TRANSCRIPT:

Kahl: You’re listening to World Class from the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. I’m your host, Colin Kahl, the director of FSI.

On February 28, the United States and Israel launched a major military campaign against Iran with profound implications for the Middle East and beyond. Given the urgency of this topic and our desire to bring our podcast listeners insights from scholars here at Stanford’s FSI, we’re doing something a little different on today’s episode.

We’re bringing you a panel discussion on the Iran war held at FSI on March 4, moderated by professor Jim Goldgeier. It features a conversation with me, Abbas Milani, and Ori Rabinowitz.

Jim Goldgeier is a research affiliate at the Center for International Security and Cooperation here at FSI and a professor at the School of International Service at American University.

Abbas Milani is the Hamid and Christina Moghadam Director of Iranian Studies at Stanford University, a visiting professor in the department of political science, and a research fellow and co-director of the Iran Democracy Project at the Hoover Institution.

Ori Rabinowitz is a tenured senior lecturer at the International Relations Department at the Hebrew University in Israel, and a visiting fellow of Israel studies here at FSI.

So without further ado, here’s our panel discussion.

[BEGIN EVENT AUDIO]

Goldgeier:  Welcome everyone, thanks so much for coming today. Thanks for those who organized this event for moving with lightning speed to put this together. I’m Jim Goldgeier. I’m a research affiliate at CISAC and at CDDRL, and I’m delighted to moderate this panel with these three experts.

Abbas, let's start with you for an understanding of what's going on inside Iran.

Milani: Well, first of all, my understanding is about three hours old. Things are changing so rapidly, and there's so much we don't know,

We don't know, for example, whether Iran has chosen a successor to Mr. Khamenei. We are fairly sure, or some people even doubt that, that Mr. Khamenei is dead. Some people think they have whisked him away. But I think, credibly, they're organizing burials for him.

But we don't know whether there is a successor. We don't know whether the committee, the council, the 86-man council that is supposed to pick the successor has met. We know they haven't met where Israel bombed and thought that they were bombing the meeting. But they are meeting on Zoom and trying to figure out the successor.

We had known for several years that Khamenei had been trying to place his son as the successor. There had been many meetings with high ranking ayatollahs and within that 86 men body to line up his son, Mojtaba, about whom I'll tell you a little bit.

He did not succeed by all accounts. There was resistance to him from the elder clergy. He is clearly a man of no experience outside being his daddy's central chief of staff. As far as I know, there is only one five-minute talk of him that has ever been publicly shown. It's a class that he taught in theology. And they showed that only because they wanted to indicate that he's now at the level that he can be the successor. In order to be a successor, you need to have the equivalent of a PhD. They had him teach a graduate course in theology, and they put that online. As far as I know, that's the only public lecture of him we have.

Yesterday there was news from one of Iran’s satellite TVs claiming that that committee had met and under command of the IRGC essentially named Khamenei's son as the new leader. Today there is less doubt that that is true. There is increasing evidence that that was leaked by intention. I don't know whether it was.

Kahl: Probably by the number two guy. Because the number one guy is probably going to get killed.

Milani: That's one theory. That really is one theory.

Rabinowitz: The HR is already on it.

Milani: That they leaked his name because that would put him as the number one target. The other theory is that they're trying to preempt everyone else's discussion, essentially make him the designated successor. And I think the more credible story is that there is resistance to him.

The meeting hasn't concluded. And it isn't even clear whether they will decide on one successor. So you have essentially a military right now in Iran that is fighting that doesn't have a commander-in-chief.

At the same time, you have a military that claim are winning this war hands down. If you read the Iranian media, you will think that Orwell missed a boat on how you can concoct a reality that is completely irrelevant to intellectual reality, mental reality.

According to Iran's narrative, they have completely weakened the assault. They have defeated the U.S. plan that was to decapitate the regime and have it fall immediately. They are now—again I'm verbatim quoting—that the U.S. is now begging, and Israel is begging, Iran to allow for a negotiated settlement to end this. In other words, they have gone to the same playbook that they did at the end of the 12 Day War. According to the Iranian regime, they won that war as well. And they ended it at the behest of the United States and at the behest of Israel, who deplored Iran to end because they realized Iran is not about to fall and it's stronger than it was.

The economy is, I think, absolutely on the verge of collapse. There are credible reports from international organizations that the banking system is unable to sustain itself for long. If you go to an ATM in Iran today, you can't get more than $10 of your own money. Iranian currency is now increased to 170,000 to $1.00. To give you a contextual point of comparison baseline: in 1979 you had 7 tomans you would get a dollar. You now need 170,000 tomans to get a dollar. And even that you can only get an equivalent of $10.00 per day.

When the news of Khamenei’s death was announced, there was really a remarkable exhibition of joy in the streets. It wasn't a propaganda. It wasn't the diaspora. I have contacts inside Iran. And it was just truly remarkable. It shows the distance between the regime and the people. So you haven't isolated the regime. I think you have a weakened regime. And the only alternative that it sees is to disrupt international trade, increase the price of oil, not even necessarily inflict damage to the U.S. military.

There was a theory they had that said the Americans can't stand casualties. If we kill a few of them, they will have to change. They will end [this]. They are not here to stay. We are planning for the long haul; the U.S. is planning for the short haul, we will win this war. That's their public position. But clearly what they're trying to do, in my view, is increase the economic cost, make everyone else pressure the U.S. and Israel to end.

My sense has been for the last two days that from the second day they were trying to find someone to mediate a negotiated ceasefire. There are some indications today in the New York Times that they did actually almost immediately after the death of Khamenei try to negotiate

My guess is that they're trying to make these encroachments and these rather—in my view—stupid attacks on Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, even Turkey. These were countries that if there is anyone who would be siding with them in this war, they would be these four countries.

China has been rather silent. Russia has been equally rather silent. And they have now managed to put those on the other side.

So,I think people are in a moment of suspended disbelief. Markets are virtually closed. Shops virtually don't open unless they have food stuff that they sell. Everybody thinks holding on to what you have is more secure than selling it, because you won't be able to buy anything to resupply your store.

Goldgeier: Thanks for that opening. Ori, I'll turn to you next, Give us a sense of Israeli objectives, support within Israel for this, how this is playing out within Israel in terms of the objectives that Israel has sought and whether they are thinking that they're achieving what they set out to do.

Rabinowitz: First of all, as opposed to the U.S. and the U.S. public, the Israeli public is predominantly supportive of the war. It's portrayed as a move which will likely remove an existential threat.

The Iranian decision to launch a combined ballistic and drone missile strike in April 2024, an operation that the Iranians titled True Promise One, was the first time that Iran directly attacked Israel, not through its proxies. And it showed the Israelis that Iran is willing to attack Israel face on. It caused the Israelis to upgrade the threat assessment and the perception of threat which Iran emanates.

So, very different to the U.S. prism. Within Israel there's also, of course, the political debate. We're now in an election year. The original date for the election is slated for around September. Could be either September or October.

Usually speaking, not during a war, Israeli governments tend to be toppled in the last year because it's a coalition system and the junior coalition parties have an incentive to topple the government and show their voters that they were willing to stick up for whatever it was that they believed in. This is regardless of the current war and the current political situation. And it's highly likely that we'll see something similar developing now.

It's also increasingly likely that Netanyahu will maneuver to have an election in June, because what we learned following the June war was that the bump that he saw after the June war was actually rather short-lived. The Israeli public have a short memory. If waits until October, he might not reap any political dividend.

The political dividend, of course, will only be on the table if he manages to convince the public that the goals were achieved.

If it's okay, I'm going to talk about the three war scenarios and then maybe we can draw on that. I think that we can generally foresee three different war-ending scenarios. This is true to both the U.S. and Israel and just general observers.

First of all, the worst outcome—at least in Israel's perspective, but probably also for the U.S.—is that the regime somehow survives either with the Mujtaba or any other kind of more radically aligned regime. It could be one leader, it could be a triumvirate of leaders. We don't know the exact formalities of that. But the biggest challenge here is the following: what happens if the radical version of the regime ends up staying in power, and they decide to go nuclear because they decide that just having a nuclear latent capacity isn't enough?

So, just to underline and stress: Khamenei, the supreme leader, was an awful person and I think personally that the world is better off without him. And he did bring Iran to the threshold of nuclear capabilities. But he was also adamant. He never gave, as far as we know, the political directive to go nuclear and to cross the threshold.

What happens if the calculus changes? If we inherit a more radical, or just a regime that's just as radical? So that would be the worst outcome and a complete failure.

The second scenario is that the regime undergoes some sort of an internal change. Other internal factions, probably within the guards and not necessarily from the clerical establishment, they seize power.

And under such a scenario, can foresee a situation where that specific faction is a faction that the U.S. and perhaps Israel can live with because it's not a faction that's as radical, that's as determined to spread violence in the Middle East.

Just as a form of comparison: there are regimes—radical to a degree, but not as radical—there are regimes in the Middle East that the U.S. can live with. If you think about the al-Sharaa regime in Syria. Al-Sharaa, formerly known as Jolani, is a former jihadist. He took control of the government. He implemented certain policies. And he's someone that the U.S. can live with. To a different degree, the same goes to General el-Sisi in Egypt. There are leaders that are not democratic leaders in the Middle East that the U.S. can live with. So will we see the ascension of someone like that in the Iranian context?

I'll give you one interesting quote from a reporter called Nadav Eyal. He's an important Israeli political analyst. He interviewed Israeli sources on that. And this is what they told him: “The chances of finding a George Washington who will liberate Iran and lead it to democracy are small. The more plausible scenario is a Gorbachev scenario. Someone who attempts to reform the system and ends up bringing it down.”

As to what we mentioned here before, that Israel reportedly struck the building where the assembly of experts were meeting to vote—either vote or not vote on Mojtaba. He was either elected or not elected. They also went on the record giving the following quote that the site was targeted purposefully, but they weren't attempting to kill the people that were there. Assuming this is correct—I'm not telling you it's correct. I'm quoting a source. I can't verify it independently.

Maybe they bombed the parking lot, maybe they dropped the bomb next to them. They wanted to signal that these people were vulnerable, not necessarily to take them out. And again, this plays into a scenario where you want to increase factionalism within the regime. Again, I don't have a way to confirm this.

And lastly, of course, there's the idea that the regime would completely collapse. I don't know how likely this is. But I think what's important to understand here is that the comparison to 20th century-style aerial bombing campaigns is wrong. We're not talking about a 20th century-style aerial bombing campaign where you just bombed them from the air and you hope that the regime collapses. We already know that it's highly likely that there are covert ground-based operations  coming along. We don't have verifiable sources, but there are certain indications if you're an intelligence analyst and you follow reports from the ground, there are certain flags which basically tell you that it's likely that covert ground-based operations are taking place.

There are also reported operations. We already know, and there are reports and leaks that Israel has been bombing the border between Iran and Iraq. And there has been a phone conversation that Trump held with leaders of Kurdish factions that are willing to go into Iran and some reports maintain that they will go into Iran in the coming two days.

So this isn't going to be a 20th century style-aerial bombing campaign that's purely an aerial bombing campaign. So it could have unforeseen consequences like the collapse of the regime.

So, I'll end here.

Goldgeier: All right, Colin.

Kahl: So first of all, thanks to all of you for coming together on short notice. And as FSI director, I'm just humbled by the degree of expertise we can marshal on short notice to bring scholarly rigor to contemporary policy issues. And I think that's actually one of the things that makes FSI so special.

How many of you have heard of the term the fog of war? The fog of war is real. And I think we all have to be humble that none of us have complete understanding about what's going on. And I think that's an important caveat to say right at the beginning.

But I think in the fog of the Iran War, two things are actually kind of unquestionably true.

The first thing that no one can question is the prowess of the American and Israeli militaries. They are doing things that no militaries in the history of the world have been capable of doing. They are engaged in a stunning series of strikes to degrade the IRGC command and control and capabilities, to go after Iran's missile arsenal, to go after their missile launchers, to go after their weapons stockpiles, to go after their military production locations, to sink their navy. From a kind of tactical and operational sense, it is extraordinarily impressive.

Okay, so no one can question that. It is objectively true and apparent. That's thing one.

Thing two is no one can question the nature of the Iranian regime. This is an Iranian regime that has killed  hundreds of  Americans. It's an Iranian regime that has terrorized its neighbors for decades. It's an Iranian regime that has brutalized its domestic opposition. It's an Iranian regime that has sought nuclear capabilities that could destabilize the region and threaten American interests. These are objectively true facts.

But none of that means that there aren't huge questions about this war. And they're actually, frankly, questions that neither the American or the Israeli leadership have been forthright in answering. So that's what I really want to focus most of my remarks around.

I think there are huge questions, especially about how this war will end and ultimately what the strategic implications of that end state will be, particularly for American national interests.

So the question of how long the war goes on, I think, will fundamentally be determined by two dynamics. The first dynamic is military.

Iran's strategy, such as it is, is to expand the war horizontally and temporally. That is to cause as much pain to as many countries as possible for as long as possible to militarily and politically exhaust the countries fighting them.

So they are targeting U.S. bases throughout the region. They're attacking American diplomatic outposts. They're attacking commercial centers throughout the region, energy infrastructure, shipping across the region. They're hitting targets in the Gulf and in the Levant. They've hit targets in Kuwait, Bahrain, UAE, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel. That is a very horizontal campaign. The goal ultimately, in my belief, is to exhaust the U.S. military and regional states, ultimately having the regime survive on war termination terms that allow them to fight another day.

Here, Iran's strategy depends in part on their ability to continue widening the conflict, for example, through the use of proxies: Lebanese Hezbollah, the Houthis in Yemen, Iraqi Shia militia. But most importantly, it depends on this hide-and-seek between Iran's ability to launch especially short-range ballistic missiles and drones, and the ability of the U.S. military and the Israeli military to target those drones and missiles before they get off the ground.

I think actually the campaign has made dramatic success integrating the medium-range ballistic missiles, especially the launchers that can attack Israel. Good news. But those are not the same missiles and launchers that can rain down on  countries in the Gulf and U.S. bases and facilities in the Gulf. Those are different launchers. There's much more plentiful ballistic missiles and they basically have an inexhaustible supply of short-range one-way attack drones.

These Shahed drones, they only cost about $35,000 apiece. We are shooting them down with $2 million missiles. That is an exchange that Iran will take any part of the day. So there is now a game of hide-and-seek. I don't mean “a game” to be a flip way. Literally the war is being paced to the ability of Iran to continue to move its forces around and deal damage to the region, especially in the Gulf, and the ability of the U.S. military and the Israeli military to go after those targets. That's the military dynamic, and that will determine which side is essentially exhausted first.

The second though is a political dynamic, namely the degree to which political pressure grows on President Trump to declare victory.

If he wanted to declare victory today, he could do it. If the goal is simply to massively degrade the Iranian regime's power projection capabilities, which is what the Pentagon has asserted, we're probably pretty close to that  already. We know that there are debates in Congress about war powers. That is putting some pressure. We know that there's grumbling in the MAGA base that an “America First” president keeps intervening in these foreign wars.

MAGA originated in part out of a sense of forever wars in the Middle East and exhaustion with that. That's become a political problem for the president's base. And we know that the one thing the president has actually responded to are signals from the market. And oil prices, gas prices, and the stock market are extraordinarily turbulent at this point. So political pressure is going to grow at home to wrap this thing up.

The cross current of that is actually international pressure, where I think this issue is complicated. First, the Israeli position is not going to be complicated. They were going to want the United States to fight as long as it takes to destroy this regime. That is the goal of the Israeli political leadership. It is supported by the Israeli people, to Ori's point.

