Stanford University

FSI International Conference: Transitions 2009

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Join us for an engaging day of debate and discussion about the profound opportunities for change offered by the U.S. presidential election and historic transitions abroad.

8:30 AM REGISTRATION AND BREAKFAST
9:15 AM - 12:00 PM MORNING SESSION
9:15 AM - 10:45 AM PLENARY I
TransitionS 2009: Where Have We Been? Where Are We Going?
  • Coit D. Blacker, Olivier Nomellini Professor in International Studies; Senior Fellow and Director, Freeman Spogli Institute
  • Gerhard Casper, President Emeritus of Stanford University; Peter and Helen Bing Professor in Undergraduate Education; Professor of Law; Professor of Political Science, by courtesy; Senior Fellow, FSI
  • Alan M. Garber, Henry J. Kaiser, Jr. Professor; Professor of Medicine; Professor, by courtesy, of Economics and of Health Research and Policy; Senior Fellow, FSI; Director, Center for Health Policy and Center for Primary Care and Outcomes Research
  • Stephen D. Krasner, Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations; Senior Fellow, FSI; Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution; former Deputy Director, FSI and former Director, Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law
11:00 AM - 12:00 PM CONCURRENT BREAKOUT SESSIONS
  • Combating HIV in Low Resource Countries: Who’s Surviving, Who’s Dying, and Why? Alan M. Garber, Chair
  • Rethinking the War on Terror. Martha Crenshaw, Chair
  • The European Union and Prospects for the Promotion of Democracy and Human Rights. Amir Eshel, Chair
  • Towards Regional Security in Northeast Asia. Daniel Sneider, Chair
12:30 PM - 2:00PM LUNCHEON
Keynote Address:
Beyond the West? New administrations in the United States and Europe face the challenge of a multipolar world
Timothy Garton Ash, Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution; Professor of European Studies, University of Oxford; Isaiah Berlin Professorial Fellow, St. Antony’s College, University of Oxford
2:30 PM - 5:30 PM AFTERNOON SESSION
2:30 PM - 4:00 PM PLENARY II
Power and Responsibility: Building International Order in an Era of Transnational Threat
  • Stephen J. Stedman, Director, Ford Dorsey Program in International Policy Studies;
    Professor of Political Science, by courtesy; Senior Fellow, FSI
  • Bruce Jones, Research Professor of Politics; Director, Center on International Cooperation, New York University
  • Carlos Pascual, Vice President and Director of the Foreign Policy Studies Program, the Brookings Institution
4:30 PM - 5:30 PM CONCURRENT BREAKOUT SESSIONS
  • Promoting Democracy: Should We, Can We? Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, Chair
  • Is African Society in Transition? Rosamond L. Naylor, Chair
  • The World Is Not Flat: Working in a Global Economy. Joshua Cohen, Chair
  • Overcoming Barriers to Nuclear Disarmament. David Holloway, Chair
5:30 PM - 6:30 PM COCKTAIL RECEPTION

KEYNOTE

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FSI International Conference

Byung Kwan Kim

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Stanford University
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Stanford, CA 94305-6055

(650) 723-9744 (650) 723-6530
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Koret Fellow, 2008-09
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General (retired) Byung Kwan Kim is the inaugural Koret Fellow for 2008-09 academic year. He was the Deputy Commander of ROK-US Combined Forces Command and the Commander of Ground Component Command.

Koret Fellowship was established by the generous support from Koret Foundation to bring leading professionals in Asia and the United States to Stanford to study United States-Korea relations. The fellows will conduct their own research on the bilateral relationship, with an emphasis on contemporary relations with the broad aim of fostering greater understanding and closer ties between the two countries.

Our Daily Bread: Without public investment, the food crisis will only get worse

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During the eighteen months after January 2007, cereal prices doubled, setting off a world food crisis. In the United States, rising food prices have been a pocketbook annoyance. Most Americans can opt to buy lower-priced sources of calories and proteins and eat out less frequently. But for nearly half of the world’s population—the 2.5 billion people who live on less than $2 per day—rising costs mean fewer meals, smaller portions, stunted children, and higher infant mortality rates. The price explosion has produced, in short, a crisis of food security, defined by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) as the physical and economic access to the food necessary for a healthy and productive life. And it has meant a sharp setback to decades-long efforts to reduce poverty in poor countries.

