The following is Part 12 of a multiple-part series. To read previous installments in this series, please visit the following articles: Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, Part 5, Part 6, Part 7, Part 8, Part 9, Part 10, and Part 11.

Since December 8, 2020, SPICE has posted 11 articles that highlight reflections from 88 students on the question, “What does it mean to be an American?” Part 12 features seven additional reflections. The reflections below do not necessarily reflect those of the SPICE staff.

The free educational website “What Does It Mean to Be an American?” offers six lessons on immigration, civic engagement, leadership, civil liberties & equity, justice & reconciliation, and U.S.–Japan relations. The lessons encourage critical thinking through class activities and discussions. On March 24, 2021, SPICE’s Rylan Sekiguchi was honored by the Association for Asian Studies for his authorship of the lessons that are featured on the website, which was developed by the Mineta Legacy Project in partnership with SPICE.

Emma Estrada, California 
For me, being an American means utilizing all the opportunities provided by the country to the people. Being able to fulfill your hopes and dreams that seem impractical to accomplish. There is a meaning behind people coming to this country. It’s because they are in search of a fresh start and our nation’s liberty and individualism allows them to have one. America has many different cultures and beliefs to explore, and everyone is entitled to their own opinion. Being an American also means looking towards the future while remembering the past. There have been many people who came before us who sacrificed and fought for this country so that we could say that we are American. Living in this country allows us to not only correct but create new history to help improve our nation.

Miki Harris, California
To be American is to accept that I will never pass as one race. It is to accept that people may make a game out of guessing my ethnicity. It is to accept that I may feel out of place in family gatherings and countries of my ethnic origin.

But to be American is to realize the unique variation of people around me and celebrate it. It is learning cultural history in African American studies, trying my friend’s homemade tamales, or simply people-watching in the school hallways.

For me, having the freedom to decide where I fit and who I am is what it means to be American. How could I ever feel out of place when there is no one place to begin with?

Bo Ichiki, California
While living in Japan, I felt an overwhelming catalog of systematic milestones for success—attend a nice elementary school, get good grades, take extracurricular activities, attend a nice middle school, and eventually get accepted for a job at a successful company, known as ōte kigyō (大手企業). For me, being American is the governing of one’s own life. Here, society seems only to shadow who we are, and leave the outline and colors for ourselves to picture—good or bad. The freedom can result in too much for one to handle. In Japan, crime rates are much lower than those of the U.S., and the disparity of wealth is much smaller; there are fewer poverty-stricken citizens or incredibly rich individuals. In the U.S., there is less guidance on the “proper” way to become successful, which leads to the inconsistency that proves to be either the gift of abstract and unique innovations or the curse of poverty and being misled. Being American allows citizens to draw a new path to the good or to the bad. Being American grants the right of control.

Claire Ishimatsu, California
When I think of America, I think of freedom, particularly the freedom to learn about my culture. As a fifth-generation Japanese American, I grew up in a very American household where being Japanese wasn’t a large part of my life. Seeing my friends speak a second language and celebrate cultural holidays inspired me to explore my ancestral heritage. I learned that my grandparents were incarcerated in the Japanese American Incarceration Camps during World War II. They lived during a time when it was “wrong” to be of Japanese descent so they distanced themselves from their native tongue and traditions. Nonetheless, they remained proud Americans with some even fighting in the war against Japan. Hearing their experiences made me grateful for the freedoms I have today. Now my family celebrates Japanese holidays and traditions. I’m also taking Japanese at my high school, and slowly, the language has started to fill my house like it did a century ago. Being American means having the freedom to learn about and embrace my Japanese identity.

Jibhum Lee, Hawai‘i
clank...clank…clank

One hundred and seventy six years ago, immigrants from many countries as well as from other parts of the United States took on a perilous journey to California. They were drawn to the California Gold Rush. Accompanying them were rhythmic “clanks”—the sound of their tools, wagons, and buckles. At each step, a “clank” gave a powerful beat as they headed toward their destination. Being an American does not mean having a navy-blue passport with the gold-leafed “United States of America.” When I was young, I compared my green-covered Korean passport with the dark blue my eyes drowned in, thinking to myself, “When will I have that?” These things are arbitrary in comparison to the rhythmic beat every American carries—the sound of passion and trust in finding their North Star. “American” is a label too small for the people who make up this country. Yet, the “clanks” made by those who immigrated and struggled to keep their place in America are passed through generations. What unites us is this beat: sometimes loud and oftentimes soft, but always steady.

