-

A change in government may be coming to Japan. Polls show that Prime Minister Aso Taro is deeply unpopular among Japanese voters, and the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) has won impressive victories in the recent Tokyo municipal elections. To stave off a revolt within his own party and his own possible replacement as party leader, Aso dissolved the House of Representatives, Japan's more powerful lower house, on 21 July. The scene is now set for an August 30 election, and if the Liberal Democratic Party's disastrous run continues, the DPJ's campaign slogan of "regime change" (seiken koutai) seems likely to be an accurate prediction.

Until now, analysis of the major opposition party has usually focused on its perceived lack of unity. Because of these divisions, the party is often said to lack concrete policy. In addition, the presence of former Socialist Party members within the DPJ is often viewed as a sign that a DPJ government may be a source of friction between Japan and the United States. On July 21, the Asia Program held an event to discuss whether these and other assumptions are true, as well as to assess the chances of “regime change” in August.

For more information please visit the Wilson Center's listing for this event

Asia Program
Woodrow Wilson Center
One Woodrow Wilson Plaza
1300 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004-3027

Richard Katz Editor-in-Chief Speaker The Oriental Economist
Ko Maeda Assistant Professor Speaker University of North Texas

Stanford University
Encina Hall, Room E301
Stanford, CA 94305-6055

0
Lecturer in International Policy at the Ford Dorsey Master’s in International Policy
2011_Dan_Sneider_2_Web.jpg MA

Daniel C. Sneider is a lecturer in international policy at Stanford's Ford Dorsey Master’s in International Policy and a lecturer in East Asian Studies at Stanford. His own research is focused on current U.S. foreign and national security policy in Asia and on the foreign policy of Japan and Korea.  Since 2017, he has been based partly in Tokyo as a Visiting Researcher at the Canon Institute for Global Studies, where he is working on a diplomatic history of the creation and management of the U.S. security alliances with Japan and South Korea during the Cold War. Sneider contributes regularly to the leading Japanese publication Toyo Keizai as well as to the Nelson Report on Asia policy issues.

Sneider is the former Associate Director for Research at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford. At Shorenstein APARC, Sneider directed the center’s Divided Memories and Reconciliation project, a comparative study of the formation of wartime historical memory in East Asia. He is the co-author of a book on wartime memory and elite opinion, Divergent Memories, from Stanford University Press. He is the co-editor, with Dr. Gi-Wook Shin, of Divided Memories: History Textbooks and the Wars in Asia, from Routledge and of Confronting Memories of World War II: European and Asian Legacies, from University of Washington Press.

Sneider was named a National Asia Research Fellow by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and the National Bureau of Asian Research in 2010. He is the co-editor of Cross Currents: Regionalism and Nationalism in Northeast Asia, Shorenstein APARC, distributed by Brookings Institution Press, 2007; of First Drafts of Korea: The U.S. Media and Perceptions of the Last Cold War Frontier, 2009; as well as of Does South Asia Exist?: Prospects for Regional Integration, 2010. Sneider’s path-breaking study “The New Asianism: Japanese Foreign Policy under the Democratic Party of Japan” appeared in the July 2011 issue of Asia Policy. He has also contributed to other volumes, including “Strategic Abandonment: Alliance Relations in Northeast Asia in the Post-Iraq Era” in Towards Sustainable Economic and Security Relations in East Asia: U.S. and ROK Policy Options, Korea Economic Institute, 2008; “The History and Meaning of Denuclearization,” in William H. Overholt, editor, North Korea: Peace? Nuclear War?, Harvard Kennedy School of Government, 2019; and “Evolution or new Doctrine? Japanese security policy in the era of collective self-defense,” in James D.J. Brown and Jeff Kingston, eds, Japan’s Foreign Relations in Asia, Routledge, December 2017.

Sneider’s writings have appeared in many publications, including the Washington Post, the New York Times, Slate, Foreign Policy, the New Republic, National Review, the Far Eastern Economic Review, the Oriental Economist, Newsweek, Time, the International Herald Tribune, the Financial Times, and Yale Global. He is frequently cited in such publications.

