In this commentary in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, CISAC's Siegfried Hecker and Peter Davis argue that the United States should continue cooperating with the Russians on nuclear security despite worsening ties over Moscow's actions in Ukraine. They argue it is in the best interest of both countires to prevent the proliferation of nulcear weapons and global nuclear terrorism.

On April 30, May 1, and May 2, 2014, Adam Tooze, Barton M. Briggs Professor of History at Yale University, delivered in three parts "The Europe Center Lectureship on Europe and the World", the first of an annual series.

With the centenary of the outbreak of the First World War as his backdrop, Tooze spoke about the history of the transformation of the global power structure that followed from Germany’s decision to provoke America’s declaration of war in 1917. He advanced a powerful explanation for why the First World War rearranged political and economic structures across Eurasia and the British Empire, sowed the seeds of revolution in Russia and China, and laid the foundations of a new global order that began to revolve around the United States.

The three lectures focused successively on diplomatic, economic, and social aspects of the troubled interwar history of Europe and its relationship with the wider world. Over the course of the lectures, he presented an argument for why the fate of effectively the whole of civilization changed in 1917, and why the First World War’s legacy continues to shape our world even today.

Tooze also participated in a lunchtime question-and-answer roundtable with graduate students from the History department.

The First Lecture

Tooze motivated his first lecture, entitled, “Making Peace in Europe 1917-1919: Brest-Litovsk and Versailles,” by the recent political developments in Ukraine, Crimea, and in Eastern Europe. In light of these political frictions, Tooze posed the question: Is a comprehensive peace for Europe, both East and West, possible? To properly answer this question, Tooze argued that we must look back to the first moment in which that question was posed, during and after World War I.

He focused on the influence of Russian power and powerlessness in shaping both the abortive effort to make peace in the East between Imperial Germany and Soviet Russia at Brest Litovsk—the first treaty to recognize the existence of an independent Ukraine—and the efforts to make peace in the West at Versailles and after.

In the Brest treaty, Russia lost territories inhabited by 55 million people, one third of its agricultural land, more than half of its industrial undertakings, and 90 percent of its coal mines. Whereas conventional narratives view these developments either as an expression of German ultra imperialism or as the ultimate demonstration of Lenin’s revolutionary realism, Tooze drew attention to Brest as the first international venue to recognize the independence of Ukraine in the modern era.

“The map that was created at Brest, the existence side by side within separate dispensations of a fragile and independent Ukraine alongside a battered, reduced and resentful Russia, is strikingly reminiscent of that which we have taken for granted since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.”

Tooze argued that Brest is the only historical precedent for the structure that the international community is seeking to defend today in Ukraine. In turn, “the first good peace gone bad was not Versailles, but Brest. Furthermore, it is not just that Versailles echoes Brest, but Brest actually directly conditioned the more familiar story of Versailles. And after acts one and two, after Brest and Versailles, there was a third act in which between 1919 and 1923 the search for a truly comprehensive peace in Europe, a peace that would embrace eastern as well as western Europe, unleashed a violent see-sawing movement that did not finally come to rest until Europe relapsed into exhausted division in 1924.”

Tooze drew insights from the period between 1917 and 1923 to draw conclusions about the stability of the world order that has largely been taken for granted since 1991.

“What the current crisis makes clear is that if we want to disarm Russian nationalism, we need to find some way of addressing the trauma of 1991, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dismembering of its component parts. If we do not want to entrench a new cold war, we need to make a serious effort to reconcile Moscow to the new order that must otherwise seem like a Brest Litovsk set in stone.”

The Second Lecture

In his second lecture, “Hegemony: Europe, America and the problem of financial reconstruction 1916-1933,” Tooze reflected on the rearrangements in the transatlantic power structure in the aftermath of World War I. Having established itself in the 19^th century as the financial center of the world, Europe’s sudden impoverishment by World War I came as a dramatic shock. The ensuing transatlantic crises of the 1920s and early 1930s were not only the most severe, but also the most consequential in the history of Europe and the wider world.

Tooze began by discussing the vast efforts that were made to restore European economies to prewar normality—and in particular, to restore gold and gold-backed currency as the basis of the international financial system—in the immediate aftermath of 1919.

Yet, these efforts culminated not in prosperity but in unprecedented deflation, unemployment and trading disruptions: “The result, by 1933 was a truly catastrophic disintegration, which marks a caesura in the history of capitalism and in world politics. The demons of imperialism, racism and nationalism were unleashed.”