Sofia McGullam Ornelas, California
The United States has a rich history of asking the complex question: What does it mean to be an American? The answer to this question has varied according to the time, place, and context of when it has been asked. For example, there have been times in American history that excluded ethnic minority groups from full citizenship rights. Our country is a mosaic of different ethnic groups who have collaborated to improve civil rights. The diversity of the United States informs the idea that anyone can come here and make a better life for themselves, despite a history of certain federal administrations preventing immigration from various countries. Americans can and should point out systemic flaws and implement legislation that can provide protections for minority groups. For example, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. witnessed economic and racial inequities and drew attention to how unjust society was for people of color in the United States. The Civil Rights Movement led to the historic passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Ultimately, the meaning of being an American is always working to better this country for all its citizens while still proudly identifying and acknowledging one’s heritage.

Ryan Tonkovich, California
Most countries are founded on geographic, ethnic, and religious heritage. Not America. Unlike anywhere else, America is founded on ideas. It is these ideas that unite us as Americans and not some shared ancestral lands or a shared ethnic or religious heritage. For nearly 250 years, people have come to America seeking economic opportunity or fleeing poverty, war, and persecution. Because nearly every race, ethnicity, and religion is represented in America, it is not these elements that bind us as Americans. Rather, it is our fundamental beliefs. It is our belief in democracy, in freedom of speech, in freedom of assembly, in religious freedom, in equal protection under the law, in a nation of laws, and in “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” that defines us as Americans. 

My time in the Stanford e-Entrepreneurship Japan program was transformative. I came in with a jumble of passions and questions about the world and left with lifelong friends across the world, invaluable mentoring, and a clear vision.

Every session was a journey in and of itself. It combined strong individual and team preparation, presentations to and from amazing guest speakers, and reflective discussions at the end. This constantly pushed me and my peers to grow into better critical thinkers, speakers, listeners, and team players; high expectations yielded high results. I was amazed by the diversity of the guest speakers and the topics we dove into: design thinking, AI & philosophy, sustainability, and more. Each gave me new world perspectives and challenged me to think in ways I hadn’t before. I began pondering upon questions such as “How does this choice impact the world around me?” “Does philanthropy benefit the rich more than the underprivileged?” “How can we navigate a world of AI?” This in turn has helped me view entrepreneurship as something inherently social, a means of designing thoughtful solutions to real problems and ultimately making a positive difference in the world.

One of my most memorable moments was the final group presentation, where we advocated for a charitable organization that would receive a donation if picked by the judges. My group chose The Ocean Cleanup and devoted ourselves to understanding the socio-environmental consequences of plastic pollution, as well as presenting it in a way that would resonate with our audience. I vividly remember calling my group members past 2am one night out of pure excitement and motivation, giving feedback on each other’s slides and encouraging one another. We ended up winning! But even more than that, I am truly grateful for the relationships that SeEJ has gifted me.

In fact, as one of the few students living in the United States, I was so honored to share a screen with people from Okinawa to Hokkaido. So much so that I decided to create a Canvas announcement titled “SeEJ Hangout in Tokyo!!!!” Mission accomplished: I got to spend a few hours with my peers in person (in Shibuya!) after three months of Zoom boxes, which was an incredible and unforgettable experience.

SeEJ allowed me to embark on a journey of self-discovery as well. Through the individual research paper and 2-minute video on a social issue of choice—core pillars of SeEJ—I discovered my passion for nuclear disarmament. Growing up listening to my hibakusha (atomic bomb survivor) grandfather’s childhood stories, I never fully realized the power of his voice and my own. (Photo below courtesy of Erin Tsutsui.) Through SeEJ, I was able to name this passion and imagine a concrete path forward. Now, I commit myself to dismantling the mindset and weaponry that allows war to exist, as I am building a youth-led initiative that mobilizes and educates youth to spread hibakusha stories by utilizing digital media and grassroots engagements.