The current situation is quite unlike the food crises of 1966 and 1973. It is not the result of a significant drop in food supply caused by bad weather, pests, or policy changes in the former Soviet Union. Rather, it is fundamentally a demand-driven story of “success.” Rising incomes, especially in China, India, Indonesia, and Brazil, have increased demand for diversified diets that include more meat and vegetable oils. Against this background of growing income and demand, increased global consumption of biofuels and the American and European quest for energy self-sufficiency have added further strains to the agricultural system. At the same time, neglected investments in productivity-improving agricultural technology—along with a weak U.S. dollar, excessive speculation, and misguided government policies in both developed and developing countries—have exacerbated the situation. Climate change also looms ominously over the entire global food system.

In short, an array of agricultural, economic, and political connections among commodities and across nations are now working together to the detriment of the world’s food-insecure people...

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Boston Review
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Rosamond L. Naylor
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Is Democracy Promotable?

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James Traub is a contributing writer for The New York Times Magazine, where he has worked since 1998. From 1994 to 1997, he was a staff writer for The New Yorker. He has also written for The New York Review of Books, Foreign Affairs, The Atlantic Monthly, The New Republic and elsewhere. His articles have been widely reprinted and anthologized. He has written extensively about international affairs and especially the United Nations. In recent years, he has reported from Iran, Iraq, Sierra Leone, East Timor, Vietnam, India, Kosovo and Haiti. He has also written often about national politics and urban affairs, including education, immigration, race, poverty and crime.

Most recently, Traub authored the critically acclaimed book, The Best Intentions: Kofi Annan and the UN in the Era of American World Power. His previous books include, The Devil's Playground: A Century of Pleasure and Profit in Times Square, which was published in 2004, and City On A Hill, a book on open admissions at City College that was published in 1994 and won the Sidney Hillman Award for nonfiction. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

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James Traub Writer Speaker New York Times Magazine
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From 11/9 to 9/11: How the Modern Interwar Years Shaped Our World

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Derek Chollet is a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security in Washington, D.C., where he also teaches at Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program. He served in the State Department during the Clinton administration, as foreign policy adviser to former U.S. Senator John Edwards, and assisted former U.S. Secretaries of State James A. Baker III and Warren Christopher with their memoirs. He has written or coedited three books on American foreign policy, and his articles have appeared in the Washington Post, Financial Times, Los Angeles Times, Washington Monthly, and numerous other publications.

James Goldgeier is a professor of political science and international affairs at The George Washington University and a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He has authored or coauthored three books on foreign policy, and his articles have appeared in publications including Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, the National Interest, the Washington Post, Financial Times, and the Weekly Standard. He has held fellowships at Stanford University, the Brookings Institution, the Library of Congress, and the Woodrow Wilson Center and has served at the State Department and on the National Security Council staff.

Drs. Chollet and Goldgeier co-authored America Between the Wars: From 11/9 to 9/11, published in June 2008 by Public Affairs.

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James Goldgeier Professor of Political Science and International Affairs Speaker The George Washington University
Derek Chollet Senior Fellow at the Center for a new American Security Speaker Georgetown University
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Pavel Podvig: U.S.-Russian relations following Georgia conflict

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If there's a consensus about the confrontation between Russia and Georgia, it's that the conflict has seriously strained the relationship between Moscow and its Western counterparts--namely, the United States and NATO. Now that the worst of the conflict seems over, it appears that the harshest measures suggested in the first days of the conflict, i.e., expelling Russia from the G-8, won't materialize. Despite all of the disagreements and mistrust, each party seems to understand that severing ties between Russia and the West isn't realistic.

The problem is that while G-8 membership is highly visible and symbolic, it isn't the most important element of the partnership between Russia and the West. This partnership is only as strong as the network of concrete agreements and bureaucratic arrangements that allow governments to work closely together, creating what someone aptly named "habits of cooperation." Today's sorry U.S.-Russian relationship is a direct result of Washington and Moscow neglecting in recent years the few existing cooperative arrangements between the countries.

We should try to remember that cooperation isn't a reward for good behavior. Rather, 'the habits of cooperation' are important building blocks of an equitable and trusting relationship that would make conflicts such as the one in Georgia impossible."
The danger is that in the emotional atmosphere of the aftermath of the Georgia conflict, the United States and Russia could damage the foundation of their relationship further, strengthening elements in both countries that are either indifferent or hostile to the idea of a partnership. Already, the early signs seem to indicate that we're moving in that direction.

Military cooperation between NATO and Russia may be the conflict's first political victim. For instance, Moscow has decided to halt joint military-to-military projects with NATO--a move that would cancel about 10 joint exercises scheduled for this year. And while both NATO and Moscow are leaving some room for normalization, the mood in the Kremlin seems to be that Russia has nothing to lose if it severs all ties with NATO.

