The Stanford Institute for International Studies assembled a panel of experts last night to discuss the aftermath of last month's devastating South Asian tsunami and the future of the affected region.

The speakers highlighted the scope of the international relief effort and agreed that the focus of the assistance should be on aiding nations in regaining self-sufficiency. They argued that affected countries must take a proactive role in the rebuilding process.

"The key for us is to start the reconstruction efforts in ways that do not undermine the well-being of the population," said Lizanne McBride, the director of the nonprofit International Rescue Committee and expert on Indonesian humanitarian issues.

When it comes to rebuilding countries ravaged by disaster, "the tendency for countries like the U.S. is to do it ourselves, and what we need to do is help them do it themselves," McBride said.

Eric Weiss, assistant professor of surgery and international health expert, agreed.

"One of the main things is to help bring the local people back to self-reliance," he said.

"In a lot of relief, we send people to help people who can't help themselves, but there is little focus of promoting self-sufficiency. I think that is critical to addressing these crises."

The panelists also addressed the barriers impeding the relief effort, like the political instability of the region. "Before the wave hit, one had to question the administrative capacity of the provincial government [in Indonesia]," said international relations professor Donald Emmerson.

"The governor [in one affected area] isn't giving out aid and taking charge because he is currently in prison on corruption charges."

For years, the relationship between the United States and Indonesia has been icy, some panelists noted, a fact that may have long-term effects on a sustained

aid effort.

"For us, security, logistical access, and political access are key; without these we are crippled," McBride said. "The Indonesian military are providing us with security, and rebel groups have remained quiet, but as the region stabilizes-and it will stabilize-we will probably be increasingly denied access."

Religious differences may also play a factor in the outcome of relief efforts, Emmerson added.

"There are in fact Christian aid-givers in Indonesia who say that they are here to lead by example and not to evangelize the population, but the predominately

Muslim population seems to be skeptical," he said. "I think this may pose a problem."

The panelists also argued that it will be difficult to maintain a long-term relief effort as time passes.

"The task for us is to hold attention to it," McBride said. "The hardest thing to do is to keep attention to the crisis after the cameras go away."

Donald Kennedy, University president emeritus and an environmental science and policy professor, agreed.

"Our political attention span about this sort of thing is notably short," he said. "The door won't be open for long."

This idea resonated with students in attendance as well.

"People seem to only want to do things that will make a quick impact," said freshman Aaron Berg. "There isn't a whole lot of popularity for groups or causes that pick a difficult task and try to stay with it until it is solved."

Political science professor Stephen Krasner, deputy director of the Stanford Institute for International Studies and moderator for the event, argued that this country still hasn't found an effective formula for providing humanitarian relief.

"We don't know how to do this," he said. "It isn't all about improving our political attention span. We just don't know how to do this."

Q. What is the history of the Journal of Korean Studies?

A. The Journal of Korean Studies was begun, I believe, in 1979 at the University of Washington by Professor James Palais, a preeminent Korean historian. The Journal of Japanese Studies appeared at the same time and both journals made tremendous contributions to their respective fields. The Journal of Korean Studies was unquestionably the top journal in the field of Korean studies. In fact, one of my first publications appeared in the Journal of Korean Studies. However, unlike the Journal of Japanese Studies, which has been published without interruption since its founding, publication of the Journal of Korean Studies was suspended in 1992 due to financial and administrative problems. So now we're reviving it at long last.

Q. Why did you feel it was important to revive the journal of korean studies and bring it to APARC?

A. First of all, there isn't really any top journal in the field at present, and Korean studies has grown enormously in the last ten years. As a result, there has been considerable demand for a good journal, especially among young scholars who want to publish their work. For Korean studies to continue to grow in the United States, it's vital for scholars to have a place to publish their research outcomes.

With respect to APARC serving as the home for the Journal of Korean Studies, we are still building up Korean studies at the Center, and at Stanford as a whole. I believe that having a premier journal in the program will more quickly place the program itself on the national map. It's also a great service to Korean studies in general. Many people-including very senior leaders in the field-really appreciate that we have put in the effort to bring back this important publication after such a long hiatus. And I'm so grateful to APARC for its financial, editorial, and administrative support in making the issue a reality. Chiho Sawada, postdoctoral research fellow in Korean studies at APARC, assisted me as associate editor and Victoria Tomkinson has done a wonderful job of editing the articles. We will celebrate the revival of the Journal of Korean Studies at the upcoming national meetings of the Association for Asian Studies.

Q. Where does the journal of korean studies fit into stanford's korean studies program?

A. Stanford's program began relatively late. This isn't to say that we haven't grown hugely, because the program has really taken off in the past three years. Yet there are other programs that have been up and running much longer, and therefore are more established. When I left the University of California, Los Angeles, which has the most well-established program in the nation, I wanted to create a unique Korean studies program at Stanford.

My vision for the Stanford Korean Studies Program can be summarized in two terms: social science and research. The research mission includes student training through research projects. Many students-both undergraduate and graduate-are involved in various research projects within the Korean Studies Program. Most other institutional programs focus on humanities and I don't intend to repeat what others elsewhere in the country and the world have already done. As I want to focus on social science, and research and publication, the Journal of Korean Studies will be a key component of that mission.

