuclear challenges Pakistan will face if moderate forces remain in control of the government and no hot war breaks out against India.

On December 7 and 8, 2007, the Third Annual Globalization of Services Conference organized by Rafiq Dossani and Martin Kenney was held at Stanford University. The conference explored the following questions:

1. The changing geography of system integrators: The incumbent system integrators (SIs) are building up their developing nation service provision capability through acquisitions and internal expansion. The thrust of their expansion is to add capacity quickly. Can they manage it effectively? At a slower pace, the Indian SIs are doing the same in developed and developing nations: adding low cost workforces in developing countries, buying relationships in developed countries. Can they manage it effectively. Will growth rates and margins converge; if not, why not? What are some of the interesting differences between firm strategies?
   
   
2. The changing business models of system integrators: The Indian system integrators appear to be driving a new, metric-based quality model that is driving price compression. Is this strong enough to provide a permanent advantage? IBM and others are responding with a combination of superior technology, client relationships and domain expertise, drawing upon their established strengths while also expanding in India and other low-cost developing countries. Are we witnessing a convergence to a common business model? Is there a European perspective? Is it different and does it make a difference?
   
   
3. Product firms' globalization strategies (separate sessions on established and new firms): The IT product firms have to balance several additional factors that service firms like the SIs do not face when they globalize; among them, intellectual property protection, business development, managing innovation, research team coordination and marketing. How is this working, and what business models are they experimenting with? What are the differences between an established firm versus a startup?

Climate change, as an environmental hazard operating at the global scale, poses a unique and "involuntary exposure" to many societies, and therefore represents possibly the largest health inequity of our time. According to statistics from the World Health Organization (WHO), regions or populations already experiencing the most increase in diseases attributable to temperature rise in the past 30 years ironically contain those populations least responsible for causing greenhouse gas warming of the planet. Average global carbon emissions approximate one metric ton per year (tC/yr) per person. In 2004, United States per capita emissions neared 6 tC/yr (with Canada and Australia not far behind), and Japan and Western European countries range from 2 to 5 tC/yr per capita. Yet developing countries' per capita emissions approximate 0.6 tC/yr, and more than 50 countries are below 0.2 tC/yr (or 30-fold less than an average American). This imbalance between populations suffering from an increase in climate-sensitive diseases versus those nations producing greenhouse gases that cause global warming can be quantified using a "natural debt" index, which is the cumulative depleted CO2 emissions per capita. This is a better representation of the responsibility for current warming than a single year's emissions. By this measure, for example, the relative responsibilities of the U.S. in relation to those of India or China is nearly double that using an index of current emissions, although it does not greatly change the relationship between India and China. Rich countries like the U.S. have caused much more of today's warming than poor ones, which have not been emitting at significant levels for many years yet, no matter what current emissions indicate. Along with taking necessary measures to reduce the extent of global warming and the associated impacts, society also needs to pursue equitable solutions that first protect the most vulnerable population groups; be they defined by demographics, income, or location. For example, according to the WHO, 88% of the disease burden attributable to climate change afflicts children under age 5 (obviously an innocent and "nonconsenting" segment of the population), presenting another major axis of inequity. Not only is the health burden from climate change itself greatest among the world's poor, but some of the major mitigation approaches to reduce the degree of warming may produce negative side effects disproportionately among the poor, for example, competition for land from biofuels creating pressure on food prices. Of course, in today's globalized world, eventually all nations will share some risk, but underserved populations will suffer first and most strongly from climate change. Moreover, growing recognition that society faces a nonlinear and potentially irreversible threat has deep ethical implications about humanity's stewardship of the planet that affect both rich and poor.