The U.S.-Russian agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation is another likely casualty of the conflict. Although the agreement probably wouldn't have entered into force during the Bush administration--the administration got the timing wrong--now it's probable that Congress will pass a resolution explicitly rejecting it, making it difficult for the next administration to bring the agreement back--even if that administration decides that the agreement is an important means in which to cooperate and secure a powerful Russian ally, Rosatom, the Russian nuclear agency. I should note that Rosatom representatives are upset that the conflict in Georgia could potentially prevent the agreement from becoming a reality.

It's also unlikely that any of the proposals for transparency or cooperation regarding European missile defense will get a chance--especially given that the Georgia conflict quickly led to Washington and Warsaw finalizing a deal that would feature Poland hosting missile defense interceptors. Russian generals responded by threatening to add Poland to Moscow's nuclear target lists--a particularly ominous threat.

At this point, no one knows the full extent of the fallout from the Georgia conflict. Some pessimists have gone so far as to ask if Russia will pull out of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program and other efforts to reduce the danger of nuclear weapons or curtail access to the International Space Station. Personally, I don't envision this happening--precisely because these are established programs that have substantial internal support in Russia.

Of course, setbacks are inevitable--it's difficult to make a case for continuing a partnership in the midst of a crisis. But we should try to remember that cooperation isn't a reward for good behavior or a bargaining chip. Rather, "the habits of cooperation" are important building blocks of a stable, trusting, and equitable relationship that would make conflicts such as the one in Georgia impossible.

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McFaul co-authors CNAS report on strategic leadership

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CDDRL Director Michael A. McFaul is co-author of a new Center for a New American Security (CNAS) report, Strategic Leadership: Framework for a 21st Century National Security Strategy. In the report McFaul and other top foreign policy experts chart a new direction for America's global role.

Strategic leadership, the report states, "requires making wise and deliberate choices about how, when, and with whom to lead...Leadership that serves common goals is the best
way to inspire the many different peoples of the world to make shared commitments."

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Creating a New Europe

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Professor Hedlund explores a shift in focus in Europe away from the 'Brussels vs. Moscow' attitude by proposing strategic interaction in what he calls the 'corridor countries.' He discusses why there is a variety of outcomes in terms of economic success in these countries, in particular the strain of rapid deregulation in 1991 in the Soviet Union. Professor Hedlund also examines the challenges for these countries in Europe now.

Synopsis

In 'Creating a New Europe,' Professor Hedlund begins by discussing the choice the European Union had when they met in the Netherlands in 1991. He argues policymakers could have widened the concept of European integration through free trade and economic cooperation which would have led to unlimited expansion options towards the East. However, Prof. Hedlund argues they decided instead to deepen this notion of 'the United States of Europe' through a currency, flag, and constitution leading to an exclusionary approach. Now, in 2008, there is new opportunity with new members in the EU. Problems such as Russia's interaction with its neighbors which were formerly seen as external issues are now internal issues affecting Brussels. Rather than being 'grateful children' as Jacques Chirac infamously put it, these 'corridor states' are decentralising the game between Brussels and Moscow. Prof. Hedlund argues we must look for more substantial success in internal dynamics in these 'corridor states,' states which were formerly part of the U.S.S.R. and are now part of the EU or are hoping to be in the near future. To Prof. Hedlund, these states are in a good position to act as credible brokers for strategic interaction between the EU and Russia, as well as between each other, such as Lithuania's intervention during the Orange Revolution.

Prof. Hedlund explains how these ‘corridor countries’ were seen as homogenous in 1991 but now have a great diversity in economic outcomes. Much of this can be attributed to the over eager embracement of a market economy by Russia in 1991 and the hardship it caused. In addition, Prof. Hedlund identifies the corrupted markets which exploited the natural resources available following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Moreover, Prof. Hedlund cites that the ‘rent seeking’ attitude of the Russian government was not reciprocated in all former Soviet states. Some were arguably lured by the prospect of EU membership while others might have drawn in by the examples of the successful and democratic Western countries.

To Prof. Hedlund, the challenge now is to develop forward movement in the areas of the ‘corridor countries’ that have become stalled. In addition, some of the markets in those areas must be developed away from their, as he puts it, ‘3rd world’ manners of operating. Accountability is crucial to a functioning economy to Prof. Hedlund. Finally, these ‘corridor countries’ can help in democracy building.

In taking questions, Prof. Hedlund further reiterates his belief in the necessity of accountability. In addition, he touches on his sense that European education is waning, and that this is setting back innovation. Moreover, Prof. Hedlund addresses the merits of a variety of diplomatic approaches.

