As a high school student in San Jose in the late 1960s and early 1970s, I used to see Norman Mineta on occasion in San Jose’s Japantown. Once at Fukuda Barber in Japantown, Mineta was on the barber chair. After he left, barbers Takeo and Atsuo Fukuda asked me if I knew who he was. I didn’t, and Takeo told me that he was Norman Mineta, vice mayor of San Jose. Since that day, I recognized Mineta whenever I saw him in Japantown, in the San Jose Mercury News, and on television. In 1971, Mineta became mayor of San Jose, and in 1974, he ran successfully for the U.S. House of Representatives. He was reelected ten more times. Mineta also served as President Bill Clinton’s Secretary of Commerce from July 2000 to January 2001 and President George W. Bush’s Secretary of Transportation from January 2001 to August 2006. Never did I imagine that our paths would cross professionally through my work at SPICE. From 2017, SPICE curriculum designer Rylan Sekiguchi assumed the responsibility of authoring lesson plans for a project called “What Does It Mean to Be an American?”—a free web-based curriculum toolkit inspired by Mineta’s life and career.

As a 10-year-old Japanese American boy in 1942, Norman Mineta was powerless when his country imprisoned him and his family in a fit of wartime hysteria. But nearly 60 years later, he sat at the highest levels of government as the United States reeled from 9/11 and began experiencing a new hysteria. In times of crisis like these, how has the institution of civil liberties been affected by individuals like Mineta whose voices guide government policy, and how have those changes impacted the lives of Americans? This was the central question that Mineta and Sekiguchi focused their comments on during their National Council of History Education session, “Civil Liberties in Times of Crisis,” on March 16, 2019.

"Civil Liberties in Times of Crisis" session at the 2019 NCHE conference, led by Rylan Sekiguchi and Secretary Norman Mineta.

Following the curriculum preview, Mineta reflected upon his life and highlighted the striking parallels between the hysteria following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 and the hysteria following 9/11. His memories of the immediate aftermath of Pearl Harbor seemed to be seared in the back of his mind as he spoke, as he vividly recalled seeing his father cry for the first time and wondering where his neighbor of Japanese descent had suddenly been taken, and by whom. (He later learned it was the FBI.) A short time later, Mineta and his family were also evicted from their home in San Jose, California and incarcerated in Heart Mountain, Wyoming, as part of what is often called the mass internment of Japanese Americans.

Mineta also shared his memories of the morning of 9/11—being informed as Secretary of Transportation of the first plane hitting the twin towers, watching the live broadcast as the second plane hit, and then being called to the Presidential Emergency Operations Center, a bunker-like underground structure that lies below the White House. He recalled how he had asked one of his chiefs to draw up the new flight security guidelines that would govern aviation henceforth, and the first bullet point was “No racial profiling will be used.” He also vividly recalled how President George W. Bush, in the aftermath of 9/11, firmly declared that the United States would not let what happened to Norm and his family (following the Pearl Harbor attack) happen again. “You could’ve knocked me off my chair with a feather!” Mineta reflected.

Deborah Rowland with Secretary Norman Mineta

The documentary film Norman Mineta and His Legacy: An American Story will receive a national PBS airing on May 20. Fukami and Nakatomi hope that the film and lesson plans become widely used in U.S. schools and carry on the legacy of Norman Mineta. They noted, “They are important tools to help young students grapple with the divisiveness in U.S. society today and to underscore the critical importance of considering civil liberties-related issues in U.S. history as well as today.”

I had the privilege of attending several screenings of the film. At the San Jose screening, it was gratifying to listen to tributes to Mineta from people who represent San Jose’s diverse communities, and it was especially moving to witness them and numerous Japanese Americans in attendance give a standing ovation to Mineta following the screening. An old family friend in attendance used to also frequent Fukuda Barber and we boasted about how our barber used to also cut the hair of Norman Mineta.

Kleptocracy--well-organized elite corruption--has come to characterize Russia and much of the post-Communist space and is one of the chief obstacles to democratic development as well as economic growth in Russia and Ukraine. This panel features three experts who have focused on anti-corruption measures in these countries and will discuss the origins, effects, and future of kleptocracy in the region.

Speakers:

Charles Davidson, the publisher of The American Interest and Director of The Kleptocracy Initiative at the George Mason School of Public Policy.

Jeffrey Gedmin, the editor of The American Interest, who previously was president of the Legatum Institute in London and of Radio Liberty/Radio Free Europe in Prague.

Oleksandra Ustinova, Ukrainian Emerging Leaders Fellow 2019 and a leading Ukrainian anti-corruption activist for a conversation on kleptocracy in Russia and Ukraine and how it is abetted by American institutions.

Moderator: Francis Fukuyama, CDDRL Mosbacher Director and FSI Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow.

Watch the video here.

Scholars Corner is an ongoing SPICE initiative to share FSI’s cutting-edge social science research with high school and college classrooms nationwide and international schools abroad.