Q. Does the journal of korean studies have a particular focus within the field of korean studies?

A. Until now, the Journal of Korean Studies has predominantly published articles on history, literature, and culture, reflecting a general trend in the current field of Korean studies. Going forward, I'd like to publish more papers on social science. The revival issue doesn't reflect that goal and given the current concentration on humanities in the field, it won't be easy. Yet it's my hope that we'll tip the balance toward social sciences in subsequent issues and this is another way of making a contribution to the field as a whole.

Q. Publishing a major academic journal is a big job. What's the editorial procedure? What, for you as the co-editor [with john duncan, at the University of California, Los Angeles], is the most challenging part of putting the journal of korean studies together each year?

A. The number one challenge is getting good manuscripts. Last year, we received over twenty articles, but we accepted only one (and asked a few authors to revise and resubmit). Now that the journal is out, we expect more submissions in the months to come. My top priority is to control the quality of what we publish.

The second big challenge is finding good reviewers. The Journal of Korean Studies is, of course, a refereed journal. Usually we send each submitted manuscript to two people to read and evaluate, but the field of Korean studies is pretty small, and we can't go back to the same people all the time. Finding good readers will continue to be a vital but time-consuming part of the editorial process.

Q. What topics do you plan to cover in future issues?

A. My plan is to publish one general issue per year that covers a broad spectrum of topics in Korean studies, much like our revival issue. And, beginning this summer, I'm going to hold an annual one-week summer workshop, a small gathering here at Stanford. I'll pick a specific topic or theme and then through open competition select five or six scholars who have a draft paper on the topic. I will bring them to Stanford for one week and work with a senior scholar to lead the workshop. I plan to publish the papers that come out of that workshop as a special issue of the Journal of Korean Studies. The workshop we are organizing for summer 2005 will address the globalization of Korea. Professor Michael Robinson of Indiana University (who previously collaborated with me on Colonial Modernity in Korea) will lead the workshop. Thus, starting in 2006, the Journal of Korean Studies will publish one general and one special issue each year.

Q. Any highlights from this inaugural issue?

A. All of the articles in this inaugural issue have been carefully selected and are very strong in their quality. I'm particularly pleased that the articles range across so many subjects, from Michael Kim's piece on vernacular fiction and popular reading, to Robert Buswell's study of the significance of Sugi's collation notes on the Korean Buddhist canon, to Jin-Kyung Lee's article about feminist literature in 1950s South Korea. In addition to these, there are two other research articles, and a number of reviews of recent books in the field.

Q. How can people get copies of the journal of korean studies?

A. Subscriptions to the Journal of Korean Studies are being handled by Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, located in Maryland. They, too, have been wonderfully supportive and involved in getting the Journal of Korean Studies off the ground. Those wishing to subscribe to the Journal can find more information on the .

For nearly two decades, most major developing countries have struggled to introduce market forces in their electric power systems. In every case, that effort has proceeded more slowly than reformers hoped and the outcomes have been hybrids that are far from the efficiency and organization of the "ideal" textbook model for a marketbased power system.

At the same time, growing concern about global climate change has put the spotlight on the need to build an international regulatory regime that includes strong incentives for key developing countries to control their emissions of greenhouse gases. In most of these countries, the power sector is a large source of emissions that, with effort, could be controlled.

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol included mechanisms that would reward developing nations that cut emissions, but so far the performance of these mechanisms has fallen far short of their potential.

Beginning in 2002, the Program on Energy and Sustainable Development (PESD) at the Stanford Institute for International Studies (SIIS) and the Indian Institute of Management in Ahmedabad (IIMA) have conducted a set of studies to examine the intersection of these two crucial challenges for the organization of energy infrastructures in the developing world. This research, funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development, examined power-market reforms and greenhouse-gas emissions in two key states in India. At the same time PESD was conducting a comprehensive study of electricity-market reforms in five developing countries (Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and South Africa) as well as detailed analyses of the greenhouse-gas emissions from three provinces in China in conjunction with other research partners.

PESD and IIMA presented their findings at a workshop on January 27-28, 2005, at Stanford University. The workshop brought together scholars studying the organization of the electric-power sector and other infrastructures in developing countries with energy policy makers, technologists, and those studying the effectiveness of international legal regimes, with the aim of not only focusing on new theories that are emerging to explain the organization of the power sector and the design of meaningful international institutions, but also identifying practical implications for investors, regulators, and policymakers.

The workshop offered diagnoses of what has gone wrong and what opportunities have nonetheless emerged. It focused on practical solutions and a look at the prospects for different technologies to meet the growing demand for power while minimizing the ecological footprint of power generation.

One of the key conclusions of the research and the workshop, as discussed by David Victor, director of PESD, is that electricity markets in the developing world have not progressed inexorably and consistently from a state-owned model to an open market-based model. Rather, much as the experience of the past ten years in the United States has demonstrated, reform of electric-power systems has proceeded differentially between parts of the industry and between jurisdictional units, with some segments of the power generation, transmission, and distribution systems still dominated by the state and some segments now fully responsive to signals from the market.

This hybrid condition-with portions of the electricity enterprise deregulated and other portions still fully regulated-has proven to be virtually universal and quite durable as well. For the most part, it also has proven beneficial to the overall operation of the system as well as to climate mitigation due to the fact that introduction of market forces to parts of the system tends to have a spillover effect, helping to improve efficiency in parts of the system that remain under state control.

