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The Brazilian energy sector reform followed a textbook model from early 1990s Latin America - specifically Chile and Argentina - premised on introducing competition to the wholesale power market while maintaining monopolies in transmission and distribution. The textbook electricity reform model also established an independent system operator and independent regulator to oversee system management. Brazil began its power sector reform by privatizing distribution, followed by generation and transmission. And because the drought and successive power rationing of 2001-02, the Brazilian power market is being reformed again. The wholesale market will be ruled by long term contracts and new institutions are being developed to coordinate the sector. In this contract environment, IPPs stand out less than in countries with a single buyer model (e.g. South East Asia, Mexico).

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Program on Energy and Sustainable Development Working Paper #53
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Erik Woodhouse

Continued growth in farmed salmon production worldwide--combined with emerging growth in the production of other lucrative farmed finfish species such as bluefin tuna, cod, and halibut--threatens marine ecosystems and heightens the need for sustainable solutions to farming practices. The debate over "whither farmed salmon" remains widely polarized, with environmental groups calling for the complete elimination of marine aquaculture or a move to land-based systems that are economically unviable under current market conditions.

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Michael A. McFaul
Abbas Milani
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CDDRL Faculty Associate, Michael McFaul and Hoover Institution Fellow, Abbas Milani argue that Iran's nuclear program does not pose a direct threat to the United States. US leaders, therefore, need a radical new approach that would nurture change from within Iran rather than impose change from without.

Even when the European-Iranian agreement to halt Iran's uranium-enrichment program looked solid, the United States was blunt in its disapproval. The ink was barely dry on the accord when the Bush administration, it appears, began trying to derail it.

First, rather than endorse the accord, Secretary of State Colin Powell essentially accused the Iranians of lying when they said their nuclear program was for peaceful purposes. He announced that new intelligence showed Iran is developing a nuclear warhead to arm its Shahab-3 ballistic missiles. Then, at a Nov. 20 meeting of heads of state in Santiago, Chile, President Bush stated unequivocally that Iran is trying to build a nuclear weapon.

Why would the administration take such a combative stance? Because hard-liners within the administration thought Tehran would use the settlement to buy time for building nuclear weapons, and that the United States would be better off bombing Iran's suspected weapons sites.

Proponents of using military force against Iran have not yet won the argument within the Bush administration. But the past two weeks of strong pronouncements about the threat Iran poses suggest that the military option may be gaining ground. And Iran's last-minute attempts to maintain some enrichment capabilities -- which by press time Friday were threatening to kill the European agreement -- no doubt strengthened the hard-liners' hand.

Before the United States even considers such a drastic step as airstrikes against suspected nuclear weapons sites -- or even trying to compel the United Nations to endorse new economic sanctions against Iran -- it is essential that our leaders be clear about what they are trying to accomplish in Iran and whether such actions will help or hurt.

If the ultimate goal is to create a democracy -- one that would not fear the United States and therefore have less use for the bomb -- then dual-track diplomacy with Iran's government and with its people is more likely to work than military action.

Probably the most important question the administration's leaders should ask themselves is whether Iran, even a nuclear-armed Iran, poses a direct threat to the United States and its allies.

The answer, we believe, is no.

The mullahs who rule Tehran long ago gave up their ideological quest to "export'' revolution. Like the last generation of octogenarians who ruled the Soviet Union, Iran's leaders today want nuclear weapons as a means to help them preserve their power, not to help them spread their model of theocratic rule to other countries.

Deterrence works

In other words, even if Iran's rulers succeeded in building nuclear bombs, they would be very unlikely to take on the United States and its vast nuclear arsenal or to attack Israel. (The mullahs in Tehran understand that any nuclear attack against Israel would trigger full retaliation from the United States.) In dealing with Iran, deterrence works.

Tehran would also be unlikely to pass a bomb to Islamist terrorists, despite its support of Arab terrorist organizations that continue to attack Israel. One reason, again, is deterrence. Iran's rulers know that the United States would probably be able to trace the weapon back to them and retaliate.