The more complicated international political equation is probably in the Gulf, where in the near term they're outraged, right? The Emiratis have suffered hundreds of ballistic missile attacks and hundreds of drone attacks. Other Gulf countries have been hit. Iran might have believed that that was going to cow them into submission right away. It has not had that effect.

There's actually a chance that the UAE and Saudi could engage in defensive strikes inside Iran. But right now they are exhausting their supply of air defense interceptors. That is especially true, I think, in the UAE. But it will be true across the region. And that is exactly Iran's goal. And there will be a point at which the countries in the Gulf do not want their ports and their infrastructure and their airports and their hotels bombed. And they will call for a timeout.

So, I think political pressure in the near term is not so high, but in the medium term, meaning in weeks, will grow as the Gulf gets tired. And I think the military exhaustion on the U.S. side will also play into this dynamic as the Pentagon warns that our own interceptor arsenals will be depleted. I'll come back to that.

So that's the dynamics I'm looking for in terms of how long the war lasts.

But I think there are even bigger strategic questions here. It's a lot easier to start wars than end them. It's a lot easier to achieve tactical victories than strategic ones. And so I think we should all be on the lookout as analysts on a few things.

First of all, what is the political end state that the Trump administration is seeking in Iran? Is it regime change? They've suggested that it is at times, and at other times that it's not. Is it behavior change? Is it simply to leave whatever regime in place so badly degraded so that it can't threaten its neighbors for some interval of time? That's certainly how the Pentagon has described its objectives.

To say the least, the Trump administration has been highly inconsistent and they have not been forthright with the American people. And separate it apart from whether you think Congress should get involved or not, it is the obligation of the President of United States to explain to the American people why he has authorized our men and women being put in harm's way at the scale that's happening in Iran. And it is crazy that that has not happened.

The second and related question: is how much divergence ultimately is there between the US end state and the Israeli end state? So Israel clearly favors regime change, but I also think basically that Plan B for Israel is simply Iranian domestic chaos. That is that Iran is so internally divided and consumed that it doesn't threaten Israel. By the way, this was basically Israel's posture for most of the Syrian civil war, which is to contain the direct threats to Israel, but basically let everybody else inside Syria kill each other. The jihadists, Hezbollah, the regime, the Russians, everybody. They could all kill each other, Israel would deal with the weapons that threaten them from Syria, and other than that, it was fine for Syria to be in a civil war.

I think they could have a similar perspective towards Iran if you don't get a kind of managed transition or regime change. As we said, the Trump administration has been all over the place on regime change. They've also been all over the place on whether they actually support Israel's Plan B, which is just domestic chaos. To Ori's point, there are credible reports that not only is Israel bombing the guard posts on the border between Northern Iraq and Iran, but the United States is working covertly and maybe overtly to agitate Kurdish forces in northern Iraq to infiltrate Iran and threaten the regime.

Now, maybe that is being done largely for coercive reasons, or maybe it's to stir up a civil war inside of Iran. And I'm old enough to have been a U.S. official during the wars in Iraq, Syria, and Libya to suggest that once a country starts down that road, all hell can break loose. And Iran is not a small country, okay? Geographically, it is the size of Iraq and Afghanistan put together, and it's 90 million people. It's the heart of Eurasia. An Iran that collapses into a violent civil war will convulse the world.  So we should just keep that in mind. So that's the second question I have.

The third is, will the Iranian people rise up? You know, Trump basically says the cavalry is on the way, but he said, stay in your home so you don't get killed, but the second the bombing happens, come out on the streets. Will they? And if they do, and the regime brutally cracks down again, what will the United States do?

Because, of course, this entire thing got started because Trump said you can't slaughter your own people and that's what they did by the thousands, maybe the tens of thousands. It took us several weeks for the U.S. military to show up en masse. They then launched. So if the Iranian people come out and they start getting gunned down, does that drag the U.S. military back in? Is there a mission creep dynamic here? If it does, then the campaign's going go on. If it doesn't, and that's what happened during the Arab Spring?

Or, do we abandon the protesters in the streets and let them be slaughtered, which is essentially what happened to the Kurds in Iraq after the Gulf War, right? Which is a blow to U.S. credibility. So one pathway to mission creep is if the people do come out into the streets and then it does become an effort to back whatever they're doing to change the regime or abandon them and face the credibility consequences from that. So that's the third question.

The fourth question is what is the implication for nuclear proliferation? Jim, to your point about like first they said it was obliterated and then they said it's two weeks. Both are true in the following respect. What wasn't obliterated are the 400 kilograms of 60 percent highly enriched uranium that were probably in tunnels under Isfahan or somewhere else that weren't destroyed last summer.

400 kilograms of 60 percent HEU is enough for 10 or 11 nuclear bombs—not the bombs themselves but the fissile material, the explosive material for the bombs, if further enriched to 90 percent. They could do that in a couple of weeks, hence the two weeks. Were they about to do that? I have no idea. I'm not privy to the intelligence, but there's no indication from reporting that they were. And believe me, if there were indications, both the Americans and the Israelis would be putting it out there.

But the question then becomes, well, if you don't get a hold of that material and the regime survives, what are the implications for nuclear proliferation in Iran? Because 400 kilograms of HEU doesn't take that many IR-6 centrifuges in a warehouse somewhere to spin up the explosive material for a nuclear weapon. And if I'm the regime, my missiles weren't enough to deter, my drones weren't enough to deter, my threshold nuclear capability wasn't enough to deter, I might draw the conclusion that only a nuclear bomb could deter this from happening again. So will that be the future?

The next question I would ask—and I'm sorry for going on so long, but I'm almost done—will a dramatically weakened Iran, which I think is inevitable . . . Iran will emerge from this dramatically weakened under every set of circumstances. Will a dramatically weakened Iran liberate the United States from the Middle East or pin us down in the Middle East? Proponents of the war, especially the America Firsters, are saying, look, we never get to be out of the Middle East as long as this regime is there. We have to swat the regime back because that liberates us to focus on, take your pick: the Western Hemisphere, the Indo-Pacific, whatever the Trump administration says they care about the most.

The challenge with that is that's historically never the way it's worked in the Middle East. In the aftermath of this, there will be enormous pressure from our own military command to keep forces in the region to contain the aftermath. There could be mission creep, which pins us down. And all of the Gulf states who now have seen Americans flow in and seen their own defenses degraded by this war, will be begging us to stay and will be telling us if we pull a single American out of the Middle East, we're abandoning them.

So the pressure to keep the United States trapped in the Middle East after we spent so much time un-entrapping ourselves from the Middle East will be profound, and that will have consequences on our ability to do anything else.

There was a reason why it took a few weeks for the U.S. military to show up in the Middle East. Not because we don't have the most powerful military in the world, but because they were busy in the Caribbean. So they had to be relocated across the world to do what they've done. And if they're pinned down in the Middle East, it means they're not available for contingencies in Europe or in Northeast Asia or in Southeast Asia or in the hemisphere.

A related question is: what does this mean for post-war U.S. strategic exhaustion? We're going to win this tactically and operationally. That's not even a close fight. It will be highly imbalanced. But I was at the Pentagon overseeing our war planning for all of these things. We basically get to fight one protracted war. And once we do, it's going to be a couple of years before you are ready to fight another one.

And that's why they are so desperate to recapitalize the munitions, because we are expending a lot of long range precision munitions and a lot of air interceptors. And a lot of these weapon systems are exactly the weapon systems you need for a contingency in North Korea, across the Taiwan Strait, in the Baltics.

And so as a consequence, the paradox is that this war is likely to be operationally a demonstration of amazing American military power. And maybe weaker countries around the world will be like, “Woah, woah, we don't want that to happen to us. Like, wow, what they did to Iran, what they did to Maduro, like no way do we want any piece of this.”

But if you're in Moscow and Beijing, you count things. And you know that for the next two or three years, the United States' cupboard is going to be bare. And so what does that mean for our ability to deter what they do in the Baltics? Across the Taiwan Strait?

And my own intuition is that the Trump administration has basically been punching down at weak actors and not punching up at major powers, and that Trump is keen to accommodate Putin and Xi. And that actually this will encourage him to do that for the next two or three years because frankly, a more confrontational posture will not be viable.

And the last point I will just make is what are the implications for the international order? Whatever one thinks of the war, it does not fit traditional understandings of international law. That's true in Iran. It's true in Venezuela. Basically what the United States says, we can do things unilaterally. We didn't even try to build a broad coalition. Even George W. Bush built a coalition of the willing before the invasion of Iraq. We didn't do any of that. We didn't appeal to international norms. We didn't appeal to international law. We didn't build an international coalition. We said that the United States can unilaterally decide to decapitate foreign regimes. We did it in Venezuela. We did it again in Iran.

And if you're in Moscow or Beijing, you will draw the conclusion that the United States has no moral, legal, or ethical leg to stand on in opposing you from doing the same thing. Will that change Putin or Xi Jinping's inclination to do something in the Baltics or in Taiwan? No, it won't. But will it make it harder for a future American administration to rally the world to deter or defeat that aggression? 100%. And so from an international order perspective, that's a problem.

I don't want to pretend any of these things are easy. They're not. Nobody should believe that Iran is a good actor. They're not. But these are the strategic questions that our leaders owe us answers to. And I have not heard an answer to a single one of them.

Goldgeier: Colin, I want to follow up on two issues, one you mentioned and one you didn't but that have been in the news a lot recently.

So one is the stockpile question, how much we actually have in order to fight a war. And people have made all sorts of accusations that we've sent too much to Ukraine and that leaves us short, or we need more in the Indo-Pacific that we don't have. And here we are fighting this major war against Iran.

You mentioned the challenge it poses for other contingencies elsewhere in the next two to three years. But what about how long we can sustain this war with what we have? That's one question.

And then the second is, there's been a lot in the news recently about Anthropic and Claude. And before the war started, it was about how the U.S. government was going to go after Anthropic because they didn't want Claude used in certain ways, especially regarding mass surveillance of Americans.

But the stories in the paper the last couple of days have been about the use of Claude for targeting and the ways in which this has really enabled the United States to fight this war in a way that it wouldn't have been able to previously. And just get your thoughts on the role of Claude.

Kahl: Okay, big questions. On the stockpile  and the “How long?” question. Thirty seconds of background: so there was a lot of underinvestment in the defense industrial base in the post-Cold War period. And to the degree that we were investing, we were investing in platforms, not munitions. And so when the Ukraine war burst out and we started to send stockpiles to Ukraine, it became increasingly evident that if we sent too much of anything, it would start to imperil our ability to defend our own interests in the context of certain contingencies.

This was a critique, in fact, as you mentioned, Jim, of those who said we provided Ukraine too much, including many who currently sit in the administration. Of course, there are also people in the administration that claim we didn't provide enough.

The Biden administration invested billions in recapitalizing the defense industrial base. The Trump administration wisely is doing the same. The challenge is that it just it's not about money. It's not how much money you spend. It doesn't happen overnight. You can't build factories, you can't hire the workers, you have subcontractor issues.

And just as an example of the scale: we currently, by shot doctrine, shoot two to three Patriot interceptors at every Iranian missile. The Iranians have shot hundreds of missiles. Do the math. We only produce 600 Patriot interceptors a year. So you're gonna burn through that stuff pretty fast.

CENTCOM has made a big deal of the fact that the Army is now using this new long-range precision strike missile called the PRISM. That was designed for contingencies in places like the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait. So everything we are shooting off in the Middle East is something that's not available in the near term for any other contingency.

How long can it go? Well, it depends on how much risk the president is willing to take on our ability to do anything else. So could it go for weeks? Certainly. Could it go for months? Probably. The longer it goes, does it cause trade-offs with our ability to do anything else anywhere else? Yeah.

And I'll tell you that the Russians and the Chinese are really good at counting things. And they will know exactly how long we can fight them. And the one thing is for sure, we can fight them less ably after this war than when the war started. It's not an argument for why the war is a bad idea, but it is an argument that that strategic trade-off is real, that you get to fight the one big war and was this war in the context of this regime at this moment what you wanted to expand American power on, separate and apart from everything else?

One thing I'm confident of is the lesson they are not drawing in Moscow and Beijing is, “This could happen to you.”

What they are drawing is because this is happening to Iran, it's actually less likely it's going to happen to you anytime soon. And then the question is, what do they do about that? I don't think it means that either one of those countries is likely to start a new war, actually. I think what it means is they're going to pursue their current objectives more aggressively with less fear that the United States will put pressure on them, and more sense that they will be accommodated.

So in Ukraine, it will mean they're more confident the United States will not send a bunch of weapons to Ukraine. In Taiwan, it could mean the same thing, or I think Xi Jinping basically wants to achieve his preferred outcome in Taiwan peacefully but coercively. And I think this will strengthen his hand in negotiations with Trump this year, especially as they meet in Beijing in April for their first summit and probably a few more times this year to try to reach some “Big, Beautiful Trade Bill.” I've always believed that Trump was likely to go soft on some combination of technology and Taiwan. And I think Beijing will calculate this gives them a stronger hand to play. So I don't think it's new aggression. I think it's their current path, but they'll see it as easier to pursue. We'll see.

Okay, Claude. As you've probably read in the news, Anthropic’s frontier model, Claude, is one of the two or three best frontier AI models in the world, alongside the offerings from OpenAI and Gemini and Google DeepMind. But the thing that separates Claude is that Anthropic was the first company to actually put its models into classified computing clusters, and Claude is also integrated, reportedly, into the Maven Smart System.

For those of you who follow Silicon Valley soap opera around national security issues, you'll recall back in 2018, Google had a Maven, the Maven contract—this was about using AI for targeting, a target identification on drones and things. There was a revolt by Google engineers, Google dropped the contract, Palantir picked it up. Anthropic is a partner with Palantir. Now Palantir integrates Anthropic's models into the Maven Smart System.

The Maven Smart System is being used in Iran. It was previously used to help the Ukrainians. All of this has been publicly reported. This is not autonomous killer robots. These are AI decision support tools. Basically, it means fusing all classified intelligence: think signals intelligence, emissions from radios, radar, satellite imagery, full motion video, social media that's geo-located, fusing all of that data at a scale and speed that human analysts would not be able to do to generate points of interest that are turned into targets.

And so basically, it speeds up the targeting process. By the way, Israel uses similar systems called Gospel and Lavender to accelerate targeting in places like Gaza and Lebanon. Maybe Ori can talk more about that.

But the point being that AI's role in warfare is already here. It is here in the Middle East. It is here in Ukraine. My suspicion is you're seeing reports about Claude’s use in Iran because people at Anthropic are trying to remind people of the costs of trying to disentangle Anthropic's tools in terms of the costs on ongoing operations. And I would be doing the same thing.

But it is a reminder that a paradox of Secretary Hegseth's approach on AI is that he released a memo in January saying we need to go at warp speed on AI. There are even posters in the Pentagon that are AI-generated of him pointing at people saying, “Use AI.” And yet in the feud with Anthropic, they're going to spend the next 6 to 18 months taking steps backwards to rip Anthropic out of their operational architectures to replace it with something else, which is not a step forward. It strikes me as a step backwards, or at least sideways.

Goldgeier: Thank you. Abbas, the issue came up, this question about regime change versus behavior change. What are your expectations regarding either of those two things? And if you could also say a little bit about the Kurds in this whole unfolding within Iran, that would be very helpful. I'm going to ask Ori to also comment on the Kurds as well. But this regime change versus behavior change first.

Milani: I think what can in the short term or midterm be expected is more  change of behavior rather than a regime change. There isn't the kind of boots on the ground, whether in terms of the opposition  or in terms of Israel or the U.S., to dislodge this regime.

