This essay first appeared in The Diplomat.

For decades, South Korean strategy rested on a stable hierarchy within the international order. The alliance with the United States provided security; Seoul then managed relations with Japan, Europe, China, and regional institutions around that anchor. The alliance remains indispensable, but Seoul can no longer assume that this foundation will stay stable.

The evidence is visible in the way Washington now deals with allies. In 2025, the United States initially announced sharply differentiated “reciprocal” tariffs on South Korea, Japan, and the European Union. Negotiations later produced a 15 percent baseline framework for all three, but the process mattered as much as the final rate. Trade access, industrial investment, defense procurement, and alliance politics were increasingly handled as one bargaining package. Allies were not exempt from economic pressure because they were allies.

At the same time, Europe and Asia have been building connections that would have seemed highly ambitious a decade ago. The European Union signed security and defense partnerships with Japan and South Korea in November 2024. This year, the EU and Japan launched a defense-industry dialogue, while the EU and South Korea signed a digital trade agreement and began implementing cooperation on maritime security, cyber and hybrid threats, information manipulation, space, and the defense industry. The strategic map is becoming more networked. 

The network, however, remains uneven. Japan already has a mature economic partnership with the EU and rapidly expanding defense-industry ties. EU-South Korea relations are deepening, but they still lack the density and regular strategic consultation found in EU-Japan ties. A trilateral format would therefore do more than add another meeting: it would reduce asymmetry among three partners whose capabilities are increasingly complementary.

Sign up for APARC newsletters to receive our scholars' commentary and analysis >

South Korea, Japan, and the EU now face four converging challenges and pressures.

The first is demographic. South Korea is aging faster than any other OECD society; Japan’s working-age population has been shrinking for decades; and the EU’s fertility rate reached a new low in 2024. Demography is not a social-policy sidebar. It affects defense recruitment, industrial capacity, fiscal room, technological adoption, and the ability to sustain long-term commitments. Each actor is experimenting with immigration, automation, workforce policy, and welfare reform, but the security implications remain largely compartmentalized.

The second is concentrated economic dependence. None of the three can or should decouple from China. Yet South Korea’s experience after the THAAD deployment, Europe’s debates over economic coercion, and China’s export controls on gallium, germanium, and other strategic inputs have shown that interdependence can be converted into leverage. De-risking therefore requires more than national stockpiles. It requires shared risk maps, compatible certification, co-investment in alternative suppliers, and advance consultation before export controls or industrial subsidies create collateral damage among partners.

The third challenge is U.S. volatility. The United States is still the only actor capable of providing extended nuclear deterrence to South Korea and Japan, and NATO remains central to European defense. But dependence on U.S. power now coexists with uncertainty about U.S. policy. The classic alliance dilemmas of abandonment and entrapment are no longer opposite ends of a spectrum. Today, U.S. allies fear both being left out and being drawn into bargains or contingencies they did not shape.

The fourth pressure is the collapse of the old geographic separation between European and Asian security. North Korean munitions, missiles, and troops have supported Russia’s war against Ukraine. Moscow, in turn, has provided Pyongyang with political cover, economic support, and the prospect of military know-how. What happens on a European battlefield is changing the military balance on the Korean Peninsula. A regional response to a cross-regional threat is structurally inadequate.

This is the case for an EU-Japan-South Korea strategic dialogue. This framework should not be described as strategic autonomy, equidistance, or a hedge against the United States. A better term would be institutionalized hedging: risk diversification through standing, rule-based consultation among allies and partners that remain anchored in the broader U.S.-led system.

The proposal is more feasible than ever before. Japan-South Korea relations have improved significantly in recent years. The January 2026 summit in Nara and the reciprocal summit in South Korea in May demonstrated continuity across leadership changes in both countries since June 2025. The EU already has free-trade, digital, green, and security frameworks with both countries. The task is not to invent three new bilateral relationships; it is to connect existing ones.

The dialogue should begin modestly, through a Track 1.5 process involving officials, experts, and industry. Its early agenda must be concrete and specific: a joint critical minerals and supply chain risk assessment; consultation on export controls and investment screening; cooperation on AI, cyber resilience, and digital standards; exchanges on demographic and defense workforce adaptation; and shared monitoring of North Korea-Russia military cooperation. Successful projects could then be elevated to ministerial working groups.

