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It took just 29 days for President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali to flee Tunisia after mass protests erupted in the country.  Twenty-three years of authoritarian rule crumbling in less than a month is rather remarkable, especially considering the relative “calm” that had prevailed in Tunisia during those two decades.

Tunisia rarely hit the headlines then. No Islamists threatening to overtake the government (the Islamist al-Nahda party was outlawed in 1991). No terrorist networks causing security concerns (the exception being the sole attack on a synagogue in 2002 which catalyzed stepped up security measures). No strategic interests for the USA to speak of. And Ben Ali’s regime succeeded in marketing Tunisia as a safe tourist haven. Cities like Hammamet allowed tourists to be parachuted into newly built all-inclusive resorts that could have been anywhere in the world. There was even a custom-built, sanitized version of a traditional medinah in Yasmine Hammamet, which reminded one more of the artificiality of the world landmarks in Las Vegas than of real North African souks.

Tunisia’s sanitized image was also due to a severe crackdown on freedom of expression, as the country had one of the highest levels of media control—especially of the internet—in the world.

But what Ben Ali’s flight showed is how fragile the foundations of his rule were. So vulnerable that, in contrast to Iran and Egypt’s leaders’ resilience in the face of mass protests, he quickly offered one concession after another before completely giving up, making it clear that he was in fear for his life.

What will happen next in Tunisia is uncertain. The Tunisian opposition is divided into groups with wildly different agendas, from the Islamists of al-Nahda to the secular reformists of the Congress for the Republic headed by Moncef Marzouki. There is no political figure who can be clearly envisaged to become the next Tunisian president, and the way the balance will tip—will there be democracy, or another authoritarian regime of a merely different kind?—is unpredictable. But the clearest lessons that have emerged from Tunisia so far are that there is a real democratic potential in the Arab world and that authoritarian regimes in the region are not always what they appear to be. Those lessons are important on two fronts:

On the foreign policy front, the Tunisian uprising seems to have catalyzed US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to make the US administration’s boldest verbal statement thus far on the need for reform in the Arab world. Describing the political order of some Arab countries as “stagnant”, Clinton, on a visit to Bahrain on January 13, said that “This is a critical moment and this is a test of leadership for all of us”.

The United States is continuously criticized by democracy experts for favoring stability over the risks of democracy in the Arab world, and for backing up authoritarian leaders—whether directly or indirectly—for fear of having to deal with an unfavorable alternative (namely, an Islamist government, as in Egypt or Syria). Tunisia should be a relatively easy case for the United States in this context, a litmus test of putting one’s money where one’s mouth is. But it also shows how applauding stability can make countries like the United States blind to the democratic potential lurking beneath the façade of seemingly impenetrable regimes.

Western governments—including that of the United States—have mostly publicly congratulated the Tunisian people on their uprising, and France and other European countries refused Ben Ali entry on Friday when his plane was looking for a place to land. This reaction has been met with cynicism by Hizbullah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, a man who, since 2006, has been working to build up his credentials as the only credible Arab leader in the present time.  In a speech on Sunday, Nasrallah was quick to point out the irony of Ben Ali’s lack of welcome in the very countries which he had “served” throughout the duration of his rule.  So, on the regional front, the case of Tunisia unveils how quickly US opponents like Nasrallah can capitalize on short-sighted foreign policy. Nasrallah’s statement paints Western support for authoritarian Arab leaders as a house of cards that can crumble with the slightest shake—a warning to the West and Arab leaders reliant on Western support alike.

It is no coincidence that the reaction to the developments in Tunisia by other Arab regimes has mostly been to lay low. And here we can find another, more important, house of cards. Ben Ali’s regime has been exposed for the decaying entity that it is, and already copycat protests in other Arab countries—Jordan, Algeria, Egypt, and even Mauritania—have started. While a blanket domino effect across the region is not likely, reformists can take heart from Tunisia’s experience: while an authoritarian regime may appear to be indestructible, it may well be a mere house of cards.    

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This panel of experts will focus on the question: Should we film war?

