Almost every facet of modern life - from driving to the grocery store to turning on a light - relies on inexpensive and abundant fossil fuels. When burned for power, these fuels yield emissions of carbon dioxide that accumulate in the atmosphere. They are the leading cause of global warming.

Assuring ample energy services for a growing world economy while protecting the climate will not be simple. The most critical task will be curtailing emissions from coal; it is the most abundant fossil fuel and stands above the others in its carbon effluent. Strong lobbies protect coal in every country where it is used in abundance, and they will block any strategy for protecting the climate that threatens the industry. The only practical approach is to pursue technologies that burn coal much more cleanly.

Such new technologies exist on the drawing board, but governments and regulators are failing to bring designs into practice with deliberate speed. Instead, most of the policy effort to tackle global warming has focused on creating global institutions, such as the Kyoto Protocol, to entice change. Although noble, these global efforts usually fall hostage to the interests of critical countries. After negotiating the Kyoto treaty, for example, the United States refused to sign when it found that it could not easily comply with the provisions. Australia did the same, and Canada is also poised to withdraw. Nor have treaties like Kyoto crafted a viable framework for engaging developing countries; these countries' share of world emissions is rising quickly, yet they are wary of policies that might crimp economic growth.

Breaking the deadlocks that have appeared in the Kyoto process requires, first and foremost, a serious plan by the United States to control its emissions. The United States has a strong historical responsibility for the greenhouse-gas pollution that has accumulated in the atmosphere, but little has been done at the federal level. (A few states are implementing some policies, and they, along with rising political pressure, might help to catalyze a more aggressive federal approach.) It will be difficult, however, for the United States (and other industrial countries) to sustain much effort in cutting emissions unless its economic competitors in China and the other developing countries make some effort as well. Without a strong policy framework to contain emissions throughout the world, levels of greenhouse-gas pollution will reflect only the vagaries in world energy markets. We need a proper strategy for moving away from harmful emissions.

A few years ago, many analysts thought that market forces were already shifting away from coal. They predicted the growth of natural gas, a fuel prized for its cleanliness and flexibility. That vision was good news for the climate because electricity made from natural gas leads to half of the carbon-dioxide emissions of electricity from coal. But natural-gas prices, which tend to track oil prices, have skyrocketed over the past few years, and, unsurprisingly, the vision for the growth of natural has dimmed. Natural-gas plants, which accounted for more than 90 percent of new plants built in the 1990s, are harder to justify in the boardroom. Most analysts now see a surge in the use of coal. One hundred new coal-fired plants are in the planning stages in the United States. Absent an unlikely plunge in gas prices, coal is here to stay.

Despite the challenges of handling coal responsibly, the potential of research and deployment of advanced technologies to help the United States and the major developing countries find common interest on the climate problem is great. In advanced industrialized countries, the vast majority of coal is burned for electricity in large plants managed by professionals - exactly the setting where such technology is usually best applied. In the United States, for example, coal accounts for more than four fifths of all greenhouse-gas emissions from the electricity sector.

Most of the innovative effort in coal is focused on making plants more efficient. Raising the temperature and pressure of steam to a "supercritical" point can yield improvements in efficiency that, all told, can reduce emissions about 20 to 25 percent. Boosting temperature and pressure still again, to "ultra-supercritical" levels, can deliver another slug of efficiency and lower emissions still further. Encouraging investments in this technology is not difficult: most countries and firms are already searching for gains in efficiency that can cut the cost of fuel; a sizeable fraction of new Chinese plants are supercritical; India is a few steps behind, in part because coal is generally cheaper in that country, but even there the first supercritical unit is expected soon. Across the advanced industrialized world, supercritical is the norm, at least for new plants. A few companies are taking further steps, investing in ultra-supercritical units. Two such plants are going up outside Shanghai, using mainly German technology, evidence that the concept of "technology transfer" is becoming meaningless in the parts of the world economy that are tightly integrated. Markets are spreading the best technologies worldwide where their application makes economic sense. In other countries, technologies to gasify coal - which also promise high efficiency - are also being tested.