Two design choices are essential. First, the initiative must remain function-driven. It is not NATO, not the Quad, and not an anti-China coalition. Its purpose is to reduce vulnerability without demanding economic separation. Second, it should be complementary to relations with Washington and transparent about that purpose. Horizontal networks strengthen alliances when they help allies absorb shocks, coordinate positions, and arrive at consultations with greater capacity.

For South Korea, the need is particularly acute. Japan already has the G7, a mature economic partnership with the EU, and expanding European defense ties. Seoul’s international weight has grown faster than its institutional depth. An EU-Japan-South Korea dialogue would help close that gap.

Horizontalizing alliances is not a vote of no confidence in the United States. It is insurance for the moments when the United States wavers, overreaches, or changes course. The postwar hierarchy cannot simply be preserved by demanding more reassurance from Washington. Its resilience will depend on whether allies can build connective tissue among themselves before the next crisis forces them to improvise.

Introduction and Contribution

A burgeoning literature considers the domestic causes and consequences of democratic backsliding for public perceptions of democracy but has yet to fully examine the role of international factors in explaining these perceptions. The effect of democratic backsliding in one

democracy on public support for democratic principles in other countries has, thus far, defied theoretical and empirical investigation. In “U.S. Democratic Backsliding and the Decline of Democratic Support Abroad,” Amnon Cavari, Amichai Magen, and Benjamin Yoel address this gap in knowledge. They propose and test a theory of the effects of backsliding on global opinion, in which information about democratic decline in one country can lead to diminished support for liberal democracy and increased support for authoritarian governance in another. To test this, they deployed an original survey experiment in Israel to examine the effect of two narratives about the 2020 U.S. elections — one signaling democratic decline and one signaling democratic resilience — on support for authoritarian governance. They found that respondents exposed to the narrative of U.S. democratic decline were more supportive of authoritarian governance than those exposed to the narrative of democratic resilience. Moreover, they find marginal evidence that the respondents’ ideological preferences condition the effect of narrative exposure. Cavari, Magen, and Yoel’s findings suggest that the democratic backsliding literature has insufficiently explored the global consequences of domestic events and processes for democratic decline worldwide.

Democratic erosion is both a supply- and demand-side phenomenon. On the supply side, leaders take anti-democratic actions, such as weakening checks on executive power, which they then justify to the public — on grounds of law and order, threats to the nation, and so on. On the demand side, varied types of social conflict, such as polarization or racial animus, can lead publics to endorse limits on democratic governance. 

Real-life models of democratic erosion have ‘diffused’ across borders. For example, strongmen in countries neighboring Russia, such as Alexander Lukashenko and Viktor Orbán, have borrowed from Vladimir Putin’s playbook of jailing opponents and using anti-Western rhetoric. It is less clear, however, whether authoritarian phenomena in one country can prompt changes in the beliefs of ordinary people in other countries.

In “U.S. Democratic Backsliding and the Decline of Democratic Support Abroad,” Amnon Cavari, Amichai Magen, and Benjamin Yoel present results from a survey experiment conducted among Israelis following the January 6 United States Capitol attack. They find that respondents who were randomly exposed to a narrative about US democracy eroding were significantly more supportive of autocracy in Israel. By contrast, those exposed to a narrative about the resilience of US democracy after January 6 were less supportive. These effects were most pronounced among conservative Israelis, perhaps unsurprising given the associations between right-wing ideologies and authoritarianism.

Readers come away with a sense of the varied ways that democratic erosion can diffuse across borders, particularly at the micro level. That changes in American politics can affect the attitudes of Israelis over 6000 miles away suggests that autocrats can be highly effective in shaping the regime trajectories of their more immediate neighbors. This makes it all the more urgent to combat anti-democratic narratives before they take root and spread.

How Authoritarian Attitudes Diffuse

The authors make a straightforward claim: someone in country A who observes democratic norms or institutions being undermined in country B may well question the value of democracy for A. To see this, consider how Nayib Bukele’s campaign of mass imprisonment without due process in El Salvador has appealed to ordinary people across Latin America. In light of the social and economic problems facing democratic countries, unchecked strongmen — and their purported successes — have come to seem more credible and pragmatic. 