"Strategies of War Remembrance in Cinema" (panel discussion)
Jean-Michel Frodon (co-author of "Geneses," and editor of "Cinema and the Shoah)
Pavle Levi (Author of "Disintegration in Frames, aesthetics and politics in the Yugoslav and Post-Yugoslav Cinema")
Peter Stein (Executive Director, San Francisco Jewish Film Festival)
Marie-Pierre Ulloa (author of "Francis Jeanson, a dissident intellectual from the French Resistance to the Algerian War")

Moderator: Vered Shemtov (Co-Director, Taube Center for Jewish Studies & Director)

 

For more information, please visit the Stanford Ethics and War series website.

Levinthal Hall

Jean-Michel Frodon Speaker
Pavle Levi Speaker
Peter Stein Speaker
Marie-Pierre Ulloa Speaker
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Norway has made a point of administering its petroleum resources using three distinct government bodies: a national oil company (NOC) engaged in commercial hydrocarbon operations; a government ministry to help set policy; and a regulatory body to provide oversight and technical expertise.  In Norway's case, this institutional design has provided useful checks and balances, helped minimize conflicts of interest, and allowed the NOC, Statoil, to focus on commercial activities while other government agencies regulate oil operators including Statoil itself.  Norway's relative success in managing its hydrocarbon resources has prompted development institutions to consider whether this "Norwegian Model" of separated government functions should be recommended to other oil-producing countries, particularly those whose oil sectors have underperformed. 

Seeking insight into this question, we study eight countries with different political and institutional characteristics, some of which have attempted to separate functions in oil in the manner of Norway and some of which have not.  We conclude that while the Norwegian Model may be a "best practice" of sorts, it is not the best prescription for every ailing oil sector.  The separation of functions approach is most useful and feasible in cases where political competition exists and institutional capacity is relatively strong.  Unchallenged leaders, on the other hand, are often able to adequately discharge commercial and policy/regulatory functions in the oil sector using the same entity, although this approach may not be robust against political changes (nor do we address in this paper any possible development or human welfare implications of this arrangement). 

When technical and regulatory talent is particularly lacking in a country, better outcomes may result from consolidating commercial, policy, and regulatory functions in a single body until institutional capacity has further developed.  Countries like Nigeria with vibrant political competition but limited institutional capacity pose the most significant challenge for oil sector reform: unitary control over the sector is impossible but separation of functions is often impossible to implement.  In such cases reformers are wise to focus on incremental but sustainable improvements in technical and institutional capacity.

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Program on Energy and Sustainable Development
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Mark C. Thurber
David Hults
Patrick R. P. Heller
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Martha Crenshaw, a senior fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), has been awarded $500,000 by the National Science Foundation to identify patterns in the evolution of terrorist organizations and to analyze their comparative development.

The three-year grant is part of the Department of Defense's Minerva Initiative launched in 2008, which focuses on "supporting research related to basic social and behavioral science of strategic importance to U.S. national security policy."

Crenshaw's interdisciplinary project, "Mapping Terrorist Organizations," will analyze terrorist groups and trace their relationships over time. It will be the first worldwide, comprehensive study of its kind-extending back to the Russian revolutionary movement up to Al Qaeda today.

"We want to understand how groups affiliate with Al Qaeda and analyze their relationships," Crenshaw said. "Evolutionary mapping can enhance our understanding of how terrorist groups develop and interact with each other and with the government, how strategies of violence and non-violence are related, why groups persist or disappear, and how opportunities and constraints in the environment change organizational behavior over time."

According to Crenshaw, it is critical to understand the organization and evolution of terrorism in multiple contexts. "To craft effective counter-terrorism strategies, governments need to know not only what type of adversary they are confronting but its stage of organizational development and relationship to other groups," Crenshaw wrote in the project summary. "The timing of a government policy initiative may be as important as its substance."

"Mapping Terrorist Organizations" will incorporate research in economics, sociology, business, biology, political science and history. It will include existing research to build a new database using original language sources rather than secondary analyses. The goal is to produce an online database and series of interactive maps that will generate new observations and research questions, Crenshaw said.

