Young Stanford researchers focusing on improving health care access in developing countries are eligible for the Dr. George Rosenkranz Prize.

The $100,000 award is given to a non-tenured professor, post-doctoral student or research associate during a two-year period. The deadline to apply is May 11. The recipient will be announced in early June

Rosenkranz, who helped first synthesize Cortisone in 1951 and went on to synthesize progestin  – the active ingredient for the first oral birth control – dedicated his career to improving health care access around the world. Born in Hungary in 1916, the chemist started his career in Mexico and helped establish the Mexican National Institute for Genomic Medicine. He lives with his wife in Menlo Park.

The award is being funded by the Rosenkranz family and administered by Stanford Health Policy, a center within the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and the Center for Primary Care and Outcomes Research. It also is designed to give its recipients access to a network that will help them develop their careers.

Eran Bendavid, a SHP affiliate and Stanford Medical School instructor, received the first award in 2010 to support his analysis of whether money going to HIV and malaria programs in sub-Saharan Africa has improved the overall health of children and their mothers.

More application information is available at http://healthpolicy.stanford.edu/fellowships/rosenkranz_prize.

On March 22, a military coup abruptly ended two decades of uninterrupted democracy in Mali, the well-reputed West African country and key counter-terrorism partner of the United States. The coup leader Army Captain Amadou Sanogo and his mutinous troops suspended the 1992 democratic constitution, took over the presidential palace, the state television and several institutions, arrested members of the government, and promised a more efficient fight against Tuareg rebels. Interruption of the Malian democracy by a belligerent military faction is a serious threat to stability, peace, and human rights given the domestic context.

Since the coup, the conflict with the Tuareg rebels has continued to worsen. The two main Tuareg groups — the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and Islamist Ansar Dine — have gained ground and seized new territories in the north of the country, pushing for sharia law. If a domestic solution is not found quickly, African regional organizations and the international community should act in concert with Malian democratic defenders - either diplomatically or coercively  - to restore democracy and peace, and stop rebel progression before it is too lateAfrican regional organizations and the international community should act in concert with Malian democratic defenders — either diplomatically or coercively — to restore democracy and peace, and stop rebel progression before it is too late.

The Coup in Mali: Who is Behind it and Why?

Plotters deposed the widely respected and democratically elected President Amadou Toumani Touré, a little over a month before the scheduled presidential election on April 29. Coup leader Captain Sanogo justified the unconstitutional seizure of power under the guise of national security, accusing President Touré of inefficiently fighting the decades-old Tuareg rebellion, and not providing enough resources to the army.

However, given the electoral timing, reasons advanced by Captain Sanogo to justify the coup are illogical. President Touré was not a candidate in the 2012 presidential election, and had just over a month left in his second and last term in office. As a visionary leader, he respected the unique Malian societal and political culture, improved governance, and put the country on a path to sustainable economic growth. Therefore, it is not surprising that Freedom House has continued over the past two decades to classify Mali as a democratic regime — whether electoral or liberal — despite several challenges such as; weak public institutions and central government, poverty, aid dependency, the Tuareg separatist rebellion, and labor or social unrests. The coup leader’s argument is further weakened because the democratic Malian government was offering public space to potentially unsatisfied military personnel to negotiate within the constitutional framework, along with the option to openly discuss issues of concern with presidential candidates.

The Coup is Reinvigorating Fear of a Repressive Military Regime 

The coup is reinvigorating fear of the resurgence of repressive rule that reigned for decades after successive military coups. Such repressive rule must be prevented. In 1968, Lieutenant Moussa Traoré ousted the civilian government, eight years after Mali gained its independence from France. Because he was resistant to democratic changes, Traoré was ousted in 1991 by Amadou Toumani Touré in the face of widespread civil unrest and demands for greater political rights and democratic reforms.

In 1991, the Transitional Committee for the Salvation of the People (CTSP) was formed by various groups representing civil society and under the supervision of Amadou Toumani Touré. The Committee organized successful political liberalization, which included; a national conference, a constitutional referendum, a founding election won by President Alpha Oumar Konaré (1992-2002), and consequently a democratic transition in 1992. Many hope that twenty years of democratic developments are not eradicated by this coup. Captain Sanogo still has the window of opportunity to respect the Malian values and people, and end his rule, as requested by the people.