Democratic erosion in country B should be especially likely to affect the beliefs of people in A when (1) B is a close ally of, or is seen as powerful or influential for A, and (2) events in B are widely covered in A’s traditional or social media. For example, coverage of the United Kingdom’s “Brexit” was shown to influence how people in other European Union countries viewed integration or withdrawal. The authors further posit that democratic erosion will have a larger effect on support for autocracy among those who subscribe to right-wing ideologies — these prioritize social order and religious or racial purity, which can conflict with inclusive democracy. 

Backsliding in Israel and Ties to the United States

Israeli democracy has eroded in recent years, particularly as Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud party has worked to undermine judicial independence and as discrimination against Arab and other ethnic minority Israelis persists. However, Israel’s backsliding also has strong demand-side components: majorities of those surveyed in 2023 agreed that a strong leader — one not limited by the legislature or judiciary — was necessary to solve Israel’s problems, that voting rights should be restricted among those unwilling to declare their loyalty to the state, and that international NGOs should be banned. The authors aim to show that these anti-democratic beliefs stem not only from elite rhetoric or national polarization, but from global backsliding. 

The United States is Israel’s closest ally, and the two countries share much in terms of political and social life. Both were founded by groups fleeing persecution, who established a political culture defined by pioneer settlement and the displacement of indigenous peoples. The US has consistently supported Israel’s wars and military operations in the Middle East. A large majority of Israelis view the US as an exemplar of democracy and freedom. This makes Israel an ideal case for measuring how global democratic erosion affects democratic sentiment at home. 

The Survey Experiment

The survey was fielded in March 2021, a time of acute political crisis in Israel: this marked the fourth election cycle in less than two years, and the prior two elections had resulted in parliamentary stalemates and short-lived governments. In the prior months, Israeli media had extensively covered Donald Trump’s efforts to overturn the 2020 elections and ensuing January 6 attack on the Capitol. 92% of survey participants reported following the US elections, and 43% reported doing so closely. A majority reported believing the US strongly influences Israeli politics.

Participants were randomly assigned to read one of two ‘vignettes’ about the 2020 elections. One emphasized that US democracy had faltered, as evidenced by Trump’s behavior and the Capitol attack. Another emphasized the resilience of US democracy, as evidenced by high turnout and the eventual transfer of power — this vignette did not mention January 6. The authors find that those who read the “US democracy faltering” vignette were significantly less likely to agree the US elections were free and fair. 

Finally, the authors measure their dependent variable — support for autocracy — in terms of support for restricting speech that is hostile to the government, the permissibility of rule by strongmen, and so on. The key finding is that Israelis exposed to the “US democracy faltering” narrative were significantly more supportive of autocracy.
 

Image

Figure 3. Support for Authoritative Governance, by Vignette.
 

These effects were most pronounced among those on the political right, but the main finding holds even when statistically controlling for ideology. In all, the study demonstrates that when democratic erosion diffuses, it can shape not only elite behavior but mass attitudes as well.
 

Image

Figure 4. Effect of ideology on support for Authoritative Governance by Vignette.
 

*Brief prepared by Adam Fefer.

This article was written by Dr. Thomas Fingar, who played an early role in the establishment of SPICE before helping to establish and then leading Stanford’s U.S.–China Relations Program before moving to the U.S. State Department where he served twice as Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research. He later served as Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis and Chairman of the National Intelligence Council before returning to Stanford in 2009. This is the sixth of several articles—focusing on the 50-year history of SPICE—that will be posted this year.

The celebration of SPICE’s 50th anniversary attests to the continuing vitality, impact, and success of ideas and constructive activism engendered by unique circumstances at Stanford in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The Bay Area China Education Project (BAYCEP) and its successor organization, the Stanford Program on International and Cross-Cultural Education (SPICE), did not just happen and its success was not assured. Many innovative projects were launched during that turbulent and transformative period but few survived or had a lasting impact. It is worth reflecting on what made this Stanford initiative different and more successful.

Context matters and it is useful to recall the political and academic environment at the time. It was the golden age of area studies when universities and the national affairs enterprise struggled to understand the societies, cultures, politics, and policies of the more than 100 ‘new’ nations that regained independence or emerged from revolution after World War II. New social science methodologies were developed to support this undertaking, and new ways to teach foreign languages and foreign cultures broadened horizons and facilitated people-to-people interactions that transformed exotic ‘others’ into fellow travelers on planet earth. Stanford was at the forefront of both the area studies and methodological revolutions.