Prior to coming to Stanford, Sneider was a long-time foreign correspondent. His twice-weekly column for the San Jose Mercury News looking at international issues and national security from a West Coast perspective was syndicated nationally on the Knight Ridder Tribune wire service. Previously, Sneider served as national/foreign editor of the Mercury News. From 1990 to 1994, he was the Moscow bureau chief of the Christian Science Monitor, covering the end of Soviet Communism and the collapse of the Soviet Union. From 1985 to 1990, he was Tokyo correspondent for the Monitor, covering Japan and Korea. Prior to that he was a correspondent in India, covering South and Southeast Asia. He also wrote widely on defense issues, including as a contributor and correspondent for Defense News, the national defense weekly.

Sneider has a BA in East Asian history from Columbia University and an MPA from the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.

Daniel C. Sneider Associate Director for Research Speaker Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University
Seminars
Authors
Donald K. Emmerson
News Type
Commentary
Date
Paragraphs

Jim Castle is a friend of mine. I have known him since we were graduate students in Indonesia in the late 1960s. While I labored in academe he went on to found and grow CastleAsia into what is arguably the most highly regarded private-sector consultancy for informing and interfacing expatriate and domestic investors and managers in Indonesia. Friday mornings he hosts a breakfast gathering of business executives at his favorite hotel, the JW Marriott in the Kuningan district of Jakarta.

Or he did, until the morning of July 17, 2009. On that Friday, shortly before 8am, a man pulling a suitcase on wheels strolled into the Marriott's Lobby Lounge, where Jim and his colleagues were meeting, and detonated the contents of his luggage. We know that the bomber was at least outwardly calm from the surveillance videotape of his relaxed walk across the lobby to the restaurant.

He wore a business suit, presumably to deflect attention before he blew himself up. Almost simultaneously, in the Airlangga restaurant at the Ritz Carlton hotel across the street, a confederate destroyed himself, killing or wounding a second set of victims. As of this writing, the toll stands at nine dead (including the killers) and more than 50 injured.

On learning that Jim had been at the meeting in the Marriott, I became frantic to find out if he were still alive. A mere 16 hours later, to my immense relief, he answered my e-mail. He was out of hospital, having sustained what he called "trivial injuries", including a temporary loss of hearing. Of the nearly 20 people at the roundtable meeting, however, four died and others were badly hurt. Jim's number two at CastleAsia lost part of a leg.

The same Marriott had been bombed before, in 2003. That explosion killed 12 people. Eight of them were Indonesian citizens, who also made up the great majority of the roughly 150 people wounded in that attack - and most of these Indonesian victims were Muslims. This distribution undercut the claim of the country's small jihadi fringe to be defending Islam's local adherents against foreign infidels.

But if last Friday's killers hoped to gain the sympathy of Indonesians this time around by attacking Jim and his expatriate colleagues and thereby lowering the proportion of domestic casualties, they failed. Of the 37 victims whose names and nationalities were known as of Monday, 60% were Indonesians, and that figure was almost certain to rise as more bodies were identified. The selective public acceptance of slaughter to which the targeting of infidel foreigners might have catered is, of course, grotesquely inhumane.

Since Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was first elected president in 2004, Indonesia's real gross domestic product has averaged around 6% annual growth. In 2008 only four of East Asia's 19 economies achieved rates higher than Indonesia's 6.1% (Vietnam, Mongolia, China and Macau). In the first quarter of 2009, measured year-on-year, while the recession-hit economies of Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand all shrank, Indonesia's grew 4.4%. In the first half of 2009, the Jakarta Stock Exchange soared.

The economy is hardly all roses. Poverty and corruption remain pervasive. Unemployment and underemployment persist. The country's infrastructure badly needs repair. And the economy's performance in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) has been sub-par: The US$2 billion in FDI that went to Indonesia in 2008 was less than a third of the $7 billion inflow enjoyed by Thailand's far smaller economy, notwithstanding Indonesia's far more stable politics.