But the regime, in my view, is desperate enough that it realizes that unless they make these kinds of changes of behavior, they won't survive. I believe that even if Mojtaba comes, Mojtaba —even with the IRGC—have no choice but to recalibrate with the people, recalibrate with the international community.

That's why when they were pitching Mojtaba, there's two pitches about him. One is that he's intimately connected with the IRGC. He is the central founder of the IRGC intelligence, that he is very deep into the economic shenanigans. But they also dropped hints that he is Iran's MBS, that the only person that can do for Iran what MBS did in Saudi Arabia is him, because he has the clout, he has the connection, he has the IRGC. So they have created both of these, and this is before this crisis.

To me, the fact that they launched this PR campaign for him indicates they know themselves that the status quo is untenable, that they need to restructure, rethink, recalibrate with the people.

And to me the idea that arming the Kurds was a very foolish thing to say and a very foolish thing to do. I think it will convince some Iranian people that what the regime has been saying is all along is true. Because what the regime has been saying is that this is not about the nuclear program, this is not about our behavior. Israel and the United States and primarily Israel want to destroy Iran, they want to dismantle Iran.

They point to some article twenty years ago that said Iran needs to be weakened. That this is part of some master plan. To me, it was was a very foolhardy.

There are people within the regime that have clearly, unambiguously, to different degrees, been saying for the last 10 years—if anybody was paying attention—that the status quo can't work. Some of them are in prison right now. Tajzadeh, example. Qadianii, for example. These people have been calling out Khamenei by name, saying you are the source of the problem, and unless you change, unless we remove you, we can’t save our own.

And in recent months, Rouhani joined them. Zarif joined. These are people who are part of the regime. Rouhani, in all but name, systematically pointed to Khamenei in saying that you have been wrong on every strategic decision. In one conversation, Rouhani said, we were in a meeting with Khamenei, and we said, Israel and the United States might attack us.

And commanders of the IRGC said, absolutely not. They won't dare. We have 200,000 missiles. We will destroy Israel the first week. And said to Khamenei, that these are stupid imaginations. They can hit us. And Khamenei sided with those. So there is that tendency. There is that desire within the regime to recalibrate, whether there will be anything left of them to do this.

One last point about the bomb, your question about the bomb and the strength of FSI. Sig Hecker, one of the most eminent scholars of  nuclear science, the head of Los Alamos, he and I wrote two articles about Iran's enrichment program, one twelve years ago and one about five months ago.

And in that one, we said, the only thing that is left of your enrichment capacity, virtually, is this 460. With this, you can make a few dirty bombs. Give it up and make a compromise with the international community that will allow Iran and you, the regime, to survive.

Absolutely, they did the opposite and began to threaten that they're going to use this and that they have the capacity to withstand all of these pressures, that there will not be another war. Khamenei famously said, there will not be war, there will not be negotiation. There has been war, there has been negotiations. And many people within the regime are basically saying that maybe a change of behavior.

Again, I can't believe that the regime change can come from outside. I was very much opposed to the idea of trying to bring regime change through attack. I thought the U.S. should help the Iranian people, not kinetically, not attacking Iran, [but by] making the battle between the Iranians and this brutal regime more equitable by giving them satellite connection, by the kinds of non-interventionist things that I think would have enabled a very viable democratic movement to bring about the change that hopefully brings peace to the Middle East.

Goldgeier: Thank you. And for Ori, what should we be looking for as we think about the Israeli objectives versus the U.S. objectives? The convergence, the divergence? How are you looking at this? And also, if you have anything you want to add on the Kurds,

Rabinowitz: I'll string together a few thoughts. So, with the Kurds, I think that there are two primary objectives. I'm not convinced that just starting a civil war is a defined objective. I think that it's more likely that the Israelis want to see a non-hostile faction take cover, but I'm basing this based on the statements. And again, fog of war, maybe these statements are just not being made. I can only use what's out there.

I think that the idea is to first of all stretch Iranian security forces and weaken them, to pave the way for those unnamed opposition forces or the factions that are more amenable to collaborate with the U.S. and Israel, and to encourage other ethnic minorities like the Baluchis and the Azeris and maybe therefore encourage the Iranians to rise up.

They haven't really given indications, the Israelis or the Americans, that they think it's now time to go tomorrow because we're still in the air. I think this is just day four, right? I mean, it looks like a hundred years from my perspective, but I think they're still kind of preparing the ground. But it's likely that we'll start seeing more . . .

Kahl: It's day five. We're like, 20% further ahead than what you . . .

Rabinowitz: Wow, yeah. Sleep deprivation will do that to a person. So just to follow up, to give you some numbers to elaborate on what Colin said. We have relatively good numbers with the UAE. I haven't been able to compile the assessments on Israel. Everything is based on open source and different analytical reports. And there's an analyst called Fabian Hoffman. He does a terrific job, and he compiled the numbers for the UAE.

In the first two days, we saw 165 ballistic missiles that were launched from Iran to the UAE, and in the following days we saw 9, 12, and 3. So these are five days, not four days. So I lost a day. So, day five of the war.

So, we saw a decline in the launches. We also saw a decline with the drones. And exactly like Colin said, if you run the numbers of how many Patriots you need to intercept these missiles, the analysts think that about 410 interceptors were probably required, which roughly amounts to anywhere between 20 to 40% of what the UAE will assess that they have in their stockpile. So you can imagine that if you're a UAE decision maker, this is going to make you rather stressed about how many interceptors you're going to need in the coming days.

So everything really depends on the success of the hunting missions that we now see in Iran.

The numbers are declining. Are they declining fast enough? We'll know in the coming days. I should mention that it looks like the numbers with Israel are probably somewhere aligned with this thing, but I don't have the actual numbers. But we did see a decrease, and we also saw a decrease in the intensity of the salvo. So when I say salvo, I don't mean a single machine that's firing repeatedly. We're talking about a bunch of launchers kind of shooting together as a pack. Think about the wolfpack submarine style from World War II. They're coming together and they each have one missile and they launch it together.

During the 12 Day War, saw the salvos shooting 40, 50 missiles together. Now we see them increasingly in lower numbers. This indicates a lot of disruption to Iranian capability to coordinate the launchers shooting together. But they're still launching, but again, in smaller numbers.

Now I want to talk a little bit about the Israeli-U.S. possible divergence. So just to frame this, because the hunt for the launchers is now the primary objective, it's definitely what the U.S. and Israel are most interested in. We didn't see a lot of Iranian nuclear facilities being hit. We saw some, and again, fog of war. I'm relying on open source reports.

There are reports that Natanz was hit. There are reports that Isfahan was hit, [but] we don't know which facilities inside Isfahan. Are we talking about the tunnels with more than 400 kilos of enriched uranium, the entrance to the tunnels? We don't know yet.

But—and here's a very interesting nugget from yesterday evening—the IDF reported that one of the sites that they hit was a secret site, not previously reported, where the Iranian weapons group was working on a trigger mechanism for the nuclear bomb.

Again, I can't verify this independently. This is something that was stated and it ties on to recent reports, again, just from an hour before we convened here, that the Israelis have intelligence that the Iranian rebuilding effort was much more intense following the 12 Day War. That specific report mentioned the missile program. I'm assuming it also touches on the nuclear issue.

The U.S.-Iranian talks about the nuclear program were held last week. It looks like a millennia ago. They were held last week. Witkoff and Kushner gave for the record briefing and off the record briefing as administration officials. And apparently they were a bit shocked because what they said in all these briefings is that the Iranians basically were taunting the fact that they still have their 460 kilos of enriched uranium and they can do whatever they want with it.

And another thing that they were stressing is their ability to produce advanced centrifuges. These advanced centrifuges are called IR-6. The number itself doesn't matter. The idea is that they were insisting on their ability to produce these machines. And I think this is something that really was significant in the decision-making process.

And here we come to the divergence. I think that the biggest possibility of divergence between Israeli and U.S. perception of the war would be if we do end up seeing a Mojtaba or another faction from within the guards taking over the regime and being convenient or malleable enough for Trump and the U.S. to work with foregoing any nuclear thing, perhaps foregoing most or all of the nuclear program, but not forgoing the ideology, the anti-Israel rhetoric, the support for destabilizing Israeli-Arab normalization, etc.

So imagine something that is somewhat similar to a Qatar actor, right? Qatar is an actor that the Trump administration is very at home with, but Qatar is an anti-Israel actor. So what do you get when you have an actor like that that the U.S. can live with but Israel isn't happy with? That's where you'll see the divergence.

Goldgeier: Okay, great. Thank you.

Milani: Let me give you a little history. Iran was the first Muslim country next to Turkey to de facto recognize the state of Israel. Iran had very close relations with Israel from 1950 to 1979.

Israel was a supporter of Iran's nuclear program, and there is evidence that Israel worked with South Africa to help Iran develop a bomb in 1975. But Iran was also systematically under the Shah, the defender of a two-state solution, demanding that Israel must give up the territories, and a democratic Iran that recognizes, contrary to what this regime has done for 47 years, that does not believe that the destruction of the state of Israel is Iran's top, or one of the top, strategic goals. That can bring peace in the Middle East, can help bring peace in the Middle East. It can't guarantee it.

You cannot, in my view, have peace in the Middle East without the recognition of the rights of Palestinians to a state. You're not going to have long-term peace. And the Abrahamic Accord, in my view, is de facto a reality on the ground. The Shah was the outlier with Turkey having diplomatic relations with Israel. Everybody in the Muslim Middle East is now craving to have that relationship. The problem is Palestine.

Rabinowitz: In opinion, Israel needs to work towards a two-state solution with the Palestinians. This is a minority opinion. I'm not representing the Israeli public here. I'm representing my own opinion as an Israeli and as a scholar of security studies in the Middle East. The only way to translate wartime achievement into sustainable political goals is to do something political with them.

I think one of the negative things that this specific current government has done in Israel was to squander away the opportunity to reach normalization with Saudi Arabia. Colin can talk more about this, but specifically in May 2024—this is still during the Biden administration—there was a relatively concrete offer on the table, but Netanyahu, due to various political considerations— they will tell you that they're altruistic and me, myself personally, as someone who doubts his motivations—I think they were politically motivated to maintain the integrity of the Israeli government. He insisted on maintaining a very right-wing political component of the government and that precluded any kind of progress in the Palestinian-Israeli path.

So that's a very simple answer, but I don't have an answer of how we get there, because again, I'm a minority. How do I convince more Israelis to agree with me? When the government calls for a snap election, which we now think will be in June, will they vote in political parties that share this? I don't know how to do this.

Kahl: First of all, I think we should acknowledge that there's no agreement on what peace even means in this context and what peace would be durable, sustainable. There's not agreement inside the United States administration. There's not an agreement between the United States and Israel on this question. So it's hard, right? So all I can speak to is what would I think winning the peace, like from my perspective, which is only as valuable as you value my opinion.

I think first it would be a peace that is an outcome where Iran is so weakened that it either changes its intention to threaten its neighbors, or for a meaningful period of time does not have the capability of doing that. I think in some ways that's the easiest objective here to achieve. Not easy, but the easiest objective to achieve because of the asymmetry and the military capabilities that are on display at the moment.

I think a second condition though, is a more integrated region that shares a sense of collective security and that is integrated across the Arab-Israeli divide. So think of it as an expansion of the Abraham Accords: more integration between Israel and moderate Arab states, looking after their defense and cooperating more with each other, not just on military issues, but intelligence and economic and energy and environment.

But a third is that it is a peace that doesn't require tens of thousands of Americans to be trapped in the desert for forever. That's not something the American people want. That's not something that is militarily wise or sustainable from the United States. And in a world of intense geopolitical competition, is strategic malpractice to keep Americans at scale trapped in the Middle East. So from a narrow U.S. interest standpoint, a stable peace is a peace that is sustainable without the United States having to do everything.

Goldgeier:  Well, we're going to have to leave it there. Thank you all so much for your insights. We really appreciate it. Thank you all for coming. Please join me in thanking the panel.

[END EVENT AUDIO]

Kahl: You’ve been listening to World Class from the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. If you like what you’re hearing, please leave us a review and be sure to subscribe on Apple, Spotify, or wherever you get your podcasts to stay up to date on what is happening around the world, and why.

Iran’s Revolution and Economy Are Intertwined

Taking a broad view of Iran’s revolution, Abbas Milani, the Hamid and Christina Moghadam Director of Iranian Studies, says that understanding the country’s future requires understanding its past.

“The 1979 Iranian revolution was no revolution at all. It was a cunning bait-and-switch game cleverly played by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who put himself at the head of the movement,” Milani writes in the New York Times.

For decades, this regime, first led by Khomeini and until recently his successor, Khamenei, has successfully kept its population under repressive control through a combination of fear, violence, and brutality, says Milani. But that stronghold has shown cracks, and fear of the regime had begun waning prior to the U.S.-Israel attacks. Coupled with frustrations with a failing economy, skyrocketing inflation, and plummeting currency, Milani sees opportunity for real change within Iran.

“The economy is a clear source of constant threat to the regime, and the new secular women and men of Iran are unwilling to accept anything less than what they were initially promised before being deceived nearly half a century ago. The machinery of the regime may survive today. But the counterrevolution of yesteryear is begetting the revolution of tomorrow.”
 

America’s Firepower Is Superior, but Not Infinite

Speaking at a panel discussion hosted by the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), FSI Director Colin Kahl, a former under secretary of defense for policy at the U.S. Department of Defense, acknowledged the magnitude and deft execution of the unfolding military operation.

“The U.S. and Israeli militaries are doing things that no militaries in the history of the world have been capable of doing. From a kind of tactical and operational sense, it is extraordinarily impressive,” he said.

But Kahl also warns that an extended military campaign could spell trouble for the United States both in the current conflict and for future readiness.

“Iran has what is basically an inexhaustible supply of short-range, one-way attack drones that only cost about $35,000 apiece. We are shooting them down with $2 million missiles. That is an exchange rate Iran will take any day of the week.”

China and Russia are also watching this conflict and America’s artillery usage, says Kahl:

“We are expending a lot of long range precision munitions and a lot of air interceptors. And a lot of these weapons are exactly the systems you need for a contingency in North Korea, across the Taiwan Strait, or in the Baltics,” he says. “If you're in Moscow and Beijing, you’re counting those, and you know that for the next two or three years, the United States' cupboard is going to be bare and a more confrontational posture will not be viable.”

U.S.-Israel Interests are Aligned but Not Identical

Unlike in previous conflicts when the U.S. was joined in combat with NATO allies or other partners, the strikes on Iran were conducted in tandem with only one other nation, Israel.

Amichai Magen, the director of the Jan Koum Israel Studies Program, believes some of the impetus for the strikes is to send a message to anti-American and anti-Israel actors.

“If you can take out Maduro or undermine the regime in Iran, you are signaling to Russia and China that America is repositioning and re-establishing deterrence against its peer competitors,” Magen told NBC Bay Area.

Or Rabinowitz, a visiting scholar of Israel studies, also points to Iran’s insistence in recent negotiations on keeping its ability to produce advanced centrifuges as being particularly significant in the decision to execute military action.

But there is the possibility of divergence in the United States and Israel’s overarching goals as well, Rabinowitz says, especially when it comes to questions of nuclear capabilities. 

“Take Qatar as an example,” she told the CISAC panel. “Qatar is an actor that the Trump administration is very at home with, even though they are an anti-Israel actor. Something similar could emerge in Iran that feels malleable enough for the U.S. to work with on the nuclear issue, but they don’t forgo their ideology, their anti-Israel rhetoric, or their support for destabilizing Israeli-Arab normalization. The U.S. may choose to live with that even if Israel isn’t happy about it. That’s where you’ll see divergence.”

