With the departure of the last U.S. combat brigade from Iraq, the Obama administration has taken a big step toward its goal of American military withdrawal form Iraq by the end of 2011, writes Larry Diamond for cnn.com. Although there are many other signs of progress, the new milestone in U.S. military disengagement comes at a moment when Iraq is starting to slip backward on the political and the security fronts.

With the departure of the last U.S. combat brigade from Iraq, the Obama administration has taken a large stride toward its goal of complete American military withdrawal from Iraq by the end of next year. And there are many other signs of progress.

The rate of Iraqi civilian deaths in political violence has fallen by 90 percent from its awful peak in 2006, before "the surge" in American forces and strategy began to roll back the insurgent challenge.

American military deaths in Iraq have fallen to 46 so far this year, by far the lowest level since the American invasion in March 2003, and again a 90 percent decline from the pace of casualties in 2007. In March of this year, Iraq held the most democratic election any Arab country has held in a generation (with the possible exception of Lebanon).

Unfortunately, however, the new milestone in U.S. military disengagement from Iraq comes at a moment when the country is starting to slip backward on both the political and security fronts.

Since the March 7 parliamentary election results were announced, the country's major political alliances have remained hopelessly deadlocked on the formation of a new coalition government. Despite months of negotiations and repeated imploring from high-level U.S. government officials, Iraq's major leaders and parties remain unable to agree on who should be prime minister or how power should be shared.

As Iraq staggers on essentially without a government, electricity and other services remain sporadic, economic reconstruction is delayed and terrorist violence is once again filling the breach. In the deadliest single incident in months, at least 48 people died and more than 140 were injured on Tuesday when a suicide bomber struck outside an army recruiting center in downtown Baghdad.

As the American troops withdraw, Iraq is also losing top government officials, judges and police officers to a rising pace of targeted assassinations. All of this has the familiar signature of al Qaeda in Iraq, although it is difficult to attribute responsibility among the shadowy web of insurgent groups.

Complicating the political impasse are deep continuing divisions along sectarian lines. Iraq's Sunni Arab minority -- which ruled under Saddam Hussein but was marginalized in the wake of his downfall -- bet heavily on the electoral process this time, in marked contrast to the first parliamentary election in 2005.

But the Sunni Arabs were the main group affected when more than 400 parliamentary candidates were disqualified earlier this year for alleged Baathist ties. Now they feel doubly aggrieved in that the political alliance they overwhelmingly supported in March -- former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi's al-Iraqiya list -- is being blocked from leading the new government, even though it finished a narrow first in the voting.

The obstacle to a political solution in Baghdad is not only the pair of Shiite-dominated political lists (including that of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, who finished second in the vote), but, it is widely believed, the Islamic Republic of Iran, which cannot abide an Iraqi prime minister over whom it does not exercise substantial leverage. Indeed, the only two interests that benefit from Iraq's drift are al Qaeda in Iraq and the hardliners in Iran.

President Obama deserves more than a little sympathy as he confronts this thorny situation. Although he opposed the war in Iraq, he essentially accepted the Bush administration's measured timetable for American military drawdown. Particularly at a time when the budget deficit is soaring and the war in Afghanistan demands more military and financial resources, Obama and most other Americans would like to be out of Iraq completely by yesterday.

But accelerating or even completing the timetable for American military withdrawal in Iraq may only compound the gathering crisis there, for two reasons.

First, as the recent spike in violence is meant to suggest, it is not yet clear that Iraq's security forces are even close to being able to handle the country's security on their own. Privately, most Iraqi political actors (Sunni, Shia and Kurd) would like to see some sort of continued American military presence well beyond 2011. Many worry not only about Iraq's internal security but also about growing Iranian dominance once the United States is completely gone.

And second, U.S. political influence declines markedly as the American military presence phases out.

The worst thing the United States could do at the moment is to take Iraq for granted.

The Obama administration has had the right instinct in trying to press for and facilitate a political breakthrough in Baghdad, but more needs to be done and soon, while the United States still retains significant leverage.

The situation may now require the designation of a high-level American official or envoy to devote sustained attention to the stalemate in Iraq, while working closely with high-level representatives from the United Nations and the European Union. Such combined diplomatic leverage and mediation broke a dangerous political stalemate in Iraq in 2005 and might help again.