The results, for example, could reveal the structure of violent and non-violent opposition groups within the same movements or conflicts, and identify patterns that explain how these groups evolve over time. Such findings could be used to analyze the development of Al Qaeda and its Islamist or jihadist affiliates, including the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, she said.

The findings may also shed light on what happens when a group splits due to leadership quarrels or when a government is overturned, Crenshaw said. "Analysis that links levels of terrorist violence to changes in organizational structures and explains the complex relationships among actors in protracted conflicts will break new ground," the summary noted.

Extensive information on terrorist groups already exists, but it has been difficult to compile and analyze. Despite such obstacles, Crenshaw said, violent organizations can be understood in the same terms as other political or economic groups. "Terrorist groups are not anomalous or unique," she wrote. "In fact, they can be compared to transnational activist networks."

Crenshaw should know. Widely respected as a pioneer in terrorism studies, the political scientist was one of a handful of scholars who followed the subject decades before the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. She joined CISAC in 2007, following a long career at Wesleyan University, where she was the Colin and Nancy Campbell Professor of Global Issues and Democratic Thought. In addition to her research at Stanford, Crenshaw is a lead investigator at START, the Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and the Response to Terrorism at the University of Maryland.

End goal

Crenshaw wants to use the findings to better analyze how threats to U.S. security evolve over time. "Terrorist attacks on the United States and its allies abroad often appear to come without warning, but they are the result of a long process of organizational development," she wrote. "Terrorist organizations do not operate in isolation from a wider social environment. Without understanding processes of development and interaction, governments may miss signals along the way and be vulnerable to surprise attack. They may also respond ineffectively because they cannot anticipate the consequences of their actions." The project seeks to find patterns in the evolution of terrorism and to explain their causes and consequences. This, in turn, should contribute to developing more effective counter-terrorism policy, Crenshaw said.

Conflicts to be mapped

  • Russian revolutionary organizations, 1860s-1914.
  • Anarchist groups in Europe and the United States, 1880s-1914. (Note: although the anarchist movement is typically regarded as completely unstructured, there was more organization than an initial survey might suppose, and the transnational dispersion of the movement is frequently cited as a precedent for Al Qaeda.)
  • Ireland and Northern Ireland, 1860s-present.
  • Algeria, 1945-1962 and 1992-present
  • Palestinian resistance groups, 1967-present.
  • Colombia, 1960s-present.
  • El Salvador, 1970s-1990s
  • Argentina, 1960s-1980s
  • Chile, 1973-1990
  • Peru, 1970-1990s
  • Brazil, 1967-1971
  • Sri Lanka, 1980s-present
  • India (Punjab), 1980-present
  • Philippines, 1960s-present
  • Indonesia, 1998-present
  • Italy, 1970s-1990s
  • Germany, 1970s-1990s
  • France/Belgium, 1980-1990s
  • Kashmir, 1988-present
  • Pakistan, 1980-present
  • United States, 1960s-present (especially far right movement)
  • Spain, 1960s-present
  • Egypt, 1950s-present
  • Turkey, 1960s-present
  • Lebanon, 1975-present
  • Al Qaeda, 1987-present
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Three internationally recognized films will be screened at Stanford University in April and May 2009. The screenings begin at 7:00 pm in Cubberley Auditorium located at the School of Education Building. Co-sponsored by the Mediterranean Studies Forum, the Forum on Contemporary Forum and the Department of Iberian and Latin American Cultures, the screenings are free and open to the public.

The three films, Gitmek: My Marlon and Brando (2008, Turkey/Iraq/Iran), Carol's Journey (2002, Spain/US), and Inch' allah Dimanche (2001, Algeria/France), address the issues of love and friendship across national borders. Each makes use of diverse cinematographic techniques and multiple languages in providing a critical reflection on different cultures, societies and political systems located in the Mediterranean Basin.