To this day, Tooze pointed out, there is substantial disagreement amongst both social scientists and historians as to the causes of these economic developments. Conventional interpretations view the interwar period either as an era of trans-historic hegemonic succession or as time when global economic cooperation disintegrated, yet Tooze argued that neither account gives adequate importance to the actual impact of World War I. According to Tooze, the war abruptly changed the nature of the international cooperation by laying the foundations of a new world system that centered on the public debt of the major entente allies: Britain, France, Russia, and the United States.

“Within that new system, from 1918 a new game of politicized global finance was played out, a power game in which the United States emerged from November 1916 as the central actor…Once we acknowledge this shift in the functioning of the international financial system, then the politics of that crucial moment in 1931 appear rather different.”

Tooze argued that the political issue of the settlement of war debts played a central role in shaping the groundwork for each nation’s return to the gold standard between 1924 and 1930. Two complementary power plays emerged and began to define what became a “self-equilibrating” system: the strategy of persistent surplus and the strategy of persistent deficit.

According to Tooze, the absence of American influence was crucial in determining Europe’s economic fate during this period. “What was catastrophic was America’s failure to commit to any of its former partners in the war, in leading a joint effort to create a new order.”

These developments hold major lessons for our understanding of world politics today, because many of the current imbalances in the global economy stem from national strategies that resonate strongly with the politics of the interwar era.

The Third Lecture

In his third and final lecture, “Unsettled lands: the interwar crisis of agrarian Europe,” Tooze laid out an ambitious agenda for a new agrarian history of the interwar crisis by drawing on “the strange entangled” micro history of an agrarian cooperative in Wuerttemberg.

Lost in scholars’ preoccupation with the study of the industrial revolution, Tooze reminded us, is the stark fact that until the middle of the twentieth century Europe, like the rest of the world, was majority agrarian. Europe’s agrarian population peaked as late as in the 1930s at roughly 250 million people. Roughly 110 million lived in the Soviet Union while the remainder inhabited the rest of Europe, pursuing occupations as rural laborers, sharecroppers, long-term tenants and peasant proprietors.

The interwar era heralded major shifts and dislocations in the organization of agrarian life in Europe. During this period, “more than in any other sector millions of small scale producers were caught up in the turmoil of early globalization.” Opportunities for migration and movement to industrial work were limited during the interwar period, producing overcrowding and severe distress. Additionally, rural struggles over the distribution of land—in Russia, Italy, Spain, and much of Central and Eastern Europe in the immediate aftermath of World War I—routinely spilled over into violent confrontation.

And yet, Tooze observed, the most influential accounts of the interwar crisis, framed by the industrial and urban world of the later twentieth-century Europe, have tended to ignore these agrarian developments, focusing instead on workers, businessmen, politicians and soldiers.

An alternate approach that studies the ebbs and flows of agrarian life in Europe during the interwar period promises to shed new light on the historical political economy of the period. Tooze’s proposal was to eschew considerations of the “macrostructures of modern history” but to instead delve into a micro history of “the more intimate networks through which the interwar crisis was understood and lived.” His goal was “to reconstruct the experience of structural change, to reconstruct how Europeans came to terms with this trajectory, how they sought to resist, to deflect to shape or to accommodate themselves to it.”

Tooze’s micro history pertained to Haeusern, a tiny Wuerttemberg hamlet containing nine homesteads that was situated 2 kilometers away from the village of Ummendorf, on the rail-line connecting the medieval market town of Biberach to Stuttgart.

“There were thousands of cooperatives across Europe, for all sorts of things, but amongst specialists this unlikely place came to stand in agronomical debates at the mid-century for a special kind of agrarian modernity…It was in fact to become an improbable model for global development policy.”

By delving into the micro history of Haeusern—which is to become the foundation for his latest research agenda— Tooze attempted to illustrate how brining the peasantry “back in” has the potential not only to throw new light on Europe's great epoch of crisis, but to open that history, beyond the “Bloodlands” to the wider world.

Video recordings of these lectures can be found on The Europe Center Lectureship on Europe and the World webpage.

Tooze is the author of The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy (2006) and Statistics and the German State 1900-1945: The Making of Modern Economic Knowledge (2001), among numerous other scholarly articles on modern European history. Tooze’s latest book, The Deluge: The Great War and the Remaking of Global Order 1916-1931, will be released in Summer 2014 in the United Kingdom and in Fall 2014 in the United States.