But power-plant efficiency alone won't account for the necessary deep cuts in emissions. Already the growth in demand for electricity is outstripping the improvements in power plants such that the need for more plants and fuel is rising ever higher, as are emissions. This is spectacularly true in fast-growing China.

A radical redesign of coal plants will be needed if governments want to limit emissions of carbon dioxide. Here, the future is wide open. One track envisions gasifying the coal and collecting the concentrated wastes. Another would use more familiar technologies and separate carbon dioxide from other gases. All approaches require injecting the pollution underground where it is safe from the atmosphere. This is already done at scale in oil and gas production, where injection is used to pressurize fields and boost output. The consequences of injecting the massive quantities of pollution from power plants, however, are another matter. Regulatory systems are not in place or tested, and public acceptance is unknown.

While these technologies can work, they won't be used widely before they progress on two fronts. First, they must become commercially viable. Despite the huge potential of adopting them, it is striking how little money is being spent on advanced coal technologies. The U.S. government has created some financial incentives to build advanced coal plants, but much of that investment is slated for plants that are not actually designed to sequester CO2. In fact, the uncertainty of American policy gives investors in power plants an incentive to build conventional high-carbon technology, because it is more familiar to regulators and bankers. Worse yet, increased emissions today might actually improve a negotiating position in the future when targets for controlling emissions are ratcheted down from whatever is business as usual. Some private firms, such as BP and Xcel, are putting their own money into carbon-free power - but the totality of the private effort is small compared with the size of the problem. There are good mechanisms in place for encouraging public research and private investment in such technologies; the real shortcoming is in the paucity of the effort.

The second problem is that countries such as China, India, and other key developing nations won't spend the extra money to install carbon-free coal. Yet these countries' share of global coal consumption has soared almost 35 percent over the past ten years.

The inescapable conclusion is that the advanced industrialized countries must create a much larger program to test and apply advanced coal technologies. Electricity from plants with sequestration might eventually cost half more than from plants without the technology. That's not free, but it is affordable and is less than the changes in electric rates that many Americans already experience and accept.

State and federal regulators need to create direct incentives - such as a pool of subsidies - to pay the extra cost until the technology is proven and competitive with conventional alternatives. That subsidy, along with strict limits on emissions, will set a path for cutting the carbon from U.S. electricity without eliminating a future for coal. They must also extend the same incentives to the major developing countries, which have no interest in paying higher rates for electricity because their priorities do not rest on controlling CO2. Yet these countries' involvement now is essential. Averting emissions has a global benefit regardless of where the emissions are controlled. And developing countries are especially unlikely to shoulder more of the burden themselves, in the more distant future, unless they are first familiar with the technologies.

Solving the climate problem will be one of the hardest problems for societies to address - it entails complicated and uncertain choices with real costs today, and benefits in the distant future. Yet the stakes are high and the consequences of indecision severe. Serious action must contend with existing political constituencies and aim at existing resources that are most abundant. The technologies needed to make coal viable will not appear automatically. An active policy effort - pursued worldwide and initially financed by the industrialized world - is essential.

Originally published in the January/February 2007 issue of Boston Review.

The 14th Informal APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting concluded on Nov. 19, 2006, and the participants had their photo taken in colorful Vietnamese traditional costumes called ao dai. Still in the shadow of the congressional election failure, President George W. Bush, realizing that a stable Asia is very important for the U.S. geostrategy, took advantage of the occasion to enhance the prestige of the United States. Just as American experts said, the Bush administration has probably become a lame duck now, but even a healthy duck needs to find a quiet pond.

"APEC's uniquely trans-Pacific character is an important political reason for U.S. to strengthen the group," Donald Emmerson, director of the Southeast Asia Forum of Shorenstein APARC at Stanford University, explained. "While APEC has lagged, East Asian regionalism has boomed. That has been good for East Asia. But U.S. and East Asian interests alike could be hurt if the Pacific Ocean ends up being split between rival Chinese and American spheres of influence."