The Vietnam War was a second critical shaper of information and ideas. This was the first ‘television war’ and it gave an immediacy to what was happening in Washington and on the other side of the world. The ‘enemy’ was humanized and the draft forced ordinary Americans to think about people, places, and government policies that were opaque and increasingly personal. Antiwar activism included demonstrations and ‘teach ins’ to educate the public about what was happening and why. These activities occurred in the context of growing dissatisfaction with many gaps between American values and everyday injustice affecting racial minorities, women, the elderly, and the poor. Determination to do something about increasingly unacceptable conditions was rampant.

These factors, and others such as the large size of the area studies community at Stanford and the leadership of key faculty, coalesced in ways that galvanized determination and efforts to link area studies-focused academic research to political action, classroom instruction, and public education. The logic was straightforward. Those at the leading edge of area studies had both an opportunity and an obligation to use what they learned about other countries and cultures to inform and influence politicians and policymakers so that they would see the error of their ways in Vietnam and Asia more broadly and adopt policies more conducive to mutual understanding, peace, and shared prosperity.

The logic of the situation and our understanding of the importance of public opinion in a democracy also drove us to seek ways to use our understanding of Asia to bring Asia and Asians into American classrooms. That meant, among other things, expanding coverage of Asian culture and history in American secondary school textbooks and developing teaching materials and training programs for high school teachers. Fifty years later, it is difficult to imagine how little information and teaching material was available. One reason that is the case is that the founders of SPICE used their knowledge of American education, textbook publishing, and teacher training to move beyond the Europe-centric content of what was and is taught in the United States.

The energy and activism during the formative period did not dissipate when graduate students earned their degrees and embarked upon the next stage of their careers. Some continued to work in and through the SPICE structures. Others accepted positions in the U.S. Government and other nonacademic institutions so that they could play direct and indirect roles in shaping official understanding and public policies. Their activities both contributed to public understanding and utilized increased public awareness and understanding to influence public policy. 

There is a bigger story to be told than the narrow component that was and is the SPICE program, but to say that is not to diminish the importance and impact of the classroom and public education achievements of the people and projects undertaken in the decades since SPICE was originally conceived. I am proud to have been a part of those early efforts and even prouder of the fact that SPICE remains as vital and vibrant as it is today and that I still have opportunities to lecture in its programs. 

To stay informed of SPICE news, join our email list and follow us on Facebook, X, and Instagram.

SPICE offers several local programs for students in Japan, including regional programs at the city and prefectural levels. Developed through collaborations between SPICE and local governments across Japan, these online programs encourage students to engage with complex global issues while deepening their understanding of U.S. society, culture, and U.S.–Japan relations through critical thinking and research.

With the 2025–2026 session now finished, each participating program has recognized two outstanding students for their exceptional achievements throughout the course, including the quality of their final research projects. These student honorees will travel to Stanford University in August 2026, where they will present their research during a series of recognition ceremonies. The events will welcome distinguished guests from the Stanford community, the Consulate General of Japan in San Francisco, and members of the Japanese community throughout the Bay Area.

SPICE proudly congratulates the following students for their outstanding academic accomplishments.

Stanford e-Fukuoka (Instructor: Kasumi Yamashita)

Student Honoree: Konoha Inoyusu
School: Fukuoka Daichi High School

Student Honoree: Haruki Kenyon
School: Kurume High School

Stanford e-Hiroshima (Instructor: Rylan Sekiguchi)

Student Honoree: Konatsu Haga
School: Fukuyama Akenohoshi Girls’ High School

Student Honoree: Momoka Nagayama
School: Hiroshima Inokuchi High School

Stanford e-Kagoshima City (Instructor: Amy Cheng)

Student Honoree: Nayuta Nei
School: Kagoshima Gyokuryu High School

Student Honoree: Shiori Nishizono
School: Kagoshima Girls’ High School

Stanford e-Kawasaki (Instructor: Maiko Tamagawa Bacha)

Student Honoree: Mio Suzuki
School: Kawasaki High School

Student Honoree: Rio Hojo
School: Tachibana High School

Stanford e-Kobe (Instructor: Alison Harsch)