One thing should be clear. No matter what one may think of the original decision to invade Iraq (which I still believe was a mistake), Iraq has come too far and the United States has paid too dearly to now stand by and watch it sink back needlessly into chaos.

New Draper Hills Summer Fellows come to Stanford to study linkages between democracy, development, and the rule of law

Rising leaders from a diverse group of nations in transition, including China, Russia, Ukraine, Syria, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Egypt, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Nigeria arrived on campus on July 25 for a three-week seminar as Draper Hills Summer Fellows on Democracy and Development. Initiated by FSI's Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) six years ago, the program has created a network of some 139 leaders from 62 transitioning countries.  This year's exceptional class of  23 fellows includes a deputy minister of Ukraine, current and former members of parliament (including a deputy speaker), leading attorneys and rule of law experts, civic activists, journalists, international development practitioners, and founders of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). (One fellow needed to withdraw because he was named to the Cabinet of the new Philippine president, Noynoy Aquino).

Draper Hills Summer Fellows are innovative, courageous, and committed leaders, who strive to improve governance, enhance civic participation, and invigorate development under very challenging circumstances"
- Larry Diamond"Draper Hills Summer Fellows are innovative, courageous, and committed leaders, who strive to improve governance, enhance civic participation, and invigorate development under very challenging circumstances," says CDDRL Director Larry Diamond. "This year's fellows are an inspiring group. They have come here to learn from us, but even more so from one another. And we will learn much from them, about the progress they are making and the obstacles they confront as they work to build democracy, improve government accountability, strengthen the rule of law, energize civil society, and enhance the institutional environment for broadly shared economic growth."

The three-week seminar is taught by an interdisciplinary team of leading Stanford faculty. In addition to Diamond, faculty include FSI Senior Fellow and CDDRL Deputy Director Kathryn Stoner; Stanford President Emeritus Gerhard Casper; FSI Deputy Director and political science Professor Stephen D. Krasner; Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow Francis Fukuyama; professor of political science, philosophy, and law Joshua Cohen; professor of pediatrics and Stanford Health Policy core faculty Paul H. Wise; visiting associate professor Beth van Schaack; FSI Senior Fellow Helen Stacy; Walter P. Falcon, deputy director, Program on Food Security and the Environment; Erik Jensen, co-director of the Stanford Law School's Rule of Law Program; Avner Greif, professor of economics; Rick Aubry, lecturer in management, Stanford Graduate School of Business; and Nicholas Hope, director, Stanford Center on International Development.

Other leading experts who will engage the fellows include President of the National Endowment for Democracy Carl Gershman, United States Court of Appeals Judge Pamela Rymer, International Center on Nonviolent Conflict founding chair Peter Ackerman, Omidyar Network partner Matt Halprin, Conservation International's Olivier Langrand, executives of leading Silicon Valley companies, such as Google and Facebook, and media and nonprofit organizations in the Bay Area.  Michael McFaul, a Stanford political science professor and former CDDRL director, who now serves on the National Security Council as President Obama's chief advisor on Russia, will come to campus to teach a session on U.S. foreign policy in the Obama administration.

The demanding, but compelling curriculum will devote the first week of the seminar to defining the fundamentals of democracy, good governance, economic development, and the rule of law.  In the second week, faculty will turn to democratic and economic transitions and the feedback mechanisms between democracy, development, and a predictable rule of law. This week will include offerings on liberation technology, social entrepreneurship, and issues raised by development and the environment.  The third week will turn to the critical - and often controversial - role of international assistance to foster and support democracy, judicial reform, and economic development, including the proper role of foreign aid.

Our program helps to create a broader community of global activists and practitioners, intent on sharing experiences to bring positive change to some of the world's most troubled countries and regions"
- Kathryn Stoner-Weiss The fellows themselves also lead discussions, focused on the concrete challenges they face in their ongoing work in political and economic development. "Fellows come to realize that they are often engaged in solving similar problems - such as endemic corruption in different country contexts," says Kathryn Stoner-Weiss. "Our program helps to create a broader community of global activists and practitioners, intent on sharing experiences to bring positive change to some of the world's most troubled countries and regions."