The threat of a nuclear Iran comes, instead, from the reaction it is almost sure to spark in the region and the world, possibly sending Egypt and Saudi Arabia on their own quests for nuclear weapons.

Such an arms race would undermine the longstanding Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, an agreement signed by nearly 190 countries, that has proved indispensable in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.

Bush administration hard-liners want to save that arms-control treaty by using arms. In advocating a "surgical'' military strike against Iran's most important nuclear facilities, including the once hidden enrichment plant in Natanz, they cite Israel's airstrike against Iraq's nuclear complex at Osirak in 1981 as a model of success. They argue that an American (or Israeli) strike would not end Iran's nuclear aspirations, but would dramatically slow its program and make the mullahs reconsider the costs of trying to restart it.

Attack would backfire

But a pre-emptive military strike would instead do just what the hard-liners in Tehran hope for: It would unite their people behind them.

Even a precise bombing campaign would kill hundreds if not thousands of innocent Iranians; destroy ancient buildings of historical and religious importance; trigger an Iranian counterstrike, however feeble, against American targets and friends in the region, and spur the mullahs to increase their direct support for American enemies in the Shiite part of Iraq.

Even more important, an attack would only encourage Tehran to redouble its efforts to build a bomb, just as Saddam Hussein sped up his efforts after the 1981 strike. It would also hurt the democratic opposition movement inside Iran, which is already in retreat and cannot afford another setback. After an attack, Iranians, not unlike Americans, are sure to rally around the flag and their government.

If the administration decides, in the end, that American military options are limited and counterproductive, the only serious way to impede the development of Iranian nuclear weapons is through negotiation. Iran's recent accord with France, Britain and Germany is only temporary, and negotiations are expected to continue.

If the United States were to jump in now, it could try to ensure that our European allies accept nothing less than a permanent and verifiable dismantling of Iran's enrichment capabilities, as well as banning any plutonium production.

Allowing the Iranians to enrich even some uranium, which they say will be used merely to feed their nuclear power plant, makes it too easy to cheat. To make the deal work, the United States would need to join with Europe, Russia and China in pledging to guarantee Iran a permanent and continuous supply of enriched uranium. To make the deal even more attractive, the fuel could be offered at reduced prices.

Even under the strictest inspection regime, Iran's leaders will cheat, as they have often done in the past, and they will eventually divert enriched uranium from peaceful to military purposes. But the harder and more transparent the allies can make it, the longer it will take Iran to begin building bombs.

In the long run, the world's only serious hope for stopping Iran from developing nuclear weapons is the development of a democratic government in Tehran. A democratic Iran will become an ally of the Western world no longer in need of a deterrent threat against the United States.

Democracy in Iran therefore obviously serves U.S. national interests. Yet Bush administration officials (as well as their predecessors in the Clinton, Bush and Reagan administrations) have not succeeded in developing a strategy for advancing the cause of Iranian democracy.

New strategy

What is needed is a radical new approach that would nurture change from within the country, in alliance with Iran's democratic movement, rather than impose change from without.

A first step would be to establish an American presence in Tehran, as many in Iran's democratic opposition have proposed. Now decades old, the U.S. policy of isolating Iran has not weakened but instead strengthened its autocratic government.

Of course, we are not suggesting that the United States open an embassy in Tehran and turn a blind eye to human rights abuses; that would only contribute to the further consolidation of the mullahs' hold on power. But we are suggesting a new strategy that would allow American government officials, as well as civic leaders, academics and business people, to engage directly with Iranian society.

This engagement cannot occur on a widespread scale without some level of diplomatic relations and some revision of the American sanctions against Iran. Then, more Western foundations would be able to make grants to pro-democracy Iranian organizations, while business people -- and especially the Iranian-American business community in the United States -- would be able to leverage their capital and know-how to influence economic and political change inside Iran. A U.S. presence in Iran would, not incidentally, also enhance the West's ability to monitor Iran's nuclear program.

Critics of engagement argue that diplomatic relations with Iran will reward this "axis of evil'' member for years of supporting terrorism and pursuing nuclear weapons. In fact, an American presence in Iran is the mullahs' worst nightmare.

