Opponents of immigration reform see illegal immigrants as criminals who will disregard U.S. laws once in the country, writes Frank Fukuyama in the Wall Street Journal, but they are better described as "informal" rather than "illegal." Reform that provides hardworking illegal immigrants with a path to citizenship should be seen as an effort to move people from a dangerous informal system to one based on a rule of law.

There is a widespread perception of a strong link between immigrants and crime. It is common to hear those who oppose immigration argue that the first act illegal immigrants commit on U.S. soil is to break the law-that is, our immigration laws-and that they are ipso facto criminals who will continue to disregard U.S. laws once in the country. Those making this argument are generally steadfastly opposed to any immigration reform that will provide the 10 million to 12 million illegals already in the country any path to citizenship, on the grounds that such an "amnesty" would reward law-breaking.

The association of immigrants with crime is strengthened by the weekly barrage of news about drug and gang violence in Mexico as the government of Mexican President Felipe Calderón seeks to crack down on that country's powerful drug mafias. And long before the Mexican drug war, Americans were threatened by Colombian cartels, Salvadoran street gangs, and other criminal groups from Latin America. Moreover, it is perfectly true that the simple fact of being an illegal immigrant induces one to break further laws: One is reluctant to buy mandated auto insurance, pay taxes, or register businesses for fear of deportation.

There is indeed a huge problem of crime originating in Latin America and spilling into the United States. This is almost wholly driven by the enormous demand for drugs from the U.S. There are many things we can and should do to mitigate this problem, but it will persist as long as that demand remains high.

But the problem of gangs and drug violence should not be confounded with the behavior of the vast majority of illegal immigrants to the U.S., who by and large are seeking the same thing that every immigrant to America has wanted since the time of the Mayflower: to better their condition and that of their families. They are not criminals in the sense of people who make a living by breaking the law. They would be happy to live legally, but they come from societies in which legal rules were never quite extended to them. They are therefore better described as "informal" rather than "illegal."

Understanding this distinction requires knowing something about the social order in Latin America or, for that matter, in many other developing countries. These societies are often characterized by sharp class distinctions between a relatively small, well-educated elite and a much broader and poorer population.

The rule of law exists in places like Mexico, Colombia and El Salvador; the problem is that access to the legal system tends to be a privilege of the well-to-do. The vast majority of illegal immigrants to the U.S. come from poor rural areas, or shantytowns in large cities, where the state-in the form of courts, government agencies and the like-is often absent. Registering a small business, or seeking help from the police, or negotiating a contract requires money, time and political influence that the poor do not possess. In many Latin American countries, as much as 70%-80% of the population lives and works in the informal sector.

The lack of legal access does not make everyone in these regions criminals. It simply means that they get by as best they can through informal institutions they themselves create. The Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto has written extensively about the lack of formal property rights, not just in his own country but throughout the developing world. The poor do not hold legal title to their homes, despite having lived in them for years, because of the insuperable barriers the system throws up to formal registration. So they squat in their homes, constantly insecure and unable to use their property as collateral.

The poor are entrepreneurial and form businesses like restaurants and bus companies, but they are unlicensed and don't conform to official safety rules. They and everyone else would be much better off if they could be brought into the formal legal system, but it is a dysfunctional political system that prevents that from happening.

What illegal immigrants to the U.S. have done is to recreate the informal system within our borders. The Americans who hire them are often complicit in this system by not providing benefits or helping them avoid taxes through cash payments. The gardeners and maids and busboys who participate in this game, along with their employers, are indeed breaking the law. But they are in a very different category from the tattooed Salvatrucha gang member who lives by extortion and drug-dealing.

A comprehensive immigration reform that provides hardworking illegal immigrants with an ultimate path to citizenship should not be regarded as rewarding criminal behavior. It should be seen as an effort to move people from a dangerous informal system to one characterized by a modern rule of law.

We need, of course, to control much better the total number of people coming into the country, which can ultimately be done only through stronger enforcement of employment rules. If we can better distinguish between illegal and informal in our political discourse, then we can begin to concentrate our resources on going after those in the immigrant population who are genuinely dangerous criminals.