Tom Heller, SIIS senior fellow, noted that the negotiations leading up to the

development of the Kyoto Protocol and subsequent discussions and experience have

demonstrated that the burden-sharing metaphor-expecting developing nations to

make a proportional investment and effort in reducing greenhouse-gas emissions-

will not be successful. Rather, as gross and per capita energy consumption increases in developing nations, which is occurring especially rapidly in China and India, policies and mechanisms that facilitate investment in efficient and clean energy production, transmission, and end-use infrastructures will need to be developed and rolled out.

The Kyoto Protocol provided a Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) to encourage such investment. However, the conclusion reached by practitioners developing such projects in China is that CDM is an inefficient and insufficient mechanism for fostering the magnitude of development projects that will be required to help mitigate the environmental effects of energy growth in the developing nations.

Two problems with CDM were raised at the workshop. First, the bureaucratic hurdles facing developers of CDM projects are daunting. To date no such project has received certification. Second, the Kyoto Protocol's current round of reductions targets expires in 2012, and uncertainty regarding the likely direction and form of future U.S. and European initiatives provides a disincentive to investment in CDM projects.

Alberto Chiappa, managing director of Energy Systems International, noted the good news is that in spite of these difficulties, investors are finding opportunities to develop projects to provide cleaner sources of energy and improve end-use energy efficiency. Professor P.R. Shukla of IIMA pointed out that there is a great need to align development and climate concerns if future mechanisms for climate mitigation in the developing world are to be successful.

Douglas Ogden, program officer at the Energy Foundation, noted that China has made a firm commitment to greatly increase the market share of electricity from renewable sources to 5 percent by 2010 and 20 percent by 2020 and in 2008 will adopt an automobile fuel-economy standard 20 percent more efficient than U.S. CAFE standards. Also, both China and India are engaged in developing natural gas markets in sectors traditionally dominated by coal.

Mario Pereira, director of Power Systems Research, discussed Brazil's current efforts to develop economical and efficient electricity supply through biomass-specifically ethanol derived from sugarcane bagasse. The ethanol industry was originally developed as a reaction to the oil shocks of the 1970s. Although the majority of electricity in Brazil is provided by hydroelectric projects, sugarcane ethanol has some important advantages. First, the sugarcane fields are geographically close to major centers of demand, and second, sugarcane thrives during drier periods of the year when hydroelectric production declines. The experience in Brazil thus demonstrates that renewables can provide an economically attractive source of energy for developing nations.

Looking toward the future, PESD has several projects under way pertaining to the

intersection of electricity-market reforms and global climate change. The program is expanding its research on power-market reforms through a set of case studies on independent power producer projects in ten developing nations and is also initiating a set of studies examining the introduction of natural gas to regions in India and China.

Much work remains to be done before the interface between electricity-market reform and global climate change is well understood. As energy markets in the developing world expand, addressing this question will become more and more important if we are to stabilize atmospheric levels of greenhouse gases.

China has a large and growing elderly population, but to be old in China-particularly in the countryside-is to be vulnerable. In the country's rural areas there are few clinics and hospitals, and health insurance is virtually nonexistent. Compared with elderly Chinese living in urban areas, those in rural areas have a shorter life expectancy and a poorer quality of life.

Further, little academic research has focused on the health needs and health status of China's elderly. It is with the goal of addressing this deficit that Pengqian Fang, a trainee with CHP/PCOR's China-U.S. Health and Aging Research Fellowship, recently returned to China from Stanford. Fang is seeking to document the health disparities between China's rural and urban elderly population, and to use his findings to propose healthcare assistance programs for the elderly in rural areas of China.

Fang spent a year at Stanford studying health-services research concepts and methods and developing his research project.

In the project, which Fang refined with guidance from CHP/PCOR faculty, Fang will conduct a detailed survey of the health status, health needs, and healthcare utilization of elderly people in rural and urban areas of China, through in-home interviews in three Chinese provinces with different geographic and socioeconomic characteristics: Guizhou (in southwest China), Hubei (in central China), and Guangdong (in the southeast).

He will conduct the project in collaboration with the health departments of the

three provinces, and with support from Tongji Medical College in Wuhan, where he

is director and associate professor of healthcare management.

Fang's study will be among the first of its kind in China. Such research is needed, Fang explained, because China's elderly population (of whom 70 percent reside in rural areas) is growing steadily, and in the coming years its members will require medical services at increasing rates. According to the country's 2000 census, China has 132 million people over age 65, making up more than 10 percent of the population; the over-80 population, which numbers 10 million people, is increasing by 5.4 percent a year; and about 20 percent of all elderly people in the world live in China.

The elderly in China's rural areas face particular challenges in getting high-quality, affordable healthcare services, Fang explained. There are few clinics and hospitals in rural areas, and there is no government-sponsored health coverage for the elderly (like the United States' Medicare program) anywhere in China. All of these factors put China's rural elderly in a vulnerable position, especially those with disabilities or serious illnesses.

"This research will show the disparities that exist, and it will encourage a dialogue about policies to help rural elderly people in China," Fang said.

Fang plans to conduct his survey in the first half of 2005, analyze the data in the summer and fall, and return to Stanford in November 2005 to present the results. In each of the three provinces studied, the research team will recruit 500 households and will conduct interviews with all individuals age 65 and over who reside there, for an estimated final sample of 2,500 people.

