Gary Mukai, director of the Stanford Program on International and Cross-Cultural Education (SPICE), was awarded the Foreign Minister's Commendation at the official residence of the Consul General of Japan in San Francisco on Oct. 5. The commendation recognizes Mukai for "greatly contribut[ing] to the promotion of mutual understanding between Japan and the United States, especially in the field of education...[and] lend[ing] his energy and expertise to actively supporting and implementing the goals and objectives of the Japan Exchange and Teaching Program (JET Program) and the activities of the JET Alumni Association of Northern California."

Mukai has been developing curricula on Japan and U.S.-Japan relations for secondary school students since he joined SPICE in 1988. As part of his leadership of SPICE, he helps oversee the Reischauer Scholars Program, a distance-learning course co-sponsored by SPICE and the Center for Global Partnership at the Japan Foundation. Each year the program selects 25 exceptional high school juniors and seniors from the United States to engage in an intensive study of Japan. Though his own experience teaching English in Japan, from 1977 to 1980, predated JET, Mukai has been closely involved with the 20-year-old program. He has been an interviewer since 1989 and has also spoken at JET orientations and panel discussions.

In bestowing the commendation, Consul General Yasumasa Nagamine called Mukai a "bridge between our two countries."

Mukai accepted the commendation with characteristic graciousness, thanking the foreign minister and crediting his SPICE and FSI colleagues for the honor. "I am very humbled by this honor from the Japanese Foreign Minister," said Mukai. "I would like to say that none of my work at SPICE would be possible without my SPICE colleagues. Also, I truly feel indebted to my colleagues at FSI. Without them, SPICE wouldn't be what it is today and SPICE wouldn't have such an embracing home."

With regards to promoting cross-cultural understanding, Mukai said, "Since joining SPICE nearly 20 years ago, one of the highlights of my work has been working with Stanford faculty and the Consulate General of Japan, San Francisco, on helping young American and Japanese students better understand one another and appreciate the importance of U.S.-Japan relations."

Retired Stanford professor Daniel I. Okimoto, who recently received a medal of honor from the Japanese government for his role in U.S.-Japan relations, praised Mukai in a short speech. "No one deserves this honor more than Gary Mukai," Okimoto said. "I think Gary is a remarkable leader, mentor, entrepreneur, and friend."

Since 1976 SPICE has supported efforts to internationalize elementary and secondary school curricula by linking the research and teaching at Stanford University to the schools through the production of high-quality curriculum materials on international and cross-cultural topics. Housed in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University, SPICE has produced over 100 supplementary curriculum units on Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Europe, Latin America, the global environment, and international political economy. SPICE draws upon the diverse faculty and programmatic interests of Stanford University to link knowledge, inquiry, and practice in exemplary curriculum materials.

Within weeks of 9/11, Japan dispatched ships to the Indian Ocean to provide fuel and other support to the Western forces waging the war in Afghanistan.

It was the first time since World War II that Japan sent forces abroad to support an overseas military conflict, although in a noncombat role. American policymakers hailed Japan as a loyal ally, willing to put "boots on the ground."

Come Nov. 1, however, the Japanese ships will be heading home.

American officials worry that, after taking steps to shed its postwar pacifism, Japan will now shirk its role as an ally in international security.

But these concerns are alarmist. The Japanese government, even its liberal opposition party, has shown a desire and commitment to contribute to global security.

A renewal of the law authorizing the mission in Afghanistan is now increasingly unlikely, since the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which opposes the measure, won a shocking victory in last summer's elections for the upper house of parliament. While the ruling conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is still determined to reauthorize the military role, it faces significant public opposition and a tough road in the parliament.

Some American officials and experts have issued bellicose warnings that not renewing the mission would signal a dangerous retreat from Japan's responsibilities in the world and undermine the security alliance. Others accused DPJ leader Ozawa Ichiro of being irresponsible, even "anti-American."

These remarks are clumsy and unfair. The possibility of Japan's return to a lesser security role is real enough, but its mission in Afghanistan is the wrong test of the country's reliability as an ally.

In reality, the maritime mission has become largely symbolic. As for Mr. Ozawa, if Americans would listen carefully to his arguments, they would find that he seeks to expand, not contract, Japan's global security role.