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None of this could have been possible without the generosity and dedication of our instructor, Dr. Makiko Hirata, and the incredible lineup of guest speakers who graciously shared their time, stories, and wisdom with us. They instilled in us empathy, bravery, tenacity, and a deep responsibility to care for our people and planet; I now see myself and my peers as visionaries, each with our own unique background and goals.

I thank Stanford e-Entrepreneurship Japan for teaching me that at the core of social entrepreneurship is community and humanity. One of our guest speakers, Ms. Megan Carroll, taught us a South African word that embodies this spirit: ubuntu—“I am because we are.”

Stanford e-Entrepreneurship Japan is one of several online courses offered by SPICE.

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David Meale, former U.S. diplomat and current consultant, offered a cautiously optimistic perspective on U.S.-China relations at an APARC China Program seminar, arguing that despite significant tensions, there remains substantial room for what he calls “managed rivalry”—a relationship that is neither warm nor easy, but constructive enough for both countries to serve their populations and address global challenges. Drawing on his 33 years in the U.S. Foreign Service, he traced the evolution of U.S.-China relations over the past three decades and assessed current trajectories, bringing both diplomatic experience and fresh insights from private sector concerns to his analysis.

Three Decades of Evolving Relations
 

His entry into China-focused diplomacy came in 1995 when he was assigned to Hong Kong during the handover. During that era and through the early 2000s, U.S. policy operated under the assumption that China would gradually embrace the post-war rules-based international order shaped largely by the United States. The thinking was that China would develop a self-interest in preserving this order, becoming a constructive, if not easy, partner. This belief undergirded the strong U.S. effort to bring China into the World Trade Organization in 2001.

During his service as an Economic Officer in Taiwan in the 2000s, Meale witnessed the merging of talent from Asia and the United States that built China’s electronics manufacturing industry. Five percent of Taiwan’s workforce had moved to the mainland; there were even Shanghainese dialect programs on Taiwanese television at night for those dreaming of seeking their fortunes through cross-strait opportunities. Although there was tension with the Chen Shui-bian administration, there was a surprising amount of positivity in Taiwan about the mainland. That, of course, has now changed.

The Obama administration continued to work within the framework of bringing China into the existing international order, even as concerns grew. The approach aimed to convince China to preserve and, if necessary, shape this order, while using it to constrain China when necessary, as demonstrated by the attempt to resolve the South China Sea dispute involving the Philippines through the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

The Trump administration marked a decisive shift. Meale noted that Trump openly discarded the goal of integrating China into the existing order, instead pursuing aggressive trade policies, technology restrictions, and explicit framing of China as a threat. The Chinese hoped the Biden administration would turn this around, but it instead maintained this posture, pursuing an “invest, align, compete” strategy—investing in the United States, aligning with allies, and defining the relationship as a competition.

Trump 2.0 brought “Liberation Day,” which Meale sees as the belief that the U.S. place in the world needs to be corrected; the United States is economically overextended, the trade imbalances and the associated debt cannot continue, and the supply chain vulnerability from COVID must be addressed. Tariffs were ratcheted up, and both sides imposed export controls. 

The Chinese hit back hard; Chinese officials are very proud of China’s pushback against an unchecked Trump. China’s economic growth is forecast at 5 percent this year, and the feeling from China is that it has shown the world the United States cannot push it around.

Looking ahead to 2026, Meale is optimistic. There will undoubtedly be crises that pop up: the Chinese will overreach on rare earth elements, and the United States will take an economic action that the Chinese did not plan on. Meale sees this as the “sine curve” of the U.S.-China relationship. There’s a crisis, tensions rise, there’s a response, and things eventually cool down. The curve goes up and down, but very little gets resolved.