Inch' allah Dimanche will be screened on Wednesday, May 27th 2009. The film tells the passionate story of an Algerian immigrant woman struggling against old world traditions. Zouina leaves her homeland with her three children to join her husband in France, where he has been living for the past 10 years. In a land and culture foreign to her, she struggles against her mother-in-law's tyrannical hand and her husband's distrustful bitterness. The film received awards from Marrakech, Toronto, Bordeaux, and Amiens International Film Festival.

For a printable film schedule, visit: http://www.stanford.edu/group/mediterranean/film%20series%2009.pdf

Jointly sponsored by the Forum on Contemporary Europe, Mediterranean Studies Forum, and Department of Iberian and Latin American Cultures.

Cubberley Auditorium
Stanford University

Conferences
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Three internationally recognized films will be screened at Stanford University in April and May 2009. The screenings begin at 7:00 pm in Cubberley Auditorium located at the School of Education Building. Co-sponsored by the Mediterranean Studies Forum, the Forum on Contemporary Forum and the Department of Iberian and Latin American Cultures, the screenings are free and open to the public.

The three films, Gitmek: My Marlon and Brando (2008, Turkey/Iraq/Iran), Carol's Journey (2002, Spain/US), and Inch' allah Dimanche (2001, Algeria/France), address the issues of love and friendship across national borders. Each makes use of diverse cinematographic techniques and multiple languages in providing a critical reflection on different cultures, societies and political systems located in the Mediterranean Basin.

Carol's Journey
will be screened on May 6th 2009. The film describes the Spanish Civil War through the eyes of a 12-year-old. Uprooted from her home in New York, Carol travels to her mother's native village in Spain. Separated from her adored father, she struggles to adjust to her new life. Through her relationships with her grandfather, a teacher and a local boy, she gains a perspective on her situation in a nation divided. The film won the special mention at Berlin International Film Festival.

For a printable film schedule, visit: http://www.stanford.edu/group/mediterranean/film%20series%2009.pdf

Jointly sponsored by the Forum on Contemporary Europe, Mediterranean Studies Forum, and Department of Iberian and Latin American Cultures.


Cubberley Auditorium
Stanford University
Campus Map: http://campus-map.stanford.edu/

Conferences
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Three internationally recognized films will be screened at Stanford University in April and May 2009. The screenings begin at 7:00 pm in Cubberley Auditorium located at the School of Education Building. Co-sponsored by the Mediterranean Studies Forum, the Forum on Contemporary Forum and the Department of Iberian and Latin American Cultures, the screenings are free and open to the public.

The three films, Gitmek: My Marlon and Brando (2008, Turkey/Iraq/Iran), Carol's Journey (2002, Spain/US), and Inch' allah Dimanche (2001, Algeria/France), address the issues of love and friendship across national borders. Each makes use of diverse cinematographic techniques and multiple languages in providing a critical reflection on different cultures, societies and political systems located in the Mediterranean Basin.

Gitmek will be screened on Wednesday, April 29th 2009. It narrates the love story between Ayca, a Turkish actress, and Hama Ali, an Iraqi Kurdish actor, at the onset of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Ayca travels from Istanbul to the Iraqi border via Iran so that she can re-unite with her beloved. The journey takes her through breathtaking landscapes, strange encounters and terrifying times. The film received recognition and awards from Tribeca, Tokyo Sarajevo, Istanbul, Kerala, Jerusalem and Yerevan International Film Festival.

For a printable film schedule, visit: http://www.stanford.edu/group/mediterranean/film%20series%2009.pdf

Jointly sponsored by the Forum on Contemporary Europe, Mediterranean Studies Forum, and Department of Iberian and Latin American Cultures.

