Authoritarian Governments in Cyberspace
In the context of authoritarian states the internet has always been viewed as an unambiguous force for good, allowing citizens of such states to mobilise around particular political and social issues, and gain access to previously banned materials. However, many authoritarian governments are now actively exploiting cyberspace for their own purposes; some of them appear to be succeeding in subverting the internet's democratising potential. Have we overestimated the internet's ability to bring democratic change and underestimated? Drawing on numerous recent examples from Russia, China, and Iran, the talk will illustrate the darker side the use of social media in these countries.
Evgeny Morozov is a leading thinker and commentator on the political implications of the Internet. He is a contributing editor to Foreign Policy and runs the magazine's influential and widely-quoted "Net Effect" blog about the Internet's impact on global politics (neteffect.foreignpolicy.com). Morozov is currently a Yahoo! fellow at Georgetown University's E.A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. Prior to his appointment to Georgetown, he was a fellow at George Soros's Open Society Institute, where he remains on the board of the Information Program (one of the leading and most experimental funders for technology projects that have an impact on open society and human rights). Before moving to the US, Morozov was based in Berlin and Prague, where he was Director of New Media at Transitions Online.
- Morozov, Evgeny. "Texting Toward Utopia. Does the Internet spread democracy?" (via Boston Review)
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Morozov, Evgeny. "The Internet: A Room of Our Own?" (via Dissent magazine)
Wallenberg Theater
Evgeny Morozov
Program on Liberation Technology
616 Serra Street E108
Stanford, California 94305
Evgeny Morozov is a visiting scholar in the Liberation Technology Program at Stanford University and a Scwhartz fellow at the New America Foundation. He is also a blogger and contributing editor to Foreign Policy Magazine. He is a former Yahoo fellow at the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University and a former fellow at the Open Society Institute, where he remains on the board of the Information Program. His book The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom was published by PublicAffairs in January 2011.
Wi(l)der West? A Transatlantic Perspective on the European Periphery from the Balkans and Turkey to Russia
In recent years, the United States and its European Union partners have often diverged in their policy outlooks towards the wider European periphery—the diverse region stretching from the Balkans and Turkey, to the Westernmost former-Soviet republics and Russia. Whether a temporary hiatus or a more profound strategic divergence, this state of affairs reflects a departure from the mission of extending peace, freedom and prosperity to the European continent that the two sides have pursued in the post-Cold War period.
Event Synopsis:
Dr. Tassinari's talk draws upon his recent book, "Why Europe Fears its Neighbors" (Praeger Security International, 2009), which attempts to survey and quantify the many challenges facing Europe with respect to its borders. Tassinari describes Europe's position toward neighbor countries as being influenced by the threat of immigration. He describes a "security-integration nexus" in progress since 1945, involving a gradual economic opening of Europe's borders to promote stability. While the EU today maintains to some degree its enlargement policy toward Turkey and the Western Balkans, other border-region states are classified under a "European neighborhood policy" with no prospects for EU membership. Recent policy discourse has decoupled security concerns from integration. The neighborhood approach, undermines EU policy by keeping neighbor states at too great a distance.
Next Tassinari offers Turkey and Russia as case studies. The debate within Turkey is leaning away from EU membership as the primary path toward modernization. Recent dialogue focuses less on meeting technical standards for EU membership and more on reckoning with issues of religion, identity and history within Turkey. With regards to Russia, in the past decade the country has become more assertive abroad and moved away from cooperation with the EU, preferring not to be grouped with countries like Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia in the EU's approach to foreign policy.
In addressing the transatlantic relationship, Dr. Tassinari reflects that the US and EU have long disagreed about EU membership for Turkey, the direction of state building in the Balkans, and integration of some of Europe's neighbor states into NATO.
Finally, responding to the question of whether this divergence comes from a conflict over the "European power constellation" or rather is simply the result of issue-specific philosophical differences, Dr. Tassinari offers three arguments:
- Strategic: EU policy reflects multi-level integration, wherein countries can be "more than partners and less than members." Tassinari believes even countries with no prospect for membership should be integrated as much as possible.
- Normative - in reality, the US and EU share goals for Europe's "neighborhood" - promoting democracy, human rights, and other values. Despite this, each side's initiatives are viewed with suspicion by the other.
- Institution - US policymakers buy in to the EU enlargement policy, with its firm commitments and well-rehearsed conditionality process, and don't see alternative policies such as the "neighborhood" approach as being useful.
