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Bechtel Conference Center, Encina Hall, First Floor, Central Wing

CISAC
Stanford University
Encina Hall, E214
Stanford, CA 94305-6165

(650) 723-1737 (650) 723-0089
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Senior Fellow Emeritus at the Freeman Spogli Institute of International Studies
Raymond A. Spruance Professor of International History
0820stanford-davidholloway-238-edit.jpg PhD

David Holloway is the Raymond A. Spruance Professor of International History, a professor of political science, and an FSI senior fellow. He was co-director of CISAC from 1991 to 1997, and director of FSI from 1998 to 2003. His research focuses on the international history of nuclear weapons, on science and technology in the Soviet Union, and on the relationship between international history and international relations theory. His book Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956 (Yale University Press, 1994) was chosen by the New York Times Book Review as one of the 11 best books of 1994, and it won the Vucinich and Shulman prizes of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies. It has been translated into seven languages, most recently into Chinese. The Chinese translation is due to be published later in 2018. Holloway also wrote The Soviet Union and the Arms Race (1983) and co-authored The Reagan Strategic Defense Initiative: Technical, Political and Arms Control Assessment (1984). He has contributed to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Foreign Affairs, and other scholarly journals.

Since joining the Stanford faculty in 1986 -- first as a professor of political science and later (in 1996) as a professor of history as well -- Holloway has served as chair and co-chair of the International Relations Program (1989-1991), and as associate dean in the School of Humanities and Sciences (1997-1998). Before coming to Stanford, he taught at the University of Lancaster (1967-1970) and the University of Edinburgh (1970-1986). Born in Dublin, Ireland, he received his undergraduate degree in modern languages and literature, and his PhD in social and political sciences, both from Cambridge University.

Faculty member at the Center for International Security and Cooperation
Affiliated faculty at the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law
Affiliated faculty at The Europe Center
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David J Holloway Raymond A. Spruance Professor in International History Moderator Institute for International Studies
Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall CISAC Senior Research Scholar; Senior Adviser, Preventive Defense Project Panelist Institute for International Studies
Donald Emmerson A/PARC Senior Fellow, IIS; Director, Southeast Asia Forum Panelist Institute for International Studies

CDDRL
Encina Hall, C152
616 Jane Stanford Way
Stanford, CA 94305-6055

(650) 725-2705 (650) 724-2996
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Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Professor, by courtesy, of Political Science
Stedman_Steve.jpg PhD

Stephen Stedman is a Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) and the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL), an affiliated faculty member at CISAC, and professor of political science (by courtesy) at Stanford University. He is director of CDDRL's Fisher Family Honors Program in Democracy, Development and Rule of Law, and will be faculty director of the Program on International Relations in the School of Humanities and Sciences effective Fall 2025.

In 2011-12 Professor Stedman served as the Director for the Global Commission on Elections, Democracy, and Security, a body of eminent persons tasked with developing recommendations on promoting and protecting the integrity of elections and international electoral assistance. The Commission is a joint project of the Kofi Annan Foundation and International IDEA, an intergovernmental organization that works on international democracy and electoral assistance.

In 2003-04 Professor Stedman was Research Director of the United Nations High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change and was a principal drafter of the Panel’s report, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility.

In 2005 he served as Assistant Secretary-General and Special Advisor to the Secretary- General of the United Nations, with responsibility for working with governments to adopt the Panel’s recommendations for strengthening collective security and for implementing changes within the United Nations Secretariat, including the creation of a Peacebuilding Support Office, a Counter Terrorism Task Force, and a Policy Committee to act as a cabinet to the Secretary-General.

His most recent book, with Bruce Jones and Carlos Pascual, is Power and Responsibility: Creating International Order in an Era of Transnational Threats (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 2009).

Director, Fisher Family Honors Program in Democracy, Development and Rule of Law
Director, Program in International Relations
Affiliated faculty at the Center for International Security and Cooperation
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Stephen Stedman CISAC Acting Director Panelist Institute for International Studies
Abdulkader Sinno Fellow Panelist Institute for International Studies
Panel Discussions
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Reuben W. Hills Conference Room, 2nd floor, Encina Hall East

Daniel Byman Assistant Professor Speaker Security Studies Program, Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University
Seminars
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North Korea's renewed bid for nuclear weapons poses an urgent, serious foreign policy challenge to the United States. The current situation -- though it bears a resemblance to the events of 1993-1994 -- is far more dangerous and difficult. North Korea has developed longer-range ballistic missiles; South Korea's growing nationalism has put its U.S. relations on shakier ground; and the United States is distracted by the wars on terrorism and for regime change in Iraq.