 

The grant will go toward supporting Rodrigo Pizarro's research on the impact of the world diffusion of conservation policy on biodiversity with special reference to Latin America.

Project Summary:

Pizarro draws from Institutional Theory to examine the accelerated adoption of conservation policies across the globe, particularly in Latin America. Although there is a remarkable convergence across countries in the ‘formal' policy of biodiversity conservation, through the establishment of protected areas, there exists a wide variety of experiences in implementation and outcomes. Pizarro seeks to understand what explains observed differences in practice by understanding the ‘structuration of the organizational field' - the exchange, interests and interplay of organizations - in selected countries. This approach can help explain why, despite having fairly similar formal policies, nations have a wide variety of implementation experiences. Further, he expect the results to provide insights to improve environmental policy implementation and thus provide guidelines for inter-governmental organizations or international non-government organizations in their support of developing countries' conservation programs.

 

By the end of the year, scholars of security studies will be able to use a new website to learn how terrorist and militant organizations evolve over time and how they collaborate with--and compete against--one another.

"Mapping Terrorist Organizations," an interdisciplinary online project headed by CISAC Senior Fellow Martha Crenshaw, will focus initially on providing detailed, annotated information on militant and terrorist groups operating in Iraq since 2003, Pakistan and Afghanistan--areas of current policy concern for the United States. Future plans involve expanding research to include groups in Latin America, Europe, the Middle East and the United States and, if time and resources permit, to include major historical groups such as the Russian revolutionary movement.

The three-year project is funded by a $500,000 grant awarded to Crenshaw last fall by the National Science Foundation. It is part of the Department of Defense's Minerva Initiative launched in 2008 to support "research related to basic social and behavioral science of strategic importance to U.S. national security policy."

"No such study exists in the literature of terrorism," Crenshaw wrote in a report on the project. "Evolutionary mapping can enhance our understanding of how terrorist groups develop and interact with each other and with the government, how strategies of violence and non-violence are related, why groups appear and disappear, and how opportunities and constraints in the environment change organizational behavior over time." Furthermore, Crenshaw noted that visual mapping of highly complex, shifting information is likely to stimulate new observations that might otherwise have been overlooked."

Student involvement

Daniel Cassman, a 2010 CISAC honors graduate in political science and computer science, is building the site, which will contain interactive timelines, family trees and detailed group profiles. Cassman's programming--developed specifically for the website--will allow scholars to better understand and analyze patterns and structures of violent and non-violent opposition groups in multiple contexts.

At a June 1 meeting of a half dozen students working on the project, Crenshaw said one of the most challenging problems facing researchers is documenting how terrorist organizations evolve over time. With no official sources to rely on, Crenshaw's team spent the last year combing through government documents and academic research, autobiographies, newspaper reports and even jihadist websites-many of which disappear as quickly as they pop up. Crenshaw acknowledges that "precision in this field is elusive" even though the project emphasizes using documented primary sources. Students working on the project include Christy Abizaid and Sadika Hameed, 2010 graduates of the International Policy Studies master's program, and undergraduates Rob Conroy, Asfandyar Mir and Ari Weiss. CISAC staff member Julia McKinnon is assisting Crenshaw as well.

"We're keenly interested in changes in the sizes of groups," Crenshaw said. "That's one of the hardest things to figure out." It also is difficult to know when a group dissolves, becomes dormant or morphs into something else, she said. To obtain as complete a profile as possible, the website will include information about failed and foiled plots, as well as successful attacks, she said.

Charles Nicas, a student in International Policy Studies and Public Policy, said he joined Crenshaw's project to learn more about militancy and terrorism in South Asia. "The U.S. presence in Afghanistan and the fact that Pakistan is a nuclear-armed country mean that the U.S. will be involved in this region...for a long time," he wrote in an email. "The complexity of the situation takes a lot of research to understand."

Nicas's area of work focuses on sectarian groups in Pakistan, mainly Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and its offshoot Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), both virulently anti-Shia groups. Nicas said SSP was founded in 1985 with state support and spawned LeJ in the mid-1990s. The groups are based in Punjab province in eastern Pakistan but had a significant presence in neighboring Afghanistan during Taliban rule. Both have become increasingly allied with militant groups in the border region, including al-Qa'ida, and are part of an umbrella group known as the Punjabi Taliban. "I've been surprised to learn how far back the roots of this problem go, which makes the challenge of effectively countering it especially daunting," Nicas said.