The program has received generous gifts from donors William Draper III and Ingrid Hills.  Bill Draper made his gift in honor of his father, Maj. Gen. William H. Draper, Jr., a chief advisor to Gen. George Marshall and chief diplomatic administrator of the Marshall Plan in Germany, who confronted challenges comparable to those faced by Draper Hills Summer Fellows in building democracy, a market economy, and a rule of law, often in post-conflict conditions. Ingrid von Mangoldt Hills, made her gift in honor of her husband, Reuben Hills, president and chairman of Hills Bros. Coffee and a leading philanthropist. The Hills project they ran for 12 years improved the lives of inner city children and Ingrid saw in the Summer Fellows Program a promising opportunity to improve the lives of so many people in developing countries.

Thanking the program's benefactors, Larry Diamond says, "The benefit to CDDRL faculty and researchers is incalculable, and we are deeply grateful for the vision and generosity of Bill Draper and Ingrid Hills." As he and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss state, "The Draper Hills Summer Fellows Program allows us to interact with a highly, talented group of emerging leaders in political and economic development from diverse countries and regions. They benefit from exposure to the faculty's cutting edge work, while we benefit from a cycle of feedback on whether these ideas work in the field."  Like CDDRL, which bridges academic theory and policy, the Draper Hills Summer Fellows Program, they note, "is an ideal marriage between democratic and development theory and practice."

For additional details on the program or to request permission to attend a session, please contact program coordinator Audrey McGowan, audrey.mcgowan@stanford.edu.

By the end of the year, scholars of security studies will be able to use a new website to learn how terrorist and militant organizations evolve over time and how they collaborate with--and compete against--one another.

"Mapping Terrorist Organizations," an interdisciplinary online project headed by CISAC Senior Fellow Martha Crenshaw, will focus initially on providing detailed, annotated information on militant and terrorist groups operating in Iraq since 2003, Pakistan and Afghanistan--areas of current policy concern for the United States. Future plans involve expanding research to include groups in Latin America, Europe, the Middle East and the United States and, if time and resources permit, to include major historical groups such as the Russian revolutionary movement.

The three-year project is funded by a $500,000 grant awarded to Crenshaw last fall by the National Science Foundation. It is part of the Department of Defense's Minerva Initiative launched in 2008 to support "research related to basic social and behavioral science of strategic importance to U.S. national security policy."

"No such study exists in the literature of terrorism," Crenshaw wrote in a report on the project. "Evolutionary mapping can enhance our understanding of how terrorist groups develop and interact with each other and with the government, how strategies of violence and non-violence are related, why groups appear and disappear, and how opportunities and constraints in the environment change organizational behavior over time." Furthermore, Crenshaw noted that visual mapping of highly complex, shifting information is likely to stimulate new observations that might otherwise have been overlooked."

Student involvement

Daniel Cassman, a 2010 CISAC honors graduate in political science and computer science, is building the site, which will contain interactive timelines, family trees and detailed group profiles. Cassman's programming--developed specifically for the website--will allow scholars to better understand and analyze patterns and structures of violent and non-violent opposition groups in multiple contexts.

At a June 1 meeting of a half dozen students working on the project, Crenshaw said one of the most challenging problems facing researchers is documenting how terrorist organizations evolve over time. With no official sources to rely on, Crenshaw's team spent the last year combing through government documents and academic research, autobiographies, newspaper reports and even jihadist websites-many of which disappear as quickly as they pop up. Crenshaw acknowledges that "precision in this field is elusive" even though the project emphasizes using documented primary sources. Students working on the project include Christy Abizaid and Sadika Hameed, 2010 graduates of the International Policy Studies master's program, and undergraduates Rob Conroy, Asfandyar Mir and Ari Weiss. CISAC staff member Julia McKinnon is assisting Crenshaw as well.

"We're keenly interested in changes in the sizes of groups," Crenshaw said. "That's one of the hardest things to figure out." It also is difficult to know when a group dissolves, becomes dormant or morphs into something else, she said. To obtain as complete a profile as possible, the website will include information about failed and foiled plots, as well as successful attacks, she said.

Charles Nicas, a student in International Policy Studies and Public Policy, said he joined Crenshaw's project to learn more about militancy and terrorism in South Asia. "The U.S. presence in Afghanistan and the fact that Pakistan is a nuclear-armed country mean that the U.S. will be involved in this region...for a long time," he wrote in an email. "The complexity of the situation takes a lot of research to understand."