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China's Current Challenges
 

China, Meale noted, effectively contains two economies: one serving approximately 400 million people who are producing world-class products with perhaps the world's best industrial ecosystem and impressive infrastructure, and another economy serving the rest of China's population, which has improved significantly over recent decades but relies heavily on informal work and the gig economy.
China faces deep structural problems, including a property sector crisis that has destroyed significant household wealth, an economy structured excessively around investment rather than consumption, youth unemployment reflecting a mismatch between graduating students and available jobs, and "involution" (neijuan, 内卷)—a race to the bottom in sectors where government incentives have driven overcapacity. China's reliance on export-led growth comes at a time when its overcapacity is increasingly unwelcome not just in developed countries but across the global South.

These challenges, Meale argues, will not result in a financial crisis or recession, but rather chronic headaches that will affect its foreign relations. Growth will continue, albeit at a slower pace, and the country will have significant work ahead to address inequality and structural imbalances.

On the question of Taiwan, Meale pushed back against predictions of imminent Chinese military action, particularly speculation about 2027 as a critical year tied to the 100th anniversary of the People's Liberation Army. He argued that, right now, one of China’s top goals is to avoid being drawn into a Taiwan conflict. China has recently purged nine senior military officials and is dealing with serious problems in its military. Five years from now, however, the situation could look quite different.

Defining End States and Finding Common Ground
 

Meale concluded by outlining what he believes each side seeks as an end state, arguing that these visions, while different, are not irreconcilable. Rather than global domination, he argued China seeks a world that works for what it calls "grand rejuvenation." This means overcoming the century of humiliation, reunifying with Taiwan, and living safely and securely on its own terms. China wants recognition as a global power, dominance in its near seas, freedom from technology containment, elimination of shipping chokepoints, access to markets, and the ability to pursue relationships with ideologically aligned countries.

The United States, meanwhile, accepts that competition with China is permanent but seeks a predictable China. U.S. goals include protecting advanced technology where it has an advantage, avoiding supply chain vulnerabilities, shaping Beijing's choices without attempting to control them, maintaining the Taiwan status quo until it evolves in a mutually and naturally agreed way, and ensuring fair trade to address what it sees as a stacked deck in current trade relationships. The United States also wants to prevent China from enabling adversaries, as seen in Chinese firms rebuilding Russia's military-industrial complex while maintaining nominal neutrality on Ukraine.

These end states, Meale acknowledged, collide in many ways but not in absolute ways. He sees substantial room for leader-driven, managed rivalry that can function constructively. This rivalry will not be easy or warm, but it can allow both countries to serve their populations while cooperating where global interests align.
 

Key Takeaways  
 

• The “integrated China” assumption is over. U.S. policy no longer aims to bring China into the existing international order, marking a fundamental shift from decades of engagement strategy.
• China's economy faces structural challenges, not a crisis. China will continue to grow, but must address inequality, overcapacity, and wealth destruction from the property crisis.
• Taiwan timing matters more to Beijing than deadlines. China seeks to control when and how the Taiwan issue is resolved, preferring not to be forced into premature action.
• Managed rivalry is possible. Despite significant tensions and incompatible elements of each side's goals, there remains space for constructive competition. While the relationship between the world's two largest economies will stay competitive and often contentious, it need not become catastrophic.
   

The longer these authoritarian parties are in power, the more they eviscerate democratic institutions. But they are not invincible or irreversible. Incipient authoritarianism has been turned back in countries as diverse as Brazil, Poland, Sri Lanka, and Senegal. The slide away from liberal democracy has been reversed recently in Botswana and Mauritius. An executive coup against democracy was defeated in South Korea. Young people in Bangladesh overthrew a dictator last year in a remarkable upsurge of protest. And the longstanding autocracies in Venezuela and Turkey are looking increasingly desperate and unpopular. These examples bear lessons we must learn and promote if we are to ignite — as we surely can — a new era of democratic progress.

First, we must study what it takes to defeat autocrats at the ballot box. Typically, electoral battles are not a straight contrast between democracy and autocracy. Voters weigh their circumstances of life as well. Fortunately, autocrats have other failings besides their corruption, lawlessness, and abuse of power: sooner or later, they fail to deliver on their material promises. Successful democratic campaigns target the populists’ hypocrisy and address not just people’s political rights but their economic and social needs. 