Nevertheless, all things considered, the macro-economy in Yudhoyono's first term did reasonably well. We may never know whether the killer at the Marriott aimed to maximize economic harm. According to another expat consultant in Jakarta, Kevin O'Rourke, the day's victims included 10 of the top 50 business leaders in the city. "It could have been a coincidence," he said, or the bombers could have "known just what they were doing".

Imputing rationality to savagery is tricky business. But the attackers probably did hope to damage the Indonesian economy, notably foreign tourism and investment. In that context, the American provenance and patronage of the two hotels would have heightened their appeal as targets. Although the terrorists may not have known these details, the Ritz-Carlton Hotel Company is an independently operated division of Marriott International, Inc, which owns the JW Marriott brand, and both firms are headquartered on the outskirts of Washington DC.

Second-round revenge against the Marriott may also have played a role - assaulting a place that had rebuilt and recovered so quickly after being attacked in 2003. Spiteful retribution may have influenced the decision to re-attack the Kuta tourist area in Bali in 2005 after that neighborhood's recovery from the bomb carnage of 2002. Arguable, too, is the notion that 9/11 in 2001 was meant to finish the job started with the first bombing of the Twin Towers in 1993. And in all of these instances, the economy - Indonesian or American - suffered the consequences.

Panic buttons are not being pushed, however. Indonesian stock analyst Haryajid Ramelan's expectation seems plausible: that confidence in the economy will return if those who plotted the blasts are soon found and punished, and if investors can be convinced that these were "purely terrorist attacks" unrelated to domestic politics.

Sympathy for terrorism in Indonesia is far too sparse for Friday's explosions to destabilize the country. But they occurred merely nine days after Yudhoyono's landslide re-election as president on July 8, with three months still to go before the anticipated inauguration of his new administration on October 20. That timing ensured that some would speculate that the killers wanted to deprive the president of his second five-year term.

The president himself fed this speculation at his press conference on July 18, the day after the attacks. He brandished photographs of unnamed shooters with handguns using his picture for target practice. He reported the discovery of a plan to seize the headquarters of the election commission and thereby prevent his democratic victory from being announced. "There was a statement that there would be a revolution if SBY wins," he said, referring to himself by his initials.

"This is an intelligence report," he continued, "not rumors, nor gossip. Other statements said they wished to turn Indonesia into [a country like] Iran. And the last statement said that no matter what, SBY should not and would not be inaugurated." Barring information to the contrary, one may assume that these reports of threats were real, whether or not the threats themselves were. But why share them with the public?

Perhaps the president was defending his decision not to inspect the bomb damage in person - a gesture that would have shown sympathy for the victims while reassuring the population. He had wanted to go, he said, "But the chief of police and others suggested I should wait, since the area was not yet secure. And danger could come at any time, especially with all of the threats I have shown you. Physical threats."

Had Yudhoyono lost the election, or had he won it by only a thin and hotly contested margin, his remarks might have been read as an effort to garner sympathy and deflect attention from his unpopularity. The presidential candidates who lost to his landslide, Megawati Sukarnoputri and Jusuf Kalla, have indeed criticized how the July 8 polling was handled. And there were shortcomings. But even without them, Yudhoyono would still have won. In this context, speaking as he did from a position of personal popularity and political strength, the net effect of his comments was probably to encourage public support for stopping terrorism.

One may also note the calculated vagueness of his references to those - "they” - who wished him and the country harm. Not once in his speech did he refer to Jemaah Islamiyah, the network that is the culprit of choice for most analysts of the twin hotel attacks. Had he directly fingered that violently jihadi group, ambitious Islamist politicians such as Din Syamsuddin - head of Muhammadiyah, the country's second-largest Muslim organization - would have charged him with defaming Islam because Jemaah Islamiyah literally means "the Islamic group" or "the Islamic community".