Nicas's area of work focuses on sectarian groups in Pakistan, mainly Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and its offshoot Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), both virulently anti-Shia groups. Nicas said SSP was founded in 1985 with state support and spawned LeJ in the mid-1990s. The groups are based in Punjab province in eastern Pakistan but had a significant presence in neighboring Afghanistan during Taliban rule. Both have become increasingly allied with militant groups in the border region, including al-Qa'ida, and are part of an umbrella group known as the Punjabi Taliban. "I've been surprised to learn how far back the roots of this problem go, which makes the challenge of effectively countering it especially daunting," Nicas said.

Terrorist organizations profiled

In addition to Afghanistan and Pakistan, Crenshaw's website will feature profiles of the following groups:

• 1920s Revolution Brigades
• Mujahideen Army
• Islamic Army in Iraq
• Ansar al-Islam
• Al-Qa'ida in Iraq

Group profiles include the following attributes:

• The group's name, including pseudonyms and name changes
• A history with a timeline, including whether the group is active, dormant or disbanded
• The group's goals/ideology
• Key leaders
• Group size (by date)
• Resources in the form of money and weapons
• Outside intervention and influence
• Dates of first and last known attacks
• Targets
• Area of Operations
• Tactics
• Political activities (by date)
• Key operational experiences (by date)
• Known splinter groups (by date)
• Relationship to other groups (by date)
• Relationship with surrounding population/popular support
• Defining characteristics/Major events

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) hosted a live debate May 25 between Scott Sagan and Keith Payne, CEO and president of the National Institute for Public Policy. CSIS is a bipartisan, nonprofit organization in Washington, D.C.

Scott Sagan's Introductory Statement

I have been asked to address the question: "What should be U.S. declaratory strategic deterrence policy?"

I continue to believe, as I wrote in my 2009 Survival article, that,

"The United States should, after appropriate consultation with allies, move toward a No-First Use declaratory policy by stating that the role of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear weapons use by other nuclear weapons states against the United States, our allies, and our armed forces and to be able to respond, with an appropriate range of nuclear retaliation options if necessary in the event that deterrence fails."

I believe that slow but steady movement toward a No-First Use (NFU) doctrine is in the U.S. interest because I think U.S. declaratory policy should have three characteristics.

U.S. declaratory policy should:

a) address the full range of nuclear threats to U.S. national security objectives (not just basic deterrence);

b) be accurate and consistent, reflecting actual military doctrine rather than being mere rhetoric; and

c) U.S. declaratory policy should reflect what U.S. leaders really might want do in the event of a deterrence failure.

In my brief opening remarks, I will explain these three points and outline the logic and evidence that leads me to the conclusion that the benefits of an NFU declaratory policy outweigh its costs.

Point #1: Deterrence is one, but only one critical U.S. national security objective and prudent decisions about declaratory policy regarding the use of nuclear weapons should take into account its likely effects on deterrence of adversaries, bit also the reassurance of allies, the further proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional states, the risks of nuclear terrorism, the impact of our declaratory policy on nuclear doctrines of other states; and the prospects for long-term nuclear disarmament. In this sense, the CSIS question (like previous Nuclear Posture Reviews (NPR) before this latest one) is too narrow in scope and could therefore lead to an excessively narrow, indeed a wrong-headed, answer. Historically, many actions and statements made in the name of deterrence - think of Richard Nixon's Madman Nuclear Alert over Vietnam or George W. Bush's suggestion that "All Options are on the Table" included nuclear preventive strikes on Iran -- might add just a smidgen of deterrence, but can be highly counterproductive with respect to other U.S. nuclear security goals. This is true of the NPR in general: just as war is too important to be left to the generals, nuclear declaratory policy is too important to be left solely to the Pentagon.

Opponents of this broader conception of nuclear posture claim that there is no evidence that U.S. nuclear posture influences others or perceptions that we are honoring our NPT Article VI commitments help with non-proliferation goals. That view is wrong. Let me give just two examples:

1. Evidence to support the point about U.S. disarmament steps helping encourage others to act is seen with Indonesia's decision to ratify CTBT earlier this month:

When Indonesia announced its decision it said it had taken note of the "serious effort" on the part of the current United States Administration in promote disarmament. "We do feel that at this time, what is needed is positive encouragement rather than pressure of a different type that we've been trying to impart in the past," he said, voicing hope that the U.S. will follow suit from his country's actions. "We are also cognizant of some positive aspects of the United States' Nuclear Posture Review."