The Devastating Consequences of the Coup in Mali and Africa

The coup has significant implications on the political developments in Mali, West Africa and the African continent. It weakens the already fragile democratic institutions, and calls into question the solidity of the unique political culture, visionary leadership, and the subordination of the military to the executive that were considered by many as the foundation of Malian democracy.The coup weakens the already fragile democratic institutions, and calls into question the solidity of the unique political culture, visionary leadership, and the subordination of the military to the executive that were considered by many as the foundation of Malian democracy. In addition, it worsened the situation in the north of the country, with rebel militias controlling more towns than before the coup. The coup has consequently increased the risk of disproportionate use of force, potentially leading to more violent and deadly conflicts threatening minority groups in Mali, with negative consequences for the entire West African region.

 The coup also gives reasons — not necessarily valid — to citizens and pessimistic observers to despair about the prospect of democracy in West Africa. The spirit of democracy has recently been challenged in countries such as Cote d’Ivoire, Senegal, Mauritania, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau. If most plotters manage to stay in power, Africa may face a resurgence of military coup plots, reviving the violent nightmare of the two last decades of the twentieth century.

 Malian and International Reactions to the Coup

Malian domestic leadership and the international community have all taken serious steps towards returning the country to civilian rule and restoring the democratic system. Malian political and civil society leaders have clearly shown deep opposition to the rupture of the constitutional order, and they have requested return to the rule of law. They are peacefully demonstrating to avoid violence and to preserve national unity. On March 28, the ousted President Touré called for a consensual solution and told French Radio station RFI "what is important is democracy, institutions, and Mali." In the same vein, the international community has strongly condemned the coup, applied some diplomatic sanctions, and requested a return to an elected civilian government.

The U.N. Secretary General has called for immediate restoration of constitutional rule, and the U.N. Security Council echoed a similar sentiment by calling for "the restoration of constitutional order and the holding of elections as previously scheduled." The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) reiterated its policy of “zero tolerance” for unconstitutional seizures of power, organized high-level meetings with heads of state to persuade the junta to step-down, readied its stand-by forces, and placed an economic embargo on Mali.

The African Union immediately suspended the membership of Mali until constitutional rule is restored, and the U.S. paused military aid to Mali and urged rebels to end fighting. France has suspended its official cooperation with Mali, but maintained humanitarian aid and is pushing the U.N. Security Council to explore avenues to support ECOWAS in their efforts to restore order. Canada, the African Development Bank, the European Union, and the World Bank have all suspended their aid. These diplomatic actions, especially from ECOWAS, have pressured the junta to announce (formally but not yet effectively) the restoration of the 1992 constitution on April 1, a few days after unconstitutionally promulgating a new one. Further actions should be made in a timely manner to pressure the junta to step-down, to ensure that power is transferred back to civilian rule and constitutional order restored.

Restoring democracy and peace in Mali — diplomatically or coercively — is imperative. It will send a strong warning to those who try to undermine democratic efforts that unconstitutional appropriation of power and threats to peace and security will not be tolerated. Citizens will also be shown that they are supported in their battle for democracy and peace.  

From the Arab Spring to the Occupy Wall Street movement, young people have emerged at the helm of citizen-led change, opposing and challenging the status quo. Recognizing their local and global impact, youth are increasingly stepping up to fulfill Gandhi's famous maxim: "Be the change you want to see in the world." In turn, they are encouraging other members of their generation to answer this call to duty. In the aftermath of revolutions across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), youth have never been more engaged and active in the future development of their communities.

Inspired by these events, a group of young Stanford students launched a forum to unite leaders from the MENA region with their Western counterparts to build a bridge towards greater understanding, collaboration, and partnership. Nothing of this scale had ever been done on the Stanford campus, and there was a clear demand from the student body for deeper engagement with the region.

