East Asia's demographic landscape is rapidly changing and comparative academic research is crucial to help guide well-informed decisions in the many policy areas that are affected, such as security, economics, and immigration. From January 20 to 21, the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) gathered subject experts from numerous fields for two days of lively and productive presentations and dialogue to help identify key research issues and questions for its new, three-year research initiative on this significant subject.

Shorenstein APARC held a public panel discussion on January 20, featuring eight scholars from across the United States and Asia. The issue of aging featured prominently in their presentations, as did fertility rates and immigration. A full audio recording of the panel discussion is available on the Shorenstein APARC website and summaries of the presentations follow below. A closed-session workshop took place the next day, the discussions from which will serve as the foundation for future programs and publications related to the research initiative.

January 20 Panel Discussion Presentations

The link between demography and security is more tenuous in East Asia than in other parts of the world, suggested Brian Nichiporuk, a political scientist with the RAND Corporation. Nichiporuk discussed possible policy responses to demographic change in Japan, North and South Korea, the Russian Federation, and China. He suggested, for example, that Japan's new maritime security focus is related to perceived economic and political competition from China, which is magnified by its domestic demographic concerns.

Michael Sutton, a visiting fellow with the East-West Center in Washington, DC, stated that Japan's aging population would remain a major policy issue for the next 20–30 years. He emphasized that the policy challenges posed by this phenomena are complicated by the role that the United States plays in the regional security structure, and also by the growing dominance of China and the history that it shares with Japan. Nonetheless, maintained Sutton, despite the obvious challenges, it is possible for Japan and the other countries facing this demographic issue to successfully adapt.

Social attitudes and policy in East Asia do not favor immigration, as they do in European countries such as Spain and Italy, suggested John Skrentny, director of the Center for Comparative Immigration Studies at the University of California, San Diego. Skrentny focused his talk on low-skill immigrant workers in South Korea and Japan, noting that these two countries, which began receiving workers in the 1970s and 1980s, commonly associate immigrants with social disruption. According to Skrentny, immigration policy is often tied to economics and tends to favor co-ethnic workers.

Chong-En Bai, chair of the Department of Economics at Tsinghua University, discussed numerous economic policy implications and responses related to demographic change in China. He noted areas where successful policies have been adopted but challenges still remain, including savings and investment, labor and urbanization, pension, healthcare, and long-term care. Bai described, for example, how the children of rural migrants now have access to urban schools, but that they still face the logistical challenge of having to travel back to their home provinces to take college entrance examinations.

Examining demographic change and health improvements is essential to understanding the significant economic growth in East Asia over the past several decades, emphasized David Bloom, chair of the Department of Global Health and Population at Harvard University. He noted the success of East Asian countries in lowering their infant mortality rates through investment in public health improvements, such as sanitation and vaccination. Bloom suggested that these and other past successful policy mechanisms have run their course, and that it is now imperative to find ways to address the region's key demographic issue of aging.

Naohiro Ogawa, director of the Population Research Institute at Nihon University, described findings from the National Transfer Accounts (NTA) project, an international effort to gauge economic flows across age groups. He discussed the pressure placed on Japan's working-age population by the increasing cost of caring for children and the elderly, as well as the challenges and possibilities related to having a large, healthy, aging population. Ogawa noted that institutional responses to demographic change, such as increasing the retirement age and adopting more open immigration policy, have moved slowly in Japan.

Andrew Mason, a professor of economics at the University of Hawai'i, Manoa, also utilized NTA data to make predictions about East Asia's economic future. He proposed that the amount of human capital, such as the money that parents spend on the education of their children, is likely to grow quite rapidly. He also suggested that financial wealth in East Asia is likely to increase significantly as the populations of its countries age. Finally, he suggested that the current trend of regional economic growth would continue, although at a somewhat steadier rate. Mason qualified his predictions with questions, such as whether the return on investment in education would be commensurate with what is spent.

James Raymo, a professor of sociology at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, described a wide array of findings about changes in fertility and family structure in Japan and their connections, as well as possible policy implications. Raymo discussed trends in marriage, childbearing, divorce, non-marital cohabitation, and the participation of women in the labor force. He pointed to gaps in current research, and suggested possible linkages to research on other demographic trends, such as Japan's aging population.

Two decades after the fall of Soviet-bloc dictatorships, popular movements for democracy are erupting in the last regional bastion of authoritarianism: the Arab world.

So far, only Tunisia's dictator, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, has been toppled, while Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak - who has ruled that ancient land longer than many pharaohs - announced Tuesday that he will step down in September. But other Arab autocrats are bound to go. From Algeria to Syria to Jordan, people are fed up with stagnation and injustice, and are mobilizing for democratic change.