China Is Likely to Sit This One Out

When it comes to Iran’s partnerships and allies, experts believe Tehran is unlikely to see much help from Moscow or Beijing. Writing for Foreign Affairs, Michael McFaul and Abbas Milani track how Russia’s focus on Ukraine has diverted its ability to engage with players in the Middle East, citing its meager response to the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria and limited engagement with Iran in the aftermath of the airstrikes in June 2025 targeting nuclear facilities.

Lisa Blaydes, an FSI senior fellow, thinks China—Iran’s major trading partner—will take a similar backseat approach to the current conflict. 

“We think that China might have some leverage over Iran. But it's not clear how much will there is in China to get involved in this,” she explained at an event hosted by the The Program on Arab Reform and Development. “We know one of the only planes to land in Tehran recently was a Chinese plane that was bringing weapons to support the Iranian regime. Will this continue? Is it a one-off? Is it a pattern? I don't think we know yet.”

While a majority of Iran’s oil does end up in Chinese markets, China also has important economic and trade interests in the Gulf, says Blaydes, where all six Gulf Cooperation Council nations have been hit by retaliatory Iranian missile strikes.

“The Gulf is an important part of the Belt and Road Initiative. And there's a lot of money at stake. Disturbances in a place like the Strait of Hormuz would cause major disruptions to global supply chains. So I don't know if the Chinese want to weigh in strongly on either side.”
 

The Risk of Global Destabilization Is Real

The question on most people’s minds in regards to the war is, “What happens next?” Hesham Sallam, a senior research scholar at the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, acknowledges the complexity and gravity of the situation.

“This is a very unpredictable situation. And it is concerning that multiple U.S. officials don’t seem to have a consistent answer about a situation that is so consequential and that puts so many people in harm's way,” says Sallam.

If not handled carefully, Sallam warns that the threat of escalation is very real. Faced with a potentially existential risk, leaders in what remains of the regime may seek broad global destabilization. 

“There’s a logic here for the regime that if you don’t exact more costs and prolong the conflict and make this as inconvenient as possible for everyone, Iran will not be dealt with on equal footing,” he says. “So they may be looking to exact huge costs not just on the U.S. and Israel and countries in the region, but to disrupt global energy markets and the flow of trade as a means of ensuring something like this never happens again.”
 

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I am coming into the MIP program from the world of foreign and defense analysis. I’ve had the opportunity to work for various groups in and out of the government in Washington D.C. looking at the foreign policy and defense strategy of various parts of Africa, the Gulf, and how the U.S. interacts with these regions.

I am particularly interested in a range of complex policy areas focusing on peace and security. My interests include evolving dynamics of drone warfare by great powers and middle powers, use of paramilitary groups by states, and strategies for countering political violence in authoritarian regimes.  

That technology aspect is one reason that drew me here to Stanford and its proximity to the Silicon Valley ecosystem. And, of course, there’s the AI aspect as well. “AI” is the buzzword in everything right now, but I want to know how these new tools and technologies are shaping political violence, democracies, and the global governance structure as a whole. If we don’t understand where the violence is coming from, we can’t understand how to pursue strategies for peace.

Another big appeal of the MIP program was that it allows me to interact with scholars like Francis Fukuyama, Larry Diamond, James Fearon, and Joe Felter. These are names I’ve read and referenced in my analytic work, and now I have the opportunity to learn from them directly. And who knows; maybe I will come back someday as a colleague if I return to Stanford for my PhD! With the hands-on experience at MIP, the networking opportunities here, and the emphasis on both quantitative and qualitative learning, I know I’m going to be in a good position to meet my goals and make a difference.
 

If you had told me ten years ago that I would be working on artificial intelligence at Stanford, in the heart of Silicon Valley, I wouldn’t have believed you. When applying to undergrad, I had to submit my application from an internet cafe in Beirut because the internet in my village in Lebanon wasn’t fast enough to upload my application. To go from a small village in Lebanon to studying at Stanford is a dream come true.

The path that led me here isn’t straightforward, but the thread that connects my experiences is a desire to be a voice for people who aren’t in the room. When I was a foreign correspondent, I published stories about systemic inequities and disadvantages. At the World Bank, it was pointing out biases and gaps in the data sets that directly impacted the distribution of aid and personal protective equipment. Today we are told artificial intelligence is going to be a “democratizing” technology. What about people who don’t have electricity? Who don’t have $20 for a ChatGPT subscription? Who have no AI literacy?  

If AI is going to impact every single person on earth’s life, how we build it can’t be decided by 0.01% of the population. If this is a printing press, Gutenberg Bible moment in history, we can’t simply leave entire communities, entire countries, nor entire continents out of the conversation. 

Drafting better AI policy is why I came back to school to the MIP program at Stanford. I worked with engineers who were Stanford CS alumni, and they were always so collaborative and inclusive. They patiently answered all of my questions while training an LLM. Those are the kinds of people and the kinds of values I want to work with to tackle these challenges. I’ve already seen that spirit here in the few weeks I’ve been at Stanford. These values of connecting the dots between engineering, policy, law and other disciplines has given me confidence that working together, we can write better AI policy and improve outcomes well beyond Silicon Valley. 
 

I come from Haiti, which is a small country. As such, we don’t always think about our foreign policy in an integrated way. How are our population, demography, topography, and borders linked? What about our trade partners and migration patterns? How do those impact our relationships with neighboring countries, or places with diaspora communities like the U.S.? I studied some of these questions while I was an undergrad at Princeton, but there’s much more to understand. 

My dream job is to work in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Haiti. So while I’m here at Stanford, I’m trying to write a handbook of sorts for myself and build out the agenda I hope to have someday. That is what is giving me direction for my time here at Stanford. If I’m learning about the balance of payments, the question I’m asking myself is, “What is Haiti’s balance of payment? What does it look like? What are the policy implications of that?”

By the time I graduate, I want to have a fully drafted idea of where Haiti’s policy landscape is currently, so I know what priorities to set to work on for the future. The fact that the MIP program is so customizable is one of the big reasons I wanted to come here; I can really tailor my studies to support these bigger projects. I get to make this time what I want it to be, and what will be most helpful to my goals.

But I also want to challenge myself to think beyond my field and learn about other parts of the world that may not have anything in common with Haiti, at least on the surface. I want to have a local impact, but I also want to develop as a global thinker. There’s a lot that connects us beyond our borders, and being able to think about those connections in a systematic, global way will only become more and more important as populations continue to migrate and integrate into communities throughout the world.
 

When I was serving as an active duty Space Operations Army officer, I had the opportunity to work on electromagnetic warfare and space control operations around the globe. My background is originally in history, and I began my military career as a military police officer, but I’ve always been really passionate about being part of the future.

There’s so much incredible defense technology out there, but the most up-to-date and effective versions don’t always get down to the individuals who really need them to operate effectively. There are so many inefficiencies and gaps between what’s actually codified in policy and what the warfighters on the ground need to execute their missions.

And that’s true of large-scale policies as well. Take the Space Treaty, for example. It was written back in 1967 when there were just 24 known satellites in orbit. Now there are thousands of satellites in orbit, yet we don't have another foundational governing document around space protocols. That’s got to change.

That’s what I want to start tackling while I’m here at Stanford. Making systemic changes in big organizations like the Department of Defense isn’t going to be easy, but we’ve got to close those knowledge gaps between the policymakers, the high level leaders and stakeholders, and those who are actually pressing the buttons of our space systems. We can't avoid these issues anymore, because it’s not just about the military or defense: it’s ATMs, it’s GPS, it's traffic lights, it's everything. There are no borders in space, so we must work hand-in-hand with our partners and allies to be successful in this emerging domain. This problem set truly involves everyone.

This is why being here at Stanford is going to be so beneficial. In addition to my courses in policy, it’s so easy to take a law or a business class or sit in on an aeronautics course. And we’re right in Silicon Valley where a lot of this technology is being built and distributed. That makes it so easy to look at these issues from different perspectives and get new insights into how to tackle them. We need a well-rounded perspective in order to get the right knowledge to the right people to make the right decisions.
 

At the root of all my interests in policy and foreign affairs is a desire to help people. I’ve always been drawn to problems that involve alleviating difficulties, whether that’s humanitarian issues, conflict resolution, or any other issues where civilians are not fairly represented. When I was first considering working in government, it was the consular aspect—being able to serve people from Thailand all over the world— that really appealed to me.

When I had the opportunity to serve at the UN as a Peace and Security Intern at the Permanent Mission of Thailand, my excitement for that assignment came from the same place; I liked the spirit of people coming together to discuss problems. There’s been waning faith about the usefulness of these types of big, multilateral organizations, but I still believe these kinds of bodies are important forums for dealing with conflicts. Reforms are needed, yes, but we can’t simply sideline conversations that are difficult to have or shut out nations we don’t easily agree with.

My own country of Thailand, for example, is not the biggest or most influential nation on security issues, but we have a lot we can teach and discuss when it comes to development. How do we balance some of that influence? How do we give countries in the global south more representation on these stages? Or domestically, how can we create policies that actually make a difference to people for the better? There tends to be a lot of talk and lofty goals, but then little action or follow through. 

That’s why one of the major appeals of coming to the MIP program was the emphasis on studying policymaking frameworks. In my undergrad at Columbia, I studied a lot of political theory and philosophy through the core curriculum. Here at Stanford, I want my focus to be on framing, implementation, and learning how to do things that address issues, not just identify them. I will be entering the Thai Foreign Service when I’m finished with my schooling, and I want to be as prepared as possible to excel as a diplomat—someone capable of solving problems effectively as part of a team, and, above all, helping people. I’m excited to learn from the experiences and perspectives of my cohort. MIP may not be as big as the UN, but we’re our own multilateral, multinational group trying to make a difference.
 

Behind all of my interests and experiences in policy is a commitment to understand how we shape and are shaped by the environment. Living  in different places and engaging with many kinds of people in different cultures has shown me how our lives are deeply connected to the environments we inhabit. No matter where we come from, we all depend on the same planet. We all have a stake in sustaining this place we share.

That being said, as a former negotiator for the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) in Japan, I know that the best course of action for how to protect the environment is not always easy or straightforward. Climate policies that make sense in one place may not be feasible in another. Requirements about renewables that work here may not work elsewhere. There are some things that we can do universally, but it’s also important that countries realize and respect that each nation has different circumstances that will require unique planning and policies to address.

One of the areas in which I would specifically like to develop is finding ways to incentivize trade policies that accelerate the dissemination of clean, low emission, or zero emission technologies. How can we make climate-related goods more appealing to the global market? How can we get over price barriers and lower the cost of climate-related products? I want to live in a world where products and trade that support climate goals are the norm, not a specialty, and those goods are easy for everyone to access.

I’ve been fortunate to have experiences already in international engagement and inter-government coordination on climate and trade negotiations, but I am looking forward to being able to learn much more about the science side of climate and the environment. Having the ability to combine my MIP classes with courses from the Doerr School of Sustainability was one of the big appeals for me in coming to this program. Gaining that dual background in policy and analytical skills from MIP and science and research from Doerr through my electives is going to be incredibly beneficial to bring back to my ministry.
 

Mofeed Digest (July 2022)

The following digest summarizes the most important scholarly and policy publications, reports, and articles covering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the politics, economies, and societies of the Arab world. Mofeed Digest is produced by Mofeed Project Coordinator Serage Amatory.

[MENA | Algeria | Bahrain | Egypt| Iraq| Jordan| Lebanon| Libya| Mauritania| Morocco| Oman| Palestine| Qatar| Saudi Arabia| Somalia| Sudan| Syria| Tunisia| UAE| Yemen]

MENA

[Back to Top]

Downplaying, Trust, and Compliance with Public Health Measures during the COVID-19 Pandemic in the MENA
POMEPS, June 2022
This working paper explains the varying levels of compliance with public health measures. Authors build on literature about compliance with non-pharmaceutical interventions and develop a theoretical argument for when trust in authorities is expected to support non-compliance, rather than compliance.

Impact of the Stringency and Volatility of COVID Containment Measures on Firms' Performances in the MENA region?
Economic Research Forum, June 2022
This working paper examines the impact of COVID containment measures and their volatility on firms’ performances. Findings indicate that tightening restrictions are associated with less sales.

Does COVID-19 Pandemic Spur Digital Business Transformation in the MENA Region? Evidence from Firm Level Data
Economic Research Forum, June 2022
This article assesses the role of the COVID-19 outbreak in accelerating digital transformation in the Middle East and North Africa region. The analysis relied on micro data collected from 5,480 firms surveyed in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia. 

Are Labor Markets in the Middle East and North Africa Recovering from the COVID-19 Pandemic? 
Economic Research Forum, June 2022
This working paper explores how labor market outcomes for MENA workers have evolved during the COVID-19 pandemic. The paper uses the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the Economic Research Forum (ERF) COVID-19 MENA Monitor phone surveys in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia to examine outcomes of employment, unemployment, and labor force participation, along with hours of work and hourly wages.

Job Loss during COVID-19: Estimating the Poverty and Food Security Effects in Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco 
Economic Research Forum, June 2022
This working paper discusses the impact of job losses caused by the COVID-19 pandemic on household income and food security in Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco. The authors show that laid-off workers have a higher propensity to consume their savings, get help from relatives, sell assets and borrow from family.

The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Women's Care Work and Employment in the Middle East and North Africa
Economic Research Forum, June 2022
This working paper examines how MENA women’s unpaid care responsibilities have changed during the pandemic. 

Employment and Care Work During the COVID-19 Pandemic: Persistent Inequality in the Middle East and North Africa
Economic Research Forum, June 2022
This working paper studies employment rates, wage inequality, hours of work, and employment recovery during the COVID-19 pandemic and after a general recovery in mid-2021. 

The Impact of COVID-19 on Jobs, Incomes and Food Security in Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco 
Economic Research Forum, June 2022
This working paper examines the impact of the COVID-19 crisis on job and income losses, and its relation to pushing people in Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco into extreme poverty.

Impact of COVID-19 on Health Professionals' Education in Eastern Mediterranean Region
East Mediterranean Health Journal, July 2022
This article assesses health professionals' education in the East Mediterranean Region and explores the strategies adopted to ensure the continuity of their education in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. 

The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Service Delivery for Noncommunicable Diseases in the Eastern Mediterranean Region. 
East Mediterranean Health Journal, July 2022
This article reports on an Noncommunicable Diseases (NCDs) assessment by the World Health Organization to evaluate the impact of COVID-19 on NCD-related services, programs, funding, and consideration of NCDs in COVID-19 response.

A New Approach in Identifying the Psychological Impact of COVID-19 on University Student’s Academic Performance
Alexandria Engineering Journal, July 2022
This article uses statistics and machine learning approaches to study the impact of COVID-19 pandemic on education systems especially on university students’ psychological health. The study was performed on students in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan and looked at key determinants such as the use of digital devices, sleep habits, social communication, emotional mental state, and academic performance.

The Impact of COVID-19 on Gender Equality and Food Security in the Arab region with a focus on the Sudan and Iraq
Care Evaluations, 2 July 2022 
This report studies how the COVID-19 pandemic affected gender equality and food security in the MENA region. The regional focus of the study identified key themes, challenges, and norms across multiple contexts in the Arab region, while highlighting specific findings for Iraq and the Sudan.

Assessment of the Non-Communicable Diseases Kit for Humanitarian Emergencies in Yemen and Libya
BMJ Global Health, 7 July 2022
This article provides a summary of the key methodologies, findings, and limitations of non-communicable diseases kit assessments conducted in Libya and Yemen in order to ensure the contents are fit for purpose and to assess usability and utility.