Cubberley Auditorium
Stanford University

Conferences
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Jennifer Pitts is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. She is the author of A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France (Princeton, 2005) and editor and translator of Alexis de Tocqueville: Writings on Empire and Slavery (Johns Hopkins, 2001). She is currently writing a book, tentatively entitled Boundaries of the International, which explores European debates about legal relations with extra-European societies in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

The republican tradition continues to frame French debates on empire, as it has done since the Revolution. French republicanism and Anglophone liberalism have shared numerous features in relation to empire: both are egalitarian traditions of moral universalism, and both uphold an ideal of political emancipation that has tended to entail assimilation to a European political model. This paper explores the course of French debates over empire from the period of Napoleon through the July Monarchy — the broader context for the thought of the iconic liberal republicans Constant and Tocqueville — with particular attention to the ways in which liberal and republican registers were deployed in both support and critique of empire, and to how the articulation of liberal and republican agendas in France was affected by the Algeria conquest. It also discusses the first Algerian contribution to French public deliberation about the conquest, Hamdan Khodja’s 1833 text Le Miroir, a work that self-consciously inhabited both a liberal cosmopolitan and a Muslim perspective and that was nearly alone in French debates in making a principled argument for Algerian

Encina Ground Floor Conference Room

Jennifer Pitts Political Science Speaker University of Chicago
Workshops
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Agenda

8:15-8:45 am Coffee, light breakfast for participants
8:45-8:50 am Opening remarks; goals of the workshop (Olivier Roy, Larry Diamond)
8:50-10:30 Stable Autocracies?
  • Jordan – Shadi Hamid, (CDDRL, Stanford)
  • Saudi Arabia – Stephane LaCroix, (Abbasi Program, Stanford)
  •  Egypt – Larry Diamond (Hoover, CDDRL, Stanford)

Commentator: Moulay Hicham (CDDRL, Stanford)

10:30-10:40 Break
10:40-12:00 Liberation Movements: The Roles of Religion and Nationalism
  • Lebanon and Hezbollah - Nicolas Pouillard, (EHESS, Paris)
  • Algeria – Lahouari Addi, (IEP, Lyon)
Commentator: Olivier Roy (CNRS/EHESS/IEPParis)
12:00-1:30 Lunch - Attending Don Emmerson talk on Islam;

Philippines Conference Room, 3rd Floor, Encina Hall Central

1:45-3:00 Framework on Democratization in the Arab World

General Discussion lead by Olivier Roy and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss

Daniel and Nancy Okimoto Conference Room

CDDRL
Stanford University
Encina Hall, C147
616 Jane Stanford Way
Stanford, CA 94305-6055

(650) 724-6448 (650) 723-1928
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Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
William L. Clayton Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution
Professor, by courtesy, of Political Science and Sociology
diamond_encina_hall.png MA, PhD

Larry Diamond is the William L. Clayton Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, the Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), and a Bass University Fellow in Undergraduate Education at Stanford University. He is also professor by courtesy of Political Science and Sociology at Stanford, where he lectures and teaches courses on democracy (including an online course on EdX). At the Hoover Institution, he co-leads the Project on Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Region and participates in the Project on the U.S., China, and the World. At FSI, he is among the core faculty of the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, which he directed for six and a half years. He leads FSI’s Israel Studies Program and is a member of the Program on Arab Reform and Development. He also co-leads the Global Digital Policy Incubator, based at FSI’s Cyber Policy Center. He served for 32 years as founding co-editor of the Journal of Democracy.

Diamond’s research focuses on global trends affecting freedom and democracy and on U.S. and international policies to defend and advance democracy. His book, Ill Winds: Saving Democracy from Russian Rage, Chinese Ambition, and American Complacency, analyzes the challenges confronting liberal democracy in the United States and around the world at this potential “hinge in history,” and offers an agenda for strengthening and defending democracy at home and abroad.  A paperback edition with a new preface was released by Penguin in April 2020. His other books include: In Search of Democracy (2016), The Spirit of Democracy (2008), Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (1999), Promoting Democracy in the 1990s (1995), and Class, Ethnicity, and Democracy in Nigeria (1989). He has edited or coedited more than fifty books, including China’s Influence and American Interests (2019, with Orville Schell), Silicon Triangle: The United States, China, Taiwan the Global Semiconductor Security (2023, with James O. Ellis Jr. and Orville Schell), and The Troubling State of India’s Democracy (2024, with Sumit Ganguly and Dinsha Mistree).