The respondents will be asked for a variety of information, including their income and education, insurance status, health status, daily activities, social activity, mental health, utilization of healthcare services, and accessibility and affordability of medical care. The researchers will also interview community healthcare workers-including physicians, nurses, and administrative staff-to seek information on the health needs of the elderly and the barriers they and their healthcare providers face.

The China-U.S. Health and Aging Research Fellowship, administered jointly by

CHP/PCOR and the China Health Economics Institute (Beijing), aims to improve

healthcare quality and efficiency in China through an exchange program in which

selected Chinese health services researchers come to Stanford to study for six months to a year, and then return to China to conduct an original research project. The fellowship is funded by the National Institutes of Health's Fogarty International Center.

"I have learned very much from Stanford and this program," Fang said. "The classes I attended have given me very useful ideas." He noted that since health services research is still a young field in China-about ten years old-"we learn a lot from the United States, like how to ask the research question, how to get a grant, how to design a study."

One aspect of Stanford that particularly impressed Fang was its emphasis on interdisciplinary collaboration.

"This is a very good feature-the close relationship between different fields," he said. "In my country we are more focused on one narrow field."

Fang said he is interested in establishing research collaborations between Stanford and Tongji Medical College-an idea that he and CHP/PCOR's leadership will be exploring in the coming months.

There is much to admire about the U.S. healthcare system's emphasis on innovation and technology, Fang said. Still, he said, "I don't hope for China to follow the U.S. health system," with its heavy reliance on free-market principles. For one thing, "medicine here is very costly." He cited a personal example of how he fractured his arm in a minor bicycle accident, and how his emergency room visit for the injury, along with a follow-up physician appointment, cost more than $1,000. "I was surprised it cost so much," he said.

A review of the fellowship program conducted by officials at the China Health Economics Institute last fall concluded that it has been successful and valuable. Leaders at the institute said the trainees' Stanford experience has enhanced their intellectual abilities, their knowledge of research methodology, their leadership capacity, and their ability to collaborate internationally.

For over five years the war in Chechnya has occupied a central and neuralgic place in Vladimir Putin's political agenda. In unleashing a renewed military campaign in September 1999-abrogating the cease-fire agreement that had terminated the earlier 1994-1996 war launched by then president Boris Yeltsin-President Putin sought to win American and Western acquiescence in, if not support for, Russia's military campaign by framing the conflict as a war on international terrorism.

However, far from extinguishing the conflict, or confining it within the territory of Chechnya, these policies have contributed to the spread of violence and instability far beyond the borders of the Chechen republic. Instead of pursuing strategies that would address the larger socioeconomic crisis of the predominantly Muslim regions of the Northern Caucasus, marginalize extremists, and win broad support from the population of the region, the brutality of Russian military forces and their local allies in the war in Chechnya and the repressive actions of the security services in neighboring republics have fanned the flames of hostility to Moscow and created conditions for the spread of radical Islamist ideologies and the recruitment of new adherents across the Northern Caucasus.

President Putin has treated the problems facing Russia as a product of state "weakness" and has called for strengthening Russia's unity and state power in response. Ostensibly in order to better combat terrorism, he has introduced a series of measures aimed at strengthening Russia's political unity and executive power at the expense of political pluralism, freedom of information, and civil society development. But by weakening or undermining Russia's fragile and weakly developed system of institutional checks and balances on central power, and reducing the transparency and accountability of official behavior, these policies may well be exacerbating rather than mitigating the challenges facing Russia today.

What began as a secular conflict over the political status of Chechnya has progressively been transformed into a wider struggle involving more radical fighters from other Muslim republics with an avowedly Islamist agenda that now threatens to destabilize the broader region of the Northern Caucasus. The past few years have also seen a rising tide of terrorist actions directed against local authorities and security services in other republics of the Northern Caucasus as well as against the Russian government and population more broadly, including terrorist acts aimed at targets in the city of Moscow itself.

From the dramatic seizure of some 800 hostages in a Moscow theater in October

2002, in which 129 hostages died from the effects of a lethal gas used by Russian security services in a bungled rescue operation, to the September 2004 horrific siege of an elementary school in Beslan, Southern Ossetia, in which over 300 civilians died-over half of them children-these episodes have not only challenged the official assertions that the war could be confined to Chechnya alone but have dramatized the inability of the Russian government to adequately protect the security of its population.

The inept and chaotic handling of many of these terrorist attacks has brought into stark relief the poor performance of the security services, the incompetence of local officials, serious intelligence failures, and above all widespread official corruption. In the Beslan episode, to take just one example, the siege was carried out by some thirty-two terrorists, of several different nationalities, who were apparently able to bribe their way across a series of checkpoints to enter the republic and to utilize weapons and explosives stored on the site beforehand. The local authorities and the federal security services proved incapable of coordinating their actions to control the situation, and the Moscow-appointed president of the republic proved completely inept. Indeed, the most courageous and effective actor was Ruslan Aushev, the former president of Ingushetia, a figure removed from power by Moscow for resisting pressure for more coercive policies.