However, the U.S. effort to save the Doha Round of trade talks with the Asia-Pacific Free Trade Agreement has yielded little. The Doha Round aimed to remove trade barriers in the world but was suspended due to some countries' agriculture protection policies. Washington had wanted to model the Doha Round upon the Asia-Pacific Free Trade Agreement. But U.S. officials never expected that there would be so many differences among the Asia-Pacific leaders, and that the economic development of Pacific Rim countries differ in thousands of ways. Despite the fact that the Hanoi Statement reiterated that supporting the Doha Round was APEC's priority, no material progress has been made.

"The U.S. is urging a last ditch effort to restart the talks through APEC," Professor Charles Morrison, president of the East-West Center located in Hawaii, says. "Whether or not APEC can do more than make a rhetorical statement of support is unsure. I feel that the APEC economies should agree to prepare new offers within a short period of time -- three weeks, for example -- to challenge the Europeans, Brazilians, Indians and others."

United States Steps Out to "Please" ASEAN

Seventeen years after its establishment, APEC now plays a decisive role in the international political arena. It has 40 percent of the world's population, 48 percent of the world trade volume and 56 percent of the world GDP. Since 1989, the economy in this region has grown by 26 percent, compared to only 8 percent economic growth rate in the rest of the world. With the double advantage of economic strength and rapid growth, China, being one of APEC's main economies and its "engine," has fully taken the limelight. On the other hand, the United States has been weighed down with countering terrorism in the Middle East.

"China has done very well in enhancing its relations with Southeast Asia in recent years," Sheldon Simon, professor of the Program in Southeast Asian Studies at Arizona State University, points out. "China has not only established a free trade forum for China and ASEAN countries, but also helped and influenced the area with its economy and culture. But I think that the United States has realized the importance of this area and come back to fasten its friendly relationship with the region."

The United States coming back to Southeast Asia and repairing its relations with the ASEAN countries is partly activated by China's increasing influence in the area.

"The naissance and growth of some democratic countries in Southeast Asia has received sympathetic response of democratic values from Washington," said Simon. "With the traditional friendly relations between the area and the United States, these countries value their friendship with the United States sometimes more than the trust in their neighboring countries. Geopolitics is also very important factor. The Asia-Pacific area is a very important to the world economy and the U.S. power structure. Therefore, the United States will not easily give it up."

Another motive for the United States to foster closer relations in the area is the common interest of countering terrorism. There are still some terrorist groups in Indonesia, the Philippines and southern Thailand.

"President Bush has a perfect attendance record at APEC meetings (Clinton missed two of them), which says that he does take APEC seriously and believes Asia is important to U.S. interests," Ralph Cossa, president of the Pacific Forum Center for Strategic and International Studies, said in an interview with the Washington Observer Weekly.

Besides attending the APEC summit meetings annually, Washington has recently activated several plans to "please" the ASEAN countries, including setting up a ministerial dialogue system with them and a platform for maintaining contact at the deputy finance minister level, even increased exchanges at the deputy defense secretary level.

The extent of U.S. efforts to foster cordial relations with Southeast Asian countries can also be seen in the increasingly friendly U.S.-Vietnamese economic and trade relations. The Bush administration is not only supporting Vietnam to enter the WTO, but has even proposed giving Vietnam Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) status.

"The reason that Bush failed to bring the gift of PNTR status to the APEC Hanoi summit is that the Congress dominated by the Republicans was lacking efficiency and could not pass the proposal in time," Simon explained. "But I think that it will be passed as soon as possible in the next month or by the Democrats who begin to dominate the Congress from next January."

Simon and Cossa both admit that Burma is an unharmonious element in U.S. relations with ASEAN. The Burmese dictatorial military government is really the most typical negative example of democracy for the United States. But ASEAN countries are reluctant to see Burma "punished" by the United States for ideological reasons. So Burma has become a sensitive issue in U.S.-ASEAN relations.

"This is a good way for him to interact with ASEAN since Myanmar is not there and this issue does not have to be addressed," said Cossa.