2. For evidence on the doctrinal influence or mimicry point let me cite India. In January 2003, the BJP government in New Delhi, influenced by the U.S. NPR, adopted a revised, more offensive nuclear doctrine including the explicit threat of Indian nuclear first-use in response to biological or chemical weapons use. "India must consider withdrawing from this [NFU] commitment as the other nuclear weapons-states have not accepted this policy." Although it is too early to know the final result, the Indian government today appears to be reversing course: A group of very senior former officials has stated that, "It is time to review the objectionable parts" of India's nuclear posture and the Foreign Minister has called for universal declarations of NFU.

Point #2: U.S. Strategic Nuclear Declaratory Policy should be consistent with actual U.S. Nuclear Doctrine. That is, U.S. government officials should not misrepresent what its "real" nuclear policy is when it makes public statements about intent and plans. This may seem like an obvious point to some... but history suggests that this principle is not always followed--from Robert McNamara's mid-1960s declaratory statements about Assured Destruction (which often downplayed the heavy Counter-Force emphasis of U.S. doctrine at the time) to the Bush Administration's February 2002 statement in which in the same speech it "reaffirmed" the 1995 Negative Security Assurances not to use nuclear weapons against NNWS parties to the NPT unless they attack the U.S. or our allies with a NWS and, in the same speech, also stated that, "If a weapon of mass destruction is used against the United States or its allies, we will not rule out any specific type of military response. This followed the leaking of the classified portion of the 2001 NPR which reportedly placed Iran, Libya, and Syria on target lists, creating a flurry of negative international press reports.

In an era in which leaks should be considered highly likely, if not inevitable and, at a time in which we want more transparency around the world, the U.S. Government should err on the side of transparency. With multiple audiences present, calculated ambiguity may sometimes be necessary and even helpful; clear contradictions and calculated hypocrisy are not.

Here, I must give the current Administration some credit, for it judged that there was a small set of specific threats that could not currently be met by U.S. and allied conventional forces. It said so clearly in the Nuclear Posture Review and also clearly committed itself to deal with the challenge:

"The United States will continue to strengthen conventional capabilities and reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks, with the objective of making deterrence of nuclear attack on the United States or our allies and partners the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons." (p. ix)

Critics say that this will weaken extended deterrence as key allies will feel abandoned. Evidence so far is to the contrary:

  Japan: Foreign Minister Okada said, in October 2009, "We cannot deny the fact that we are moving in the direction of No-First Use of nuclear weapons. We would like to discuss the issue with Washington." The Japanese 2010 Rev Con statement said, "Japan appreciates and welcomes the Nuclear Posture Review by the United States." "We call on all states possessing nuclear weapons to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their national security strategies. In this connection, we call on the Nuclear Weapon States to take, as soon as possible, such measures as providing stronger negative security assurances that they will not use nuclear weapons against Non-Nuclear-Weapon States that comply with the NPT." Japanese 2010 NPT Review Conference statement

  This is also the case in NATO: The German, Dutch, Belgian and Norwegian governments have all called for removal of the tactical nuclear weapons on their soil. NATO meetings will address this soon. We should not just assume that the credibility of extended deterrence and reassurance to allies is threatened by NFU declarations or removal of tactical weapons. Instead, we should listen to what our allies are saying and work with them.

Point #3: U.S. declaratory policy should reflect what the U.S. might really want to do if deterrence fails. Doctrine and declaratory policy should be made with an acute awareness that deterrence might fail and not succumb to the common wishful thinking biases that assumes perfect prospects of success. This leads me to appreciate the wise advice that Brent Scowcroft gave to President George H.W. Bush during the first Gulf War to avoid "spoken or unspoken threats to use them (Nuclear Weapons) on the grounds that it is bad practice to threaten something that you have no intention of carrying out."

When an official threatens actions that we have no intention of carrying out it can add a thin sliver of deterrence strength but at the grave cost, if the action occurs anyway, of either cheapening the currency of deterrence or risking the creation of a commitment trap that leads the state to execute an option that it otherwise would deem ill-advised. Here, I think of General Chilton's recent remarks about using nuclear threats to deter cyber attacks, as an example.

Here, I should note that in order to enhance non-proliferation and move slowly in the direction of a nuclear-free world the current NPR adds new NSAs and threatens conventional attacks only against NNWS in compliance with the NPT: "The United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations" (p.viii) and promises that its conventional responses would be "devastating" and that, "any individuals responsible for the attack, whether national leaders or military commanders , would be held fully accountable."