Student Honoree: Sakura Oe
School: Kobe Municipal Fukiai High School

Student Honoree: Shotaro Take
School: Kobe Municipal Fukiai High School

Stanford e-Oita (Instructor: Kasumi Yamashita)

Student Honoree: Mao Hieida
School: Nakatsu Minami High School

Student Honoree: Taichi Morikawa
School: Takada High School

Stanford e-Tottori (Instructor: Jonas Edman)

Student Honoree: Una Ishikawa
School: National Institute of Technology, Yonago College

Student Honoree: Asumi Nishimura
School: Tottori Nishi High School

Stanford e-Yamaguchi (Instructor: Jonas Edman)

Student Honoree: Misaki Kobayashi
School: Keishin Senior High School

Student Honoree: Hiroi Tomokawa
School: Iwakuni Senior High School

SPICE commends these students for their intellectual curiosity, academic excellence, and commitment to developing a global perspective. We look forward to recognizing their accomplishments at Stanford University next month.

SPICE also offers online courses to U.S. high school students on Japan (Reischauer Scholars Program), China (China Scholars Program), Korea (Sejong Korea Scholars Program), and entrepreneurship (Stanford e-Entrepreneurship U.S.), and online courses to Chinese high school students on the United States (Stanford e-China) and to Japanese high school students on the United States and U.S.–Japan relations (Stanford e-Japan) and on entrepreneurship (Stanford e-Entrepreneurship Japan).

To stay informed of news about Stanford e-Japan and SPICE’s other programs, join our email list and follow us on Facebook, X, and Instagram.

The Stanford e-Yamaguchi Program recently concluded its second year, continuing a successful partnership between SPICE and the Yamaguchi Prefectural Board of Education. Designed to provide high school students in Yamaguchi Prefecture with opportunities to strengthen their English communication skills, explore global issues, and engage with Stanford educators and guest speakers, the program offers participants a unique opportunity to develop their global perspectives while interacting with experts from a variety of fields.

This year marked my first year teaching the Stanford e-Yamaguchi course, and it has been a truly rewarding experience. Throughout the program, I was consistently impressed by the students’ intellectual curiosity, thoughtful participation, and willingness to engage with complex global topics in English. Their enthusiasm for learning and openness to new perspectives made every virtual classroom session meaningful and enjoyable.

I would like to express my sincere appreciation to Mia Kimura, who taught the inaugural year of the program and helped establish a strong foundation for its continued success. Her efforts during the program’s first year played an important role in creating a welcoming and engaging learning environment, one that I have sought to emulate in my own teaching.

The course featured a series of outstanding guest speakers who shared their expertise and experiences with students. I would like to thank Dr. Stephen Murphy-Shigematsu, Dr. Elizabeth Baham, Dr. Gary Mukai, and Dr. Mariko Yoshihara Yang for their generous contributions to the program. Through their presentations and discussions, students explored a wide range of topics, including mindfulness in leadership, diversity in leadership, global citizenship, and design thinking. These sessions provided students with opportunities to connect classroom learning to real-world challenges and encouraged them to think critically about the qualities needed to lead in an increasingly interconnected world.

The success of the Stanford e-Yamaguchi course is the result of the efforts of many individuals and organizations. I am especially grateful to Professor Yuko Hayashi, Yamaguchi University, for introducing SPICE to Tsugumasa Muraoka, Governor of Yamaguchi Prefecture. That introduction helped establish the connections and support necessary to make this partnership possible.

I would also like to extend my deepest thanks to Akinobu Tomonari of the Yamaguchi Prefectural Board of Education. Tomonari-sensei has been instrumental in planning, coordinating, and facilitating the program. His dedication and commitment have been essential to the program’s success.

As we conclude another successful year, we celebrate not only the accomplishments of the students but also the strong partnership between SPICE and Yamaguchi Prefecture. We look forward to continuing this collaboration and providing future cohorts of students with opportunities to develop the knowledge, skills, and global perspectives needed to become thoughtful leaders in their communities and beyond.

Stanford e-Yamaguchi is one of SPICE’s local student programs in Japan.

To stay informed of SPICE news, join our email list and follow us on Facebook, X, and Instagram.