One may hope that Din's ability to turn his Islamist supporters against jihadi terrorism and in favor of religious freedom and liberal democracy will someday catch up to his energy in policing language. Yet Yudhoyono was right not to mention Jemaah Islamiyah. Doing so would have complicated unnecessarily the president's relations with Muslim politicians whose support he may need when it comes to getting the legislature to turn his proposals into laws. Nor is it even clear that Jemaah Islamiyah is still an entity coherent enough to have, in fact, masterminded last Friday's attacks.

Peering into the future, one may reasonably conclude that the bombings' repercussions will neither annul Yudhoyono's landslide victory nor derail the inauguration of his next administration. Nor will they do more than temporary damage to the Indonesian economy. As for the personal aspect of what happened Friday, while mourning the dead, I am grateful that Jim and others, foreign and Indonesian, are still alive.

Donald K Emmerson heads the Southeast Asia Forum at Stanford University. He is a co-author of Islamism: Contested Perspectives on Political Islam (Stanford University Press, November 2009) and Hard Choices: Security, Democracy, and Regionalism in Southeast Asia (Stanford/ISEAS, 2008).

Copyright 2009 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved.

All News button
1
Authors
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

Ony Avrianto Jamhari taught the Indonesian language at Stanford in 2005-06 as a
Foreign Language Teaching Assistant (FLTA) under Fulbright sponsorship.  He was
active on campus in other ways as well, including organizing an Indonesian film festival. 
SEAF Director Don Emmerson enjoyed working with him on research projects in
Indonesia.  In 2009 Ony began teaching Indonesian language and culture at Woosong
University, Daejeon, South Korea.  He can be reached at ony_jamhari@yahoo.com.
 
In July 2009 he looked back on his time at Stanford and brought SEAF up to date on his
activities and interests since then:
 
“My time as an FLTA at Stanford was a blessing, an honor, and an incredible experience
for me.  Not only did I gain academic experience; my time at Stanford opened doors to
my future career. In addition to teaching Indonesian, I was able to learn about the
American system of higher education. This knowledge encouraged me to strive toward
the ultimate goal of my life:  to become an agent for change in the educational world.  
 
“In 2006 I left Stanford to return to Indonesia.  I continued teaching Indonesian (bahasa
Indonesia) in Jakarta.  Thanks to contacts with colleagues and friends, I was able to teach
the Indonesian language to many foreigners working and living in the capital city of
Indonesia.  Sudirman Street (Jalan Sudirman)—Jakarta’s main thoroughfare and business
area, became in effect my office, as I moved from one building to another from early
morning to late evening teaching Indonesian. I was also often asked by the Fulbright
committee in Jakarta to serve as a resource person helping to orient and train their new
grantees—Indonesians preparing to go to the US as FLTAs and Americans who had
come to teach English to Indonesia.
 
“My desire to focus and develop my personal skills in education also motivated me to
work at the Indonesian International Education Foundation (IIEF) as a program officer
for an International Fellowships Program (IFP) sponsored by the Ford Foundation. This
program provided opportunities for advanced study to individuals who would go on to
use their education to become leaders in their respective fields. My experience with IFP
broadened my knowledge and my network of colleagues and contacts, as I worked with
twenty-two international partners of the program in cities around the world. 
 
“In February 2009 I moved to South Korea to my present position teaching bahasa
Indonesia at Woosong University in Daejeon here in South Korea.  So far not many
students have signed up to take Indonesian.  Many Korean students prefer to take either
Japanese or Chinese, in addition to English, which is required.  It is a big challenge for
me to promote the study of Indonesian.  Fortunately, some professors and staff have been
very helpful in disseminating information about the availability of Indonesian classes.  I
expect there will be more students interested in learning the language next semester.  