To defeat autocrats, democratic forces must offer specific, credible plans to meet the core policy challenges of economic growth and distribution, fairness and inclusion, education, health care, infrastructure, public safety, and national security. 

But people everywhere also need a vision of what constitutes a good and just form of government. Here, democracies have dropped the ball in making the case FOR democracy as the best form of government. Decades ago, as they fought dictatorships and then came to power, democracies taught their young people the values, ideas, and history of democracy. But as new democracies stabilized, the existence of a democratic culture came to be assumed, and countries forgot the terrible price they paid under dictatorship — the fear, falsehoods, powerlessness, and repression, the lack of accountability, voice, justice, and human dignity. We can make the practical case for democracy — it performs better over time. But we cannot pin the argument on performance, which may fail at specific points in time.
 

Ultimately, the case for democracy is that being able to speak truth to power, to hold it accountable, and to change those who exercise it is a core element of human dignity and a basic human right. The freedoms to speak, publish, pray, organize, and assemble are inalienable human rights. As are the rights to a fair and impartial trial and to have all citizens be treated equally under the law. It is only democracy — never autocracy — that protects these rights and treats citizens with dignity by investing sovereignty in them, not some self-appointed minority. Liberty and democracy are intertwined.

We must make these points relentlessly, creatively, and convincingly, not just in the schools, at successively higher levels of instruction and deliberation, but through the social media platforms where people live their information lives. Russia, China, Iran, and other autocracies wage extensive propaganda campaigns to trash liberal values and institutions. They portray democracy as lacking in dynamism, capacity, and masculine strength. These arguments are false, offensive, and degrading to the human spirit. But they will not fail of their own accord. They need to be defeated by better, more inspiring arguments and narratives about why people need freedom to thrive, and why societies need democracy to have freedom.

Today, there are four arenas of struggle for the future of freedom, and democrats must prevail in all of them. The core battle is now in the countries that have been sliding back from democracy to autocracy. 

In almost every instance where authoritarian projects have been defeated, it has been through elections. Illiberal populists crave the legitimacy that comes from victory in multiparty elections. But corruption and misrule erode their electoral support. So, they need elections that are competitive enough to validate their claim to rule but rigged enough to minimize the risk of defeat. The pathway to restoring democracy is to seize the electoral opportunity, flood the zone with election workers and observers, and wage an effective campaign so that people who have grown weary of authoritarian abuse can defeat it at the ballot box.

To win, democrats must forge a unified coalition across factional and ideological divides. They must offer concrete policy ideas to improve people’s lives. They need a narrative about what has happened to justice and democracy, and why restoring these will help to make the country great again. A campaign is not a legal brief. It must inspire and excite. It requires strong, compelling leadership. It must engage diverse sections of society, including people who once supported the authoritarian populists but are now disillusioned. Democrats must also express patriotism and show that illiberal populists wave a false flag. Democrats are the truer patriots because they recognize democracy and liberty as pillars of national greatness.

These lessons can help to restore democracy where it has been lost and to secure it in a second arena, when it is under challenge from authoritarian populist parties. But there are two other arenas of struggle in which we must prevail. Globally, democrats cannot let the world’s powerful authoritarian states capture and hollow out the global institutions to defend freedom — the UN Human Rights Council, the international and regional instruments of electoral observation and assistance, and the rules that govern the flows of data and information. Neither can we shrink from the global battle to support democratic values and free flows of information, and to lend technical and financial support to peoples, parties, media, and movements around the world struggling for freedom. 

In the face of isolationist efforts to defund and withdraw from this cause, we must convince democratic publics that we can only secure our own freedom by supporting that of others. A more democratic world will be a safer, fairer, less corrupt, more peaceful, and prosperous world.
 

All of that has been under existential challenge in Ukraine since Russia’s brutal invasion in February of 2022. Resisting aggression is the fourth arena of struggle. There is no more urgent priority than to give the Ukrainian people the weapons, resources, and economic sanctions to defeat Russian aggression. Similarly, we must ensure that Taiwan’s democracy does not suffer the same aggression from the People’s Republic of China. Taiwan must have the weapons, trade, and international dignity it needs to survive. We must preserve the status quo across the strait by making clear that the US and other democracies stand behind the resolve of a free people to chart their own destiny in Taiwan — as we do in Ukraine.