Simon, an expert of Southeast Asia affairs, points out ASEAN countries should be happy about the advantage they have with China and the United States vying for their attention. Being able to juggle the two big powers, Southeast Asia has gained many practical interests and financial aid for its economy, trade, security, culture and education.

"In a short period, there will not be any serious interest conflicts in the triangle balance of China, the United States and ASEAN," Simon told the Washington Observer Weekly. "ASEAN countries' only worry, if there is any, is an accidental spark in the U.S.-China military interaction in Southeast Asia such as the confrontation across the Taiwan Straits."

Turning the Asia-Pacific into a "Gigantic Enterprise?"

"The United States wants to demonstrate its continuing interest in the Asia-Pacific region. It is urging for a study of an Asia Pacific free trade area and support for an APEC business card, and both shifts of approach, illustrate its interest in and support for the APEC process," said Morrison.

An important subject for the APEC Hanoi summit is the "active discussion" of establishing an APEC free trade region. Former U.S. President Bill Clinton proposed for the first time in 1993 the setting up of such an economic zone. Before Bush's visit, Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Karan Bhatia suggested that establishing an APEC free trade zone would be a subject worth serious discussion. But his proposal did not receive a warm response from the host. The Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister Le Cong Phung stressed that establishing a free trade zone is a long-term objective and will not affect progress of negotiations with the WTO or other bilateral trade agreements.

"Regarding the study of the Asia Pacific free trade area, a number of economies were skeptical because it would be such a large undertaking," said Morrison. A similar plan was once axed in an APEC ministerial statement and the leaders attending this summit do not seem to have much interest in it.

Simon explained Bush's thinking on the subject: "Washington reiterated its intention to establish an Asia-Pacific free trade zone in order to save the precarious WTO Doha Round. Breaking the tariff barriers in the Asia-Pacific region will help continue to press relevant countries to concede in granting agricultural tax subsidies and hopefully open the door to the Doha Round."

The five-year Doha Round was suspended in July this year because six major WTO members -- the United States, the European Union, Japan, Australia, Brazil and India -- failed to reach agreement on market access for agricultural and non-agricultural products. Given the situation, the organizer said that the informal APEC economic leaders' meeting would provide a "good opportunity" to help restore the Doha Round talks. However, the Hanoi summit joint declaration just vaguely indicated that APEC will pursue further integration on issues such as energy in 2007. It would be extremely optimistic to expect that APEC will be able to remove all the tariff barriers in the region before 2010. Although the area produces 50 percent of the world's economic value, the styles and stages of economic development, the cultural backgrounds and political systems of the countries in the region vary a great deal, making it very difficult for these Asian countries to eliminate all these discrepancies and become fully integrated.

"Out of different worries, many Southeast Asian countries are actually not interested in the proposal though they do not speak out. Or we may say that it's not time yet now to change the Asia-Pacific region into a gigantic enterprise," Simon told Washington Observer Weekly.

Quite apart from who concedes what in return for what concession over the APEC free trade mechanism, the question arises: What geographical scope should a regional trade arrangement have? Who should be a party to the agreement and who should not?

There would appear to be three different ideas on the table: (a) the APEC-wide free trade area that the United States proposed at the recent summit in Hanoi; (b) the East Asia Summit-wide framework that Japan reportedly favors, which would include ASEAN + 6 (China, Japan, South Korea, India, New Zealand, Australia) but not the United States; and (c) the ASEAN Plus Three (China, Japan, South Korea) context that China seems to prefer, in which the exact positions of Tokyo and Beijing are not entirely clear.

"Without discussing the merits or demerits of each of these arrangements, suffice it to note that since ASEAN is common to all of them, the net effect of these alternative ideas is to strengthen the negotiating position of ASEAN," said Emmerson. "Then again, ASEAN will not necessarily be unified as to its preference for the three proposals. It will be interesting to look for the positions to be taken by individual ASEAN countries and for their collective effort to arrive at a single negotiating position, e.g., in the run-up to the ASEAN summit and the second the East Asia Summit in the Philippines next month."