Europe is benefiting from tough, painful economic reforms in the wake of the 2008 downturn, according to the leader of the European Union.

"Europe had to evolve dramatically because reality forced it to," said José Manuel Barroso, president of the European Commission, in a May 1 talk on campus. "This change came about with the economic and financial crisis initiated with the collapse of the Lehman Brothers back in 2008, and that has caused me many sleepless nights."

The title of Barroso's presentation was "Global Europe, from the Atlantic to the Pacific." The event was co-sponsored by Stanford's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, The Europe Center and the Center for Russia, East European and Eurasian Studies. The European Commission is the executive body of the European Union.

Barroso acknowledged that the financial meltdown hit Europe especially hard, given the "serious flaws" in the way some countries were running their economies, living beyond their means and lacking the competitiveness required in a globalized world.

The crisis revealed, he added, the "economic interdependence inside Europe," and the fact that the 28-member union did not have the capability to handle large-scale financial emergencies or prevent unsound policies on the part of member nations like Greece.

"So we had to adapt and reform as we have done many times in the European Union," Barroso said.

Economic reforms, regulations

And so, the European Union adopted a more extensive system of economic and budgetary governance to ensure member states stick to their financial commitments and become more competitive. Today, each country sends their national budget to the EU headquarters in Brussels before approving it at the national level, he said.

Barroso added that the EU created a "European stability mechanism," or safety net, worth about $1 trillion to help member states adopt key reforms and assist them in times of crisis. There are also more detailed banking regulations that give the EU more authority over national banks.

"Now the control is exercised at European level through the European Central Bank and there are common rules for banks so that we avoid having to use taxpayers' money to rescue them," he said.

Barroso dismissed criticism that the EU moves too slowly, saying that is inevitable in a system that depends on the will of national governments and citizens to work together rather than coercion.

Still, high unemployment persists in Europe, especially among the young, he said. But he is hopeful about Europe's prospects in the long run.

He added, "We have now returned to growth after some painful but necessary reforms."

Upheaval in Ukraine

With the situation in Ukraine worsening by the day, Barroso said that Europe "stands ready" to support that country in becoming a democratic, prosperous and independent country. He described the Ukrainian crisis as the "biggest threat to Europe's stability and security since the fall of the Berlin Wall."

He said the people of Ukraine expressed a "clear wish to take their future into their own hands and come closer to the European Union" through an agreement that would have given them political association and economic integration.

"Instead of accepting the sovereign choices of Ukraine, Russia decided to interfere, to destabilize and to occupy part of the territory of a neighboring country in a gesture that we hoped was long buried in history books," said Barroso.

He noted, "Europe cannot accept nor condone this type of behavior." Russia's aggression will carry political, diplomatic and economic costs, he said, adding that the issue looms larger than Europe, the United States or even the G7.

"It should concern the rest of the world as well, as it is a direct threat to international law and to international peace," he said.

Barroso served as the prime minister of Portugal from 2002 to 2004. He has been the president of the European Commission for the past 10 years.

Clifton B. Parker is a writer for the Stanford News Service. 

By Clifton B. Parker

Europe is benefiting from tough, painful economic reforms in the wake of the 2008 downturn, according to the leader of the European Union.

"Europe had to evolve dramatically because reality forced it to," said José Manuel Barroso, president of the European Commission, in a May 1 talk on campus. "This change came about with the economic and financial crisis initiated with the collapse of the Lehman Brothers back in 2008, and that has caused me many sleepless nights."

The title of Barroso's presentation was "Global Europe, from the Atlantic to the Pacific." The event was co-sponsored by Stanford's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, the Europe Center and the Center for Russia, East European and Eurasian Studies. The European Commission is the executive body of the European Union.

Barroso acknowledged that the financial meltdown hit Europe especially hard, given the "serious flaws" in the way some countries were running their economies, living beyond their means and lacking the competitiveness required in a globalized world.

The crisis revealed, he added, the "economic interdependence inside Europe," and the fact that the 28-member union did not have the capability to handle large-scale financial emergencies or prevent unsound policies on the part of member nations like Greece.

"So we had to adapt and reform as we have done many times in the European Union," Barroso said.