Navigating beyond COVID-19 Recovery in the MENA Region
OECD, 14 July 2022
This article reflects on the impacts of the COVID-19 crisis on MENA countries and the potential changes it may bring to their reform agendas. It addresses the ongoing effects of the crisis and the long-term consequences and identifies emerging new trends. 

Pandemic Effects: COVID-19 and the Crisis of Development in the Middle East
Development and Change, 27 July 2022
This article explores the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on socio-economic development and political mobilization in the Middle East. It argues that beyond its direct public health implications, the pandemic is serving to intensify the extreme inequalities in wealth and power that have characterized the region for many years. 

Algeria

[Back to Top]

The Impact of e-Learning Systems on Motivating Students and Enhancing Their Outcomes during COVID-19: A Mixed-Method Approach
Frontiers in Psychology, 29 July 2022
This article analyzes the impact of e-learning systems utilized during the COVID-19 pandemic across Algerian universities on higher education students' motivation and outcomes.

Bahrain

[Back to Top]

Bahrain COVID-19 Case Studies
World Health Organization, July 2022
This World Health Organization report lauds the Bahraini government for its management of the COVID-19 pandemic and highlights lessons learned from the Kingdom’s lockdown, testing, and vaccination experiences. 

The Impact of COVID-19 on Summer Travels in 2022
Derasat, 25 July 2022
This article from the Bahrain Center for Strategic, International, and Energy Studies "Derasat" reflects on the results of an opinion poll to study how COVID-19 impacted summer travels in 2022. [Arabic]

Egypt

[Back to Top] 

Egypt COVID-19 Country Case Study
Economic Research Forum, June 2022
This working paper examines COVID-19 measures undertaken by the Egyptian authorities and the effect they had on employment, wages, income, and enterprises. 

Promoting Family-Friendly Jobs and Labor Market Policies in Egypt in the Context of COVID-19 and beyond
Economic Research Forum, June 2022
This policy brief shows how the COVID-19 outbreak impacted females’ employment, time-use, and work preferences in Egypt and how it increased the burden of domestic work and unpaid work imposed on women with children, through the restrictions, measures, and closure of daycares and schools.

Outcome and Characteristics of COVID-19 Patients Associated with Stroke: A Multicenter Hospital-Based Study in Egypt
The Egyptian Journal of Neurology, Psychiatry and Neurosurgery, 7 July 2022
The article studies the impact of COVID-19 on strokes by examining the outcomes and characteristics of patients who had an acute ischemic stroke due to COVID-19 infection.

Clinical and Chest Computed Tomography Features of Patients Suffering from Mild and Severe COVID-19 at Fayoum University Hospital in Egypt
PLOS ONE, 8 July 2022
This article investigates whether chest CT characteristics are correlated to COVID-19 severity. Specifically, it evaluates the potential association between clinical data and 25-point CT score and investigates their predictive significance in COVID-19-positive patients at Fayoum University Hospital in Egypt.

Characteristics, Causes and Impact of Headache among a Sample of Physicians Working during COVID-19 Pandemic
The Egyptian Journal of Neurology, Psychiatry and Neurosurgery, 14 July 2022 
This article determines the prevalence of new onset headache among physicians working in COVID-19 isolation hospitals and its impact on their performance. Authors also aimed to explore factors affecting the headache symptoms and its clinical characteristics.

Iraq

[Back to Top] 

Knowledge, Attitudes, and Practices on COVID-19 in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq: An Online Cross-Sectional Survey
Passer Journal of Basic and Applied Sciences, June 2022
This article aims to gain a better understanding of the people’s awareness and their attitude towards the pandemic by conducting a knowledge, attitude, and practice (KAP) survey in Kurdistan.

Religious Beliefs and Work Conscience of Muslim Nurses in Iraq during the COVID-19 Pandemic
Historical Thought and Source Interpretation, 8 July 2022
This study aims to evaluate the impact of religious beliefs on work conscience of healthcare workers through a standard questionnaire conducted on 1800 Muslim nurses in Iraq during the COVID-19 pandemic. 

Prevalence of SARS -CoV-2 IgG/IgM Antibodies among Patients in Zakho City, Kurdistan, Iraq
The Journal of Infection in Developing Countries, 28 July 2022
This article aims to detect seropositivity against the SARS-CoV-2 virus among outpatients, symptomatic, and asymptomatic individuals in Zakho City in Kurdistan.

Potential Role of TLR3 and RIG-I Genes Expression in Surviving COVID-19 Patients with Different Severity of Infection
Iraqi Journal of Science, 31 July 2022
This article reports on a case-control study (100 recovered COVID 19 cases and 100 healthy individuals) which aimed to determine the role of gender, age, TLR3 and RIG-I genes in COVID-19 aggressiveness.

Jordan

[Back to Top] 

Obstacles in the Road of Biomedical Research on COVID-19 in Jordan: Poor Funding and Beyond
Journal of Global Health, July 2022 
This article examines the contributions of Jordanian scientists to academic studies on COVID-19 since the beginning of the pandemic, categorizes them, and provides insights on the challenges the researchers face such as limited funding. 

Dr. Assessment Problems Faced by Faculty Members at Fine Arts Faculties in Jordan During COVID-19 Epidemic
Journal of Arts and Humanities, 4 July 2022
This article examines the most common assessment challenges facing faculty members at Fine Arts Faculties in Jordan during the COVID-19 pandemic by surveying a sample of 38 faculty members working in Jordanian universities.

Vaccination Intention against COVID-19 among the Unvaccinated in Jordan during the Early Phase of the Vaccination Drive: A Cross-Sectional Survey
Vaccines, 21 July 2022
This article assesses the intention and predictors of accepting the corona virus disease 2019 (COVID-19) vaccine in Jordan. The article found that despite having high rates of intention to receive a COVID-19 vaccine, older adults and housewives, general workers and unemployed individuals were less likely to be vaccinated.

Establishing the First COVID-19 Convalescent Plasma Biobank in Jordan
Biopreservation and Biobanking, 28 July 2022
This article reflects on the identification and storage of 214 fresh frozen plasma units qualified for CCP-plasma therapy for COVID-19 patients according to World Health Organization standards and the subsequent establishment of the first COVID-19-convalescent plasma data and plasma biobank for treating COVID-19-infected cancer patients in Jordan and the region.

Lebanon

[Back to Top] 

Predicting Intention to Vaccinate against COVID-19 in Older Syrian Refugees in Lebanon: Findings from a Multi-Wave Study
medRxiv, 24 July 2022
This working paper aims to examine the prevalence, reasons and predictors of COVID-19 vaccine refusal among older Syrian refugees in Lebanon. 

Fear and Death Anxiety in the Shadow of COVID-19 among the Lebanese Population: A Cross-Sectional Study
PLOS ONE, 27 July 2022
This article assesses the fear related to the COVID-19 pandemic and its associated factors among the adult population in Lebanon. Death anxiety was identified as the most significant predictor of fear related to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Libya

[Back to Top] ​

Business Resilience in Libya in the Post-COVID Age
Spark, 17 July 2022 
This article reflects on SPARK’s extension of the Tadamon program to Libya with the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) and the Islamic Solidarity Fund for Development (ISFD) to support medium, small, and micro enterprises in order to create job opportunities. The article assesses the resilience of businesses in Libya and provides further resilience designs. 

Low SARS-CoV-2 Antibodies in Blood Donors after the First 6 Months of COVID-19 Epidemic in the Tobruk Region, Eastern Libya
Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness, 27 July 2022
This article estimates the seroprevalence rate of antibodies to severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (anti-SARS-CoV-2) in blood donors' population to reflect the progression of the epidemic in the Tobruk region and reveal how many people have contracted the virus because only symptomatic cases had been registered.

Morocco 

[Back to Top] ​

Morocco COVID-19 Country Case Study
Economic Research Forum, June 2022
This working paper assesses COVID-19 measures undertaken by Moroccan authorities and the effect they had on employment, wages, income, and enterprises.

Contribution to the Study of the Impact of COVID-19 on the Management of Accounting Results: Case of the Telecommunications and New Technologies Sector in Morocco
Revue Du Contrôle, De La Comptabilité Et De l’Audit, 26 July 2022
This article focuses on the management of corporate accounting results in the first year of the pandemic in Morocco. It analyzed the annual financial reports published on the website of the Moroccan Capital Market Authority to verify ex-post whether earnings management has taken place for all listed companies in the telecommunications and new technologies sector.

Oman

[Back to Top] ​

Seroconversion of COVID-19 in Frontline Healthcare Workers in a Tertiary Care Hospital in Oman
Oman Medical Journal, July 2022
This article studies the seroconversion among frontline staff at the highest risk of exposure to SARS-CoV-2 infections, including emergency department, critical care, and COVID-19 isolation wards in all healthcare job categories.

Prophylactic Anticoagulant Treatment Might Have an Anti-Inflammatory Effect and Reduce Mortality Rates in Hospitalized COVID-19 Patients?
Oman Medical Journal, July 2022
This article studies the anti-inflammatory effects of Prophylactic Anticoagulant Therapy (PAT) in COVID-19 patients. The article eventually determined that PAT was not effective. 

Impact of the COVID-19 Face Mask Disposal on Environment and Perception of People of the Sultanate of Oman
The Ethiopian Journal of Health Development, 4 July 2022
This article assesses how the SARS-CoV-2 virus disrupted the household waste management chain in the Sultanate of Oman. In addition, a descriptive survey has also identified people's perception about the existing household waste management system.

Factors Sustaining Clients' Behavioral Intentions To Use Smartphones-Banking In Oman: A Survey Study Based On COVID-19 Crisis
OSF-Center for Open Science, 9 July 2022
This article surveys the opinions of a sample of bank clients operating in the Omani banking sector regarding the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the client's behavioral intentions in adopting smartphone banking techniques and their sustainability use after the crisis. 

Conceptualizing Graduates Attributes (GAs) in English Language Teacher Education Programs in Oman During the COVID-19 Pandemic
Sage Open, 25 July 2022
This article examines stakeholders’ perspectives and aspirations concerning the graduate attributes used in English-language teacher education programs in Oman during and after the COVID-19 pandemic.

Palestine

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An Investigation into Religious Awareness as a Crucial Factor in Adherence to COVID-19 Medical Directives in Palestine
BMC Public Health, 13 July 2022
This article examines the role of religion as a factor in adherence to the COVID-19 medical directives in Palestine. 

Qatar

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COVID-19 Disease Severity in Persons Infected with the Omicron Variant Compared with the Delta Variant in Qatar
Journal of Global Health, 6 July 2022
This article studies the disease severity associated with the Omicron variant of the SARS-CoV-2 virus in order to determine the appropriate management strategies at the individual and population levels. The authors assess the severity of SARS-CoV-2 infection in persons infected with the Omicron vs the Delta variant.

Duration of Immune Protection of SARS-CoV-2 Natural Infection Against Reinfection in Qatar
MedRxiv, 7 July 2022
This working paper investigates the duration of protection afforded by natural infection, the effect of viral immune evasion on duration of protection, and protection against severe SARS-CoV-2 reinfection, in Qatar, between February 28, 2020 and June 5, 2022.

Effects of Previous Infection and Vaccination on Symptomatic Omicron Infections
The New England Journal of Medicine, 7 July 2022 
This article evaluates the effectiveness of vaccination with Pfizer–BioNTech or Moderna, natural immunity due to previous infection with variants other than omicron, and hybrid immunity (previous infection and vaccination) against symptomatic Omicron infection and against severe, critical, or fatal coronavirus disease 2019.

COVID-19 Risk Score as a Public Health Tool to Guide Targeted Testing: A Demonstration Study in Qatar
PLOS ONE, 19 July 2022
This article presents the development of a COVID-19 risk score to guide targeted RT-PCR testing in Qatar in order to identify those at highest risk of having the infection.

Assessing Factors Influencing Technology Adoption for Online Purchasing Amid COVID-19 in Qatar: Moderating Role of Word of Mouth
Frontiers in Environmental Science, 25 July 2022 
This article examines how contingencies disrupt existing theoretical models and their implications for the post-COVID-19 era for online purchases. 

Saudi Arabia

[Back to Top] ​

Fungal Coinfections in COVID-19-Positive Patients at a Tertiary Care Hospital in Saudi Arabia
Egyptian Journal of Medical Microbiology, July 2022
This article aims to investigate the relationship between fungal coinfections and morbidity and mortality rates in patients with severe COVID-19 admitted to a tertiary hospital in Makkah, Saudi Arabia.

Awareness, knowledge, Attitudes, and Practices before the Second Wave of the COVID-19 Pandemic in Saudi Arabia
European Review for Medical and Pharmacological Sciences, July 2022 
This article assesses the knowledge, awareness, and attitudes of the general population in Saudi Arabia towards COVID-19, as well as its adherence to preventive measures and its willingness to take the vaccine.

Contribution of Saudi Arabia to Regional and Global Publications on COVID-19–Related Research: A Bibliometric and Visualization Analysis
Journal of Infection and Public Health, July 2022
This article assesses the increasing Saudi Arabian contribution to worldwide research on COVID-19. 

Sustainable Participatory Governance: Data-Driven Discovery of Parameters for Planning Online and In-Class Education in Saudi Arabia During COVID-19
Frontiers in Sustainable Cities, 19 July 2022
This article provides a case study on sustainable participatory governance using a data-driven parameter discovery for planning online, in-class, and blended learning in Saudi Arabia evidenced during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Functional and Psychosocial Impact of COVID-19 Pandemic on Rheumatic Patients’ Quality of Life in Saudi Arabia
Quality of Life Research, 20 July 2022
This article studies the impact of COVID-19 on rheumatic patients both functionally and psychosocially, in addition to the virus' impact on their quality of life. 

Side Effects of COVID-19 Vaccines (Pfizer, AstraZeneca) in Saudi Arabia, Eastern Province
Cureus, 26 July 2022
This article studies the side effects of the COVID-19 vaccine and the factors that contribute to their occurrence. 

COVID-19 and Saudi Arabia: Awareness, Attitude, and Practice
Journal of Multidisciplinary Healthcare, 26 July 2022
This article reviews the awareness/knowledge, attitudes, and practices (KAP)-related publications in Saudi Arabia up to date to understand the impact of COVID-19 on these domains. 

Somalia

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Overcoming COVID-19 Restrictions Through Adaptive Measures that Facilitate Access to Agricultural and Nutrition Knowledge
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2022 
This fact sheet documents a new distance learning initiative in Somalia through radio launched in 2020 by FAO as a response to public health threats posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, complementing cash+ activities and replacing face-to-face beneficiary training.

Double Burden on Health Services in Somalia due to COVID-19 and Conflict
Annals of Medicine and Surgery, July 2022
This article explores the detrimental effects of conflict in Somalia during the COVID-19 pandemic such as the inadequate amount of available health workers, facilities, and health service delivery methods.

Sudan

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Attitude and Behavior of Emerging Novel COVID-19 Disease - Khartoum, Sudan
Medical Journal of Clinical Trials and Case Studies, 18 July 2022
This article assesses the attitudes and behavior of 1200 Sudani participants towards COVID-19 and reports negative attitudes in more than half of the participants. 

Syria

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Knowledge and Attitudes about Influenza and the Common Cold in Syria Post COVID-19: A Qualitative Study
Annals of Medicine and Surgery, 16 July 2022
This article examines the knowledge and understanding of common flu and influenza during the COVID-19 pandemic in Syria. Key findings showed that most people cannot differentiate between common cold and influenza. 

Tunisia

[Back to Top] ​

Tunisia COVID-19 Country Case Study
Economic Research Forum, June 2022
This working paper examines COVID-19 measures undertaken by the Tunisian authorities and the effect they had on employment, wages, income, and enterprises. 