A Q&A session following the talk raised such issues as: Will the EU’s problems with “deepening” its relationships with neighbors hurt its prospects for “widening” through enlargement? What are the reasons for the mixed signals to Turkey from the EU? Do arguments about the EU’s denial of Turkey’s membership being based on racism hold any merit? If the Lisbon Treaty is ratified, what cross-border policy areas will remain the prerogative of nation-states and which might fall under EU Commission jurisdiction?
CISAC Conference Room
CISAC announces members of 2009-10 Honors Program
CISAC is pleased to announce that 14 seniors have been selected
to participate in its Undergraduate Honors Program in International Security
Studies.
The program provides an opportunity for eligible students focusing on international security subjects in any field to earn an honors certificate.
Students selected intern with a security-related organization, attend the program's honors college in Washington, D.C. in September, participate in a year-long core seminar on international security research, and produce an honors thesis with policy implications.
- Bertram Ang
Departments of Economics & Political Science
Restructuring of the Military Mindset - Amir Badat
Program in International Relations
Nuclear Disarmament and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty - Daniel Cassman
Departments of Political Science & Computer Science
The Restart of Ended Civil Wars - Philippe de Koning
Program in International Relations
Minor in Economics
The Influence of North Korea and China on Japanese Militarization - Daniel Leifer
Department of Biology
Rapid Mobilization of Health Care Workers in Times of Crisis - Ashley Lohmann
Program in International Relations
Tactical Change by Middle Eastern Terrorist Organizations, 1970-2004 - Raffi Mardirosian
Department of Economics & Public Policy Program
The Adaptability of Terrorists and Rogue Nations to Financial Methods of Preventing WMD Proliferation and other Breaches of National Security - Ben Picozzi
Department of Philosophy
Minor in Classical Languages
Norms and International Security with Respect to the Responsibility to Protect - Amir Ravandoust
Department of Management Science & Engineering
Minor in International Relations
Nuclear Arab States: Is Proliferation Inevitable? - Sam Stone
Department of Mathematics & Program in International Relations
The Use of Energy Exports as a Foreign Policy Tool in the CIS and Eastern Europe - Gautam Thapar
Department of Political Science
Minor in Economics
U.S. Aid to Pakistan - Son Ca Vu
Department of Management Science & Engineering
Minor in Political Science
The A.Q. Khan Network: A Rogue Business Model - Georgia Wells
Program in Human Biology
Explaining the Radicalization of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt - Hao Yan
Departments of Political Science & Economics
China's Global Strategy
CDDRL Visiting Scholar Olena Nikolayenko Analyzes Post-Soviet Youth Movements
Over the past decade, thousands of young people in the post-communist region applied nonviolent methods of resistance to protest against large-scale electoral fraud. In 2000, the social movement Otpor (Resistance) played a vital role in removing Slobodan Milosevic from power. Inspired by Otpor, a number of youth movements emerged in Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, and Ukraine. In my post-doctoral project at the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, I examine why some youth movements were more successful than others in mobilizing the population against the repressive political regime. My research suggests that political learning of autocratic incumbents has contributed to the diminishing power of similar youth movements.
In the wake of the 1998 draconic laws on universities and the mass media, a group of students from the University of Belgrade formed the youth movement Otpor and chose the clenched fist as its symbol. In the course of two-year nonviolent struggle against Milosevic, Otpor spread across Serbia and attracted more than 70,000 supporters. The youth movement launched a campaign with the provocative title “He Is Finished” and shifted the blame for all the country’s problems on the incumbent president. In addition, Otpor collaborated with other civil society actors to stage a get-out-to-vote campaign “It’s Time!” aimed at bringing first-time voters to the polling stations. In the 2000 election, almost 86 percent of 18-29 year old Serbs cast their ballot; most of them voted against Milosevic.
Given state pressures on the mainstream media, the Serbian movement delivered its messages by occupying the public space. Movement participants plastered Otpor stickers, spray-painted graffiti, staged street performances, and organized street concerts. “It is amazing how people notice branding in their everyday life, but underestimate it in nonviolent struggle,” a former Otpor activist noted. Without doubt, Otpor succeeded in creating and popularizing a model of nonviolent resistance.
Notwithstanding slight modifications of Otpor’s model, Belarus’ Zubr (Bison) in 2001, Georgia’s Kmara (Enough) in 2003, Ukraine’s Pora (It’s Time) in 2004, and an assortment of Azerbaijani youth groups in 2005 largely took a similar course of action. The youth movements were formed around the time of a national election and called for free and fair elections. Emulating Otpor, youth activists planned a negative campaign targeted at the incumbent president and a positive campaign aimed at boosting youth voter turnout. Likewise, youth movements employed a similar toolkit of protest strategies, including stickers, graffiti, street performances, and rock concerts.