Iran's government has long used its ongoing tensions with the United States, as well as the embargo, as an excuse for the economic difficulties that are, in fact, the direct results of the regime's incompetence and corruption. Tehran's leaders have conveniently labeled nearly all of their opponents as "agents of America.''

Most important, part of the regime's self-declared legitimacy lies in its claim to be the only Muslim country fighting what it sees as U.S. imperialism. If the United States could prove it's not an enemy of the Iranian people, the legitimacy of Iran's leaders would diminish.

Reagan's course

In the first years of his presidency, Ronald Reagan labeled the Soviet Union the "evil empire'' and went out of his way to avoid contact with such a regime.

Over time, however, Reagan charted a new course of dual-track diplomacy. He engaged Kremlin leaders (well before Gorbachev) in arms control, while also fostering contacts and information flow between the West and the Soviet people in the hope of opening them up to the possibilities of democracy.

In the long run, it was not arms control with the Soviets, but democratization within the Soviet Union, that made the United States safer.

If George W. Bush desires a foreign-policy legacy as grand as Reagan's, now is the time to think big and change course as dramatically as Reagan did.

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In a May 14 lecture hosted by the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, Francis Fukuyama, PhD -- professor of international political economy at Johns Hopkins University and renowned author of The End of History and the Last Man -- discussed the problem of weak, underdeveloped nation-states; the effectiveness of various approaches to strengthening such states; and the importance of culture, context and history in the task of state-building. His lecture, titled "State-building: A Framework for Thinking about the Transfer of Institutions to Developing Countries," drew a full room of attendees to the Bechtel Conference Center in Encina Hall

A former member of the RAND Corp. and the U.S. Department of State who has written widely on issues of democratization and international political economy, Fukuyama first presented a framework with which nation-states can be evaluated according to two key criteria: the strength of the state, and the scope of its functions. The first refers to a state's ability to enforce its own laws and policies; the second refers to how involved the state becomes in carrying out various societal functions, ranging from basic functions such as maintaining law and order and protecting public health, to more "activist" functions such as running industries and redistributing wealth.

Fukuyama asserted that from a development standpoint, nation-states should be strong but should carry out only the minimum necessary functions. He said that only one country he has studied -- New Zealand -- has effectively moved toward this ideal in recent years. He noted that many struggling, developing nations, such as Brazil, Mexico, Pakistan and Turkey, are overly ambitious in their scope -- attempting to run vast industries, for example -- but are weak and unable to carry out their policies because of factors like corruption. Other states that Fukuyama identified as "failed states," such as Haiti and Sierra Leone, are both limited in scope and weak, attempting to carry out only the most basic governmental functions and not doing it very well.

Fukuyama then discussed and evaluated various approaches to strengthening developing nations. He noted that in recent years much emphasis has been placed on encouraging such nations to reduce the scope of their functions, through deregulation and privatization, but said the effectiveness of this approach is now in question. A more effective approach, he said, is helping weak nation-states build their own strong institutions, such as political parties, public health networks and central banking.

Unfortunately, Fukuyama said, sometimes the efforts of outside organizations to strengthen a country's institutions only make things worse, because solutions are imposed from outside rather than developed from within. "Ideally, we would want a country's own public health system to handle that country's problems with AIDS or malaria," he said. "But when you flood the country with your organization's own doctors and nurses and infrastructure, what do the local doctors do? They quit their government posts to get on the payroll of your NGO." In a few months or years, when the organization withdraws its support, Fukuyama noted, the system collapses, because it was not built to be self-sustaining.

At the end of his talk, Fukuyama emphasized the importance of understanding local culture, context and history in the task of state building. For example, he said, those who run programs aiming to reduce the spread of HIV/AIDS in Africa should consider working with traditional faith healers, as they are an important part of the healthcare system in Africa.

Francis Fukuyama is dean of faculty and the Bernard L. Schwartz Professor of International Political Economy at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University. His book The End of History and the Last Man was published in 1992 and has appeared in more than 20 foreign editions. It made the bestseller lists in the United States, France, Japan and Chile, and has been awarded the Los Angeles Times' Book Critics Award.