Despite these challenges, good prospects still exist for a diplomatic resolution to the North Korea problem. North Korea's dire economic circumstances have made it more vulnerable to outside pressure at a time when its neighbor nations and the United States are increasingly concerned about its nuclear ambition. Military means would not only exact huge human casualties but also deepen U.S. estrangement from Seoul and diminish prospects for developing a joint strategy with other Asian powers.

Given the urgency and complexity of the current situation, appointment of a special coordinator for North Korean policy could help the administration to formulate a unified policy, sell it to Congress, coordinate it with allies, and present it to Pyongyang. In any event, a key requirement will be real "give and take" negotiations with South Korea to arrive at a coordinated strategy.

In the end, Pyongyang must choose: economic assistance and security assurance on the condition that all nuclear activities be abandoned, or dire consequences if nuclear programs continue. Any new agreement, however, must avoid the deficiencies of the 1994 Agreed Framework. It must be more verifiable, less readily reversible, more comprehensive, more politically defensible, and more enforceable through the involvement of North Korea's neighbors.

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Shorenstein APARC
Authors
Daniel I. Okimoto
Gi-Wook Shin
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Asked his reaction to the Iraq war, the accused Bali bomber Amrozi said: "It just goes to show I was not wrong to bomb." The October 2002 bombings of two nightclubs on Bali were the worst act of terrorism since 9/11. 202 people died; 350 were seriously injured. Preliminary analysis of what the suspected perpetrators have said about the case suggests that they were motivated mainly by deep hatred of the United States. This lecture will explore the ideology and psychology of the accused bombers and, more broadly, the likely impact of the war in Iraq on terrorism in Southeast Asia. Greg Fealy is a leading specialist on Islam and the history and politics of Indonesia. His publications include two co-edited books, Nahdlatul Ulama, Traditionalism and Modernity in Indonesia and Local Power and Politics in Indonesia: Decentralisation and Democratisation. He has worked as an Indonesia analyst for the Office of National Assessments in Canberra and as a consultant for the Asia Foundation and the U.S. Agency for International Development in Jakarta. The history of Indonesia's largest Muslim party was the subject of his dissertation (PhD, Monash University, Australia, 1998).

Philippines Conference Room, Encina Hall, Third Floor, Central Wing

Greg Fealy Visiting Professor, Southeast Asian Studies Program School of Advanced International Studies, John Hopkins University
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Japan and America's two most senior statesmen examine the Iraq and North Korea crises. How these two challenges are resolved will have profound implications for the U.S.-Japan relationship and its ability to deal with future regional and global challenges. This is the inaugural program in the Yomiuri-Japan Society Distinguished Speaker Series.

The Commonwealth Club, 595 Market Street, San Francisco

Michael H. Armacost Professor Moderator
Yasuhiro Nakasone Prime Minister, Japan (1982-1987) Panelist
George Shultz Secretary of State (1982-1989) and Thomas W. and Susan B. Ford Distinguished Fellow at the Hoover Institution Panelist
Workshops
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Kresge Auditorium

CISAC
Stanford University
Encina Hall, E214
Stanford, CA 94305-6165

(650) 723-1737 (650) 723-0089
0
Senior Fellow Emeritus at the Freeman Spogli Institute of International Studies
Raymond A. Spruance Professor of International History
0820stanford-davidholloway-238-edit.jpg PhD

David Holloway is the Raymond A. Spruance Professor of International History, a professor of political science, and an FSI senior fellow. He was co-director of CISAC from 1991 to 1997, and director of FSI from 1998 to 2003. His research focuses on the international history of nuclear weapons, on science and technology in the Soviet Union, and on the relationship between international history and international relations theory. His book Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956 (Yale University Press, 1994) was chosen by the New York Times Book Review as one of the 11 best books of 1994, and it won the Vucinich and Shulman prizes of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies. It has been translated into seven languages, most recently into Chinese. The Chinese translation is due to be published later in 2018. Holloway also wrote The Soviet Union and the Arms Race (1983) and co-authored The Reagan Strategic Defense Initiative: Technical, Political and Arms Control Assessment (1984). He has contributed to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Foreign Affairs, and other scholarly journals.