Economic reforms, regulations

And so, the European Union adopted a more extensive system of economic and budgetary governance to ensure member states stick to their financial commitments and become more competitive. Today, each country sends their national budget to the EU headquarters in Brussels before approving it at the national level, he said.

Barroso added that the EU created a "European stability mechanism," or safety net, worth about $1 trillion to help member states adopt key reforms and assist them in times of crisis. There are also more detailed banking regulations that give the EU more authority over national banks.

"Now the control is exercised at European level through the European Central Bank and there are common rules for banks so that we avoid having to use taxpayers' money to rescue them," he said.

Barroso dismissed criticism that the EU moves too slowly, saying that is inevitable in a system that depends on the will of national governments and citizens to work together rather than coercion.

Still, high unemployment persists in Europe, especially among the young, he said. But he is hopeful about Europe's prospects in the long run.

He added, "We have now returned to growth after some painful but necessary reforms."

Upheaval in Ukraine

With the situation in Ukraine worsening by the day, Barroso said that Europe "stands ready" to support that country in becoming a democratic, prosperous and independent country. He described the Ukrainian crisis as the "biggest threat to Europe's stability and security since the fall of the Berlin Wall."

He said the people of Ukraine expressed a "clear wish to take their future into their own hands and come closer to the European Union" through an agreement that would have given them political association and economic integration.

"Instead of accepting the sovereign choices of Ukraine, Russia decided to interfere, to destabilize and to occupy part of the territory of a neighboring country in a gesture that we hoped was long buried in history books," said Barroso.

He noted, "Europe cannot accept nor condone this type of behavior." Russia's aggression will carry political, diplomatic and economic costs, he said, adding that the issue looms larger than Europe, the United States or even the G7.

"It should concern the rest of the world as well, as it is a direct threat to international law and to international peace," he said.

Barroso served as the prime minister of Portugal from 2002 to 2004. He has been the president of the European Commission for the past 10 years.

CISAC Senior Fellow Siegfried Hecker and a delegation of American scientists traveled to Moscow last week to revitalize nuclear cooperation with Russia, despite diplomatic tensions between the United States and Russia over the crisis in Ukraine.

The delegation that traveled to Russia last week included former U.S. laboratory scientists Paul White, James Toevs, and K. David Nokes, as well as CISAC research assistants Peter Davis and Alla Kassianova and CISAC fellow Jason Reinhardt.

The team traveled to Russia to host a workshop and make the case that continued scientific cooperation in reducing nuclear risks – particularly to prevent nuclear proliferation and terrorism – should remain a top priority for both countries, even as U.S.-Russia relations continue to deteriorate.

The White House has implemented increasingly stricter sanctions against top Russian officials and has restricted official travel and scientific cooperation. Washington accuses Moscow of trying to destabilize the new government in Ukraine by backing pro-Russian separatists in the former Soviet state.

Hecker chaired a Track II workshop at the Moscow Engineering and Physics Institute (MEPhI) on April 24 on “Cooperation on Countering Nuclear Terrorism and Nonproliferation.” Presenters from Russian institutes and U.S. laboratories included Reinhardt, a national security systems analyst at Sandia National Laboratories who is pursuing a PhD at Stanford in Management Science & Engineering. He argued for expanded cooperation to counter nuclear terrorism and reduce the risk of global proliferation.

“It is paramount that American and Russian scientists continue to work together to deal with today’s nuclear risks despite the tension between our two nations,” says Hecker, a Stanford professor of management science and engineering. The former head of the Los Alamos National Laboratory made his first trip to the Russian nuclear complex in early 1992, shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union to promote joint efforts to mitigate the threats posed by the huge Russian nuclear complex during a time of political and economic turmoil.

The threats have changed during the past 22 years, but have not gone away, Hecker says. Yet cooperation between Russian and American nuclear scientists has declined significantly during the past decade because Russia has recovered economically and has grown progressively more protective against external intervention. Now, the crisis in the Ukraine threatens to stop cooperation completely.

More than 200 students from MEPhI’s nuclear science and nonproliferation programs participated in the workshop, alongside prominent Russian scientists.

“The large audience indicates how seriously the nuclear specialists from both sides take the need to protect the world from the spread of nuclear weapons and materials to other states and non-state actors,” says Hecker, whose workshop grew from his Nuclear Risk Reduction Project (NRR), which is funded by the Carnegie Corporation and the MacArthur Foundation.