It was in this spirit that the American Middle Eastern Network for Dialogue at Stanford (AMENDS) was born, which will host its inaugural conference at Stanford University April 10 to 14, 2012 to convene exceptional young leaders together to share their ideas, seed potential collaborations and inspire the world. The AMENDS team represents a diverse group of students of various nationalities, faiths, and persuasions, but the common thread that connects them all is a desire to interact with the future generation of leaders who are writing a new chapter in the history of the Middle East.

AMENDS seeks to take a step forward towards greater partnership with a post-Arab Spring generation of leaders in the Middle East.                                -AMENDS co-founders Elliot Stoller and Khaled AlShawi

Co-founders Elliot Stoller (BA '13) and Khaled AlShawi (BA '13), hailing from Chicago and Bahrain respectively, were inspired to start a project devoted to U.S.-MENA relations largely in response to events surrounding the Arab Spring, “The problems addressed through the uprisings transcend a single country or region. They affect us all and require global collaboration to solve. AMENDS seeks to take a step forward towards greater partnership with a post-Arab Spring generation of leaders in the Middle East. ”

Within a year of launching the initiative, the AMENDS team received applications from over 300 promising delegates, organized a four-day summit, and launched an ambitious fundraising campaign to cover the costs of such an endeavor. Described by AMENDS senior leadership as a "full-time job" on top of their demanding academic schedules, this grassroots operation is fueled by the entrepreneurial energy of a band of passionate and dedicated student volunteers. AMENDS has benefited from the consultation of a board of advisors comprised of Stanford faculty and staff from the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL), the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and the Hamid and Christina Moghadam Program in Iranian Studies.

According to Larry Diamond, CDDRL director and member of the AMENDS advisory board, "It has been a pleasure working with the AMENDS team on the design and implementation of this innovative project — the first of its kind — to convene a new generation of leaders in the U.S. and the Middle East at Stanford University."

AMENDS delegates hail from 17 countries and together represent students and young professionals leading projects driven by the ingenuity of the new Middle East. 

AMENDS delegates hail from 17 countries and together represent students and young professionals leading projects driven by the ingenuity of the new Middle East. While many of their projects are still in their initial stages of development, the AMENDS conference and network is intended to provide leadership training and peer support to help scale-up these initiatives. A mentorship program pairs delegates with professionals, development practitioners, and industry leaders for tailored advice and support.

AMENDS delegates are as diverse as the issues they are confronting in the Middle East, North America, and the United Kingdom. Several AMENDS delegates are leveraging the use of new technology and social media to unite civil society, stimulate public debate, introduce alternative energy resources, and promote citizen-led journalism. In Egypt, Morocco, and Palestine, delegates are members of youth movements at the forefront of the Arab Spring revolutions and are championing new approaches for political change. Others are working in their local communities to defend the rights of HIV/AIDS patients in Egypt, support children with disabilities in Canada, and empower uninsured MENA immigrants in the U.S. Many projects share the common goal of getting more youth engaged and active in their local communities to achieve broader societal goals.

Over a five-day period, delegates will deliver ten-minute "AMENDS Talks" styled after TEDTalks^TM, where they will introduce their initiatives to the larger Stanford community. The videos will be recorded and available through an online forum — in both Arabic and English — giving delegates’ a global platform to share their ideas, inspiring others to take action. Delegates will also participate in leadership development workshops at the Stanford Graduate School for Business and networking events sponsored by AMENDS strategic partner TechWadi, a Silicon Valley-based organization fostering high-tech entrepreneurial development in the Arab world.

Notable scholars and practitioners from the U.S. and the MENA region will provide unique insight and analysis to some of the timeliest topics emerging from the region. Speakers include Sami Ben Gharbia, Tunisian political activist and a Foreign Policy Top 100 Thinker; Thomas T. Riley, former U.S. ambassador to Morocco; and Rami Khouri, director of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut.