At the same time, autocratic incumbents in the post-Soviet region began to scrutinize Otpor’s model of nonviolent resistance to prevent the repeat of the Serbia scenario. In light of electoral revolutions in Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine, the governments in Azerbaijan and Belarus deployed coercive measures against youth movements before they could develop into powerful agents of political change. In addition, the incumbent presidents have invested considerable resources into the creation of state-sponsored youth organizations. In 2005 and 2008, the Azerbaijani youth movement Ireli (Forward) called upon young voters to support President Ilham Aliyev. Similarly, the Komsomol-like Belarusian Republican Union of Youth has become a tool for youth co-optation under President Alyaksandr Lukashenka. Like in the Soviet times, membership in the state-sponsored youth organization is now a pre-requisite for university admission and career growth in Belarus.
Energy Security, Memory Wars and "Compatriots" in Baltic-Russian Relations
According to Professor Muiznieks, since the early 1990s, the Baltic states have been seen as unfriendly in the eyes of Russians due to their "return to the West" attitude. Professor Muiznieks explains the key features of Baltic-Russian relations while looking at how these problems may be resolved in the future.
Synopsis
Professor Muiznieks begins by discussing the less than warm relations between the Baltic states and Russia. He explains how this is particularly due to the Baltic states’ desire to “return to the West” since the early 1990s and escape Russian influence after so many years of occupation. This is particularly evident in the EU and the UN where Poland and Baltic States form a sort of anti-Russian “axis.” However, the Baltic states’ membership of such organizations means a share of their secrets, which, as Professor Muiznieks explains, the Russians subsequently exploit for intelligence purposes.
At the same time, Professor Muiznieks cites another crucial security issue for the Baltic states, energy security. Currently, there is less oil transit through the Baltic states then there was before; Professor Muiznieks believes this has helped issues of corruption. However, he notes energy companies still play a significant role both locally and in relations with Russia. Looking the future, Professor Muiznieks believes that while there are options for the Baltic states to lessen their electrical dependence on Russia by looking to Scandinavia, the shutting of Lithuania’s nuclear plant will most likely mean Latvia and Lithuania will turn to Russia for further supply. To Professor Muiznieks, the current situation holds opportunities but also many risks.
Unfortunately, the strategic power-plays continue on another platform, memory wars. Professor Muiznieks feels World War II is the key point of debate between the Baltic states and Russia. While Russia sees the war as a great triumph, the Baltic states view the conflict as a catastrophe which led to further occupation. Professor Muiznieks discusses the fact that this battle plays out locally through monuments or textbooks but also internationally through border disputes and UN resolutions. He cites the European Court of Human Rights as a new strategic arena for this war because of its utmost authority on the continent and the fact that its rulings can cement one group as victims and force others to pay compensation. However, Professor Muiznieks believes any truce is unlikely. For him, this conflict is too linked to many personal family histories and not government based enough to be put to a real end.
Professor Muiznieks also looks to “compatriots” as a focal point of Baltic-Russian relations. “Compatriots,” in this case, are Russian citizens living abroad, particularly in the Baltic states. This issue is serious because Russian speakers comprise over a quarter of both Latvia and Estonia’s populations. Professor Muiznieks explains that tension was caused in the Baltic states after Russia’s war with Georgia as to how Russian policy would change towards its diasporas. In addition, Professor Muiznieks reveals that there is further concern over the possibility that Russia is encouraging speakers abroad to take up citizenship to create legal basis for any action against other states in the future. Professor Muiznieks also argues that funding for these “compatriots” is perhaps to counteract increasing EU influence in the region.
Overall, Professor Muiznieks believes that the Baltic states are seriously suffering from the global economic crisis which in turn is making it difficult for them to counteract Russian policy and be effective. Professor Muiznieks argues this makes the Baltic states quite vulnerable.
In a lengthy question-and-answer session, a multitude of points were raised. One of the key issues addressed was where the Baltic States, and in particular Latvia, fit in the European framework. This led to discussion of several other issues such as Scandanivia's changing role in the Baltic States, the role of the Baltic States in NATO, and language integration. Finally, another possibility much emphasized was the potential creation of nuclear power plants as a way to offset surging prices for Russian energy.
Encina Ground Floor Conference Room
Ukraine's Challenges, the West's Response
Mired in political gridlock, battered by economic crisis, and uncertain about its foreign relations, Ukraine faces a difficult year, a year that will end with a presidential election. How is Ukraine coping with these difficulties? And how should the West respond in helping Ukraine meet the challenges before it?