Fukuyama received a BA in classics from Cornell University and a PhD in political science from Harvard University. He was a member of the Political Science Department of the RAND Corporation from 1979-1980, then again from 1983-89, and from 1995-96. In 1981-82 and in 1989 he was a member of the policy planning staff of the U.S. Department of State. In the early 1980s he was also a member of the U.S. delegation to the Egyptian-Israeli talks on Palestinian autonomy. He is a member of the President's Council on Bioethics, the American Political Science Association, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Pacific Council on International Policy, and the Global Business Network.

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Francis Fukuyama is Dean of Faculty and Bernard L. Schwartz Professor of International Political Economy at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University.

Dr. Fukuyama's book, The End of History and the Last Man, was published by Free Press in 1992 and has appeared in over twenty foreign editions. It made the bestseller lists in the United States, France, Japan, and Chile, and has been awarded the Los Angeles Times' Book Critics Award in the Current Interest category, as well as the Premio Capri for the Italian edition. He is also the author of Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (1995), The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order (1999), and Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution (2002). His book State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century will be published by Cornell University Press in the spring of 2004.

Dr. Fukuyama has written widely on issues relating to questions concerning democratization and international political economy. He has, in recent years, focused on the role of culture and social capital in modern economic life, and on the social consequences of technological change.

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Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Director of the Ford Dorsey Master's in International Policy
Research Affiliate at The Europe Center
Professor by Courtesy, Department of Political Science
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Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), and a faculty member of FSI's Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL). He is also Director of Stanford's Ford Dorsey Master's in International Policy, and a professor (by courtesy) of Political Science.

Dr. Fukuyama has written widely on issues in development and international politics. His 1992 book, The End of History and the Last Man, has appeared in over twenty foreign editions. His book In the Realm of the Last Man: A Memoir will be published in fall 2026.

Francis Fukuyama received his B.A. from Cornell University in classics, and his Ph.D. from Harvard in Political Science. He was a member of the Political Science Department of the RAND Corporation, and of the Policy Planning Staff of the US Department of State. From 1996-2000 he was Omer L. and Nancy Hirst Professor of Public Policy at the School of Public Policy at George Mason University, and from 2001-2010 he was Bernard L. Schwartz Professor of International Political Economy at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. He served as a member of the President’s Council on Bioethics from 2001-2004. He is editor-in-chief of American Purpose, an online journal.

Dr. Fukuyama holds honorary doctorates from Connecticut College, Doane College, Doshisha University (Japan), Kansai University (Japan), Aarhus University (Denmark), the Pardee Rand Graduate School, and Adam Mickiewicz University (Poland). He is a non-resident fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He is a member of the Board of Trustees of the Rand Corporation, the Board of Trustees of Freedom House, and the Board of the Volcker Alliance. He is a fellow of the National Academy for Public Administration, a member of the American Political Science Association, and of the Council on Foreign Relations. He is married to Laura Holmgren and has three children.

(October 2025)

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Francis Fukuyama Bernard L. Schwartz Professor of International Political Economy Speaker Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University
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Discussions of trade in natural gas in South America's Southern Cone (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay) began as early as the 1950s. But it was not until 1972 that the first international gas pipeline in the region, linking Bolivia and Argentina, was built. It was twenty years later before significant gas pipeline projects integrating Chile and Argentina were proposed, followed by one large project connecting Bolivia and Brazil.

This paper examines three historical cases to understand why there was a 25 year lag between the first international pipeline project and the others, and to uncover key factors that determine why particular pipeline projects were built while similar proposed pipelines languished.

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Program on Energy and Sustainable Development Working Paper #29
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Chairman King, Ranking Member Moloney and distinguished members of the committee, my name is Peter Henry Blair. I am Associate Professor of Economics at the Stanford University Graduate School of Business. I am also a Faculty Research Fellow of the National Bureau of Economic Research, and my research is funded by the National Science Foundation's Early CAREER Development Program. I have wirtten extensively on the economic effects of capital account liberalization. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the implications of my research for the financial services component of the recent U.S. trade agreements with Chile and Singapore.