CDDRL faculty and staff will also be leading sessions and addressing the AMENDS delegates at the summit, including CDDRL Director Larry Diamond, CDDRL Consulting Professor and AMENDS Advisory Board Member Prince Hicham Ben Abdallah, Arab Reform and Democracy Program Manager Lina Khatib, and Moroccan journalist and CDDRL Visiting Scholar Ahmed Benchemsi.

Most AMENDS Talks and sessions are open to the Stanford community and general public. For more information on AMENDS, to read about the 2012 delegates, and to view the conference agenda, please visit: amends.stanford.edu.

Men are playing soccer in the street when soldiers from the Army’s 1^st Infantry Division arrive in Shar-e-Tiefort. Vendors selling vegetables, teapots and toys shout to the troops who are here to speak with town leaders about building better roads and schools. The greetings in Pashto and Dari don’t sound like taunts – just a noisy welcome.

The place seems safe.

But chaos explodes when a roadside bomb detonates beneath a Humvee. Downed soldiers lie in the road. Survivors take cover behind the damaged vehicle – its side now stained by blood-red streaks.

A sniper shoots though a second-story window. The Americans return fire and the brat-a-tat-tat of machine guns is followed by the clinking of shell casings raining on the ground.

Then, silence. The sniper is hit. Or reloading. The troops flank the brick and concrete buildings, trying to secure their position and eliminate more threats in this small mountain town.

They’re not fast enough. A rocket-propelled grenade rips the air, striking close to the disabled Humvee and wiping out several more troops.

Overlooking from a nearby rooftop, Stanford scholars watch the action – a training session at Fort Irwin’s National Training Center, a sort of graduate school in California’s Mojave Desert for combat troops going to Afghanistan.

The bullets aren’t real. Neither are the bombs, the blood and the casualties. The soccer players, street vendors and sniper are either soldiers stationed at Fort Irwin or some of the hundreds of role players hired to populate Shar-e-Tiefort and the 10 other mock towns and villages built to replicate communities in Afghanistan.

But the tension and pressure of battle are genuine.

“You watch them train, and you become aware that the soldiers and the military supporting them are doing the best they can,” says Norman M. Naimark, a history professor and senior fellow at Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies who had the rooftop view.

“But you know some people are going to die.”

From the ivory tower to the trenches

Karl Eikenberry knows that tension better than any civilian. Now at FSI as the Payne Distinguished Lecturer, Eikenberry was the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan from 2009 to 2011. Before that, he was there as a lieutenant general overseeing the American-led coalition forces.

Eikenberry has delivered several formal talks and had countless conversations with scholars about the war in Afghanistan since arriving at Stanford this past summer. He’s proud of the Army he served for more than 35 years, and he speaks often of how adept it has become at meeting the needs of modern warfare.

Organizing the February trip to the National Training Center with the help of Viet Luong and Charlie Miller – Army colonels who are currently visiting scholars at FSI’s Center for International Security and Cooperation – gave Eikenberry the chance to show a group of about 20 historians, doctors and political scientists exactly what he’s been talking about.

CISAC visiting scholars and Army colonels Viet Luong (left) and Charlie Miller (center) organized the trip to Fort Irwin with Karl Eikenberry, a distinguished lecturer at FSI and the former ambassador to Afghanistan. Photo credit: Adam Gorlick

“I wanted them to have the opportunity to see the technology and the networked
approach to combat,” he said. “And I also wanted them to realize that – beyond all the technologies, beyond all the equipment – the most decisive force on any battlefield for the U.S. Army remains the individual soldier and the individual leader.”

Trips like this inform a scholar’s work. And the papers produced, the lectures delivered, and interactions with other academics and policymakers can help shape the way politicians, government officials and military leaders think about wars.

“It’s always very helpful to get out of the ivory tower and into the trenches,” says Amy Zegart, a CISAC affiliate and senior fellow at the Hoover Institution who focuses on the effectiveness of the country’s national security organization.

“Even for someone like me who’s been studying the military for more than 15 years, I learned things I didn’t know before,” she says. “I hadn’t appreciated how hard it is to coordinate the human element when you’re going in and doing counterinsurgency operations. You can think about it abstractly, but to see it makes it more tangible.”