During 2002–03, Diamond served as a consultant to the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and was a contributing author of its report, Foreign Aid in the National Interest. He has advised and lectured to universities and think tanks around the world, and to the World Bank, the United Nations, the State Department, and other organizations dealing with governance and development. During the first three months of 2004, Diamond served as a senior adviser on governance to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad. His 2005 book, Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq, was one of the first books to critically analyze America's postwar engagement in Iraq.

Among Diamond’s other edited books are Democracy in Decline?; Democratization and Authoritarianism in the Arab WorldWill China Democratize?; and Liberation Technology: Social Media and the Struggle for Democracy, all edited with Marc F. Plattner; and Politics and Culture in Contemporary Iran, with Abbas Milani. With Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset, he edited the series, Democracy in Developing Countries, which helped to shape a new generation of comparative study of democratic development.

Download full-resolution headshot; photo credit: Rod Searcey.

Former Director of the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law
Faculty Chair, Jan Koum Israel Studies Program
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Larry Diamond Senior Fellow at FSI and Hoover Institution Commentator Stanford University

FSI
Stanford University
Encina Hall C140
Stanford, CA 94305-6055

(650) 736-1820 (650) 724-2996
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Satre Family Senior Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
kathryn_stoner_1_2022_v2.jpg MA, PhD

Kathryn Stoner is the Mosbacher Director of the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL), and a Senior Fellow at CDDRL and the Center on International Security and Cooperation at FSI. From 2017 to 2021, she served as FSI's Deputy Director. She is Professor of Political Science (by courtesy) at Stanford and she teaches in the Department of Political Science, and in the Program on International Relations, as well as in the Ford Dorsey Master's in International Policy Program. She is also a Senior Fellow (by courtesy) at the Hoover Institution.

Prior to coming to Stanford in 2004, she was on the faculty at Princeton University for nine years, jointly appointed to the Department of Politics and the Princeton School for International and Public Affairs (formerly the Woodrow Wilson School). At Princeton she received the Ralph O. Glendinning Preceptorship awarded to outstanding junior faculty. She also served as a Visiting Associate Professor of Political Science at Columbia University, and an Assistant Professor of Political Science at McGill University. She has held fellowships at Harvard University as well as the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, DC. 

In addition to many articles and book chapters on contemporary Russia, she is the author or co-editor of six books: "Transitions to Democracy: A Comparative Perspective," written and edited with Michael A. McFaul (Johns Hopkins 2013);  "Autocracy and Democracy in the Post-Communist World," co-edited with Valerie Bunce and Michael A. McFaul (Cambridge, 2010);  "Resisting the State: Reform and Retrenchment in Post-Soviet Russia" (Cambridge, 2006); "After the Collapse of Communism: Comparative Lessons of Transitions" (Cambridge, 2004), coedited with Michael McFaul; and "Local Heroes: The Political Economy of Russian Regional" Governance (Princeton, 1997); and "Russia Resurrected: Its Power and Purpose in a New Global Order" (Oxford University Press, 2021).

She received a BA (1988) and MA (1989) in Political Science from the University of Toronto, and a PhD in Government from Harvard University (1995). In 2016 she was awarded an honorary doctorate from Iliad State University, Tbilisi, Republic of Georgia.

Download full-resolution headshot; photo credit: Rod Searcey.

Mosbacher Director, Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law
Professor of Political Science (by courtesy), Stanford University
Senior Fellow (by courtesy), Hoover Institution
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Kathryn Stoner-Weiss CDDRL Associate Director for Research Panelist Stanford University
Moulay Hicham CDDRL Commentator Stanford Univeristy
Shadi Hamid CDDRL Panelist Stanford University
Olivier Roy Research Director Commentator CCNRS/EHESS/IEP, Paris
Lahouari Addi Professor of Political Sciology Panelist IEP, Lyon
Nicholas Pouillard PhD student Panelist EHESS, Paris
Stephane LaCroix Abbasi Program Panelist Stanford University
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Authors
David G. Victor
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Conventional wisdom holds that the OPEC oil cartel has the world in its grasp. It can manipulate prices by tinkering with supplies. Last month OPEC released a new study on world oil demand that seemed to signal the cartel was readying to tighten the taps because higher prices were slaking the world's thirst for oil. The American Petroleum Institute released fresh data showing that demand for oil products in the United States (the world's largest market) dropped a whopping 3 percent from the year earlier. The news about lower demand has caused oil prices to fall a bit, and all eyes are on OPEC's wizards to tighten supplies.