The Putin government has used these events to justify a series of measures which

are ostensibly intended to more effectively combat terrorism but which appear to

have little relation to the real terrorist threat. First, it has refused to seek a political solution to the conflict in Chechnya and has deliberately sought to undermine possible negotiations or international mediation and to delegitimize potential negotiating partners by demonizing a broad array of Chechen political figures within the country and abroad as "terrorists."

Conflating Chechen resistance with international terrorism, President Putin has explicitly refused to distinguish between more moderate figures and extremists and has exaggerated their ties to international terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda.

Domestically, the Russian government has used security concerns to justify ever greater restrictions on freedom of information, on civil rights, and on the role of nongovernmental organizations, particularly those engaged in the defense of human rights. The military and the organs of law enforcement have been given an ever freer hand, rarely if ever held accountable for their abusive behavior and atrocities against civilians.

Refugee camps in the neighboring republic of Ingushetia were closed and the international non-governmental organizations providing medical care and humanitarian assistance to refugees there were compelled to depart. The mass media have largely lost their independence and editors and journalists have been dismissed or attacked for expressing critical views.

A whole series of measures aimed at further centralization of political power and the strengthening of the executive branch have eroded the already fragile elements of federalism and separation of powers in the Russian political system. The autonomy and political influence of regions and republics has been sharply reduced. Parliament, now dominated by a single pro-presidential party, no longer acts as an independent check on executive power, and liberal political parties and their leaders have been marginalized. Most recently, the popular election of regional governors was abolished in favor of their appointment by Moscow, and a discussion is now under way of bringing even local government under tighter central control by eliminating the election of mayors as well.

Moreover, a high proportion of President Putin's appointees to key positions in

the regions are drawn from the military and security services, selected for their presumed loyalty to the president but often lacking political skills or understanding of local conditions. But the substitution of appointed for elected officials does not necessarily guarantee either loyalty or competence.

In the absence of a competitive party system in which political parties help create a web of ties between the central government and local populations, Putin's centralizing measures could well widen the chasm between state and society.

This growing emphasis on centralization, unity, repression, and secrecy is arguably exacerbating rather than mitigating the problems and making state power even more dysfunctional. In Chechnya and in the broader Caucasus region the brutality as well as the corruption of Russian military and security forces and their local allies-and their extensive reliance on torture, mass roundups, indiscriminate executions, disappearances of civilians, and simple extortion-has embittered many toward Moscow and made it increasingly difficult to win "hearts and minds" and build popular support. Indeed, the lack of transparency, and the difficulty of holding Russian officials accountable for abusive behavior, has led unprecedented numbers of Russian citizens frustrated by the unresponsiveness of their own government to seek redress at the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.

Lacking a positive agenda for ameliorating socioeconomic conditions in the Northern Caucasus, the expanding operations of security forces across the Northern Caucasus, the closure of mosques, and the wave of often indiscriminate arrests have served to drive Islam underground and facilitated the spread of extremist ideologies. Without a coherent and sustained program of economic development that would create employment, housing, and education and offer alternative opportunities to an impoverished and alienated population, particularly young males, and absent a serious effort to eliminate corruption, these trends are likely to worsen.

Russia under Putin is facing a somber future.

Ten years ago, on January 25, 1995, Russian early-warning radars detected a scientific rocket launched from Norway. Details of what followed have never been officially disclosed, but the detection apparently generated an alarm that made its way to the Russian political leadership. The nuclear forces' command-and-control system worked exactly as it was supposed to, stopping the alert without launching an attack, but the accident vividly demonstrated the dangers inherent in the launchon-warning posture of nuclear forces.

The Soviet Union and the United States are the only nuclear states to have implemented launch-on-warning, a combination of early-warning systems to detect a missile attack and command-and-control systems that can launch a retaliatory strike while the aggressor's missiles are in flight. The United States and Russia have preserved this capability as an option for using their strategic nuclear weapons.

The dangers of this rapid-response nuclear posture are widely recognized, but the United States and Russia have nevertheless failed to address this issue. Reducing the level of readiness, known as de-alerting, has not come to the forefront of the U.S.-Russian agenda. One of the reasons for this is their reluctance to enter into new arms control agreements, which are thought to be necessary for a coordinated action in this area. Careful examination of the arguments for de-alerting, though, suggests that there are a number of steps that the United States and Russia could and should take unilaterally.

Discussion of launch-on-warning dangers usually concentrates on the decline of Russian early-warning and command-and-control systems. As a result, most de-alerting measures proposed on the U.S. side are seen primarily as a way to create incentives for Russia to reciprocate. But this perspective overestimates Russia's reliance on the launch-on-warning posture and underestimates the dangers associated with that of the United States.

History shows that the Soviet strategic forces could never rely on radars and satellites to get a timely and accurate assessment of an incoming attack. As a result, the Soviet military never displayed high enough confidence in its early-warning system to make a launch decision based solely on the information provided by the early-warning system.

The United States, on the other hand, built a highly capable and sophisticated earlywarning system. It provides global coverage and very high probability of detection of a missile launch, which allows the United States to have a very high degree of confidence in the system. Paradoxically, this confidence potentially makes a catastrophic technical malfunction more dangerous than in the Russian case, since operators might be less likely to question the data provided by the system.

Although it is difficult to quantify the two systems' vulnerability to a possible technical malfunction, the less sophisticated Russian system does not necessarily pose a substantially greater risk of a catastrophic accident than its U.S. counterpart. This means that efforts to reduce the readiness level of the U.S. forces would bring benefits regardless of reciprocity.