Before 9/11, the Army’s training program was shaped by Cold War perspective. Tanks ruled the battlefield, soldiers were easily identified by their uniforms, and nobody thought about the tactics that have come to define the war in Afghanistan.

“The Army wasn’t planning to fight counterinsurgency in a remote country in Central and South Asia,” Eikenberry says of the organization in which he rose through the ranks. “But today, if you look at the effectiveness of our forces on the ground, it’s extraordinary.”

In The Box

Roughly the size of Rhode Island, Fort Irwin is home to the largest and most expansive of the three combat training facilities designed for each branch of the military. About 4,500 soldiers and their families are permanently stationed here, and another 50,000 troops rotate through three weeks of combat training each year.

The base is a community unto itself, with the shopping centers, schools, gyms and restaurants you’d expect to find almost anywhere in America.

But all familiarity vanishes in “The Box”– the National Training Center’s 1,250-square-mile operations area that sprawls across an otherwise empty high desert with infinite views of mountains, dirt and sky.

Activated in 1980, the NTC was filled with tanks and troops expecting to take on the Soviets. Trainers blasted this no-man’s land with every live weapon in the defense department’s arsenal with the exception of nuclear bombs.

Just before 9/11, the Army began rethinking the command structure of war. Rather than having generals make top-down decisions for thousands of troops, military leaders figured it was wiser to have smaller units do what made the most sense given their individual combat situations.

The move toward decentralization was complete soon after the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan began.

“By that time, we were well-structured to be able to fight smaller guerilla and insurgent networks,” Eikenberry says. “We changed how we were going to fight, and that meant we needed to change how we trained.”

Tanks rolled out of The Box, replaced by a new land of make-believe. Apartments. Courthouses. Government buildings. Mosques. A construction boom of facades ushered in a new way of training for the next generation of warriors.

Replicating the worst

The Army’s 1st Infantry Division arrives in Shar-e-Tiefort, a mock Afghan town at the National Training Center. Photo credit: Adam Gorlick

As the 1^st Infantry Division moves through a makeshift market in Shar-e-Tiefort, crowds of men bicker and barter over vegetables while women shrouded in burqas hover in doorways.

They scuttle and take cover when the roadside bomb explodes and the gunfight begins, but they don’t break character.

While the skirmish looks and sounds like the real thing, what’s happening is essentially an elaborate game of laser tag. The vehicles, soldiers and actors posing as insurgents and civilians wear targets that detect safe lasers being fired at them from otherwise authentic weapons.

When they’re hit, they hear a beep. Game over.

The terrain of the Mojave Desert may not be similar to the high peaks and lush valleys of northern Afghanistan, but there’s enough here to disorient – and ultimately familiarize – the soldiers with what awaits them when they deploy.

Pyrotechnics create bursts of flames and leave clouds of smoke. Speakers wired through some of the town’s 480 buildings play the soundtrack of urban warfare: Shouts, shrieks and cries replace the brief quiet that comes when rounds are no longer being fired.

Even the stench of battle is copied. Hidden sensors emit the stink of burning flesh and rotting garbage.

Scripts and mock weapons used for the combat scenarios are constantly changed and updated in response to new battlefield threats. When troops in Iraq saw a surge in casualties caused by a newly developed grenade, they were able to describe the device in enough detail so artillery experts at the NTC could replicate it.

Within 96 hours of initial reports of the new explosive, soldiers at Fort Irwin were being trained how to outsmart it.

“We try to replicate the worst possible day they’ll ever see and make sure they learn from it,” Capt. Richard Floer tells the Stanford group while escorting them through The Box.

“In Afghanistan, there’s no rewind,” he says. “There’s no stop or pause or do it again.”

Bad guys and best practices

The training isn’t all about offensive and defensive tactical maneuvers. The NTC has designed dozens of scenarios meant to replicate actual missions carried out in Afghanistan. Some involve nothing but fighting. Others rely heavily on role-playing, where soldiers have face-to-face meetings with actors posing as town leaders who are eager – or sometimes resistant – to negotiate local stability for the American promise of improved infrastructure.