But the conventional wisdom is mostly wrong. OPEC (which stands for the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) is no wizard. For the most part, its actions lag behind fundamental changes in oil supply and demand rather than lead them. OPEC looks like a masterful cartel when, in fact, it is mainly just riding the waves.

It is hard to figure out exactly what goes on behind's OPEC's closed doors, but glimpses are possible by probing what the cartel members say about prices and how they set quotas. Over the last five years, OPEC members have announced ever-higher price goals only after the market had already delivered those high prices. As the market has soared, OPEC has followed. Only in the last few months has Saudi Arabia suggested that the cartel would be better off if prices reversed because high prices would encourage the world's big oil consumers to wean themselves from oil. It proffered $125 a barrel. The markets shrugged and kept on rising until real facts about slowing demand revealed that fundamentals were changing.

OPEC also sets quotas so that each member knows its role. Throughout its history, OPEC has faced the difficult task of holding the cartel in the face of strong incentives by each member to cheat. Today's oil market makes that job easy because nearly every member, except Saudi Arabia, is producing at full capacity. OPEC, more or less, has nothing to do.

In fact, the last time OPEC made a major adjustment to its quotas—September 2007—it jiggered them to reflect what its members were already pumping. Algeria got a big boost because it was already supplying nearly 50 percent more than its quota. Kuwait, Libya and Qatar also got boosts that aligned their OPEC quotas with existing reality. OPEC also set, for the first time, a quota on Angola's output. Since then, Angola has attracted a steady stream of new production projects, which makes it inevitable that OPEC will adjust Angola's quota to reflect the new reality. (Iraq has no quota; it has troubles enough without pretending to align its oil output to OPEC strictures.)

Nigeria and Venezuela got haircuts because their political troubles meant they were already producing far less than their quotas. Indonesia also cut its quota and a few months later left OPEC because it realized that as a big oil user it actually had more in common with oil importers than its fellow OPEC members. These changes in quotas were reflections of political realities that OPEC doesn't control.

Today's oil cartel, even more than in the past, is really about Saudi Arabia. But Saudi Arabia also is no wizard at the controls of the world market. The Saudis can adjust their output a bit since they control nearly all of spare capacity in the world market. (Earlier this month they pledged another 200,000 barrels per day to dampen pressure from the United States and other governments that are reeling from high oil prices. But that move was more symbolic than real as the markets were already expecting the new supplies.)

Saudi Arabia is on the front lines of the new reality in world oil supply. It is proving much harder and more costly to bring on more supplies. The Saudis have an ambitious plan to increase output about one third over the coming decade, but they are finding that will be a stretch. Their fellow OPEC members are in a similar situation, and those hard facts also produce high oil prices. In fact, the Middle East members of OPEC are, today, producing at just the same level as they were three decades ago because none of them invested much in finding and producing new supplies. High prices into the future reflect these fundamental facts rather than the assumption that OPEC is a masterful cartel.

Conventional wisdom holds that because OPEC is raking in more cash than ever, it has never been stronger than it is today. In fact, OPEC has rarely been weaker. It is the accidental beneficiary of forces that have caused today's high prices, and it will be nearly as powerless when prices come down.

The real solutions to today's high oil prices require more attention to demand. Blaming OPEC, while good political theater, won't have much impact. Legislation now working its way through the U.S. Congress would actually attempt to break up the oil cartel. Such schemes won't work, and the political effort would be better spent on policies that redouble the nation's efficiency, producing more oil from diverse sources here at home, and in finding ways to move beyond oil altogether.

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