Since joining the Stanford faculty in 1986 -- first as a professor of political science and later (in 1996) as a professor of history as well -- Holloway has served as chair and co-chair of the International Relations Program (1989-1991), and as associate dean in the School of Humanities and Sciences (1997-1998). Before coming to Stanford, he taught at the University of Lancaster (1967-1970) and the University of Edinburgh (1970-1986). Born in Dublin, Ireland, he received his undergraduate degree in modern languages and literature, and his PhD in social and political sciences, both from Cambridge University.

Faculty member at the Center for International Security and Cooperation
Affiliated faculty at the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law
Affiliated faculty at The Europe Center
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David J. Holloway Raymond A. Spruance Professor in International History Moderator Institute for International Studies
Panel Discussions
Authors
David G. Victor
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Having backed down from its trade dispute with the EU over GM food, the Bush administration will find it hard to make the threat of going to the trade organization credible again and to continue the momentum toward removing Europe's ban.

STANFORD, California - The Bush administration wisely backed away this month from formally challenging Europe's ban on genetically modified foods. It made no sense to antagonize Europeans over the food they eat when they are pivotal to more weighty matters, such as a new resolution on Iraq.

Still, Washington's threat that it would file a case against the European Union at the World Trade Organization had palpable benefits. Even the countries with the most hostile policies on engineered food - France and Germany among them - took steps toward allowing the European Union to work on replacing the blanket ban with a new system for tracing and labeling engineered food.

But the decision to back off also means that American farmers are still denied access to the lucrative European market. European consumers still pay more for food than they should. And developing countries that could most benefit from engineered crops are still frightened that losing their "engineering-free" status will make it impossible to export food to Europe.

Yet the science on food safety is as certain as it ever gets: There is no known danger from eating engineered food.

Having backed down, the Bush administration will find it hard to make the threat of going to the trade organization credible again and to continue the momentum toward removing Europe's ban. But even harder for the administration will be keeping domestic politics at bay.

The biggest threat to the success of the U.S. strategy on engineered foods is in the American heartland, which is angling for a fight with Europe over the ban as the 2004 elections approach. Senator Charles Grassley of Iowa called the decision to defer a trade dispute "the usual snobbery" of a State Department "more concerned about international sensitivities than the American farmer." Two tactics should guide the effort to open Europe's markets. One is to let the Europeans lead their own reform.

The engineered foods available to consumers today mainly benefit farmers who can grow them at lower cost. These foods look and taste the same as their traditional counterparts. For rich consumers in Europe willing to pay a bit more, it is easy to focus on hypothetical risks and shun these products. But the next generation of engineered foods, already nearing the marketplace, will have healthful benefits for consumers - fruits that contain cancer-fighting lycopene, for instance - and this will make it harder for European countries to bar all these foods.

During the furor last summer over Zambia's rejection of genetically modified corn, prominent European politicians were forced to declare that these foods were safe - a blatant contradiction of Europe's own policies.

The other tactic is outreach to the developing world. In the poorest nations, agriculture provides the livelihood of most of the population, and agricultural research proves that genetic engineering can make crops that poor farmers grow both healthier and more productive.

Yet research on engineered crops and support for farmers who grow them lack money, not only in U.S. agricultural development and extension programs but also at the international agricultural research centers that were the engine of the first green revolution. In the last decade American support for international agricultural research has declined considerably.

An American program that would finance agricultural research on novel uses for genetically modified crops in developing countries would help those countries and could eventually help open European markets.

An American-led effort to pry open those markets would backfire. But one led by a developing country could succeed, as Europe considers the moral issues posed by barring food from a country which needs to sell its crops to survive. So far, few developing countries (South Africa is one exception) allow commercial planting of engineered crops. The United States needs to overcome the fears of the developing nations by growing such crops there and demonstrating how they could transform agriculture.

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David G. Victor
Nadejda M. Victor
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Since the fall of communism, the U.S. and Russia have been searching for areas for mutually beneficial cooperation. While oil has historically taken center stage, David and Nadejda Victor argue that diplomats should consider nuclear energy as well.