Cossa has hope for 2007. "The U.S. in particular would like to see APEC moving faster, and will look ahead to next year, with Australia in the chair, for some real progress."

American Public Doesn't Share Washington's Interest in Southeast Asia

The prospect of economic and strategic cooperation brought about by APEC made for a lively week in Southeast Asia. But it stirred little response in the United States. According to the interviewed experts of Southeast affairs, the American public is still haunted by the situation in Iraq and the mid-term election. Even the U.S. media framed the event as Bush's first visit to a foreign country since the Republicans were defeated in the mid-term election.

"Because of the Congressional election, President Bush will want to show leadership rather than simply respond to the new Congress. Both Doha and the nuclear proliferation issue are examples," said Morrison.

Cossa holds a different view: "I don't think the elections will have any major impact on what Bush does or how he does it during this trip. Iraq is his legacy. What he does in Asia can make things better or worse at the margins but will likely be overshadowed by Iraq."

Simon echoed the sentiment. "On one hand, the Republican Party's defeat in the election cannot directly influence Bush's trip to Asia. On the other hand, Bush's economic achievements in the Southeast region will not add to his political record. In Asia, only the North Korea issue may sway the public opinion in the United States."

Yan Li, Washington Observer weekly - Issue No. 201, November 22, 2006

Reprinted by Permission February 12, 2007.

Siegfried S. Hecker, a prominent U.S. expert on nuclear technology and policy, was appointed co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation, in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University on Jan. 16. He also assumed positions as a professor (research) in the Stanford School of Engineering's Department of Management Science and Engineering and a senior fellow at FSI.

Hecker's "scientific achievements as a metallurgist, his leadership and talent as the head of a renowned U.S. Department of Energy laboratory and his decades-long dedication to improving global security make him an extraordinary choice to help direct CISAC in the years ahead," FSI Director Coit D. Blacker said, announcing the appointment.

Political science Professor Scott Sagan, whom Hecker joins as a co-director of CISAC, said he is "thrilled to have Sig Hecker as a partner" in leading the center. "Hecker follows in a long line of distinguished scientists--Sidney Drell, William Perry, Michael May, and Christopher Chyba--who have become leaders of CISAC's efforts to produce cutting edge policy-relevant research," Sagan noted. "Stanford University is extremely fortunate to be able to have a scholar-practitioner of Sig Hecker's stature coming to CISAC to help guide our multidisciplinary efforts to address the tough security challenges facing the world right now."

The center, traditionally co-directed by a scientist and social scientist since its founding in 1983 by physicist Drell and political scientist John Lewis, draws from a range of disciplines to focus on current problems in international security.

An emeritus director of Los Alamos National Laboratory, Hecker has fostered U.S. cooperation with Russian nuclear laboratories for 15 years to secure the vast stockpile of former Soviet nuclear weapons and materials. At CISAC, where he has been a visiting professor since fall 2005, Hecker has contributed to international projects to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and secure materials for making them.

Looking forward to the new assignments, Hecker said, "I have enjoyed the Stanford environment--the students, faculty, and the great range of international issues being examined. I look forward to the new challenge of leading CISAC with Scott Sagan, as well as teaching and research in management science and engineering."

With Lewis, Hecker has made three visits to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the last three years, gaining rare access to and expertise on North Korea's nuclear weapons program. His reports on the program's status provide valuable insights to U.S. diplomats and scholars seeking to resolve the nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula. With Sagan, Hecker has participated in meetings with security experts from China, India, Pakistan, Russia, and the United States to secure nuclear weapons and materials and lessen tensions in South Asia.

Last fall, Hecker co-taught Stanford's popular management science and engineering course, Technology and National Security, with CISAC and MS&E colleague Perry. Hecker lectured on nuclear weapons history and technical fundamentals, nuclear terrorism, and North Korea.

"Dr. Hecker has added 'outstanding professor' to his list of many accomplishments," Perry said. "I am delighted he has accepted this appointment and look forward to working with him."