Synopsis
Ambassador Pifer begins his assessment of Ukraine’s challenges by identifying the four key issues it will have to face this coming year. Firstly, Mr. Pifer argues that a serious problem is the incompatible relations between Ukraine’s president, Viktor Yushchenko, and Ukraine’s prime minister, Yulia Tymoshenko. Mr Pifer identifies the energy situation as a key battle issue between the two. Most seriously, Mr. Pifer believes that such feuding compromises Ukraine’s ability to deal with serious issues such as energy and the economic crisis. In addition, Russia seems to play the two against each other. Therefore, Mr. Pifer argues that the West begin by getting the two to cooperate on key issues. Mr. Pifer also stresses the need for a coordinated US-EU stance and also proposes the possible revival of a US-Ukraine bi-national commission.
An aspect of Ukraine clearly being affected by this feud is Ukraine’s handling of the economy. Mr. Pifer examines how Ukraine was suddenly hit hard by the global financial crisis in October 2008. This was partly caused by a fall in the global demand for steel, one of Ukraine’s key exports, and led to further inflation and investors avoiding the country. Ukraine also received $16 billion from the IMF on the conditions of having almost no budget deficit and fell short of this condition earlier this year leading to a delay in the transfer of funds from the IMF. While some believe in a possible recovery in 2010, Mr. Pifer argues the West can help in several ways. Firstly, it must push Ukraine to continue to follow IMF conditions to receive the vital funding. Mr. Pifer also proposes an international donor conference for Ukraine to receive the additional money it needs but will not receive from the IMF. He argues for the abolition of Ukraine’s “communist” commercial code and the freer sale of land to get the agricultural market flowing.
Another possible crisis point is Ukraine’s energy situation. Mr. Pifer examines Ukraine’s dependence on Russia and how during the January crisis it did not pass any reserve gas onto its Western neighbors, weakening its international reputation. Mr. Pifer does recognize Ukraine’s efforts to lessen its use of natural gas, particularly due to the increase in prices. However, he argues Ukraine is still very vulnerable, and this is not helped by the fact that Ukraine’s own energy agency is nearing bankruptcy as it maintains unsustainably low prices. Therefore, Mr. Pifer believes the first step forward is, although tough, for energy prices to be raised. Then, the West should offer technical assistance to improve the efficiency of Ukraine’s energy system. Finally, Ukraine should seek EU funding to modernize its pipelines.
The final issue Mr. Pifer addresses is Ukraine’s complex foreign policy. Mr. Pifer explains Ukraine’s difficult relationship with Russia is marred by differences over energy, NATO, and Georgia. Mr. Pifer also cites Russia’s resources in Ukraine to stir tension if it wants to weaken the country. Another serious aspect is Ukraine’s uncertain relationship with the EU consisting of support from the Baltic states and reluctance from the Western states such as France and Germany. Mr. Pifer feels it is important for the West not to give up on Ukraine but to push the country to forge a consistent line between president and prime minister. The US should also let Ukraine know how much support it would receive were it to become involved in an economic conflict with Russia.
Mr. Pifer concludes by stating that the US should be clear that this new attempt at resetting relations might not survive a Russian-initiated crisis with Ukraine.
In answering the audience's multitude of questions, a variety of issues were raised. Discussion included key points such as the receptiveness of Ukrainian leaders to international advice or the impact of Ukraine's membership of the World Trade Organization. One issue Mr. Pifer particularly emphasized was his belief that Ukraine should not be part of NATO as long as public opinion stands against it.
about the speaker
Steven Pifer is a visiting fellow at the
Brookings Institution and a (non-resident) senior adviser with the
Center for
Strategic and International Studies. A retired Foreign Service officer,
his more than 25 years with the State Department focused on U.S.
relations with the former Soviet Union and Europe, as well as on arms
control and security issues. His assignments included deputy assistant
secretary of state in the
Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs (2001-2004), ambassador to
Ukraine (1998-2000), and special assistant to
the president and National Security Council senior director for Russia,
Ukraine
and Eurasia (1996-1997). He also served
at the U.S. embassies in Warsaw, Moscow and London, as well as with the
U.S.
delegation to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces negotiations in
Geneva. He holds a
B.A. in economics from Stanford University, where he
later spent a year as a visiting scholar at Stanford's Institute for
International Studies. He is a member of the Council on Foreign
Relations.
Sponsored by the Forum on Contemporary Europe and the Center for Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies.
Encina Ground Floor Conference Room