Since the Iron Curtain came crashing down, American and Russian diplomats have been searching for a special relationship between their countries to replace Cold War animosity.

Security matters have not yielded much. On issues such as the expansion of Nato, stabilising Yugoslavia and the war in Chechnya, the two have sought each other's tolerance more than co-operation. Nor have the two nations developed much economic interaction, as a result of Russia's weak institutions and faltering economy. Thus, by default, "energy" has become the new special topic in Russian-American relations.

This enthusiasm is misplaced, however. A collapse of oil prices in the aftermath of an invasion of Iraq may soon lay bare the countries' divergent interests. Russia needs high oil prices to keep its economy afloat, whereas US policy would be largely unaffected by falling energy costs. Moreover, cheerleaders of a new Russian-American oil partnership fail to understand that there is not much the two can do to influence the global energy market or even investment in Russia's oil sector. The focus on oil has also eclipsed another area in which US and Russian common interests could run deeper: nuclear power. Joint efforts to develop new technologies for generating nuclear power and managing nuclear waste could result in a huge payoff for both countries. These issues, which are the keys to keeping nuclear power viable, are formally on the Russian-American political agenda, but little has been done to tap the potential for co -operation. Given Russia's scientific talent and the urgent need to reinvigorate nuclear non-proliferation programmes, a relatively minor commitment of diplomatic and financial resources could deliver significant long-term benefits to the United States.

On the surface, energy co-operation seems a wise choice. Russia is rich in hydrocarbons and the US wants them. Oil and gas account for two-fifths of Russian exports. Last year, Russia reclaimed its status, last held in the late 1980s, as the world's top oil producer. Its oil output this year is expected to top eight million barrels per day and is on track to rise further. Russian oil firms also made their first shipments to US markets last year - some symbolically purchased as part of US efforts to augment its strategic petroleum reserve. In addition, four Russian oil companies are preparing a new, large port in Murmansk as part of a plan to supply more than 10 per cent of total US oil imports within a decade.

Meanwhile, the US remains the world's largest consumer and importer of oil. This year, it will import about 60 per cent of the oil it burns, and the US Energy Information Administration expects foreign dependence will rise to about 70 per cent by 2010, and continue inching upwards thereafter. Although the US economy is much less sensitive to fluctuations in oil prices than it was three decades ago, diversification and stability in world oil markets are a constant worry.

War jitters and political divisions cast a long shadow over the Persian Gulf, source of one-quarter of the world's oil. In Nigeria, the largest African oil exporter, sectarian violence periodically not only interrupts oil operations but also sent Miss World contestants packing last year. A scheme by Latin America's top producer, Venezuela, to pump up its share of world production helped trigger a collapse in world oil prices in the late 1990s and ushered in the leftist government of President Hugo Chavez. Last year, labour strikes aimed at unseating Mr Chavez shut Venezuela's ports and helped raise prices to more than US$ 30 (HK$ 234) a barrel. Next to these players, Russia is a paragon of stability.

The aftermath of a war in Iraq would probably provide a first test for the shallow new Russian-American partnership. Most attention on Russian interests in Iraq has focused on two issues: Iraq's lingering Soviet-era debt, variously measured at US$ 7 billion to US$ 12 billion, and the dominant position of Russian companies in controlling leases for several Iraqi oilfields. Both are red herrings. No company that has signed lease deals with Saddam Hussein's government could believe those rights are secure. Russia's top oil company, Lukoil, knew that when it met Iraqi opposition leaders in an attempt to hedge its bets for possible regime change. (Saddam's discovery of those contacts proved the point: he cancelled, then later reinstated, Lukoil's interests in the massive Western Kurna field.)

Russian officials have pressed the US to guarantee the existing contracts, but officials have wisely demurred. There would be no faster way to confirm Arab suspicions that regime change is merely a cover for taking control of Iraq's oil than by awarding the jewels before a new government is known and seated.

Of course, the impact of a war on world oil supply and price is hard to predict. A long war and a tortuous rebuilding process could deprive the market of Iraqi crude oil (about two million barrels a day, last year). Damage to nearby fields in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia could make oil even more scarce. And already tight inventories and continued troubles in Venezuela could deliver a "perfect storm" of soaring oil prices.