“Besides teaching, I am also working for Prof. Lee Sung Joon, the Director of the Asia
Research Center at Woosong, to conduct research on Indonesian education. On 6-10 July
2009 I attended two conferences in Vietnam. Prof Lee and I presented a paper entitled
‘Higher Education as a Trade Service in Indonesia’ at one conference organized by the
Korea Research Academy of Distribution and Management and the Korea Logistics
Research Associations, Inc. At the other event, hosted by the Korean Education
Development Institute, I was a discussant of ‘Mid to Long Term Education Cooperation
Development in Indonesia,' a research paper presented by Prof. Lee Sung Joon. 
 
“I am hoping and expecting that my contribution in education will be useful for others, as
well as for my beloved country, Indonesia. 
 
“Looking forward, there are two things that I want to do in the near future: to work
toward a Ph.D in the field of education, and to write my first novel, entitled ‘International
Jomblo,’ about an individual who looks for better things in his life.”

All News button
1
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs
Gregory Domber, 2007-2008 Hewlett Fellow, received the 2009 Betty M. Unterberger Prize from the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) for his dissertation "Supporting the Revolution: America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland, 1981-1989." He is currently teaching at teaching at the University of Northern Florida.
All News button
1
Authors
Larry Diamond
Abbas Milani
News Type
Commentary
Date
Paragraphs
As the presidential electoral turmoil in Iran continues, pitting supporters of challenger Mir Hussein Moussavi against President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, President Obama has gotten it right, Larry Diamond and Milani say, "by signaling America's support for peaceful protest, human rights, and the rule of law." More explicit language, or action, would only play into the hands of Iran's conservative elements. But the world has more than 100 other democracies, Diamond and Milani note, arguing "It is time that their voices were heard and their actions felt in Tehran."

Notices of the demise of Iran’s Green Revolution are premature. Without question, the tyrannical triumvirate — Ayotallah Ali Khamenei, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the Revolutionary Guard — have dealt a crippling blow to the popular movement protesting their electoral coup of June 12.

Thousands of Iranians have been arrested and savagely tortured — from street protesters to election campaign organizers for Mir Hussein Moussavi, the likely victor in that contest. Many are now being forced to “confess” to having been agents of the United States or Britain.

We have seen this play before, not simply in Iran but in other tyrannies that suppressed mass movements for democratic change with massive violence and terror.

But Iran in 2009 is not China in 1989, Burma in 1990 or Belarus in 2006. The crisis in the Islamic Republic has exposed and widened massive cracks within the ruling elite. Such divisions are always a sign of an impending crackup of dictatorship.

Despite the rush to bury Iran’s reformist movement as another lost cause, Iran remains at a possible political tipping point. Democracies around the world have a duty — not simply to themselves, but to their strategic interests — to weigh in. They must not be deterred by threats to shun talks over Iran’s nuclear program.

President Obama has gotten it right by signaling America’s support for peaceful protest, human rights and the rule of law. More explicit language, not to mention action, would only play into the hands of the most cynical and vicious conservative elements in Iran. Moreover, with no diplomatic ties and all but no trade with Iran, there is little more the U.S. could do right now to pressure the regime.

But there are over 100 other democracies in the world. It is time that their voices were heard and their actions felt in Tehran.

Britain shares with the U.S. the handicap of a past history of negative interference in Iran. But Britain has diplomatic and economic ties to the regime, and breaking or suspending those will weaken Ayatollah Khamenei and his reactionary allies.

Moreover, Britain can have a unique kind of impact in Iran: For more than a century, Iranians have believed in the omnipotence of the “British hand” in the affairs of their country. Any indication that Britain is no longer willing to do business with the Islamic regime will hearten the Iranian people and undermine the regime’s aura of invincibility.

Germany, France and Italy are major trading partners with Iran. They have little history of colonial interference in Iranian affairs. Their decision to refuse to recognize the Ahmadinejad regime would have an immense effect. More compelling still would be a similar declaration from the entire Group of 8 at its impending summit.

The smaller and less powerful democracies can also have an impact. It would be preposterous for Iranian hardliners to attribute ulterior strategic motives to actions by the Scandinavian countries or the Netherlands, Ireland, Canada or Slovenia. If a coalition of such countries were to condemn the crackdown, call for a release of political prisoners and demand full respect for human rights — and back up these positions with a downgrading of diplomatic and trade ties — this would send a powerful message to both sides in Iran.