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U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services, in "Opening Trade in Financial Services - The Chile and Singapore Examples"
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Peter Blair Henry
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There is a reading of democracy in both these countries that is not optimistic. In a recent assessment of the nature of Brazil's democratic regime, Kurt Weyland characterized Brazil's democracy as "low quality." He bases this characterization on Brazil's gross level of inequality and the incapacity of Brazilian civil society effectively to demand that government redress inequality. He goes on to argue that it is precisely because Brazil's democracy is of "low quality" that it can survive so well.

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Executive Summary

 

The purpose of this paper is to present a general framework for electricity market design in Latin American Countries (LACs) that addresses the current problems facing electricity supply industries (ESIs) in this region. The major issue addressed is what market rules, market structures, and legal and regulatory institutions are necessary to establish a competitive wholesale market that provides the maximum possible benefits to consumers consistent with the long-term financial viability of the ESI.

The paper first presents a theoretical foundation for analyzing the electricity market design problem. A generic principal-agent model is presented and its applicability to the electricity market design problem explained. It is then applied to illustrate the incentives for firm behavior under regulation versus market environments. The impact of government versus private ownership on firm behavior in both market and regulated environments is also addressed using this model. This discussion is used to guide our choices for the important lessons for electricity market design in developed countries and LACs.  Using the experiences from ESI reform in developed countries, the paper presents five essential features of a successful wholesale electricity market. The first is the need for a sufficient number of independent suppliers for a competitive market to be possible. Merely declaring the market open to competition will not result in new entry unless no single supplier is able to dominate the market. Second is a forward market for electricity where privately-owned firms are able to sell long-term commitments to supply lectricity. This report argues that the conventional wisdom of establishing a competitive spot market first leading to a competitive forward market is an extremely expensive process in developed countries and is prohibitively expensive in developing countries. Third is the need for the active involvement of as many consumers of electricity as is economically feasible in the operation of the wholesale market.  This involvement should occur both in the long-term and short-term market. In the short-term market, there must be a number of buyers willing to alter their consumption of electricity in response to short-term price signals. Fourth is the importance of a transmission network to facilitate commerce, meaning that the transmission network must have sufficient capacity so that all suppliers face significant competition. This implies a dramatically different approach to determining the quantity and magnitude of transmission network expansions in a market regime.  The final lesson is the need to establish a credible regulatory mechanism as early as possible in the restructuring process. An important lesson from developed countries around the world is that the initial market design will have flaws. This implies the need for ongoing market monitoring to correct these flaws before they develop into disasters.

The paper then takes on the issue of the specific challenges to LAC restructuring. Rather than focus on the details of specific markets, the paper instead identifies a number of problems common to LACs and provides recommended solutions to each of these problems. A major theme of this section is a warning that short-term solutions to market design flaws can have longterm market efficiency costs. The paper identifies seven major challenges to Latin American ESI restructuring. The first is related to the problem of introducing wholesale markets in systems dominated by hydroelectric capacity. This section also deals with the related issue of using cheap hydroelectric power as a way to keep electricity prices low and the risk of electricity shortages high. The second issue is concerned with the difficulties of establishing an active forward market for electricity in LACs. The third relates to the LAC-specific challenges associated with establishing an independent and regulatory body. The fourth addresses the advisability of cost-based versus bid-based dispatch of generation units in LAC wholesale markets. The fifth is how to regulate the default provider retail electricity price in LACs. Sixth concerns the advisability of capacity payments mechanism for ensuring energy adequacy in markets where demand is expected to grow rapidly. The final issue is the role for government versus private ownership in LACs.

The report then discusses specific market design challenges in five LACs. These countries are Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Honduras, and Mexico. A number of these challenges are specific examples of the general challenges discussed earlier in the paper, whereas others are unique to the geography, natural resource base or legal environment in the country.

The report closes with a proposed market design that should serve as a baseline market design for all LACs. Deviations from this basic design could be substantial depending on initial conditions in the industry and the country, but the ideal behind proposing this design is to have a useful starting point for all LAC restructuring processes.

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Stanford University, Department of Economics
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Frank Wolak
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