Adverse Effects of Personal Protective Equipment among First Line COVID-19 Healthcare Professionals: A Survey in Southern Tunisia
Infection, Disease and Health Journal, 12 July 2022
This article assesses the negative effects of personal protective equipment on healthcare workers in Tunisia. It estimates the prevalence of the adverse effects and determines their predictive factors.

COVID-19 Vaccines and Roles of the Health Regulatory Authority in Tunisia
Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness, 28 July 2022
This article outlines the roles of the Tunisian regulatory authority, the Directorate of Pharmacy and Medicines (DPM) at the Ministry of Health, in the registration and the procurement of the COVID-19 vaccine.

Income Loss and COVID-19: Evidence from Tunisia
European Journal of Business and Management Research, 28 July 2022
This article assesses income loss during the COVID-19 pandemic in Tunisia in light of factors such as education, job sectors, and income brackets. 

UAE

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The Rise of Telepharmacy Services during the COVID-19 Pandemic: A Comprehensive Assessment of Services in the United Arab Emirates
Pharmacy Practice, 4 July 2022
This article explores changes in community pharmacies’ processes in response to the pandemic in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and factors affecting the adoption of these changes.

Distress Symptoms during the COVID-19 Lockdown: A Study with the General Population of the United Arab Emirates
Pharmacy Practice, 4 July 2022
This article analyzes distress symptoms surfacing during the COVID-19 lockdown period and their associated factors among a sample of the UAE population.

The Radiography Students’ Perspective of the Impact of COVID-19 on Education and Training Internationally: A Cross Sectional Survey of the UK Devolved Nations (UKDN) and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)
Radiography, 18 July 2022
This article investigates the impact of COVID-19 on the education and training of radiography students internationally in the United Kingdom Devolved Nations (UKDN) and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), to determine any possible impact on their future careers.

Prevalence and Factors Associated with Mental Illness Symptoms among School Students Post Lockdown of the COVID-19 Pandemic in the United Arab Emirates: A Cross-Sectional National Study
medRxiv, 21 July 2022
This working paper analyzes the frequency of depression, anxiety and PTSD after the COVID-19 pandemic lockdown in school students in the UAE. 

ABO Blood Group in Relation to COVID-19 Susceptibility and Clinical Outcomes: A Retrospective Observational Study in the United Arab Emirates
Life, 29 July 2022
The article studies the relation between ABO blood groups and clinical outcomes in COVID-19 patients.

Yemen

[Back to Top] ​

Situation Report for COVID-19: Yemen
MRC Centre for Global Infectious Disease Analysis - Imperial College London, 3 July 2022 
This report uses excess mortality data in Yemen for the period of the COVID-19 epidemic, calculated by comparing current mortality to historic trends and then back-calculating an inferred number of COVID-19 infections using mathematical modeling techniques to estimate the number of people that have been infected and to make short-term projections for future healthcare needs.

Mofeed Digest (June 2022)

The following digest summarizes the most important scholarly and policy publications, reports, and articles covering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the politics, economies, and societies of the Arab world. Mofeed Digest is produced by Mofeed Project Coordinator Serage Amatory.

[MENA | Algeria | Bahrain | Djibouti | Egypt| Iraq| Jordan| Kuwait| Lebanon| Libya| Morocco| Oman| Palestine| Qatar| Saudi Arabia| Somalia| Sudan| Syria| Tunisia| UAE| Yemen]

MENA

[Back to Top]

Arab States: Overcoming the Fragilities of Governance Systems for Sustainable Recovery
UNDP, Date Unspecified 
This article assesses the fragility of Arab government responses to the COVID-19 pandemic and provides policy recommendations. It discusses how government trust and the perception of the social contract will change due to the citizen-government interaction during the pandemic. 

COVID-19 in the MENA: An Exploration of Gender Sensitive State Responses
Middle East Political Science, Date Unspecified
This article describes how women in the formal sector of MENA economies have been impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic. Authors focus on 3 MENA countries and explore the gendered impacts of the pandemic. 

COVID-19 Responses in the Middle East and North Africa in Global Perspective
Middle East Political Science, Date Unspecified 
This article studies the nature of the government response to the COVID-19 pandemic in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), exploring both within-region diversity and between-region variation. It concludes that while the MENA region as a whole is broadly similar to other parts of the world in its COVID response, there are substantial within-region differences in terms of how COVID policies were implemented and to what extent residents were affected by the pandemic and adopted public health behaviors. 

Does COVID-19 Pandemic Spur Digital Business Transformation in the MENA Region? Evidence from Firm Level Data
Economic Research Forum, June 2022
This working paper analyzes how the outbreak of COVID-19 in the MENA region affected the accelerating digital transformation in business firms. The results demonstrate a strong association between the pandemic outbreak and digitization. They also show that the firms operating in the service sector were more likely to adopt digital solutions.

Presentation, Management, and Outcome of COVID-19 among Patients with Cancer in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.
Journal of Clinical Oncology, 2 June 2022
This article captures data on 1345 patients with cancer to assess SARS-COV-2 infection presentations, diagnosis, treatment, complications, and outcomes in 12 centers in 8 Mena region countries.

Economic and Psychosocial Effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic on the Nations of the GCC
Global Business and Economics Review, 17 June 2022
This article examines the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic in GCC countries, especially on the economic and psychosocial level. The article investigates the impact of government support on mitigating the psychological and psychosocial impacts of the pandemic on citizens.

Algeria

[Back to Top]

Impact of COVID-19 Crisis on Energy Consumption and Socio-Spatial Behavior of the Residential Sector in Extreme Climates. Case study Southwest of Algeria
TECHNIUM, 9 June 2022
This article examines the immediate and long-term impact of COVID-19 on various forms of energy consumption during confinement in Algeria. The authors focus on the impact of COVID 19 on the energy consumption of electricity, gas, and water in the residential sector.  

The Impact of the COVID-19 Related School Closure on the Mental Health and Well-Being of Children with SEN and Their Parents in Algeria
International Journal of Disability, Development and Education, 23 June 2022
This study studies and analyzes the experience of twenty-three parents and five children with special educational needs during complete lockdown and limited access to school support in Algeria.

Bahrain

[Back to Top]

Post-Vaccination Outcomes in Association with Four COVID-19 Vaccines in the Kingdom of Bahrain
Scientific Reports, 2 June 2022
This study examines COVID-19 related outcomes derived from Bahraini national database where 4 vaccines were deployed, comparing the 4 vaccines through post-vaccination outcomes. 

Students’ Perception Regarding E-learning During COVID-19 at Bahrain Polytechnic
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 6 June 2022
This article presents the findings of a descriptive cross-sectional study conducted at Bahrain Polytechnic to assess students' perspectives towards e-learning during the COVID-19 pandemic. 

Bahrain Ranks First in Post-Pandemic Tourism Recovery Report
National News, 15 June 2022
According to money.co.uk study, Bahrain has been given the highest ranking in tourism recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic, at a 95% rate. This ranking indicated that the Gulf nation's 2021 tourist numbers bounced almost all the way back to the 2019 level of 3.8 million.

Djibouti

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Epidemiology of the First and Second Waves of COVID-19 Pandemic in Djibouti and the Vaccination Strategy Developed for the Response
BMJ Public Health, June 2022
This study examines the epidemiology of the first two covid-19 waves in Djibouti, highlighting mishaps in the National Plan for Introduction and Deployment for COVID-19 vaccines. 

Assessing the Effectiveness of the Djiboutian Government during the COVID-19: Focusing on the Djiboutian Perspective
FigShare, 30 June 2022
This study assesses the Djiboutian government’s effectiveness in combating COVID-19 through studying different indicators like citizen trust in government, government responsiveness and leadership, and COVID-19 information access and accuracy. Results conveyed a strong link between responsiveness and effectiveness. 

Egypt

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The Impact of Job Stress on Employee’s Performance at one of Private Banks in Egypt during COVID-19 Pandemic
International Business Research, Date Unspecified 
This article investigates the perception of employees of one of the private banks in Egypt and their performance in the presence of job stress in the uncertain period of the coronavirus pandemic. 

Impact of COVID-19 Pandemic on the Neurosurgical Practice in Egypt
Egyptian Journal of Neurosurgery, 7 June 2022
This article examines the impact of lockdown and restrictive measures adopted during the COVID-19 pandemic on neurosurgical cases at two university hospitals in Egypt. Results show that the number of cases has dropped by 38%.

Exenterate or Not: A Simple Proposed Management Algorithm for Mucormycosis During the Era of COVID-19 in a Tertiary Eye Care Center in Egypt
Clinical Ophthalmology, 11 June 2022
This article studies available data of 30 Egyptian patients with post COVID-19 orbital mucormycosis to construct a simple management algorithm for posed cases. 

Egypt Loses $23 Billion from COVID-19, Ukraine Conflict
Egyptian Streets, 21 June 2022
Egypt's Minister of Finance declared during his proposed budget speech that the country had lost 440 EGP, about 23.4 billion dollars due to the Russian-Ukrainian war and the COVID-19 pandemic over the span of the last two years. 

Recovering from COVID-19 Learning Losses
UNICEF, 23 June 2022
This UNICEF article delineates the various challenges that the pandemic has posed for children and their learning in Egypt. The article focuses on marginalized children of color or refugee status and recognizes that despite the progress achieved in the education sector in Egypt, marginalized children are still far behind expectations for their age in literacy. [ARABIC]

Acceptance Rate of COVID-19 Vaccination and Its Predictors in Egypt: An Online Survey
The Journal of Infection in Developing Countries, 30 June 2022
This article presents the findings of a self-administered study conducted on random participants from six different Egyptian governorates to assess the acceptance rate of COVID-19 vaccination among the Egyptian adult population. 

Acceptance of COVID-19 Vaccination among Maintenance Hemodialysis Patients: an Egyptian Survey Study
Tropical Medicine and Health, 30 June 2022
This article presents a study conducted in 2 Maintenance Hemodialysis centers in Egypt to investigate the level of vaccine acceptance among Egyptian patients with MHD.

Iraq

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Acceptance of COVID-19 Vaccine Among Nursing Students of Mosul University, Iraq
Rawal Medical Journal, Date Unspecified 
This article uses a quantitative cross-sectional study to assess the acceptance of COVID-19 vaccination among nursing students in Mosul city in Iraq.

The Relationship between COVID-19 Fear and Anxiety with the Quality of Life of Students in Sulaymaniyah, Iraq
Novelty in Clinical Medicine, June 2022
This article examines the link between the fear and anxiety students experience during the pandemic with online learning, and their quality of life. According to intention to be vaccinated, the patients were divided into vaccine acceptant (VA), hesitant (VH), and resistant (VR) groups who comprised 58.3%, 26.5%, and 15.2%, respectively.

Misdiagnosis of COVID-19 Infection before Molecular Confirmation in Sulaimaniyah City, Iraq
European Journal of Medical Research, 3 June 2022
This article utilizes a detailed questionnaire to assess the misdiagnosis and mismanagement of COVID-19 cases in Northern Iraq, Kurdistan region. Regarding the false diagnosis of cases, 92% were made by non-physician healthcare workers, and only 8% were made by physicians.

The Role of Influenza Vaccination in the COVID-19 Infection: Impact on Incidence and Severity in Iraq
Journal of Applied Pharmaceutical Science, 21 June 2022
This article investigates the extent to which influenza vaccinations can mitigate the severity and decrease the frequency of incidence of COVID-19 infections in Iraq. 

Predictors of Mental Health Symptomatology among Kurdish Patients Who Recovered from COVID-19 in Iraq
Discover Psychology, 27 June 2022
This article seeks to determine the mental health symptomatology and its associated factors among Kurdish Iraqis who recovered from COVID-19. It was found that 31.6% of the participating recovered patients with COVID-19 met the diagnostic criteria for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and 21.05% were classified with probable depression.

Menstrual Changes Following COVID-19 Infection: A Cross-Sectional Study from Jordan and Iraq
Plos One, 29 June 2022
This study aimed to investigate and to evaluate menstrual changes in females following COVID-19 infection, and to evaluate female perception about the effect of COVID-19 on their menstrual cycles. Authors conducted the study on 483 women from Jordan and Iraq. 

Postmortem Lung Biopsy for COVID-19 Patients in Iraq
Research Square, 30 June 2022
This article studies the pathophysiological changes that happen to lung tissues in COVID-19 affected individuals and to accurately specify the cause(s) of death. Authors utilized a case series of post-mortem lung histopathology examinations of deceased COVID-19 positive patients in Iraq.

Jordan

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User Experience Assessment of a COVID-19 Tracking Mobile Application (AMAN) in Jordan
Indonesian Journal of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, Date Unspecified 
This article examines the user experience of a COVID-19 tracking application in Jordan by getting feedback from users and identifying UX (user experience) based on user interaction.

Short-Term Side Effects of COVID-19 Vaccines: A Cross-Sectional Study in Jordan
Human Vaccines and Immunotherapeutics, 27 June 2022
This article presents the findings of a cross-sectional study of the short-term side effects of the COVID-19 vaccine to clarify the expected outcome of getting vaccinated and reduce vaccine hesitancy.

Menstrual Changes Following COVID-19 Infection: A Cross-Sectional Study from Jordan and Iraq
Plos One, 29 June 2022
This study aimed to investigate and to evaluate menstrual changes in females following COVID-19 infection, and to evaluate female perception about the effect of COVID-19 on their menstrual cycles. Authors conducted the study on 483 women from Jordan and Iraq. 

Exploring the Role of Superspreading Events in SARS-CoV-2 Outbreaks
medRxiv, 29 June 2022
This article presents a study that formulates a Markov chain model to investigate the influence of superspreading events on SARS-COV-2 outbreak dynamics.

Kuwait

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The Effects of COVID-19 School Disruptions Will Last Decades
World Bank, 20 June 2022 
This World Bank blog-post discusses the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on schools and learning in Kuwait. It states the long-term life long losses to their earning, males being affected more tragically than females. [Arabic here]

Incidence of SARS-CoV-2 Reinfection in a Paediatric Cohort in Kuwait
BMJ Open, 28 June 2022
This article reports the findings of a population-level retrospective cohort study to describe the clinical characteristics and dynamics of SARS-COV-2 reinfection in children in Kuwait. Results show that reinfection is uncommon in children. 

Pandemic Price Controls Experiment Goes Seriously Awry in Kuwait
Bloomberg, 29 June 2022 
This Bloomberg article reports on the indiscriminate economic havoc that has risen in Kuwait two years after price control was applied to freeze food costs during the first wave of the COVID-19 outbreak. 

Lebanon

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Evaluating the Governance and Preparedness of the Lebanese Health System for the COVID-19 Pandemic: A Qualitative Study
BMJ Open, 1 June 2022
This article reports on a qualitative study held in Lebanon aiming to assess the capacity and governance of Lebanon's health system throughout the coronavirus pandemic. The health workforce showed high resilience despite the inadequate training and staff shortages. 

Genomic Surveillance of SARS CoV2 in COVID-19 vaccinated healthcare workers in Lebanon
BioRxiv, 6 June 2022 
This article reports on the findings of a national SARS-COV-2 genomic surveillance among healthcare workers in Lebanon. 

Experience of Field Testing in Lebanon during the COVID-19 Pandemic, January to August 2021
BMJ Global Health, 7 June 2022
This article presents data related to COVID-19 cases after field testing in Lebanon. The article also reflects on challenges faced and lessons learned. 

Risk Markers of COVID-19, a Study from South-Lebanon
MDPI, 27 June 2022
This article aims to assess the prevalence of SARS-CoV-2 among suspected COVID-19 patients in South Lebanon as well as the risk markers for COVID-19 associated with ABO blood group, Rhesus factor, and patient’s address during the past year.