This Scholars Corner video features New York Times bestselling author Francis Fukuyama discussing the recent rise of identity politics, both in the United States and around the world. “In the 20th century we had a politics that was organized around an economic axis, primarily. You had a left that worried about inequality…and you had a right that was in favor of the greatest amount of freedom,” summarizes Fukuyama. “[N]ow we are seeing a shift in many countries away from this focus on economic issues to a polarization based on identity.”

According to Fukuyama, this shift in politics is reflected in such domestic social movements as Black Lives Matter and #MeToo, as well as in international movements like the Catalan independence movement, white nationalism, and even the Islamic State.

To hear more of Dr. Fukuyama’s analysis, view the video here: “The Rise and Implications of Identity Politics.” For other Scholars Corner episodes, visit our Scholars Corner webpage. Past videos have covered topics such as cybersecurity, immigration and integration, and climate change.

"Identity" hardcover book by Francis Fukuyama

Francis Fukuyama is a Senior Fellow at FSI and the Mosbacher Director of the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law. This video is based on his recent book Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment, which was recognized as The Times (UK) Best Books of 2018, Politics, and Financial Times Best Books of 2018.

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• Learning from experts

 

Researchers at Stanford University released findings of a study examining what happens to physicians who experience multiple malpractice claims. Where do physicians with poor malpractice liability records go? Where do they practice? Who would hire them? Stanford professors David Studdert and Michelle Mello, both core faculty members at Stanford Health Policy, wanted to know.

The answers to these questions are described in a new study released March 27 in the New England Journal of Medicine. After reviewing more than a decade’s worth of data from nearly half a million physicians, Studdert and Mello found that physicians who were sued repeatedly were no more likely to relocate their clinical practices than colleagues who had no claims. However, they were more likely to either cease practice or, if they continued to practice, to shift to smaller practice groups or solo practice.

“There is an emerging awareness that a small group of ‘frequent flyers’ accounts for an impressively large share of all malpractice lawsuits,” said Studdert, the lead researcher and professor at both Stanford Law School and Stanford University School of Medicine. “This study confirms that, and begins to shed light on the professional trajectories of these physicians.”

In a 2016 study, also published in the New England Journal of Medicine, Studdert and Mello examined demographic characteristics of claim-prone physicians. “When we presented that work, people kept asking us questions about this group that we couldn’t answer, like who would ever hire or insure them,” Studdert said. “Now we have a better idea.”

A small group with many lawsuits

The research team reviewed data from 480,894 physicians who had 68,956 claims paid against them between 2003 and 2015. The researchers estimated that 2 percent of practicing physicians had two or more paid malpractice claims. Those physicians account for nearly 40 percent of all paid claims, confirming results from their earlier study.

“Our main goal was to follow these multi-claim practitioners over time as they accumulated claims and see where they went and what kind of changes they made to their practices,” said Mello, professor of law and professor of health research and medicine at Stanford and a co-author of the study. “One surprising result was that they were no more likely to relocate than their colleagues.”

In the late 1980s, widespread concerns that physicians with poor liability records were moving interstate to put their reputations behind them led Congress to establish the National Practitioner Data Bank. When a malpractice claim is paid on behalf of a health practitioner, or the practitioner is subjected to certain forms of disciplinary action, the information must be reported to the Data Bank. Employers, such as hospitals, are then required to check the Data Bank.

“Given the policy history here, it was gratifying to find that physicians prone to malpractice claims were not flight risks,” Mello said, noting that it is clearly harder for physicians with bad records to escape their past than it once was.

They don’t move, but many go solo

The study also found that claim-prone physicians were more likely than their peers to quit practicing. Nonetheless, more than 90 percent of physicians who racked up five or more paid claims continued to practice medicine.

The study also showed that claim-prone physicians were much more likely than their peers to shift into smaller practice settings. For example, physicians with five or more claims were more than twice as likely as physicians with no claims to switch to solo practice.

“Compared to practicing in large group practices or hospitals, physicians in small or solo practices are subject to less oversight from administrators and peers,” Mello said. “Quality problems with solo practitioner may be more difficult to detect and report. From a patient safety standpoint, this is the study’s most troubling finding. Frankly, solo practice is the last place we want practitioners who pose patient safety risks to be working.”

While a single malpractice claim is a weak signal that there’s a quality problem, when there are repeated paid claims over a relatively short period of time, that sends an important signal about patient safety risk, Studdert said.

“We think the study’s main message is that regulators and the companies that provide physicians with liability insurance should be paying closer attention to this signal,” Studdert said. “I wouldn’t want my family members to be treated by a physician who had paid out six malpractice claims in the past few years. Who would?”