What the US sees as backtracking on global responsibility is actually something else --opposition, shared by Japan's liberal and conservative parties, to the American decision to invade Iraq. Once carefully buried behind the appearance of alliance solidarity, it is now surfacing.

Ozawa and his party have been unusually open in questioning the Iraq war, characterizing it as a war without clear international justification. According to reliable accounts, Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda Kazuo privately shares that view, as do others in the LDP.

US officials critical of the DPJ for avoiding a greater security role for Japan should remember that the party supported the antiterrorism law when it was passed in 2001. But they refused to support its renewal later after the Iraq war began. Over time, senior DPJ members say, the mission's original purpose got muddied with military operations in Iraq. Japanese and American officials deny that any diversion took place, but the Pentagon admits that ships engage in multiple missions and there is no way to segregate how fuel is used.

The new version of the law proposed by the LDP explicitly narrows the role of the Navy to supporting antiterrorist interdiction operations, a backhanded acknowledgment that there was no clear separation from the Iraq war.

Ozawa has long advocated a more visible security role for Japan outside its borders, calling on the government to send forces to aid the Gulf War in 1991 and pushing through legislation allowing Japanese participation in UN peacekeeping operations.

Japanese peacekeepers, however, are restricted to noncombat missions. Despite inching toward a larger security role, the government stands by an interpretation of Japan's American-authored antiwar clause in its Constitution that bars the use of force for anything other than to respond to an attack on themselves. But Ozawa has long contended that the constitutional bar should not extend to UN activities.

This month, Ozawa proposed that instead of the maritime force, Japan should send peacekeepers to Afghanistan under the auspices of the UN-authorized international security forces, and to Sudan as well.

Ironically, the ruling conservatives reject that as unconstitutional, arguing it would be an act of collective defense rather than self-defense.

"If Japan is to really be an ally of the US ..." Ozawa wrote, "it should hold its head up high and strive to give proper advice to the US." And in order to do that," he continued, "Japan had to be willing to put itself more on the line by sharing responsibility for peacekeeping, not just sending a few boats out of harm's way."

These are ideas that should be embraced, rather than denounced, by American officials.

Reprinted by permission by the Christian Science Monitor.

Once the jewel in the crown of the formidable British Empire, India has been surrounded by myth for years. After gaining independence in 1948, this often misunderstood country found itself faced with a new sense of freedom -- and along with it, enormous burdens and challenges. While exotic, mysterious, and seductive, it has also become an economic force to be reckoned with. With the fourth largest economy in the world, the largest youth population on Earth, and a thriving middle class, India is the second-most-preferred destination for foreign investment. But very few Americans truly understand what a rich and powerful country it has become -- or its role as a global power, center of outsourcing, and potential partner with the United States.

From the country's thriving film industry to its burgeoning high-tech industry, as well as its attempts to stabilize its economy, India Arriving offers a fascinating glimpse into the real India, with all of its assets and all of its faults.

Author Rafiq Dossani goes beneath the veil surrounding India and considers the many ways it has begun to emerge onto the world stage. He explores its birth as an independent nation and forces like political shifts, social reform, and education that have helped to shape a new India. Honest and revelatory, India Arriving provides a deeper understanding of a country that promises to be the next major player in the world economy.

Northeast Asia stands at a turning point in its history. The key economies of China, Japan, and South Korea are growing increasingly interdependent, and the movement toward regionalism is gaining momentum. Yet interdependency, often set in a global context, also spurs nationalism in all three countries, and beyond in East Asia. The essays in this volume assess current interactions -- or cross currents -- between national and regional forces in Northeast Asia, and suggest their future direction.

Cross Currents: Regionalism and Nationalism in Northeast Asia features provocative, plain-spoken contributions from a range of eminent international scholars and practitioners. They address key questions facing the region today: What competing visions of regional integration are being considered in Northeast Asia? Will they be realized? How do national pressures, especially the renewed China-Japan rivalry, stunt the movement toward regionalism? What role can Korea play to mitigate tensions between the two arch-rivals? How does the United States figure in Northeast Asian regionalism? Do America's Cold War alliances still have currency?

By addressing these questions from both Asian and U.S. perspectives, Cross Currents sheds new light on the interplay of national and regional forces in this strategic part of the world. Reformulating these interactions constructively is one of Northeast Asia's most pressing contemporary challenges.