About the speaker

Stefan Hedlund is an Anna Lindh Research Fellow at the Stanford Forum on Contemporary Europe. He is professor of Soviet and East European Studies at Uppsala University, Sweden. Before 1991, his research was centered on the Soviet economic system. Since then, he has been focusing on Russia's adaptation to post-Soviet realities. This has included research on the multiple challenges of economic transition as well as the importance of Russia's historical legacy for the reforms. With a background in economics, he has a long-standing interest in problems related to the Soviet economic system, and the attempted transition that followed in the wake of the Soviet collapse. More recently, his research has revolved around neo-institutional theory, and problems of path dependence. Among sixteen authored and coauthored titles in English and Swedish, he is the author of Russian Path Dependence (2005), and the forthcoming co-edited volume Russia Since 1980: Wrestling with Westernization (Cambridge, 2009.) Professor Hedlund has received numerous awards including fellowships at the Davis Center for Russian Studies, Harvard University; the Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University; and at the Kennan Institute, Washington DC.

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Stefan Hedlund

Department of East European Studies
Uppsala University
Gamla Torget 3, III
Box 514, 751 20 UPPSALA
Sweden

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Professor of East European Studies, Uppsala University
Visiting Scholar, Forum on Contemporary Europe (December 2008)
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Stefan Hedlund is Professor of East European Studies at Uppsala University, Sweden. A long-standing specialist on Russia, and on the Former Soviet Union more broadly, his current research interest is aimed at economic theories of institutional change. He also has a devouring interest in Russian history, which he has sought to blend with more standard theories of economic change. He has been a frequent contributor to the media, and has published extensively on matters relating to Russian economic reform and to the attempted transition to democracy and market economy more generally. His scholarly publications include some 20 books and close to 200 journal and magazine articles. His most recent monographs are Russian Path Dependence (Routledge, 2005), and Russia since 1980: Wrestling with Westernization (Cambridge University Press, 2008), the latter co-authored with Steven Rosefielde.

 

Stefan Hedlund Professor of Soviet and East European Studies Speaker Uppsala University, Sweden
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Victor Pulls Back the Curtain; OPEC is No Wizard of the Oil Markets

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David G. Victor
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Conventional wisdom holds that the OPEC oil cartel has the world in its grasp. It can manipulate prices by tinkering with supplies. Last month OPEC released a new study on world oil demand that seemed to signal the cartel was readying to tighten the taps because higher prices were slaking the world's thirst for oil. The American Petroleum Institute released fresh data showing that demand for oil products in the United States (the world's largest market) dropped a whopping 3 percent from the year earlier. The news about lower demand has caused oil prices to fall a bit, and all eyes are on OPEC's wizards to tighten supplies.

But the conventional wisdom is mostly wrong. OPEC (which stands for the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) is no wizard. For the most part, its actions lag behind fundamental changes in oil supply and demand rather than lead them. OPEC looks like a masterful cartel when, in fact, it is mainly just riding the waves.

It is hard to figure out exactly what goes on behind's OPEC's closed doors, but glimpses are possible by probing what the cartel members say about prices and how they set quotas. Over the last five years, OPEC members have announced ever-higher price goals only after the market had already delivered those high prices. As the market has soared, OPEC has followed. Only in the last few months has Saudi Arabia suggested that the cartel would be better off if prices reversed because high prices would encourage the world's big oil consumers to wean themselves from oil. It proffered $125 a barrel. The markets shrugged and kept on rising until real facts about slowing demand revealed that fundamentals were changing.

OPEC also sets quotas so that each member knows its role. Throughout its history, OPEC has faced the difficult task of holding the cartel in the face of strong incentives by each member to cheat. Today's oil market makes that job easy because nearly every member, except Saudi Arabia, is producing at full capacity. OPEC, more or less, has nothing to do.

In fact, the last time OPEC made a major adjustment to its quotas—September 2007—it jiggered them to reflect what its members were already pumping. Algeria got a big boost because it was already supplying nearly 50 percent more than its quota. Kuwait, Libya and Qatar also got boosts that aligned their OPEC quotas with existing reality. OPEC also set, for the first time, a quota on Angola's output. Since then, Angola has attracted a steady stream of new production projects, which makes it inevitable that OPEC will adjust Angola's quota to reflect the new reality. (Iraq has no quota; it has troubles enough without pretending to align its oil output to OPEC strictures.)

Nigeria and Venezuela got haircuts because their political troubles meant they were already producing far less than their quotas. Indonesia also cut its quota and a few months later left OPEC because it realized that as a big oil user it actually had more in common with oil importers than its fellow OPEC members. These changes in quotas were reflections of political realities that OPEC doesn't control.