Additional authors on the study include Matthew J. Spittal from the Melbourne School of Population and Global Health, University of Melbourne; Yifan Zhang from Stanford’s Center for Health Policy; and Derek S. Wilkinson and Harnam Singh from the Health Resources and Services Administration in the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

Learn More in this Stanford Law School Q&A with Studdert and Mello

The study was supported by a grant from SUMIT Insurance, a company that is wholly owned by Stanford Hospital and Clinics and Lucile Packard Children’s Hospital, and a Future Fellowship to Spittal from the Australian Research Council.

The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence held a public hearing on Thursday, March 28, 2019, as part of its investigation into Russian influence during and after the 2016 election campaign.

The hearing, "Putin’s Playbook: The Kremlin’s Use of Oligarchs, Money and Intelligence in 2016 and Beyond” included testimony by Michael McFaul, former U.S. Ambassador to Russia and Director of the Freeman Spogli Institute at Stanford University.

Download Complete Testimony (PDF 263 KB)

EXCERPT

To contain and thwart the malicious effects of “Putinism,” the United States government and the American people must first understand the nature of the threat. This testimony focuses onthe nexus of political and economic power within Russia under Putin’s leadership, and how these domestic practices can be used abroad to advance Putin’s foreign policy agenda. Moreover, it is important to underscore that crony capitalism, property rights provided by the state, bribery, and corruption constitute only a few of many different mechanisms used by Putin in his domestic authority and foreign policy abroad.

This testimony proceeds in three parts. Section I describes the evolution of Putin’s system of government at home, focusing in particular on the relationship between the state and big business. Section II illustrates how Putin seeks to export his ideas and practices abroad. Section III focuses on Putin’s specific foreign policy objective of lifting sanctions on Russian individuals and companies.

Watch the C-SPAN recording of the testimony. 

Media Contact: Ari Chasnoff, Assistant Director for Communications, 650-725-2371, chasnoff@stanford.edu

Three years into the Trump administration, “the United States and the People’s Republic of China find their bilateral relationship at a dangerous crossroads,” write Orville Schell of the Asia Society and Susan Shirk of the University of California San Diego (UCSD), co-chairs of the Task Force on U.S.-China Policy, at the opening of a recently published report, Course Correction: Toward an Effective and Sustainable China Policy. The report features the second set of findings issued by the Task Force, a group comprising China specialists from around the United States, which is convened by Asia Society’s Center on U.S.-China Relations and UCSD’s 21st Century China Center and which includes Karl Eikenberry, director of APARC’s U.S.-Asia Security Initiative.

In its first report, issued in 2017, the Task Force identified the fundamental interests of the United States in its relationship with China. Since then, more stresses and strains have beset the bilateral relations between the two countries. But while “Beijing’s recent policies under Xi Jinping’s leadership are primarily driving this negative dynamic” and the “Trump administration is justified in pushing back harder against China’s actions, note Schell and Shirk, “pushback alone isn’t a strategy. It must be accompanied by the articulation of specific goals and how they can be achieved.” The new report propose a strategy to that end, which the Task Force calls “smart competition.”

APARC caught up with Ambassador Eikenberry to learn more about the report and its recommendations.

Note: the following has been edited for clarity.

How does the February 2019 report by the Task Force on U.S.-China Policy differ from its 2017 report? 

Since our Task Force’s first report was published in February 2017, the Trump Administration’s China policy has developed significantly, its defining characteristics being demonstrated in trade and economic policy and in security strategy. Our new Task Force study takes stock of the current state of U.S.-China relations and focuses on policy analysis and policy prescription. It seems clear that President Trump’s shift from a strategy of engagement to one of more explicit competition was overdue. This report suggests the best organizing principles for the management of what will likely be an increasingly competitive U.S.-China relationship in the coming years.

How does this report frame Sino-American relations?

The report underscores the fact that this is not a zero-sum game. Emphasis is placed on finding ways and means to cooperate with China when mutually advantageous—and there are many issue areas where this is or might be possible, such as climate change and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. But the report also makes clear that in the domains of economic exchange, security, and political values—such as individual freedom and the primacy of the rule of law—America needs to work with like-minded allies and partners to ensure the global system that has benefitted all for over seven decades is not overturned by those seeking unilateral advantage.

Several of the report’s Task Force members were also involved in the recent China report from the Hoover Institution, Chinese Influence and American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance. Where do you think these two publications intersect and part ways?

There was some overlap among the contributors to the two reports—full disclosure, I had the opportunity to participate in both projects. I think the studies are actually complementary—the portion of Course Correction devoted to PRC overseas influence activities drew upon the findings published in Chinese Influence and American Interests.

What development is of greatest concern to you as you think about the future of Sino-American relations?

I’m most concerned about the blurring of the management of economic exchange (trade and investment issues) and security competition (which includes maintaining a technological advantage over one’s competitors). The proliferation of technologies with military applications is complicating efforts of those trying to maintain robust economic relations between China and the United States. If our economies decouple, we will have a new Cold War