Occasionally there’s a combination of force and diplomacy. An operation meant to engage local officials can be derailed by insurgents bent on driving the Americans away, like the members of the 1^st Infantry Division experienced in their training.

Soldiers plan their next move after a simulated IED attack "kills" a comrade and disables their vehicle. Photo credit: Adam Gorlick

And once the insurgents are killed and the casualties are tended to, the meetings sometimes go on.

“You need to dust yourself off and continue with your mission,” says Luong, the Army colonel and visiting scholar at CISAC who fought in Afghanistan from 2010 to 2011 and in Iraq four years earlier.

“You have to show the bad guys that they can’t just scare you away,” he says. “You need to show them that the Army can stay on mission.”

As the United States draws down its military presence in Afghanistan, the NTC is preparing new training programs for future wars. Based on newly imagined conflicts, the so-called decisive action training will pull together the motivations of military forces, freewheeling criminal organizations, guerillas and insurgents to create a host of worst-case scenarios.

Tanks, bombs, weapons of mass destruction and political, religious and cultural grudges will all come into play.

“We’re looking at the world’s worst actors and using all of their best practices,” says Brig. Gen Terry Ferrell, Fort Irwin’s commanding officer. “This will serve as our new baseline training. Once we get specific orders, we will refine that skill set and respond accordingly.”

Learning from mistakes

After about an hour of simulated combat in Shar-e-Tiefort, the troops of the 1^st Infantry Division are sitting in a room watching a rerun of the mission they just carried out. Dozens of video cameras rigged around the town captured their maneuvers and create a powerful teaching tool used during what’s called an AAR – an after action review that gives the soldiers and their combat trainer a chance to critique the operation.

They’ve run through the same battle scenario twice today and will have another crack at it after the AAR. In just a few weeks, they’ll be in Afghanistan.

“What are the things that worked better this time or need to be modified or fixed?”

Maj. Peter Moon, the combat trainer, wants to know.

First, they report the good: Vehicles were positioned to provide good cover from enemy fire. The unit did a better job responding to casualties. Overall, the soldiers tell Moon, they worked better together.

Moon agrees. “You looked a lot more controlled,” he tells them. “Things went much smoother than this morning.”

Then, the problems:  Too much chatter over the radios. A lag in communications that could have been deadly – four rounds of sniper fire went off before it was reported over the radio.

Despite the errors, one soldier describes how quickly he spotted the sniper from the second-story window. And how he waited for his shot.

“Next time he poked his head out, I zeroed the .50-cal in,” the soldier says. “And that was that.”

Moon keeps at it, asking the same questions over and over again to go over every detail. What went wrong? What needs to be tweaked? What must be duplicated?

Facades of apartments, government buildings and mosques were built in the Mojave Desert to replicate Afghan villages. Photo credit: Adam Gorlick

Here, they can learn from their mistakes. In Afghanistan they won’t have that luxury.

“That’s your goal,” Moon says. “To keep getting better and better and better.”

Drawing insight and saving lives

For many in the Stanford group, the AAR provided some of the best insight into how the military trains for combat.

Beyond the technological gadgets and computerized network systems they saw, beyond the off-the-record briefings they received from Fort Irwin’s leaders, and beyond the simulated combat they watched, many say the most impressive aspect of the NTC is the student-teacher relationship where questions are asked, lessons are learned and lifesaving knowledge is the goal.

“As a teacher, that’s what really sticks out,” says Katherine Jolluck, a senior lecturer in history and FSI affiliate. “You see the leaders trying to draw real insight from the soldiers. They’re not just being told what to do. They’re being encouraged to think for themselves and come up with solutions.”

And the most important solutions often lie in what can seem like the smallest of details: Marking a building properly so everyone knows it’s clear. Stationing vehicles in just the right place. Determining how much chatter should fill the radio. Figuring out who should be carrying the radio in the first place.

“It isn’t about grand strategy,” says Stephen D. Krasner, FSI’s deputy director and the Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations.

“The goal of the training is to make sure you do all the small things right,” he says. “That’s what saves lives.”