Libya

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Knowledge, Attitude, Perception and Psychological Status of Healthcare Workers During COVID-19 Outbreak in Libya: A Cross Sectional Study
Journal of Pure and Applied Microbiology, 1 June 2022
This article studies and evaluates levels of knowledge, attitude, perception, and psychological effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on Libyan citizens. 

Morocco 

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Dataset to Explore Factors Affecting COVID-19 Vaccination Intention. Evidence from Morocco
Data in Brief, 9 June 2022 
This article identifies the various factors that influenced Moroccan citizens to get the COVID-19 vaccine.  The data were collected using an online questionnaire. 

Depression and Eating Disorders among Health Care Professionals in Morocco during the COVID-19 Pandemic
Electronic Journal of General Medicine, 8 June 2022
This article reports on the findings of an online anonymous self-administered questionnaire that was conducted on Moroccan healthcare workers to screen for depression and eating disorders during the coronavirus pandemic.

Oman

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Assessing COVID-19 Vaccine’s Acceptability Amongst Health Care Workers in Oman: A Cross-Sectional Study
Journal of Infection and Public Health, 16 June 2022
This article assesses the acceptability of COVID-19 vaccines among health care workers in Oman. A cross-sectional study using a self- administered questionnaire was conducted among the HCWs in December 2020.

Audit Fees under the COVID-19 Pandemic: Evidence from Oman
Journal of Accounting in Emerging Economies, 28 June 2022
This article reports on the findings of a study examining the effect of COVID-19 on audit fees after its huge impact on companies' financial statements in Oman. 

Pulmonary Barotrauma in COVID-19 Patients: Experience From a Secondary Care Hospital in Oman
Cureus, 29 June 2022
This article discusses the findings of a retrospective study identifying patients with pulmonary barotrauma and recording their medical data at an Intensive Care Unit in Oman.

Palestine

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COVID-19 Vaccine Uptake and Its Associated Factors among Palestinian Healthcare Workers: Expectations Beaten by Reality
Vaccine, 9 June 2022
This article presents a cross-sectional study conducted in Palestine to examine the level of vaccination among healthcare workers and its determinants. Key findings show that almost two thirds of Palestinian healthcare workers have already received their vaccine. 

Health Consequences of University Employees Post COVID-19 Vaccination at Palestinian University
Research Square, 14 June 2022
This article examines health consequences of Palestinian university workers receiving their COVID-19 vaccination, aiming to decrease vaccination hesitancy and provide more adequate input on its side effects.

Vaccine Apartheid and Settler Colonial Sovereign Violence: From Palestine to the Colonial Global Economy
Distinktion Journal of Social Theory, 14 June 2022
This article adopts a decolonial lens to assess the distribution of the COVID-19 vaccine in Palestine and globally. It challenges the underlying premise being that the advanced, wealthy, and capable nation-states have endogenously earned the position of power and prosperity and that the world’s poor nation-states are posited as the recipients of charity from these rich states only after the latter have sufficiently inoculated themselves.

The Impact of the Corona Pandemic on the Performance of Palestinian Commercial Banks Listed on the Palestine Stock Exchange
Lecture Notes in Networks and Systems, 30 June 2022
This article studies a sample of 6 companies from the banking sector in Palestine to shed light on the Palestinian stock exchange before and during the COVID-19 pandemic. 

Qatar

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Predictive Ability of Factors in diagnosing COVID-19: Experiences from Qatar's Primary Care Settings
International Journal of Infectious Diseases, June 2022 
This article aims to establish the predictive ability of demographic and clinical factors in diagnosing Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in Qatar's publicly funded primary care settings.

Duration of mRNA Vaccine Protection against SARS-CoV-2 Omicron BA.1 and BA.2 Subvariants in Qatar
Nature Communications, 2 June 2022
This article investigates the duration of protection of the Pfizer and Moderna vaccines after the second dose and after the third/booster dose, against symptomatic COVID-19 infections in Qatar.

Qatar: Challenges and Successes in COVID-19 Pandemic Response
Rand Blog, 9 June 2022
This article presents an overview of the Qatari experience in combating the coronavirus pandemic. It references Qatar's strict contact tracking and tracing policy, the launching of a vaccination campaign in December 2020, and media campaigns that promote awareness of the importance of taking preventive measures and getting the vaccine as important steps in the state’s pandemic response.

Qatar Airways Bounces Back from Pandemic with Record Revenues and Profits
Forbes, 16 June 2022
This Forbes article discusses the efforts, resilience and trajectory of Qatar Airways in emerging from the coronavirus pandemic. It references a sharp uptick in annual revenues to QR52.3 billion ($14.4 billion).  

COVID-19 Vaccine Hesitancy and Acceptance among the Public in the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries: A Review of the Literature
Human Vaccines and Immunotherapeutics, 29 June 2022
This article aims to provide an up-to-date evaluation of COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy among the public in the Gulf Cooperation Council countries.

Saudi Arabia

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Factors Related to COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy in Saudi Arabia
Public Health in Practice, June 2022
This article presents the findings of a cross-sectional study aiming to assess the amount of vaccine hesitancy and its determinants in relation to various demographic, social, and personal characteristics among the Saudi population.

A Nationwide Survey to Assess COVID-19’s Impact on Health and Lifestyle in Saudi Arabia
European Review for Medical and Pharmacological Science, June 2022 
This article aims to assess the COVID-19 related knowledge and its socio-demographic correlates in individuals from different parts of Saudi Arabia and to evaluate the health-related impact and lifestyle changes in the Saudi population because of the COVID-19 pandemic. It also determines the perceived importance of future preparedness among residents. 

Characteristics of Mechanically Ventilated COVID-19 Patients in the Al-Ahsa Region of Saudi Arabia: A Retrospective Study with Survival Analysis
Annals of Saudi Medicine, 2 June 2022
This article seeks to identify the characteristics and risk factors for mortality in mechanically ventilated COVID-19 patients in Al-Ahsa region in Saudi Arabia. 

Psychological Distress Reported by Healthcare Workers in Saudi Arabia during the COVID-19 Pandemic: A Cross-Sectional Study
PLOS ONE, 3 June 2022
This article estimates the prevalence and severity of psychological distress and studies predisposing risk factors among healthcare workers in KSA during the COVID-19 pandemic. Authors conducted a cross-sectional online survey of 1,985 HCWs from 6 hospitals across the country designated with caring for COVID-19 patients.

Side Effects and Perceptions of COVID-19 Vaccination in Saudi Arabia: A Cross-Sectional Study
Frontiers in Medicine, 7 June 2022
This article assesses the side effects and perceptions about COVID-19 vaccines among adults following vaccination in Saudi Arabia.

Factors Affecting Online Learning, Stress and Anxiety during the COVID-19 Pandemic in Saudi Arabia
International Journal of Human Rights in Healthcare, 10 June 2022
This article reports the findings of a study investigating the factors affecting online learning (OL) and stress and anxiety (SaA) during the COVID-19 pandemic in Saudi Arabia.

Voluntary Testing for COVID-19: Perceptions and Utilization among the Inhabitants of Saudi Arabia
Osong Public Health and Research Perspectives, 10 June 2022
This article investigates the perceptions and utilization of Voluntary Testing services for coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) among the inhabitants of Saudi Arabia. In total, 3,510 adult participants from all provinces of Saudi Arabia were recruited via a national online survey.

Types of Variants Among Increased Cases of COVID-19 in the Western Region of Saudi Arabia in June 2021
Cureus, 16 June 2022
This article seeks to identify the types and distribution of the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) variants causing cases of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) in the western region in Saudi Arabia in June 2021.

Assessment of Risk Factors Associated with COVID-19 Illness Outcomes in a Tertiary Hospital in Saudi Arabia
International Journal of General Medicine, 27 June 2022
This article reports the findings of a retrospective study that presents the demographic, epidemiological, clinical, laboratory, and imaging characteristics of patients at a tertiary hospital in Saudi Arabia and determines risk factors contributing to their COVID-19 outcome.

Somalia

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Pumping Oxygen into Somalia’s Health System as Part of COVID-19 Response
World Bank, 6 June 2022
This article reviews the response of Somalia to the coronavirus pandemic in the light of the amalgamation of crises facing the country. The article acknowledges that unlike many countries, Somalia was dealing with multiple threats of crises: locusts, drought, flooding, COVID-19 in addition to the country’s fragility, after decades of war and political instability.

Sudan

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Mental Health Status of High School Students in Khartoum State, Sudan During the COVID-19 Pandemic: A Cross-Sectional Study
BJPsych Open, 20 June 2022 
This article aims to assess the mental health status of high school students in Khartoum State, to evaluate the participants’ adherence to COVID-19 preventive measures and to identify factors associated with commitment to COVID-19 guidelines and mental health status during the COVID-19 pandemic. 

Syria

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Syndromic Surveillance of Respiratory Infections during Protracted Conflict: Experiences from Northern Syria 2016-2021
International Journal of Infectious Diseases, June 2022 
This article investigates the trends of Early Warning and Response Network (EWARN) reported ILI (influenza-like illness) and SARI (severe acute respiratory illness) in northern Syria between 2016 and 2021 and the potential impact of SARS-CoV-2.

Addressing the Impacts of COVID-19 on Refugee Health
PLOS Medicine, 27 June 2022
This article discusses the disparity in the experience of the pandemic between refugees and citizens and focuses on Syrian refugees.  It acknowledges that refugees are often blamed by governments and members of the public for infectious disease epidemics and states that they may experience elevated risks of infectious diseases like COVID-19 through no fault of their own.

Tunisia

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Students’ perceptions of distance education during a Covid-19 pandemic in Tunisia
International Journal of Educational and Psychological Studies, June 2022
This article uncovers the perceptions of university students regarding the use of distant learning tools and techniques during the spread of COVID-19, by exploring their experiences during containment. 

COVID-19’s Impact on Tunisia
The Borgen Project, 1 June 2022
This article discusses the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on Tunisia, exploring different indicators such as GDP, tourism, retail and agriculture. 

COVID-19 and Gender-Based Violence: Pandemic Response and Impact on Civil Society in Tunisia
Project on Middle East Political Science, 16 June 2022
This working paper argues that CSOs made progress in combatting violence during the first year of the pandemic due to political openness, a culture of coalitions, and bipartisan support for eliminating violence against women. However, the President’s power grab and subsequent political instability led to a breakdown in coalition culture and a stifling of civil society, making it harder for feminist organizations to advocate for GBV protections. The paper draws on pre-pandemic ethnographic data and international and Tunisian news articles, polling data, statistics, and reporting during the pandemic.

UAE

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Association between Quality of Sleep and Screen Time during the COVID-19 Outbreak among Adolescents in the United Arab Emirates
Journal of Sleep Research, 7 June 2022 
This article aims to investigate the association between screen time on different electronic devices and sleep quality among adolescents in the United Arab Emirates during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Effectiveness of BBIBP-CorV Vaccine Against Severe Outcomes of COVID-19 in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates
Nature Communications, 9 June 2022
This article aims to study the effectiveness of the inactivated BBIBP-CorV vaccine against severe COVID-19 outcomes (hospitalization, critical care admission and death due to COVID-19) and its long-term effectiveness in Abu Dhabi in the UAE.

Yemen

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Adult Mortality before and during the COVID-19 Pandemic in Nine Communities of Yemen: A Key Informant Study
medRxiv, 21 June 2022
This article aims to estimate population mortality during the pre-pandemic and pandemic periods in nine purposively selected urban and rural communities of southern and central Yemen (Aden and Ta’iz governorates).

Mofeed Digest (May 2022)

The following digest summarizes the most important scholarly and policy publications, reports, and articles covering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the politics, economies, and societies of the Arab world. Mofeed Digest is produced by Mofeed Project Coordinator Serage Amatory.

[MENA | Algeria | Bahrain | Egypt| Iraq| Jordan| Kuwait| Lebanon| Morocco| Oman| Palestine| Qatar| Saudi Arabia| Somalia| Sudan| Tunisia| UAE]

MENA

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Population’s Behavior toward COVID-19 Safety Measures: Evidence from Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia
Agence Française de Développement, May 2022
This article captures the public’s behavior toward COVID-19 safety measures in each of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. In all these countries, the article found that women are those who mostly observe the safety measures.

Social Safety Nets and Food Insecurity in MENA in the Time of COVID-19
Agence Française de Développement, May 2022
This article assesses the efficiency of social safety nets in the MENA region in mitigating food insecurity during the COVID-19 pandemic. It also provides context for the chronic undernourishment of over 50 million people in the region in 2019.

A Billionaire’s World: Labor, Loss, and Inequality in the Middle East and North Africa During COVID
Harvard International Review, 4 May 2022
This article focuses on the MENA region in juxtaposing the global spike of 3.9 trillion USD in billionaires’ wealth during the first year of the pandemic with the parallel loss of 3.7 trillion USD in workers’ assets.

Diverging Levels of COVID-19 Governmental Response Satisfaction Across Middle Eastern Arab Countries: A Multinational Study
BMC Public Health, 5 May 2022
This article evaluates and compares public opinion on the governmental measures to control the spread of COVID-19 of high, low and middle-income countries in the Middle East. When benchmarked with international levels of satisfaction, GCC countries scored highly whereas Lebanon scored poorly. 

Tracking COVID-19 Urban Activity Changes in the Middle East from Nighttime Lights
Scientific Reports, 16 May 2022
This article utilizes nighttime lights data from NASA from 584 urban areas to track the implementation and adherence to curfew and lockdown measures in 17 MENA countries during the first four months of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Algeria

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The Geometrization of the COVID-19 Care Offer for the ORSEC Plan in Algeria
Algerian Journal of Environmental Science and Technology, Date Unspecified 
This article utilizes several scientific tools to examine the readiness of different Algerian provinces to face the COVID-19 pandemic.

Intention to Get COVID-19 Vaccination and Its Associated Predictors: A Cross-Sectional Study Among the General Public in Algeria
Science Direct, 13 May 2022 
This article presents the results of an online survey conducted to assess the intentions to receive the Covid-19 vaccine among the Algerian population. Out of a total of 656 participants, 51.1% were in favor of COVID-19 vaccines while 18.5% and 30.5% were against or hesitant respectively.

Side Effects of COVID-19 Inactivated Virus vs. Adenoviral Vector Vaccines: Experience of Algerian Healthcare Workers
Frontiers in Public Health, 16 May 2022
This article evaluates side effects of COVID-19 vaccines in a sample of 721 Algerian healthcare workers. Most common self-reported side effects were injection site pain, arm pain, fatigue, fever, headache and myalgia. 

Food Behavior of the Algerian Population at the Time of the COVID-19: The First Survey Carried Out in the Western Algerian Region
South Asian Journal, 28 May 2022
This article sheds light on the Algerian population's food habits during the pandemic through an observational and descriptive epidemiological study conducted on 640 individuals.

Bahrain

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Comparative Modelling of Stock Price Volatility Before and During the COVID- 19 Pandemic in Bahrain: Implications to the Effect of the Pandemic to Stock Price Autocorrelation
Diamond Scientific Publishing, Date Unspecified  
This article studies the volatility of stock prices before and during the pandemic in Bahrain. It found that the weekly price movements of the BAX index were more volatile during the pandemic than before its onset.

The Effect of Age, Gender and Comorbidities Upon SARS-CoV-2 Spike Antibody Induction After Two Doses of Sinopharm Vaccine and the Effect of a Pfizer/BioNtech Booster Vaccine
Frontiers in Immunology, 30 May 2022
This article reports the findings of a study that evaluated antibody levels in 379 Bahraini individuals to assess the effect of a COVID-19 booster dose. The authors hoped that their study would help develop a triple dose vaccination strategy to ensure protective immunity against COVID-19.