Dr. Payne, in his 2009 article, was critical of the whole goal of nuclear disarmament, despite the U.S. Article VI commitment to work in good faith toward that objective. He has written that, "The continuing threat posed by chemical and biological weapons is a fatal flaw in the logic of the nuclear-disarmament narrative, one that is all but ignored by its proponents.

"In fact, even if all enemies and potential enemies of the United States miraculously gave up their nuclear weapons, the United States would still need to maintain a nuclear deterrent arsenal. Why? Because some enemies reportedly retain other types of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), such as chemical and biological weapons, that could inflict enormous civilian casualties...If we also take nuclear deterrence off the table, we may, as Gen. Paul Fouilland, commander of the French Strategic Air Forces, has observed, 'Give a green light' to chemical and biological threats," Dr. Payne states.

I fail to see how a promise of "devastating" conventional responses and a promise that, "Any individuals responsible for the attack, would be held fully accountable" is giving any kind of green light to an adversary contemplating a chem/bio attack.

Furthermore, the only historical evidence that Dr. Payne cites to demonstrate his belief that, "Nuclear weapons threats have unique deterrent qualities" is the alleged success in deterring Iraqi use of Chem/Bio during the 1991 Gulf War:

The preponderance of evidence suggests that this is not right: Saddam did not use his WMD in 1991 because we threatened to march on Baghdad and overthrow his regime if he did that and "promised" to do that if he refrained from using his WMD.

First, look at the Bush, 25 January, 1991, letter to Saddam:

"Should war come it will be a far greater tragedy for you and your country. Let me state too that the United States will not tolerate the use of chemical or biological weapons or the destruction of Kuwait's oil fields and installations. Further, you will be held directly responsible for terrorist actions against any member of the coalition. The American people would demand the strongest possible response. You and your country will pay a terrible price if you order unconscionable acts of this sort." Two of the three things that Bush warned about happened...hardly good evidence that vague threats or calculated ambiguity worked as a deterrent.

Second, look at James Baker's memoirs in which he claimed that he "purposely left the impression that the use of chemical or biological agents by Iraq could invite tactical nuclear retaliation," but also warned Aziz that if Iraq used weapons of mass destruction, "Our objective won't just be the liberation of Kuwait, but the elimination of the current Iraqi regime." Advocates of maintaining calculated ambiguity too often cite the first statement but fail to cite the second Baker statement.

Third, look at what Saddam said under interrogation: "How would Iraq have been described if it had used nuclear weapons? A: "We would have been called stupid." In the May 2004 interrogation: "The WMD was for the defense of Iraq's sovereignty. Iraq demonstrated this with the use of WMD during the Iraq and Iran War, as Iran had threatened the sovereignty of Iraq. Yet, Iraq did not use WMD during the 1991 Gulf War as its sovereignty was not threatened."

In conclusion: I think you will discover today that reasonable people can certainly disagree about how to value and prioritize these different nuclear-related objectives and reasonable people can (and do) disagree about how best to pursue them. But reasonable people should not ignore the full range of U.S. objectives and narrowly conflate deterrence with security, should continue to search for evidence that supports or weakens their assumptions, and should engage in rigorous dialogues like this to help propel the debate forward.

The Obama administration's decision to preview its National Security Strategy at West Point highlighted its coverage of security crises from Afghanistan to North Korea. But back-to-back events at Brookings with Hillary Clinton and Samantha Power today showed that the core of the strategy is a deeper argument about the central challenge confronting America -- the increased impact on our economy and security of a new global reality.

For two decades, the United States could take economic and security supremacy for granted. Three things have changed.

First, the global economic boom. Yes, boom -- remember? Before the crash, there were two decades of uninterrupted growth in the global economy, global trade, and global financial activity. The U.S. profited, but so too did China, India and Brazil, which grew into major economic players; so did several others, like Mexico, Indonesia and Turkey, which have emerged as the new middle powers.

Second, the Iraq war. Love or loath U.S. policy in Iraq, it launched us into sustained expenditure of financial and military resources alongside another draining war in Afghanistan. In the minds of the Vulcans, decisive U.S. victory in Iraq was to assert global order by force of -- well, force. The strategy backfired, and rising states from Ankara to Brasilia found few, if any, costs to opposing U.S. strategy in the Middle East -- and domestic political points to be won. The Obama administration is feeling the consequences in its Iran policy.