Concerns about the deterioration of the Russian early-warning system are well founded. With the breakup of the Soviet Union most radars were left outside of the Russian territory, and many are not operational. The system's space-based tier is hardly better off. Russia is currently operating only three early-warning satellites, while a complete constellation would require ten satellites. Russia would need at least five satellites to provide minimum coverage of the U.S. territory.

Although the Russian system's decline is indeed serious, it does not necessarily increase the dangers associated with launch-on-warning. A loss of early-warning capability would pose a dire risk only if it were sudden and unexpected or discovered at the time of an attack. But this is not the case in Russia, where deterioration of the early-warning network has been gradual and well understood.

Since the early-warning system is an essential element of a launch-on-warning posture, it is understandable that a number of proposals that aim at reducing the risks of accidental launch suggest helping Russia to repair or upgrade its system. Instead of reducing the risk, however, upgrades would most likely increase risk by introducing new elements into the already complex system and increasing confidence in its performance.

Instead of trying to help Russia repair its early-warning system, efforts should be directed at helping Russia change the command-and-control procedures to accommodate the loss of early-warning capability. These changes would almost certainly result in a shift away from the launch-on-warning posture, reducing the risk of an accidental launch.

Trust And Do Not Verify

One reason de-alerting measures have not yet been implemented is that most of them are thought to require intrusive verification procedures. Indeed, measures like removal of nuclear warheads from missiles or limiting strategic submarine patrol areas, proposed by many, would be very difficult to implement in a transparent and verifiable manner.

Transparency, however, is not required to achieve the main goal of de-alerting-reduction of the risk associated with the launch-on-warning postures. The benefits of de-alerting do not depend on the ability to verify them. For example, submarines that are out of range of their targets cannot take part in a launch-on-warning strike regardless of whether the other side is able to verify their locations. Of course, without verification the opponent would have to assume that these submarines are in full readiness, but there is nothing wrong with that as long as we do not consider de-alerting a substitute for disarmament.

In fact, transparency makes de-alerting not only harder to implement but potentially dangerous. If measures that reduce the readiness level are visible and verifiable, an attempt to bring missiles back into operation could create instability in a crisis situation, when countries could find themselves in a rush to re-alert their forces. The dangers associated with this kind of instability could well outweigh any benefits of de-alerting.

Ideally, de-alerting measures should be designed in a way that would make them undetectable. That way, each side could reap the benefits-missiles not being available for launch-on-warning-while avoiding the instabilities associated with re-alerting.

Unilateral Solutions

The greatest challenge to de-alerting is not devising technical proposals but finding ways to convince the United States and Russia to implement them. This would be very difficult, for the United States and Russia have grown wary recently of negotiated agreements that would impose limits on their strategic forces. However, de-alerting seems ideally suited for unilateral non-binding declarations that might work now.

Russia and the United States could begin with a public commitment to de-alert a portion of their strategic arsenals. Of course, there will be plenty of questions about the value of a commitment that is neither enforceable nor verifiable. But this value would be quite real if both sides follow through and change their practices and procedures to exclude at least part of their forces from the launch-on-warning arrangements. The risk of a catastrophic accident will be reduced and these practices could then be extended to the whole force, further reducing the risk.

Making practical steps toward reducing the danger of accidental launch will not be easy. But de-alerting is one of those few arms control issues that still enjoy fairly strong political and public support. This support certainly creates an opportunity for action.

A new united nations report recommending the most sweeping reform in the institution's history offers a global vision of collective security for the 21st century that is as committed to development in poor nations as it is to prevention of nuclear terrorism in rich ones.

The point is, according to the report's research director, Stephen Stedman, a threat to one is a threat to all in today's world. "Globalization means that a major terrorist attack anywhere in the industrial world would have devastating consequences for the well-being of millions around the developing world," the document states. The report's value lies in putting forward a comparative framework of collective security that addresses all the compelling threats of the day, Stedman explained. "The recommendations really are the most important possible makeover of the institution in 60 years," he said. "I think something is going to come out of it." Stedman, a senior fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at the Stanford Institute for International Studies (SIIS), was recruited a year ago by U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan to direct research for the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change. Stedman is an expert on civil wars, mediation, conflict prevention, and peacekeeping.

Annan created the 16-member blue-ribbon panel, made up mostly of former government leaders and ministers, in the wake of widespread heated criticism of the United Nations following the U.S.-led war in Iraq. In Annan's annual report to the General Assembly in 2003, he said, "Rarely have such dire forecasts been made about the U.N. ... We have reached a fork in the road ... a moment no less decisive than 1945 itself, when the U.N. was founded." The panel was charged with analyzing global security threats and proposing far-reaching reforms to the international system.

On December 2 the panel, chaired by former Thai prime minister Anand Panyarachun, issued its 95-page report: "A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility." The document identifies six major threats to global security:

-War between states;

-Violence within states, including civil wars, large-scale human rights abuses, and genocide;

-Poverty, infectious disease, and environmental degradation;

-Nuclear, radiological, chemical, and biological weapons;

-Terrorism; and

-Transnational organized crime.