Today's oil cartel, even more than in the past, is really about Saudi Arabia. But Saudi Arabia also is no wizard at the controls of the world market. The Saudis can adjust their output a bit since they control nearly all of spare capacity in the world market. (Earlier this month they pledged another 200,000 barrels per day to dampen pressure from the United States and other governments that are reeling from high oil prices. But that move was more symbolic than real as the markets were already expecting the new supplies.)

Saudi Arabia is on the front lines of the new reality in world oil supply. It is proving much harder and more costly to bring on more supplies. The Saudis have an ambitious plan to increase output about one third over the coming decade, but they are finding that will be a stretch. Their fellow OPEC members are in a similar situation, and those hard facts also produce high oil prices. In fact, the Middle East members of OPEC are, today, producing at just the same level as they were three decades ago because none of them invested much in finding and producing new supplies. High prices into the future reflect these fundamental facts rather than the assumption that OPEC is a masterful cartel.

Conventional wisdom holds that because OPEC is raking in more cash than ever, it has never been stronger than it is today. In fact, OPEC has rarely been weaker. It is the accidental beneficiary of forces that have caused today's high prices, and it will be nearly as powerless when prices come down.

The real solutions to today's high oil prices require more attention to demand. Blaming OPEC, while good political theater, won't have much impact. Legislation now working its way through the U.S. Congress would actually attempt to break up the oil cartel. Such schemes won't work, and the political effort would be better spent on policies that redouble the nation's efficiency, producing more oil from diverse sources here at home, and in finding ways to move beyond oil altogether.

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Wolak Argues Speculators Are Not to Blame for High Oil Prices

Authors
Frank Wolak
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The price of a barrel of oil has more than doubled in the past year and a half, from $60 in early 2007 to a high of $142 earlier this summer. This has led to a search for someone to blame for this price increase and for government policies to reduce oil prices.

The actions of energy traders, more pejoratively known as speculators, are being targeted by Ralph Nader, the chief executives of the major domestic airlines and many members of Congress as a major cause of this price increase. However, data from world oil market demonstrates that it is unlikely that speculators have had a noticeable impact on world oil prices.

House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, D-San Francisco, recently called on President Bush "to
draw down a small portion" of the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve to reduce oil prices. But this is unlikely to have a discernible effect on world oil prices.

Oil is a relatively homogenous commodity traded in a world market with a demand of 85
million barrels a day, of which 25 percent is consumed by the United States. The demand for oil is insensitive to changes in the price of oil, particularly in oil-producing countries, where its use may be subsidized. Recent research suggests a 10 percent increase in the price of oil would reduce world demand by no more than 1 percent.

Speculators are accused of increasing the price of oil by taking large financial positions in oil futures markets. But these bets on the future price of oil have no impact on the current price of oil if the current demand equals the current supply, meaning there is no net change in inventories of oil.

According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, commercial inventories of oil
currently held by the major industrialized countries are below their five-year average. That means consumers are willing to purchase all available supply and run down inventories at the current high price. Given that market outcome, the behavior of speculators cannot be inflating the price.

What would speculators have to do to increase the world price of oil by $25 relative to a
$100 baseline? They would need to buy and put into inventory approximately 2.5 percent of world demand, or approximately 2.125 million barrels a day. Over the course of a year, this would amount to storing 775 million barrels, which is the current amount in the our country's Strategic Petroleum Reserve.

Applying this same logic to Speaker Pelosi's recommendation to draw down a small
portion of the reserve--say 100 million barrels over the course of a three-month period--this 1-million-barrel-a-day increase in supply implies at best a three-month-long $12.50 reduction in the price of oil relative to its current price of $125.

However, according to the Energy Information Administration, world inventories of oil
held by industry and government are on the order of 7 billion to 8 billion barrels. So a more likely outcome of withdrawing 1 million barrels a day from the government's reserves for three months is that privately held inventories would increase one-for-one, and world oil prices would be unaffected.

Although energy traders are a convenient scapegoat for the current high price of oil, the
numbers just don't add up for their actions to have any significant impact on market prices. A strong world demand, not the actions of speculators, is responsible.
But releasing a small amount of oil from the U.S. reserve may still make sense. Given
historically high prices--and the great need for government revenues--this may be a fortuitous time to sell oil and take advantage of the market.
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FRANK A. WOLAK is a professor of economics at Stanford University specializing in the
energy sector. He is chairman of the California Independent System Operator's Market
Surveillance Committee, an independent monitor for the electricity supply industry. He wrote
this article for the Mercury News.

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