Hecker is also working with his former Russian counterparts at the Russian nuclear weapons laboratories on a book about the history of U.S.-Russia national laboratory cooperation, which is due out later this year. That book will tell the story of how the scientists worked together during difficult times to make the world a safer place.

Russian and American scientists discuss nuclear collaboration as students from the Moscow Engineering and Physics Institute look on. Photo Credit: Peter Davis

We asked Hecker to answer several questions related to his trip to Moscow.

Why did you still travel to Moscow given the recent events in Ukraine?

I had to discuss the book with my Russian collaborators in order to meet our fall deadline for publication. We also wanted to reinforce the belief of scientists on both sides that we must continue to cooperate even, or perhaps especially, when our governments are at odds. That is why we organized the educational conference on nuclear cooperation.

Did the U.S. government try to stop you?

Since I went as a Stanford University professor, I did not need official approval. Key individuals in the government knew that I was going and did not try to stop me. However, colleagues from the Department of Energy’s nuclear laboratories were prohibited from attending a related conference and Washington canceled several official bilateral meetings and visits.

Were the Russians allowed to meet with your delegation?

Yes, we met with the key individuals on the Russian side and MEPhI organized a great conference. We did have to switch the venue of one of our side meetings from one of the Russian nuclear weapons laboratories to neutral ground. I think the Russian government did not want these meetings to look official after the U.S. government has canceled most interactions for the foreseeable future.

How do your Russian collaborators view the recent events in Ukraine?

Without exception, they viewed it with alarm and laid the blame squarely on the “fascists” who took over Kiev’s government illegally. They could not understand how the Americans could support what they see as an illegitimate regime. We got quite a lesson on the intertwined history of Russia and the Ukraine. They believe the Americans simply don’t understand the deep relations and commitment all Russians have for Ukraine. When we tried to give a Western point of view, some Russian colleagues told us that we have been brainwashed by Washington and the media.

How does the downturn in relations affect your views on the need for cooperation?

Despite their views on Ukraine, our Russian colleagues all said we must continue to work the nuclear issues together. So while we couldn’t agree on Ukraine, we agreed for the need to keep up our work – which for me has now spanned 49 visits to Russia during the past 22 years. 

What role has CISAC’s collaboration with the Moscow Engineering and Physics Institute (MEPhI) played in your work on nuclear cooperation?

MEPhI is a great counterpart for CISAC and a number of other American universities. It educates about one-third of the scientists and engineers that make up the Russian nuclear complex. It is with the next generation that we have the best chance of reducing the global nuclear risks that we face now and in the future.

President Barack Obama’s trip to four Asian nations – Japan, South Korea, Malaysia and the Philippines – set out to address an ambitious agenda, including trade negotiations, territorial disputes, and the threat of North Korea. Scholars at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center in the Freeman Spogli Institute provided commentary to local and international media about the state tour.

Ambassador Michael Armacost, a distinguished fellow at Shorenstein APARC, evaluated the goals of the trip, saying it aimed to deliver a message of reassurance to East Asia that the U.S. rebalance is intact. Armacost highlighted the efforts to negotiate a 12-nation trade pact, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) as the centerpiece of the Obama trip to Asia. He was interviewed by Weekly Toyo Keizi, a Japanese political economy magazine. An English version of the Q&A is available on Dispatch Japan.

Many foreign policy issues shadowed the outset of President Obama’s Asia trip, the crisis in Ukraine and Syria, among others. Daniel Sneider, associate director of research at Shorenstein APARC, said in Slate that Asian nations notice where the United States focuses its time. Obama’s commitment to the region may have come across as distracted given the breadth of his current foreign policy agenda.

Sneider also spoke with LinkAsia on Obama’s stop in Tokyo. President Obama met with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe; the two leaders addressed issues surrounding territorial disputes and attempted to reach an agreement on outside market access issues in the TPP negotiations.

Donald Emmerson, director of Shorenstein APARC’s Southeast Asia Forum, offered an assessment of America’s ‘pivot to Asia’ and on the significance of the Malaysia and Philippines visits. He said the trip most notably reinforced America’s efforts to upgrade security commitments and promote freer trade negotiation in that region. The Q&A was carried by the Stanford News Service.

Emmerson spoke with McClatchyDC on two occasions about the Philippines leg of the tour. He commented on Obama’s statement reaffirming the United States’ security commitment to Japan, which recognized Japan’s administrative control over the Senkaku Islands. Emmerson suggested the greater context of claims in the South China Sea must be considered, including Manila’s. He also said maintenance of the security alliance is a positive step, but trade is a an essential part of the the pivot's sustainablility.