Many democracies around the world, including the above, have diplomatic ties with Iran. It is important that they maintain their embassies in Tehran. But they should now refuse to recognize the legitimacy of Ahmadinejad’s government.

The most powerful coalition of democracies in the world, the 27-member European Union, is now debating whether to withdraw their ambassadors from Tehran in protest over the detention of the British Embassy’s Iranian personnel.

The withdrawal of E.U. ambassadors would send a stunning message to the Iranian hardliners that coups and bloody suppression of peaceful protests carry a heavy price in international standing.

With the simple diplomatic act of denying legitimacy — something nearly all democratic forces in Iran are now asking of the world — the democracies of the world can give a needed boost to the forces of democratic change in Iran and earn the lasting gratitude of a movement that will eventually triumph.

All News button
1

This year marks the 60th consecutive Current Strategy Forum at the Naval War College in Newport. The first was held on 9 May 1949 under the title "Round Table Talks," and offered an opportunity for the nation's public servants, scholars, and senior military officers to join the College faculty and students to discuss the future strategy of the United States. Over time this forum has expanded to include a cross section of America's civilian leadership to encourage a wide-ranging debate on national and international security. Each year the Secretary of the Navy hosts the Current Strategy Forum to provide an opportunity for an exchange of views among outstanding scholars and leaders from across industry, government and the military. Today, as the Navy continues to focus on its support for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan it also must also look beyond the horizon.  The Navy must support our nation's national security objectives even as new challenges and threats emerge to threaten   the global system.  This year's forum will present the perspective of the nation's leading experts on how the Navy can both meet future challenges and identify opportunities to promote a more stable world with the theme:

» "Seizing Strategic Opportunities: Challenging the Paradigm"

Naval War College
Newport, RI

Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Stanford University
Encina Hall, C-327
Stanford, CA 94305-6055

(650) 723-9149 (650) 723-6530
0
Shorenstein APARC Fellow
Affiliated Scholar at the Stanford Center on China's Economy and Institutions
tom_fingar_vert.jpg PhD

Thomas Fingar is a Shorenstein APARC Fellow in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. He was the inaugural Oksenberg-Rohlen Distinguished Fellow from 2010 through 2015 and the Payne Distinguished Lecturer at Stanford in 2009.

From 2005 through 2008, he served as the first deputy director of national intelligence for analysis and, concurrently, as chairman of the National Intelligence Council. Fingar served previously as assistant secretary of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (2000-01 and 2004-05), principal deputy assistant secretary (2001-03), deputy assistant secretary for analysis (1994-2000), director of the Office of Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific (1989-94), and chief of the China Division (1986-89). Between 1975 and 1986 he held a number of positions at Stanford University, including senior research associate in the Center for International Security and Arms Control.

Fingar is a graduate of Cornell University (A.B. in Government and History, 1968), and Stanford University (M.A., 1969 and Ph.D., 1977 both in political science). His most recent books are From Mandate to Blueprint: Lessons from Intelligence Reform (Stanford University Press, 2021), Reducing Uncertainty: Intelligence Analysis and National Security (Stanford University Press, 2011), The New Great Game: China and South and Central Asia in the Era of Reform, editor (Stanford University Press, 2016), Uneasy Partnerships: China and Japan, the Koreas, and Russia in the Era of Reform (Stanford, 2017), and Fateful Decisions: Choices that will Shape China’s Future, co-edited with Jean Oi (Stanford, 2020). His most recent article is, "The Role of Intelligence in Countering Illicit Nuclear-Related Procurement,” in Matthew Bunn, Martin B. Malin, William C. Potter, and Leonard S Spector, eds., Preventing Black Market Trade in Nuclear Technology (Cambridge, 2018)."

Selected Multimedia

CV
Date Label
Thomas Fingar Panelist
Workshops
Subscribe to North America