Terrorist organizations profiled

In addition to Afghanistan and Pakistan, Crenshaw's website will feature profiles of the following groups:

• 1920s Revolution Brigades
• Mujahideen Army
• Islamic Army in Iraq
• Ansar al-Islam
• Al-Qa'ida in Iraq

Group profiles include the following attributes:

• The group's name, including pseudonyms and name changes
• A history with a timeline, including whether the group is active, dormant or disbanded
• The group's goals/ideology
• Key leaders
• Group size (by date)
• Resources in the form of money and weapons
• Outside intervention and influence
• Dates of first and last known attacks
• Targets
• Area of Operations
• Tactics
• Political activities (by date)
• Key operational experiences (by date)
• Known splinter groups (by date)
• Relationship to other groups (by date)
• Relationship with surrounding population/popular support
• Defining characteristics/Major events

The Obama administration's decision to preview its National Security Strategy at West Point highlighted its coverage of security crises from Afghanistan to North Korea. But back-to-back events at Brookings with Hillary Clinton and Samantha Power today showed that the core of the strategy is a deeper argument about the central challenge confronting America -- the increased impact on our economy and security of a new global reality.

For two decades, the United States could take economic and security supremacy for granted. Three things have changed.

First, the global economic boom. Yes, boom -- remember? Before the crash, there were two decades of uninterrupted growth in the global economy, global trade, and global financial activity. The U.S. profited, but so too did China, India and Brazil, which grew into major economic players; so did several others, like Mexico, Indonesia and Turkey, which have emerged as the new middle powers.

Second, the Iraq war. Love or loath U.S. policy in Iraq, it launched us into sustained expenditure of financial and military resources alongside another draining war in Afghanistan. In the minds of the Vulcans, decisive U.S. victory in Iraq was to assert global order by force of -- well, force. The strategy backfired, and rising states from Ankara to Brasilia found few, if any, costs to opposing U.S. strategy in the Middle East -- and domestic political points to be won. The Obama administration is feeling the consequences in its Iran policy.

Third, the global financial crisis. The bust, when it came, reaffirmed the centrality of the U.S. in the short term. But it also showcased the growing weight of the emerging economies, which now lead the global recovery. Before Lehman Brothers collapsed, other big players may have disliked our Middle East policy, but they banked -- figuratively and literally -- on our stewardship of the global financial system. Since then, doubts have crept in, and a new assertiveness to match.

The net result is rising global influence and solidifying regional power for China, India, and Brazil -- and less room for maneuver for the US.

The administration will be criticized in predictable terms from predictable quarters for acknowledging any of this, even in tacit terms: for 'giving ground' to the emerging powers, for 'ceding' American supremacy, for forgetting to carry a big stick while talking softly. But that dog won't hunt. The Bush administration had begun to adapt to these changed realities towards the end of its tenure, and the Obama administration deserves credit for putting the new global realities front and center in its assessment of U.S. national strategy. The core concepts of revitalizing international order, pressing others to take up their responsibilities and working within, not against, multilateral arrangements are the right ones.

The tougher question is, will it work? Skeptics will point to Chinese heel-dragging and Brazilian gallivanting on Iran to say no. Optimists will point to Chinese cooperation on the financial crisis, and everybody's cooperation on Somali piracy and counter-terrorism, to say yes.

The reality is, we don't know. There's a struggle in Beijing between betting on cooperation with the US, and those who seek sharper competition. A pro-U.S. strategy in India has the high ground for now, but divisions remain. The better angels in Brazil's foreign ministry can't quite hold back Lula's dalliance with global populism -- an October election there may tilt the balance.

But we know this much: if the U.S. doesn't try, no one will succeed. None of the emerging powers can underwrite stability, and none that are serious want the job. The emerging powers may not play ball, and if so, we'll be in a lose-lose global game. But only U.S. strategy can pull us into win-win, and the Administration is right to try. Making this point to the American people won't be popular; but reality is reality, and denial does not a strategy make.