China's government has sentenced two of its citizens to life in prison for their role in securing prostitutes for hundreds of male Japanese visitors in the southern city of Zhuhai last autumn. The Chinese government is also pressuring Tokyo to turn over the Japanese businessmen who allegedly requested the prostitutes. This story made headlines around the world, and fits well with how the world press typically covers Sino-Japanese relations. Regrettably, such incidents recur with enough regularity to feed the media machine that continues to stir a nationalism rooted in conflicting historical memories. Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's annual visits to the Yasukuni Shrine -- which is widely viewed as a symbol of Japan's former militarism -- is a conspicuous example of this. The publicity that the press gives to these visits has helped impede an invitation to Koizumi from China's leaders for a state visit. Recently, the discovery of mustard gas canisters left behind by Japanese forces during World War II has also served to keep memories of the Imperial Japanese Army's wartime conduct alive among older Chinese. Moreover, rival Sino-Japanese claims to the Senkaku (or Diao Yutai) Islands resurfaced last year when the Japanese government leased three islets in the chain from private parties. The action, purportedly undertaken to reduce the prospect of landings and demonstrations by Japanese right-wingers, set off a brief, though frenzied, reaction in China, as well as in Hong Kong and Taiwan. Meanwhile, differences over Taiwan also foster tensions periodically, such as when former Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui sought to visit Japan for medical treatment. But this is not the whole story. Although such incidents reveal a troubling level of mistrust between the Chinese and Japanese that is not merely a product of media coverage, it is noteworthy that both governments have worked consistently, diligently, and with considerable success to resolve such problems and contain their political fallout. Of course, official relations between the two countries are marked by much political and economic competition -- some of it healthy, some of it a possible harbinger of future strategic rivalry. The competitive strain in Sino-Japanese relations is especially visible in energy politics. Demand for oil in Asia is growing rapidly, and with China and Japan increasingly dependent upon imports, each has naturally sought to improve its energy security by diversifying sources of supply. Both countries covet access to Russian reserves, especially those located in the Angarsk fields of Siberia. Last spring, China appeared to have locked up a Russian commitment to build a pipeline to service the China market at Daqing. Japan, however, raised the ante with new offers of financial incentives. Its bid for an alternative pipeline to Nakhodka to serve Japanese, Korean and other markets remains alive, creating another point of competitive friction. In their rivalry for leadership in promoting Asian regional cooperation, meanwhile, China has taken an early lead. Nearly two years ago, China trumped Japan by offering a Free Trade Agreement to the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, while front-loading its own tariff concessions. But this backdrop of contention and competition masks emerging collaborative aspects of Sino-Japanese relations that are profoundly important. For example, trade and investment flows continue to expand rapidly. Bilateral trade topped $100 billion in 2003, as Japan's exports to China increased by more than 10 percent, fueled by semiconductors, electrical equipment and automobiles. Meanwhile, China replaced the United States as Japan's biggest source of imports, and is now one of the few non-members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries with which Japan runs a trade deficit. Similarly, direct investment by Japanese firms is increasing as they relocate production facilities to China to capitalize on lower labor costs and high-quality engineering talent. Of course, there is no assurance that today's expanded commerce will preclude eventual strategic rivalry, or succeed in erasing lingering wartime animosity. But both countries now place a premium on extending their economic interdependence. Ultimately, the historical wounds that have long divided China and Japan, and the more current diplomatic flash points that the global media inevitably trumpet, tell only part of the Sino-Japanese story. There are economic and geopolitical rivalries between China and Japan that dwarf in importance the high-profile insults to national pride that make headlines. But there are also compelling economic and political inducements toward cooperation that prevent these rivalries from developing into full-blown crises.

On January 14, 2004, APARC was privileged to welcome Admiral Thomas Fargo, Commander of U.S. Pacific Command, the largest unified command in the United States military. Introduced by Ambassador Michael Armacost and former Secretary of Defense William Perry, Admiral Fargo addressed a large audience on "The Future of America's Alliances in Northeast Asia." The admiral, whose remarks were off-the-record, spoke warmly about the importance, flexibility, and increasing strength of U.S. alliances in the Asia Pacific. He observed that these alliances, in their various forms, remain the cornerstone of the U.S. military posture in the Asia Pacific, and noted in particular America's longstanding relationship with Japan. The U.S.-ROK alliance, too, has matured considerably in recent years, and the impressive ROK military has made enormous contributions to regional and global security in recent years.

Conflict on the Korean peninsula, the admiral noted, can be considered the Asia Pacific's most pressing security challenge. In addressing that challenge, the U.S. Pacific Command seeks to ensure that ongoing diplomatic initiatives, including the six-party talks, are backed by viable military capabilities. Admiral Fargo stressed that U.S. forces are stationed in the Asia Pacific not to provoke, but to deter conflict. They are positioned where they have the greatest relevance, and may best support a given alliance at a given time, but likewise pose the fewest problems to the host countries.

The admiral also spoke of the complexity and promise of America's relationship with the People's Republic of China (PRC). A successful PRC is very much in the U.S. interest, he observed, and a constructive and progressive relationship that further promotes peaceful exchange will benefit both parties and allow the alliance to deepen and adapt to changing times. Admiral Fargo's address was followed by a lively question-and-answer session.

John W. Lewis, director of the CISAC Project on Peace and Cooperation in the Asian-Pacific Region, led a private delegation of American experts and officials to North Korea and the country's nuclear weapons facility in Yongbyon. The visit took place January 6-10, 2004, and was the first visit by outsiders to that country's nuclear facilities since North Korea expelled international inspectors a year ago.

Accompanying Lewis were the former director of Los Alamos National Laboratory Sigfried Hecker, former State Department official Jack Pritchard, and two staffers from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Frank Jannuzi and Keith Luse.

Lewis and the others briefed U.S. government officials upon their return. Hecker, a nuclear weapons expert, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 21 and 22 about their visit to the Nuclear Scientific Research Center in Yongbyon.

The visit generated intensive interest from the media.