As Russian troops gather on Ukraine’s borders, the outstanding question is whether Russian President Putin is prepared to bear the domestic and international costs of a full-scale invasion or if he’ll stop at pressuring NATO and the West for political concessions. Steven Pifer explains why a military incursion in 2022 will not be as easy for Russia as annexing Crimea in 2014, and where there are avenues for dialogue to defuse the brewing confrontation.

Read the rest at Brookings

Approximately 100,000 Russian troops housed in rows upon rows of barracks have amassed near the Russia-Ukraine border. Moscow claims they are there to conduct routine military exercises. And they have. Amidst political crisis in Belarus this fall, for example, up to 200,000 Russian and Belarusian forces participated in the Zapad 2021 exercise series.

Yet many observers worry these exercises are largely a pretense, and the soldiers’ stay may be more permanent. US military intelligence reported Russia may be preparing as many as 175,000 troops for offensive operations into Ukrainian territory.

Read the rest at Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

Click the link for a transcript of "Why Right Matters to Democracy Here and Abroad."

Upholding Democracy At Home
 

It's really kind of quizzical how an immigrant refugee kid from Kyiv ends up in the White House working on Russia and Ukraine policy. And that’s what my book is really about; it talks about some of the key moments from my background and my family's background that I drew on in making those fateful decisions that I did on January 25, and how they carried me through my congressional testimony.

I made that report without any hesitation, because I thought there was an opportunity to right the course of events. I didn't really think that these things were going to enter the public view. I just did what I thought was right, and then when I was called to testify about making these reports, I followed through. Even there, it was not a hard decision about what the right thing to do was. I was not going to put my interests ahead of U.S. interests.

Supporting Democracy Abroad
 

When we see everything that’s happening in the world right now, I can understand why people look at someplace like Ukraine and think, “Why should we care about what happens there?”

But Ukraine makes a really compelling normative case for where Russia could end up, which I think everyone would agree is important. I think about the example of West Germany making East Germany unviable in the Cold War. Both countries started at the same place: decimated. But West Germany, being democratic and prosperous and enjoying basic human rights, thriving economy, made East Germany unviable and demonstrated Germany as a failure.

In much the same way, Ukraine could do the same thing for Russia. As we both know, Putin believes that Ukraine and Russia are the same people separated by an artificial boundary; the share roots and have a shared identity. Now, that's a vast oversimplification. That's not entirely true. But that's what he believes. And that's what he's convinced this population of. So, how would he explain 20 years from now, or in 2036, when he's done with his latest term in office, and there's somebody else that's looking to step in: How can another authoritarian leader step in and say, “We’re going to continue the course with managed democracy,” when Ukraine is prosperous?

It makes a really compelling case for a path that Russia could take on a path that would take it towards democracy. That would be a difficult road, but it's a viable path, because Ukraine is the example. And that's important not just because of our strategic aspirations for Russia, but also because it has an impact on China also. You've heard me talk about this notion that all of Russia's national security threats are from a belligerent rising, coercive China; they're not from the West.

The West is held out as a boogeyman at the moment, because it's useful to the regime. It's important to the regime to fight against the West as the aggressor and to couch the West as a failure and decadent for regime stability purposes. But from a national security perspective, I think any reasonable assessment would indicate that those threats are really not emanating from the West, but from the East. So supporting Ukraine also empowers our competition with China. That's why I think that the Biden administration should be unconstrained in its support of Ukraine.

More from Alexander Vindman
 

Watch the book talk FSI hosted with Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Vindman (Ret.) for Here, Right Matters.

Russia’s massing of military power near Ukraine was certain to dominate the December 7 video conference between Presidents Biden and Putin. A Russian assault would turn into a bloody affair (for Russians and Ukrainians alike) and plunge relations between Russia and the West deeper into crisis. Is Putin prepared to take that step?  Perhaps even he has not yet decided.

By all appearances, Biden did what he had to do. He spelled out for Putin the costs that would ensue if Russia attacked. These include more painful Western economic sanctions, more military assistance for Ukraine, and a bolstering of NATO’s military presence in the Baltic states and Poland. Moreover, he strengthened his hand by consulting the day before with the leaders of Britain, Germany, France and Italy.  That meant he could talk to Putin on the basis of a consolidated Western position.

Biden also described a way out of the crisis: de-escalation and dialogue, or dialogues, to address the Russia-Ukraine conflict in Donbas and broader European security questions. Neither of those discussions will prove easy. For example, NATO will not, and should not, accede to the Kremlin’s demand that the alliance renounce its "open door" policy on enlargement. But diplomacy is all about finding ways to defuse such difficult problems.

Did Biden succeed? That remains to be seen. One thing to watch is whether Moscow’s recent over-the-top rhetoric moderates. Of course, the more important signal would come from the movement of Russian troops away from Ukraine and back to their regular garrisons.

Read more views on what the Biden-Putin video call means for the regional security situation on Atlantic Council.

All eyes are on Ukraine (including ours). Steven Pifer, a William J. Perry Research Fellow at CISAC and former ambassador to Ukraine, joins co-host Tom Collina to discuss Putin’s motivations for Ukraine and more. 

Ploughshares Fund · Will Russia Invade Ukraine?