Although states do not face these threats equally, a collective security system must take all member states' threats seriously and deal with them equitably, the report noted. It specifically mentioned the world's appallingly slow response to AIDS.

The report makes 101 recommendations for collective prevention and response to the threats, including ways to reform the United Nations. Annan described these in a December 3 editorial in the International Herald Tribune as "the most comprehensive and coherent set of proposals for forging a common response to common threats that I have seen."

The document also reaffirms the right of states to defend themselves-even preemptively-when an attack is imminent, and it offers guidelines to help the Security Council decide when to authorize the use of force. Stedman said other significant proposals involve improving biosecurity, strengthening nuclear nonproliferation, and defining terrorism. Panel members agreed that any politically motivated violence against civilians should be regarded as terrorism and condemned.

The panel was very critical of the Human Rights Commission, a body that has often harmed the United Nations' reputation by permitting the membership of some of the worst human-rights violators, including Cuba, Libya, and Sudan. The report also discussed the need for new institutions, such as a peace-building commission, that would support countries emerging from conflict.

Scott Sagan, co-director of CISAC, described the report as hard-hitting, although he said he would have tried to extend the withdrawal clause of the nonproliferation treaty from three months to a year. "I think it's the beginning of some major changes that will be helpful," he said. "We need to get states to work together to reform the U.N. rather than sniping at it."

CISAC was closely involved in the panel's work and was named in a cover letter accompanying the report from Panyarachun to Annan. Co-director Chris Chyba served on the panel's 30-member resource group, providing expertise on nuclear nonproliferation and bioterrorism. Bruce Jones, a former CISAC Hamburg Fellow, acted as Stedman's deputy, and Tarun Chhabra, a graduate of CISAC's undergraduate honors program and recent Marshall Scholarship recipient, worked as a research officer. Political science Professors David Laitin and James Fearon, and SIIS Senior Fellow David Victor, provided, respectively, expertise on terrorism, civil wars, and the environment, Stedman said. "There is an immense amount of Stanford influence in the report," he added.

CISAC also hosted a nuclear nonproliferation workshop for the panel on campus last March and helped organize a meeting during the summer in Bangkok. SIIS co-hosted a conference on governance and sovereignty on campus in April and a meeting at Oxford University in June. CISAC provided workspace to give the research team a quiet place to focus on writing the report's first draft in August.

The report has attracted intense international media interest in part because it calls for expanding the U.N. Security Council, its top decision-making group, from 15 to 24 members. The panel was unable to agree on one proposal and offers two options that would make the council more representative and democratic. "I believe either formula would strengthen the legitimacy in the eyes of the world, by bringing its membership closer to the realities of the 21st century-as opposed to those of 1945, when the U.N. Charter was drafted," Annan wrote in the International Herald Tribune.

According to Stedman, the media has highlighted the Security Council's proposed expansion because so many nations have a stake in it. "But in the absence of a new consensus on international peace and security, expansion of the council will not be effective," he explained.

In March, Annan will use the report to inform a series of proposals he will present to the 191 U.N. member states. These, in turn, will be submitted to a summit of world leaders before the General Assembly convenes next September in New York. Stedman said he has been asked to stay on for another year as a special advisor to the secretary general to keep the United Nations "on message" during negotiations.

Engagement by the United States, which has openly questioned the institution's relevance, will be critical to implementing the report's recommendations, said Stedman, who added that the superpower can benefit from a revamped United Nations. "Putting threats to the United States into a global framework makes it more secure," he said.

Stedman noted that one of the most disturbing aspects of the panel's consultations was listening to government representatives from civil-society organizations dismiss the seriousness of bio- and nuclear terror threats against the United States. "They were essentially denying this as a real threat to American security," he said. "I said it's as real a threat to the U.S. as other threats are to you."

When Stedman accepted the job, he thought he would spend 80 percent of his time on research and writing and 20 percent on consultations and negotiating. In fact, he said, it was the other way around. "It's unlike anything I've ever done," he said. "It's been a blast." In contrast to academia, where a researcher presents his or her best findings and defends them, Stedman was faced with 16 people who would push back, reject, or accept his work. "I had to work to change language to include their concerns," he said. "My biggest concern at the beginning was that the report would be based on the lowest common denominator. It's not."

Stedman said the panel members remained open-minded throughout the year. "They showed flexibility, listened to arguments, and changed their minds," he said. "Our job was to be as persuasive, rigorous, and comprehensive in our analysis as we were able to achieve."

In the end, Stedman said, the report belongs to the panel. "Parts of what the exercise shows is that access to those making policy is really important," he said. "If you do really good work and you have access, you have a chance of being heard. Kofi Annan gave me that opportunity."

Among the growing number of recent cases where international actors have become engaged in trying to rebuild a shattered state and construct democracy after conflict, Iraq is somewhat unique. The state collapsed not as a result of a civil war or internal conflict, but as a result of external military action to overthrow it. We are still very much in the middle of an internationally assisted political reconstruction process in Iraq, and we will not know for a year or two, or maybe five or ten, the outcome of the postwar effort to rebuild the Iraqi state. Nevertheless, some important lessons can be identified.

Prepare For A Major Commitment

Rebuilding a failed state is an extremely expensive and difficult task under any circumstance, and even more so in the wake of violent conflict. Success requires a very substantial commitment of human and financial resources, delivered in a timely and effective fashion, and sustained over an extended period of time, lasting (not necessarily through occupation or trusteeship, but at least through intensive international engagement) for a minimum of five to ten years.