When President Barack Obama this week began a high-profile visit to Asia, it called into question how effective the "Asian pivot" in America's foreign policy has been. A few years ago, Obama announced that a rebalancing of U.S. interests toward Asia would be a central tenet of his legacy. Now he is visiting Japan, South Korea, Malaysia and the Philippines to reassert the message that America is truly focused on Asia – despite finding itself repeatedly pulled away by crises in Ukraine and the Middle East, and political battles in Washington, D.C.

Stanford political scientist Donald K. Emmerson, an expert on Asia, China-Southeast Asia relations, sovereignty disputes and the American "rebalance" toward Asia, sat down with the Stanford News Service to discuss Obama's trip. Emmerson is a senior fellow emeritus at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.

President Obama started his Asian pivot a few years ago. Have problems in Ukraine, Syria, Iran and at home detracted from this new approach?

The pivot as practiced continues unabated. The pivot as perceived has suffered from its displacement on various attention spans by superseding events and concerns, both foreign and domestic. President Obama's current trip to Asia is itself a reflection of these distractions. Originally planned for October, it was postponed by extreme political discord in Washington. But the chief elements of the pivot remain in place and in progress. They are most notably the upgrading of American security commitments and the effort to negotiate freer trade.

Why does this rebalancing in U.S. foreign policy make sense – or not?

The pivot certainly serves U.S. interests. Americans cannot afford to deny themselves, or be denied by others, the opportunities for trade and investment that Asia's most dynamic economies will continue to generate. The U.S. also needs to work with China and its neighbors to help ensure that China's rise serves the wider security interests of Americans, Chinese, Asians and the world, however dissonant the day-to-day advocacy of those interests may be. Ironically, by obliterating Obama's proposed reset of U.S.-Russia relations, Vladimir Putin has become an unintentional friend of the rebalance toward Asia. His aggression in Crimea and eastern Ukraine has made all the more urgent the need for Washington to pursue mutually beneficial relations with Beijing and the rest of Asia that could moderate China's willingness and ability to force its ownfaits accomplis in the East and South China Seas.

Do Chinese leaders view Obama's Asian pivot as a de facto containment approach to a rising China?

China's leaders do question U.S. intentions. But one ought not ignore the dozens and dozens of venues and ways in which the two countries' governments continue to cooperate on multiple fronts. In domestic terms it is politically convenient for Chinese hardliners to disparage American motives. As with the pivot itself, however, perception and practice are not the same thing.

Are Asian countries more rattled than ever by China's behavior in places like the South and East China Seas?

Concerned, yes; rattled, no. There are six or seven different claimants to contested land features and/or sea space in the South China Sea, not to mention the territorial tensions that also bedevil interstate relations in Northeast Asia. East Asian leaders are not lined up in a united front against Beijing. They are themselves divided. The more assertive China becomes, the more pushback it can expect. But most of the states in Southeast Asia do not want to ally with the U.S. against China, or with China against the U.S.

The U.S. and the Philippines are poised to sign a treaty that will expand America's military presence in the island country. What's the significance of the treaty?

Articles 4 and 5 of the treaty commit Washington and Manila to "act to meet the common dangers" implied by "an armed attack in the Pacific Area" on the "metropolitan territory" of either party, or on the "island territories under its jurisdiction," or on "its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific," and to do so "in accordance with its constitutional processes." But these provisions are hardly self-implementing; they require interpretation. Even if China were to forcibly evict the Philippine marines who now occupy Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea, the treaty would not automatically trigger an American military response. Applied to that scenario, the treaty would not instantly entrap the U.S. in a war with China. But the treaty would require some action or statement on the part of Washington. In Manila, Obama will try to reassure his Philippine host in this regard without enraging its Chinese neighbor.

Obama will be the first U.S. president in five decades to visit Malaysia. What does that visit mean for that country?

Of the four countries that Obama is visiting, it is in Malaysia that the pivot's third face after security and economy – namely democracy – will be most visible. Obama will be careful not to appear to enter into the domestic political turbulence Malaysia is experiencing, but his visits with civil society actors and university students in Kuala Lumpur will send the nonpartisan message that America remains committed to democratic values for itself and for Asians as well.

Clifton Parker is a writer for the Stanford News Service.