Egypt

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Impact of COVID-19 on Cardiothoracic Surgery: Experience of Alexandria (Egypt) Main University Hospital
Brazilian Journal of Cardiovascular Surgery, 23 May 2022
This article examines the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the workflow and waiting lists of high-cost Cardiothoracic surgeries in Egypt. It found that cardiac surgeries have witnessed the worst consequences, including cancellation of all surgeries, expansion of waiting lists, and patients' non-compliance with follow-up.

Iraq

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Trends in COVID-19: Incidence, mortality, and case fatality in Iraq
Saudi Medical Journal, May 2022
This article reports the findings of a biometric study conducted in 2021 to help detect the epidemiological trend of COVID-19 in Iraq, the distribution of cases according to age, gender, and geographic distribution. The authors also examined morbidity and mortality rates to evaluate the intensity of the COVID-19 burden on the Iraqi healthcare system.

Jordan

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The Impact of COVID-19 on the Jordanian Households and Firms: Findings from the ERF Covid-19 Monitor in Jordan 
Economic Research Forum, May 2022
ERF and FCDO collaborated to conduct short panel phone surveys aiming to assess how Jordanian households, firms, micro firms, and workers cope with the impact of COVID-19.

Attitude of Pregnant and Lactating Women toward COVID-19 Vaccination in Jordan: a Cross-Sectional Study
Journal of Perinatal Medicine, 3 May 2022
This article reports the findings of a study conducted with pregnant and lactating women in Jordan to determine their stances towards the COVID-19 vaccine and understand their varying attitudes. 

COVID-19 Epidemiology and Changes in Health Service Utilization in Azraq and Zaatari Refugee Camps in Jordan: A Retrospective Cohort Study
Plos Medicine, 10 May 2022
This article utilized observational programmatic data to describe the epidemiology of COVID-19 in Jordan, and at two refugee camps Zaatari and Azraq specifically. The authors analyzed the difference in routine health services pre and post COVID-19. 

Conception Preferences during COVID-19 Pandemic Lockdowns
Behavioral Sciences, 13 May 2022
This article focused on women in Jordan to study their insights regarding fertility, the preparedness to use assisted reproductive technology, and the awareness and beliefs related to conceiving during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Kuwait

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School Is Closed : Simulating the Long-Term Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic–Related School Disruptions in Kuwait
World Bank, 5 May 2022
This working paper tackles the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the subsequent educational disruptions on students in Kuwait. It found that during the pandemic, students in Kuwait faced significant reductions in their lifetime income, with males facing a larger reduction than females.

COVID-19 Outcomes Among Rheumatic Disease Patients in Kuwait: Data from the COVID-19 Global Rheumatology Alliance (C19-GRA) Physician Registry
International Journal of Rheumatic Diseases, 11 May 2022
This article assesses the characteristics of inflammatory rheumatic disease (IRD) patients in Kuwait diagnosed with COVID-19 and the factors linked with hospitalization, complications, and mortality.

Lebanon

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Lebanon: Challenges and Successes in COVID-19 Pandemic Response
Rand Corporation, 6 May 2022 
This blog-post from The Rand Blog identifies challenges in COVID-19 responses faced by Lebanon amid the current political and economic crises. The authors also highlights the country’s successes and innovations in combating those challenges. 

Too Much to Mask: Determinants of Sustained Adherence to COVID-19 Preventive Measures Among older Syrian Refugees in Lebanon
MedRxiv, 10 May 2022 
This article studies the determinants of adherence of two non-pharmaceutical COVID-19 preventive measures in Lebanon: masking-up and social distance.  The study focused on Syrian refugees in Lebanon aging 50 and older. 

The Impact of COVID-19 and the Economic Crisis on Lebanese Public Health: from Food insecurity to Healthcare Disintegration
Ethics, Medicine and Public Health, 16 May 2022
This article reviews the impact of the economic crisis in Lebanon and the pandemic's effect on health and healthcare. The study looked at measures such as food insecurity, water shortages, hospital and medication crises, labor force issues, and electricity and fuel shortages. 

Development of a Quality Assurance Tool for Intensive Care Units in Lebanon during the COVID-19 Pandemic
International Journal for Quality in Healthcare, 31 May 2022
This article was motivated by the fact that the World Health Organization has supported the Lebanese Ministry of Public Health to increase ICU beds at public hospitals by 300%, without having a readily available tool to monitor the quality of ICU care. Therefore, the authors describe the process of rapidly developing and implementing a tool to monitor the quality of ICU care at public hospitals in Lebanon.

Morocco 

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Real-world study of the effectiveness of BBIBP-CorV (Sinopharm) COVID-19 vaccine in the Kingdom of Morocco
medRxiv, 27 April 2022 
This article discusses the findings of a case control study that was conducted to determine the effectiveness of the Sinopharm vaccine in Morocco. The results were in agreement with the literature showing it was highly protective against serious and critical hospitalization. 

Factors Associated with COVID-19 Vaccine Acceptance in Morocco: Applying the Health Belief Model
Vaccines, 16 May 2022
This article presents an analysis of a cross-sectional survey completed by 3800 individuals to identify the factors that influenced the population in Morocco to receive the vaccine. Authors show that the strongest predictor for the intention of receiving a vaccine is whether a participant is married.

Role of Instagram on the Purchasing Behavior of Moroccan Consumers during the COVID-19
International Journal of Accounting, Finance, Auditing, Management and Economics, 31 May 2022
This article delineates the factors that influenced the purchasing habits of Moroccans during the COVID-19 pandemic and investigates the way Instagram specifically shaped these behaviors. It presents the results of a survey taken among 200 Instagram using consumers.

Oman

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Psychological Effects of, and Compliance with, Self-Isolation among COVID-19 Patients in South Batinah Governorate, Oman: A Cross-Sectional Study
The Egyptian Journal of Neurology, Psychiatry and Neurosurgery, 8 May 2022
This article investigates the extent to which COVID-19 patients complied with self-isolation policies. It also examines the psychological effects of self-isolation on patients in Oman.

The Impact and Challenges of Education and Administration in VET on Economic Growth in Oman During the COVID-19 Period
Frontiers in Psychology, 16 May 2022
This article aims to understand the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on economic growth and the impact of institutional management and education on Vocational Education and Training schools in Oman. 

Clinical and Biochemical Characteristics of COVID-19 in a Primary Care Center in the South Batinah Region of Oman
Cureus, 18 May 2022
This article reviews the medical charts of 150 patients at Rustaq Polyclinic in South Oman to identify the clinical and biomedical profile of the coronavirus disease and variations across demographic groups.

Palestine

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Seroprevalence of SARS-COV-2 Antibodies Among Vaccinated and Non-Vaccinated Adults in the West Bank: Results of a Repeated Cross-Sectional Study
medRxiv, 16 May 2022
This article discusses the findings of an assessment of the seroprevalence rate among a random sample of Palestinians residing in the West Bank region. The authors reveal a drastic rise in seroprevalence of SARS-CoV-2 antibodies due to infection and vaccination.

UNRWA Releases Health Programme Report: Innovation in the Face of Covid-19 – Press Release
United Nations, 24 May 2022
This UNRWA report examines the situation of Palestinian refugees during the COVID-19 pandemic against the backdrop of the hostilities in Gaza, the ongoing war in Syria, and the economic/social/political crisis in Lebanon.

Qatar

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Effectiveness of Ehteraz Digital Contact Tracing App versus Conventional Contact Tracing in Managing the Outbreak of COVID-19 in the State of Qatar
BMJ Innovations, 3 May 2022
This article uses two databases to evaluate the accuracy of Ehteraz (the Qatari app for the control of the COVID-19 pandemic) as a tracing tool and compares its effectiveness to that of the traditional human led case investigation. 

Effect of mRNA Vaccine Boosters against SARS-CoV-2 Omicron Infection in Qatar
The New England Journal of Medicine, 12 May 2022
This article conducted two retrospective studies in Qatar to examine the effectiveness of a booster vaccination, compared to the usual two dose vaccination, in preventing SARS-COV-2 infection and serious COVID-19 hospitalization and death.

Flu Vaccine Could Cut COVID Risk
Nature, 12 May 2022
This article reports that influenza vaccines were effective in preventing COVID-19 according to a study held on more than 30,000 healthcare workers in Qatar.

Predictors of Mortality and Morbidity in Critically Ill COVID-19 Patients: An Experience from a Low Mortality Country
Health Sciences Report, 17 May 2022
This article studies the clinical characteristics and factors associated with mortality in patients admitted to intensive care units in Qatar. They found that these rates were lower in Qatar compared to other countries. 

The Association between Tobacco Use and COVID-19 in Qatar
Preventive Medicine Reports, 19 May 2022
This article studies the association between tobacco usage and COVID-19 hospitalization cases.

The Impact of the COVID-19 Lockdown “Home Quarantine” on the Physical Activity and Lifestyle of Children in Qatar
Frontiers in Public Health, 25 May 2022  
This article presents the results of a cross-sectional online survey distributed in Qatar to assess the impact of quarantine on physical activity, screen time, sleep, and diet in children aging 5 to 12.

Saudi Arabia

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Fractional-Order Coronavirus Models with Vaccination Strategies Impacted on Saudi Arabia's Infections
AIMS Mathematics, Date Unspecified  
This article highlights the role of fractional calculus models in describing the growth of COVID-19 dynamics in Saudi Arabia over the span of 107 days. 

Post-Acute COVID-19 Condition in Saudi Arabia: A National Representative Study
Journal of Infection and Public Health, May 2022
This article presents a retrospective cross-sectional study characterizing the symptoms that appear after SARS-COV-2 infection in Saudi Arabia. The article also determines the relationship of the different “post-symptoms” with COVID-19 severity. 

Clinical Characteristics, Laboratory Findings, Management, and Outcome of Severe Coronavirus Disease 2019 in Children at a Tertiary Care Center in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia: A Retrospective Study
Frontiers in Pediatrics, 3 May 2022
This article investigates the clinical features of COVID-19 infected children, and discusses the therapeutic methods used in their treatment in Saudi Arabia. It analyzes data on children with COVID-19, including demographics, comorbidities, symptoms, imaging and laboratory results, therapies, and clinical outcomes.

Perceived Stress and Resilience Levels during the COVID-19 Pandemic among Critical Care Nurses in Saudi Arabia: A Correlational Cross-Sectional Study
PeerJ, 6 May 2022
This article studies the level of stress of nurses working in critical care units fighting directly against COVID-19. Although COVID-19 cases had declined significantly during the study period in Saudi Arabia, the majority of nurses were still experiencing moderate to high levels of stress about the epidemic, but were, at the same time, moderately resilient.

Prevalence of Anxiety, Depression, and Sleep Disturbances Associated With the COVID-19 Outbreak in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
Cureus, 9 May 2022
This article assesses the occurrence of sleep disturbance associated with the spread of COVID-19 among residents in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. It also discusses the psychological effects of the outbreak. 

Effect of Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions in the Early Phase of the COVID-19 Epidemic in Saudi Arabia
Plos Global Public Health, 9 May 2022
This article reports on a study of the relation between non-pharmaceutical interventions (such as masking and lockdowns etc…) and SARS-COV-2 transmission in Saudi Arabia during its first pandemic wave. 

The Psychological Impact of COVID-19 on Residents of Saudi Arabia
Psychology Research and Behavior Management, 13 May 2022
This article studies stress levels and their determinants during the COVID-19 pandemic in Saudi Arabia. The authors report that 35.4% of participants suffered from moderate or severe psychological impact, 19.7% had a mild psychological impact, whereas 44.9% reported minimal psychological impact. 

How Students in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are Coping with COVID-19 Pandemic
Journal of Public Health Research, 16 May 2022
This article sheds light on the coping mechanisms adopted by higher education students in Saudi Arabia during the COVID-19 pandemic. Results reveal that the 4 most frequent strategies were: seeking social support, acceptance, mental disengagement, and humanitarian engagement. 

Stress Perception among Dental Practitioners in Saudi Arabia during the COVID-19 Pandemic: A Cross-Sectional Survey
Sigma Vitae, 18 May 2022
This article reports the stress levels among dentists in Saudi Arabia after the outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic. Overall dental practitioners are at moderate stress levels; among them, males, private practitioners, and dentists above 50 years of age exhibited more stress, whereas graduates had the least stress scores.

A Remaining Piece of the COVID-19 Puzzle: Saudi Arabia’s Remittances Account
King Abdullah Petroleum Studies and Research Center, 30 May 2022
This paper assesses the behavioral shift and trend break in remittance outflows from Saudi Arabia which is ranked among the top 5 countries in remittance worldwide. It contextualizes the change within the reality of the COVID-19 pandemic. 

Knowledge Levels of Acceptance and Hesitancy of COVID-19 Vaccine Among General Population of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Medicine and Pharmacology, 31 May 2022
This article examines the knowledge levels of acceptance and hesitancy of receiving the COVID-19 vaccine among the population of Saudi Arabia. 

Somalia

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Resilience during the COVID-19 Pandemic: Perspectives from Somalia’s Businesses
World Bank, 5 May 2022
This World Bank blog-post discusses the COVID-19 related sections of the WB Somalia Economic Update.

Sudan

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Women Mental Health Status and Behaviour Change during the COVID-19 in Sudan
Heliyon, May 2022
This article discusses the results of a questionnaire assessing women's roles during the COVID-19 pandemic in Khartoum, Sudan. It also tackles changes in their mental health. 

Face Mask Practice and Technique During the COVID-19 Pandemic: A Nonrepresentative Cross-Sectional Study in Sudan
Patient Preference and Adherence, 3 May 2022
This article reports the findings of a cross-sectional study conducted among Sudanese aged 18 and older to assess face mask wearing practice during the COVID-19 pandemic among the Sudanese population. 

Socio-Economic Impact Assessment of COVID-19 on Migrants in Eastern Sudan
DTM, 15 May 2022
This report examines the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on various aspects of migrants’ life in Sudan.

Widespread Cynicism About COVID-19 Vaccines In Sudan
SMEX, 26 May 2022
This article highlights the governmental and non-governmental responses in Sudan to counter vaccine and COVID-19 misinformation online.

Tunisia

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Phylogenetic and Amino Acid Signature Analysis of the SARS-CoV-2s Lineages Circulating in Tunisia
Infection, Genetics and Evolution, 10 May 2022
This article identifies SARS-COV-2 lineages in Tunisia and explores their genetic characteristics. The researchers captured a total of 335 mutations. 

UAE

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Vaccine Side Effects Following COVID-19 Vaccination Among the Residents of the UAE—An Observational Study
Frontiers in Public Health, 6 May 2022
This article aims to investigate the nature, difference, and severity of COVID-19 vaccines’ side effects.

The Psychological Distress and COVID-19 Pandemic during Lockdown: A Cross-Sectional Study from United Arab Emirates (UAE)
Heliyon, 13 May 2022
This article evaluates the psychological impact of COVID-19 related lockdown measures on UAE residents. It concludes that the lockdown more psychologically impacted males, older people, and unemployed individuals during the pandemic.

Investigation of Factors Affecting COVID-19 Vaccine Acceptance Among Communities of Universities in the United Arab Emirates
Human Vaccines and Immunotherapeutics, 20 May 2022 
This article investigates the impact of various factors on the acceptance of the COVID-19 vaccine in 5 universities across UAE. 

Impact of the Coronavirus Disease Pandemic and Related Vaccination in an Orthopedic Clinic in the United Arab Emirates: An Observational Study
Frontiers in Surgery, 31 May 2021
This article explores the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and vaccination on individuals fighting musculoskeletal disorders in the UAE.