Commit Enough Troops

One of the major problems with the American engagement in Iraq is that there were not enough international troops on the ground in the wake of state collapse to secure the immediate postwar order. As a result, Iraq descended into lawless chaos once Saddam's regime fell. The United States Army wanted a much larger force on the ground in order to secure the postwar order, something like 400,000 troops rather than the total invasion force of less than 200,000 that was ultimately authorized. Of course, what is needed is not simply enough troops but the right kind of troops with the proper rules of engagement. It does no good to have troops on the ground if they simply stand by and watch what is left of the state being stolen and burned. One lesson of Iraq is that international post-conflict stabilization missions need to be able to deploy not just a conventional army but a muscular peace implementation force that is somewhere between a war-making army and a crime-fighting police, between a rapid reaction and riot control force.

Mobilize International Legitimacy and Cooperation

In the contemporary era, a successful effort at post-conflict reconstruction requires broad international legitimacy and cooperation, for at least two key reasons. First, the scope and duration of engagement is typically more than any one country-and public-is willing to bear on its own. The broader the international coalition, the greater the human and financial resources that can be mobilized, and the more likely that the engagement of any participating country can be sustained, as its public sees a sense of shared international commitment and sacrifice. Second, when there is broad international engagement and legitimacy, people within the post-conflict country are less likely to see the intervention as the imperial project of one country or set of countries. All other things being equal, international cooperation and legitimacy tends to generate greater domestic legitimacy-or at least acceptance-for the intervention.

Generate legitimacy and trust within the post-conflict country

No international reconstruction effort can succeed without some degree of acceptance and cooperation-and eventually support and positive engagement-from the people in the post-conflict country. Without some degree of trust in the initial international administration and its intentions, the international intervention can become the target of popular wrath, and will then need to spend most of its military (and administrative) energies defending itself rather than rebuilding the country and its political and social order. Unfortunately, these qualities were lacking in the occupation of Iraq, and the Iraqi people knew it. From the very beginning, the American occupation failed to earn the trust and respect of the Iraqi people. As noted above, it failed in its first and most important obligation as an occupying power-to establish order and public safety. Then it failed to convey early on any clear plan for post-conflict transition.

All international post-conflict interventions to reconstruct a failed state on more democratic foundations confront a fundamental contradiction. Their goal is, in large measure, democracy: popular, representative, and accountable government, in which "the people" are sovereign. But their means are undemocratic: in essence, some form of imperial domination, however temporary and transitional. This requires a balancing of international trusteeship or imperial functions with a distinctly non-imperial attitude and some clear and early specification of an acceptable timetable for the restoration of full sovereignty. As much as possible, the humiliating features of an extended, all-out occupation should be avoided.

Hold Local Elections First

One of the toughest issues on which to generalize concerns the timing of elections. Ill-timed and ill-prepared elections do not produce democracy, or even political stability, after conflict. Instead, they may only enhance the power of actors who mobilize coercion, fear, and prejudice, reviving autocracy and even precipitating large-scale violent strife. In Angola in 1992, in Bosnia in 1996, and in Liberia in 1997, rushed elections set back the prospects for democracy and, in Angola and Liberia, paved the way for renewed civil war. There are therefore compelling reasons, based in logic and in recent historical experience, for deferring national elections until militias have been demobilized, new moderate parties trained and assisted, electoral infrastructure created, and democratic media and ideas generated. International interventions that seek to construct democracy after conflict must balance the tension between domination for democracy and withdrawal through democracy. In these circumstances, two temptations compete: to transform the country, its institutions and values, through an extended and penetrating occupation (à la British colonial rule), and to hold elections and get out as soon as possible. The question is always, in part, how long can international rule be viable? In Iraq, for better or worse, the answer-readily apparent from history, and from the profound and widespread suspicion of American motives in the region and among Iraqis themselves-was: not long.

Disperse Economic Reconstruction Funds and Democratic Assistance As Widely As Possible

Both for the effectiveness and speed of economic revival, and in order to build up local trust and acceptance, there is a compelling need for the decentralization of relief and reconstruction efforts, as well as democratic civic assistance. The more that the international administration, as well as private donors, works with and through local partners, the more likely that their relief and reconstruction efforts will be directed toward the most urgent needs, and the better the prospect for the accumulation of political trust and cooperation with the overall transition project. In Iraq there was a particularly compelling need for the creation of jobs, which might have been done more rapidly by channeling repair and reconstruction contracts more extensively through a wide range of local Iraqi contractors, instead of through the big American mega-corporations.

Proceed With Some Humility

This encompasses perhaps the ultimate, overarching contradiction. It is hard to imagine a bolder, more assertive, and self-confident act than a nation, or a set of nations, or "the international community," intervening to seize effective sovereignty in another nation. There is nothing the least bit humble about it. But ultimately the intervention cannot succeed, and the institutions it establishes cannot be viable, unless there is some sense of participation and ultimately "ownership" on the part of the people in the failed and re-emerging state. This is why holding local elections as early as possible is so important. It is why it is so vital to engage local partners, as extensively as possible, in post-conflict relief and economic reconstruction. And it is why the process of constitution making must be democratic and broadly participatory.