Third, the global financial crisis. The bust, when it came, reaffirmed the centrality of the U.S. in the short term. But it also showcased the growing weight of the emerging economies, which now lead the global recovery. Before Lehman Brothers collapsed, other big players may have disliked our Middle East policy, but they banked -- figuratively and literally -- on our stewardship of the global financial system. Since then, doubts have crept in, and a new assertiveness to match.

The net result is rising global influence and solidifying regional power for China, India, and Brazil -- and less room for maneuver for the US.

The administration will be criticized in predictable terms from predictable quarters for acknowledging any of this, even in tacit terms: for 'giving ground' to the emerging powers, for 'ceding' American supremacy, for forgetting to carry a big stick while talking softly. But that dog won't hunt. The Bush administration had begun to adapt to these changed realities towards the end of its tenure, and the Obama administration deserves credit for putting the new global realities front and center in its assessment of U.S. national strategy. The core concepts of revitalizing international order, pressing others to take up their responsibilities and working within, not against, multilateral arrangements are the right ones.

The tougher question is, will it work? Skeptics will point to Chinese heel-dragging and Brazilian gallivanting on Iran to say no. Optimists will point to Chinese cooperation on the financial crisis, and everybody's cooperation on Somali piracy and counter-terrorism, to say yes.

The reality is, we don't know. There's a struggle in Beijing between betting on cooperation with the US, and those who seek sharper competition. A pro-U.S. strategy in India has the high ground for now, but divisions remain. The better angels in Brazil's foreign ministry can't quite hold back Lula's dalliance with global populism -- an October election there may tilt the balance.

But we know this much: if the U.S. doesn't try, no one will succeed. None of the emerging powers can underwrite stability, and none that are serious want the job. The emerging powers may not play ball, and if so, we'll be in a lose-lose global game. But only U.S. strategy can pull us into win-win, and the Administration is right to try. Making this point to the American people won't be popular; but reality is reality, and denial does not a strategy make.

"In terms of geo-politics, the most difficult and most challenging part of the world in this era, particularly in the aftermath of 9/11, is the broader Middle East," said Zalmay Khalilzad, in a 2010 Payne Distinguished Lecture, "The Struggle for the Broader Middle East: Where We Are and Where We Need to Go." A native of Afghanistan, Khalilzad served as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Iraq, and Afghanistan, and as a senior White House, Defense, and State Department Advisor.

Tracing the dynamic interplay of national, regional, and international forces, he set out five major issues likely to shape the future of the region:

1. The challenge of militant Islam, resulting from an ongoing crisis of civilization within a once powerful, innovative, and dynamic Islamic world.
2. Regional disputes, including the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Afghanistan-Pakistan border dispute, and ongoing Indian-Pakistani disputes.  Terming the Arab-Israeli conflict an important shaping factor, Khalilzad said that circumstances were not ready for a settlement.  "Israel wants a process without an outcome and the Palestinians want an outcome without a process," he said.
3. Rivalry for regional hegemony, including the rivalry between Shia and Sunni Islam and Iran's quest to obtain a nuclear weapon.  In the struggle over Iran's nuclear program, he said, is the potential for a wider regional conflict. Israel could attack Iran's facilities, destabilizing the region, and over the long term, a nuclear Iran would threaten Israel and provoke both state and sub-state proliferation.
4. Broader political and economic development and democratization efforts. The region's population is growing rapidly, but the educational system prepares the young poorly for the modern world and job prospects are limited, creating discontent and the danger of internal instability.
5. Extra regional factors, including U.S. policy. Setting a July 2011 timeline to withdraw troops from Afghanistan has had unintended consequences, he said, including increased corruption, as people seek to maximize access to resources now. In Iraq, institution building has been effective, the resource base is there for a power-sharing formula, and Iraq can do quite well. The pledge of U.S. troop withdrawals this summer, however, has led Iraqis to think "we are on our way out" and led them to look to regional actors for support, adding to polarization.

The region remains vitally important, he concluded, given the challenges emanating from it.  "A civilization crisis takes a long time to work itself out," he said, "and although the world is affected by it, we can influence it to a degree, but we have to do so without undermining the more moderate and secular forces for the good."