We meet here today just a short distance from the grotesque wall that stood for decades as the dividing line between freedom and tyranny. 36 years ago — almost to this day — the wall was torn down. Few imagined it would happen when it did. But it did because of democratic conviction and resolve. Now, we are in a new cold war with global authoritarianism. The history of Berlin should constantly remind us that freedom is fragile, but it can also be resilient. We must never lose faith in the rightness of our cause and the obligation we bear once again to defend freedom in an hour of peril.

Professor Diamond delivered this speech at the Berlin Freedom Conference on November 10, 2025.

Motivation & Overview:

Black Americans have long and overwhelmingly supported the Democratic Party, though Donald Trump modestly increased his share of the Black vote in 2024 (15%, up from 8% in 2020). Given this enduring partisan loyalty — and the fact that Democrats generally take more liberal policy positions than Republicans — we might expect a strong overlap between Black Americans’ partisanship and their ideological self-identification. Yet, according to national surveys, up to 50 percent of Black Americans describe themselves as conservative, a pattern many social scientists have treated as paradoxical. 

In “The curious case of Black ‘conservatives’,” Hakeem Jefferson shows that the terms ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ are unfamiliar to many Black Americans. Constructing a “Liberal-Conservative Familiarity Scale,” Jefferson finds that Black Americans who are familiar with these ideological labels overwhelmingly identify as liberal Democrats. As such, the canonical liberal-conservative measure — used not only in the American National Election Studies (ANES) but also throughout the social sciences — may be ill-suited to understanding Black political behavior. Jefferson calls on researchers to describe ideological concepts more carefully to respondents and to develop new measures that better capture Black Americans’ political worldviews. 

Prior Research & Jefferson’s Intervention:

Political scientists and other researchers and practitioners have long accepted that the “mismatch” between Black voting behavior (or partisanship) and ideology is real. Some explain this by pointing to the strength of Black racial identity or consciousness: Black conservatives, they argue, are indeed conservative but support Democrats because of a shared commitment to racial progress. Others suggest that Black conservatives who might otherwise support Republicans refrain from doing so because of social costs within their communities. And indeed, experimental research has shown that Black participants are less likely to donate to Republican campaigns if they believe that members of their community will learn of such contributions. Still others emphasize that many Black Americans hold conservative views on social or moral issues, such that their identification as conservative on surveys may reflect those views, which do not necessarily inform their Democratic partisanship and thus help explain the partisanship-ideology mismatch. 

Jefferson acknowledges that there are indeed Black conservatives and that Black Americans who wish to ‘defect’ to the Republican Party may fear the social consequences of doing so. However, he argues that these explanations fall short of accounting for the long-standing mismatch between partisanship and ideology among Black Americans, and that the prevalence of Black conservative Democrats has been dramatically overstated. His argument begins with a striking observation: in 2012, 30 percent rated Barack Obama as conservative and 9 percent said they did not know where to place him ideologically. Conversely, 29 percent rated Mitt Romney as liberal, while 12 percent said they did not know. These patterns suggest that many Black respondents may have less familiarity with ideological concepts than is often assumed. Political scientists, dating back to the 1960s, have cautioned that few Americans, across racial groups, think about politics in abstract ideological terms. That the liberal-conservative measure remains so central to research on public opinion suggests that these early warnings have largely gone unheeded. 

Data & Methods:

Jefferson begins by examining the relationship between partisanship and ideological self-identification over time and across racial groups. From 1972 to 2016, the average correlation between these two measures was .44 for White Americans, compared to just .12 for Black Americans. In 2016, the correlations were .73 and .001, respectively! In other words, among Black Americans, partisanship and ideology were almost wholly unrelated.. 

As shown below, the correlation between partisanship and ideology among White Americans has increased sharply over the past five decades, reflecting the broader ideological sorting of the major parties since the 1960s. By contrast, among Black Americans, the relationship has remained weak and, if anything, has slightly declined over time.
 