The most plausible scenario, however, is bad news for Russia: a brief war, quickly followed by increased Iraqi exports, along with a clear policy of releasing oil from America's reserves to deter speculators. A more lasting Russian-American energy agenda would focus on subjects beyond the current, fleeting common interest in oil. To find an area in which dialogue can truly make a difference, Russia and the US should look to the subject that occupied much of their effort in the 1990s, but that both sides neglected too quickly: nuclear power.

With the end of the Cold War, the two nations created a multi-billion-dollar programme to sequester Russia's prodigious quantities of fissile material and nuclear technology. The goal was to prevent these "loose nukes" from falling into the hands of terrorists or hostile states.

The Co-operative Threat Reduction programme also included funds to employ Russian scientists through joint research projects and academic exchanges.

Inevitably, it has failed to meet all its goals. In a country where central control has broken down and scientific salaries have evaporated, it is difficult to halt the departure of every nuclear resource. Nor is it surprising that US appropriators have failed to deliver the billions of dollars promised for the collective endeavour. Other priorities have constantly intervened, and Russia's uneven record in complying with arms control agreements has made appropriation of funds a perpetual congressional battle. Various good ideas for reinvigorating the programme have gone without funding and bureaucratic attention - even in the post-September 11 political environment, in which practically any idea for fighting terrorism can get money.

Russia has opened nuclear waste encapsulation and storage facilities near Krasnoyarsk, raising the possibility of creating an international storage site for nuclear waste. This topic has long been taboo, but it is an essential issue to raise if the global nuclear power industry is to move beyond the inefficiencies of small-scale nuclear waste management.

Russia should also be brought into worldwide efforts to design new nuclear reactors. The global nuclear research community, under US leadership, has outlined comprehensive and implementable plans for the next generation of fission reactors. The Russian nuclear programme is one of the world's leaders in handling the materials necessary for new reactor designs. Yet Russia is not currently a member of the US government-led Generation IV International Forum, one of the main vehicles for international co-operation on fission reactors and their fuel cycles. Top US priorities must include integrating Russia into that effort, endorsing Russia's relationships with other key nuclear innovators (such as Japan), and delivering on the promise made at last summer's G8 meeting of leaders of the world's biggest economies - to help Russia secure its nuclear materials.

For opponents of nuclear power, no plan will be acceptable. But the emerging recognition that global warming is a real threat demands that nations develop serious, environmentally friendly energy alternatives. Of all the major options available today, only nuclear power and hydroelectricity offer usable energy with essentially zero emissions of greenhouse gases.

Neither government should be naive about the sustainability of this endeavour. Russia is not an ideal partner because its borders have been a sieve for nuclear know-how and because its nuclear managers are suspected of abetting the outflow. Thus, plans for nuclear waste storage, for example, must ensure that they render the waste a minimal threat for proliferation. The US must also be more mindful of Russian sensitivity to co-operation on matters that, to date, have been military secrets.

Another difficult issue that both nations must confront is Russia's relationship with Iran. A perennial thorn in ties, Russia's nuclear co -operation with officials in Tehran owes much not just to Iranian money but to the complex relationship between the two countries over drilling and export routes for Caspian oil. This link to Iran cannot be wished away, as it is rooted in Russia's very geography. Any sustainable nuclear partnership between the US and Russia must develop a political strategy to handle this reality.

The world, including the US, needs the option of viable nuclear power. Yet Russia's talented scientists and nuclear resources sit idle, ready for action.

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Lunch served to those who respond to Okky Choi by Wednesday, February 26 by 12:00 noon. You can reach Okky at 650-724-8271 or via email at okkychoi@stanford.edu.

Philippines Conference Room, Third Floor, Encina Hall, Central Wing

Daniel Chirot Professor Speaker International Studies and Sociology, University of Washington
Seminars
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The forum, which is jointly organized by the Institute for International Studies and the Stanford Law School, will seek to outline the legal, security, economic, and human options and implications of US foreign policy towards Iraq. The discussion will be moderated by Stanford Law School Dean, Kathleen M. Sullivan, a constitutional law expert, whose latest books include "First Amendment Law" and "New Federalist Papers: Essays in Defense of the Constitution."

Annenberg Auditorium

Panel Discussions
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