As if living in space weren’t difficult enough. The Russian military recently tested a direct-ascent antisatellite, or ASAT, missile on an old Soviet orbital, Cosmos 1408.

Read the rest at the Chicago Tribune*

*This article is behind a paywall.

Europe currently faces several crises exploited or instigated by Russia.  Speculation runs rampant regarding what Vladimir Putin hopes to achieve.  He should take care not to overplay his hand.

One crisis came to a head over the past two months as the cost of natural gas in Europe skyrocketed.  While down from peaks in October, the price now hovers at about four times what it was at the beginning of the year.  Russia did not cause this crisis—its roots lie in factors such as abnormally high energy demand and reduced gas production in Europe—but Moscow certainly has exploited the situation.

The Kremlin maintains that gas sales to Europe are “a purely commercial issue.”  One would expect, however, that Russia’s Gazprom would eagerly increase gas exports, attracted by the dramatically increased prices.  But gas flows remain significantly below what they could be.  In October, Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak suggested that gas flows could increase if the Nord Stream 2 pipeline that runs under the Baltic Sea from Russia to Germany began operation.  That overlooks the fact that Russia already has plenty of pipeline capacity to move additional gas to Europe … if it wanted to do so.

Belarusian strongman Alexander Lukashenko manufactured the second crisis, playing out along the border with Poland.  Belarus has attempted to force migrants and economic refugees from the Middle East into Poland.  Lukashenko is unhappy that the European Union does not recognize him as president and has applied sanctions as Minsk cracked down on domestic opposition, including forcing down a civilian airliner to arrest one of the passengers in May.

This despicable weaponization of migrants is likely Lukashenko’s brainchild.  Moscow has nevertheless aligned itself with Minsk.  When Poland reinforced its border police with regular army soldiers, the Russian air force flew nuclear-capable bombers over Belarus in response.

The third crisis stems directly from Moscow having positioned military forces near Ukraine’s borders, raising questions about a possible Russian assault.  The Russian military carried out a similar build-up last spring, though nothing came of it.  However, relations between Kyiv and Moscow have only worsened.  In July, Putin published a 6,000-word essay that all but denied Ukraine’s right to exist as an independent state.  In October, former President Dmitry Medvedev asserted that it was “pointless” to negotiate with Kyiv.

While Moscow denies ill intent, in recent days Secretary of State Antony Blinken and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg have publicly cautioned Russia about using force against Ukraine.  French President Emmanuel Macron stated that France was ready “to defend the territorial integrity of Ukraine,” and Britain prepared to send 600 troops to the country.

This all plays out as the Kremlin tightens the repressive screws at home.  The Russian Prosecutor General’s Office moved last week to close down the Memorial Human Rights Center.  The best-known human rights entity in Russia, it was established and allowed to operate in Soviet times.

These crises all put pressure on Europe and the West, as they no doubt were intended to.  But Putin and the Kremlin in each case run the real risk of miscalculating and overplaying their hand.

When an earlier surge of migrants swept into Europe beginning in 2015, EU member states divided over what to do.  Germany heroically accepted one million, while Poland resettled virtually none, and its ruling party’s leader blamed Berlin for the influx.  This time, EU members are of a single mind.  The German government offered to send German border guards and place them under Polish command to manage the situation on the border with Belarus.  The European Union has begun preparing a list of new sanctions to apply against Minsk.  The greater their impact, the more that Lukashenko will turn to Moscow for financial assistance—something that should hold little appeal for Putin.

Russia over the past 30 years has a history of using the energy weapon against post-Soviet states, such as Ukraine and Georgia, and others in what was once termed “eastern Europe.”  Moscow sought, however, to maintain a reputation as a reliable energy supplier to countries such as Germany, Austria, Italy and the Netherlands.  The current situation puts that reputation in doubt, and European capitals may have begun to realize the vulnerability created by dependence on Russian energy.  In Germany, where the eco-friendly Greens party will enter the new government, it could spur a faster transition away from carbon energy.  As Putin well knows, oil and gas are Russia’s two most lucrative exports.  Is it in Russia’s interest to encourage Europe to intensify its search for alternative sources and accelerate its move away from carbon energy? 

As for Ukraine, a Russian military attack would trigger a string of costs.  U.S. and European officials have already begun to develop a list of possible new sanctions against Moscow.  Following Putin’s summit with President Joe Biden, several U.S.-Russian communications channels were restored, and both sides reported constructive exchanges in their strategic stability dialogue.  Nothing would kill those small positive steps more quickly than a Russian attack.  The largest potential cost for Moscow looms in Ukraine; its military is greatly improved and, while it might not be able to defeat a Russian incursion, it would make the invaders pay a heavy price.  More sanctions, a deep freeze with Washington and the West, and Russian soldiers coming home in body bags hardly seem in Moscow’s interest.

Each of these crises could develop in ways inimical to Russia’s—and Putin’s—interest, at least as those interests are perceived from the West.  Putin, however, does not follow Western logic.  As noted in a recent article, he does not always make decisions rationally and sometimes tends to act emotionally, especially when it comes to Ukraine.  (Indeed, Kremlin aggression the past seven years has done more than anything to drive Ukraine away from Russia and to the West.)

Deepening these crises could well lead to negative outcomes for Russia if Putin miscalculates.  Still, the West should not overly discount the possibility that he just might do it.

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