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Figure 1. Correlation between ideology and partisanship over time, by race, ANES 1972–2016. Figure 1 displays the correlation coefficient (r) between ideology and partisanship in the ANES over time. The red open dots indicate the r for Black Americans. The black closed dots indicate that for whites. LOESS lines are overlaid in black for white Americans and dashed red for Black Americans.
 

In addition, Jefferson notes that in 2012, 41 percent of Black respondents who were asked to identify their political ideology answered “don’t know,” while 18 percent placed themselves at the midpoint. In total, roughly 60 percent of Black respondents declined to take a clear ideological position. By contrast, only 19 percent of White respondents said “don’t know,” and 24 percent identified as moderate.

To further explore these patterns, Jefferson constructs a five-item Liberal-Conservative (L-C) Familiarity Scale based on whether respondents correctly identified Democrats and Democratic presidential nominees as liberal, Republicans and Republican nominees as conservative, and the Republican Party as the more conservative political party. Respondents who answered all items correctly, demonstrating perfect ideological familiarity. Jefferson finds that the scale exhibits high internal consistency.

The L-C Familiarity Scale serves as Jefferson’s key independent variable, which he theorizes influences how strongly people’s ideological self-placement aligns with their partisan identification. Consistent with this expectation, Black respondents with greater ideological familiarity are more likely to exhibit coherent alignments between ideology and partisanship. As the figure below shows, among Black respondents, higher liberal-conservative familiarity is associated with a lower likelihood of identifying as conservative. In other words, Black respondents who more accurately recognize which parties and candidates are liberal or conservative tend to place themselves further to the left on the ideological scale, where we would expect them to be, given their longstanding support for the Democratic Party. Conversely, Black respondents who identify as conservative and who have a clearer grasp of ideological terms are more likely to identify as Republicans, suggesting that ideological familiarity helps resolve the apparent paradox that has long puzzled political scientists and other researchers.
 

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Figure 3. Liberal-conservative familiarity scores predict ideological identification for Black Americans (top plot), but not white Americans (bottom plot). X-axis presents liberal-conservative familiarity score and the corresponding 95th percent confidence interval. Y-axis indicates the model for predicting ideology (conservative), faceted by race. Model 1 includes controls for age, income, education, gender, economic policy attitudes, social policy attitudes, religiosity, and moral traditionalism. Model 2 includes all of model 1’s variables and feeling thermometers toward Black Americans, white Americans, big business, unions, Hispanics, middle class, and gays and lesbians. Model 3 includes all of model 2’s variables and four averaged questions for office recognition. Model 4 includes all of model 2’s variables and three averaged questions for office recognition. Model 1 includes years 1992, 1994, 1996, 2004, 2008, 2012, and 2016; Model 2 includes 2004, 2008, 2012, and 2016; Model 3 includes 2012; Model 4 includes 2004, 2008, 2012, and 2016. Models 1, 2, and 4 include year-fixed effects. Standard errors are robust SE (HC1) and clustered by year when applicable.
 

White respondents demonstrate much greater familiarity with ideological concepts, yet this familiarity does not predict their ideological self-identification, as it does for Black respondents. Instead, White ideological self-placement is more closely tied to public policy and symbolic issues, such as government involvement in the economy or attitudes toward demographic change.

These results hold even after Jefferson controls for social conservatism (e.g., religiosity), which some have argued helps explain the partisanship-ideology mismatch among Black Americans. They also persist when he controls for the interviewer’s race, addressing the alternative explanation that Black respondents may understate their Republican partisanship to avoid social sanction within their communities.

Findings & Mechanisms:

Jefferson concludes by offering several possibilities for why Black Americans exhibit lower levels of liberal-conservative familiarity. One possibility is that Black and White Americans inhabit different “racialized informational environments.” Political discourse in Black communities may focus more on concrete issues such as racial inequality and systemic injustice, while discourse in White communities may more often invoke ideological labels like “liberal” and “conservative.” Another explanation builds on the idea that the Democratic Party — with which most Black Americans identify — is itself less oriented around ideology and more around social groups and issue bundles, whereas the Republican Party is more explicitly ideological. This may lead to less exposure to ideological terms among Black Americans.

*Research-in-Brief prepared by Adam Fefer.