So, what happens when the autocrat is gone? Will the end of despotism give way to chaos - as happened when Mobutu Sese Seko was toppled in 1997 after more than 30 years in power in Zaire? Will the military or some civilian strongman fill the void with a new autocracy - as occurred after the overthrow of Arab monarchs in Egypt and Iraq in the 1950s, and as has been the norm in most of the world until recently? Or can some of the Arab nations produce real democracy - as we saw in most of Eastern Europe and about half the states of sub-Saharan Africa? Regime transitions are uncertain affairs. But since the mid-1970s, more than 60 countries have found their way to democracy. Some have done so in circumstances of rapid upheaval that offer lessons for reformers in Tunisia, Egypt and other Arab countries today.

Unite the democratic opposition.

When a dictatorship is on the ropes, one thing that can rescue it is a divided opposition. That is why autocrats so frequently foster those divisions, secretly funding a proliferation of opposition parties. Even extremely corrupt rulers may generate significant electoral support - not the thumping majorities they claim, but enough to steal an election - when the opposition is splintered.

In the Philippines in 1986, Nicaragua in 1990 and Ukraine in 2004, the opposition united around the candidacies of Corazon Aquino, Violeta Chamorro and Viktor Yushchenko, respectively. Broad fronts such as these - as well as the Concertacion movement that swept Christian Democrat Patricio Aylwin to power in Chile in 1989 after the departure of Gen. Augusto Pinochet - often span deep personal and ideological differences. But the time for democratic forces to debate those matters is later, once the old order is defeated and democratic institutions have been established.

Egypt is fortunate - it has an obvious alternative leader, Mohamed ElBaradei, whom disparate opposition elements seem to be rallying around. Whether the next presidential election is held on schedule in September or moved up, ElBaradei, or anyone like him leading a broad opposition front, will probably win a resounding victory over anyone connected to Mubarak's National Democratic Party.

Make sure the old order really is gone.

The exit of a long-ruling strongman, such as Ben Ali, does not necessarily mean the end of a regime. Fallen dictators often leave behind robust political and security machines. No autocrat in modern times met a more immediate fate than Romania's Nicolae Ceausescu, who was executed by a firing squad of his own soldiers in 1989 just three days after a popular revolution forced him to flee the capital. Yet his successor, Ion Iliescu, was a corrupt former communist who obstructed political reform. Most of the former Soviet states, such as Georgia and Kazakhstan, had similar experiences.

Countries are much more likely to get to democracy quickly if they identify and embrace political leaders who are untainted by the old order and are ready to roll it back.

But also come to an understanding with the old order.

Victorious democrats won't be able to completely excise the pillars of the authoritarian order. Instead, for their country to turn toward democracy, those pillars must be neutralized or co-opted. This old order may descend into violence when, as in Iraq, broad classes of elites are stigmatized and ousted from their positions. In a successful bargain, most old-regime elites retain their freedom, assets and often their jobs but accept the new rules of the democratic game.

Unless the military collapses in defeat, as it did in Greece in 1974 and in Argentina after the Falklands War, it must be persuaded to at least tolerate a new democratic order. In the short run, that means guaranteeing the military significant autonomy, as well as immunity from prosecution for its crimes. Over time, civilian democratic control of the military can be extended incrementally, as was done masterfully in Brazil in the 1980s and in Chile during the 1990s. But if the professional military feels threatened and demeaned from the start, the transition is in trouble.

The same principle applies to surviving elements of the state security apparatus, the bureaucracy and the ruling party. In South Africa, for example, old-regime elements received amnesty for their human rights abuses in exchange for fully disclosing what they had done. In this and other successful transitions, top officials were replaced, but most state bureaucrats kept their jobs.

Rewrite the rules.

A new democratic government needs a new constitution, but it can't be drawn up too hastily. Meanwhile, some key provisions can be altered expeditiously, either by legislation, interim executive fiat or national consensus.

In Spain, the path to democratization was opened by the Law for Political Reform, adopted by the parliament within a year of dictator Francisco Franco's death in 1975. Poland adopted a package of amendments in 1992, only after it had elected a new parliament and a new president, Lech Walesa; a new constitution followed in 1997. South Africa enacted an interim constitution to govern the country while it undertook an ambitious constitution-writing process with wide popular consultation - which is the ideal arrangement.

An urgent priority, though, is to rewrite the rules so that free and fair elections are possible. This must happen before democratic elections can be held in Egypt and Tunisia. In transitions toward democracy, there is a strong case for including as many political players as possible. This requires some form of proportional representation to ensure that emerging small parties can have a stake in the new order, while minimizing the organizational advantage of the former ruling party. In the 2005 elections in Iraq, proportional representation ensured a seat at the table for smaller minority and liberal parties that could never have won a plurality in individual districts.

Isolate the extremes.

That said, not everyone can or should be brought into the new democratic order. Prosecuting particularly venal members of a former ruling family, such as those tied to the Philippines' Ferdinand Marcos, Indonesia's fallen strongman Suharto or now Tunisia's Ben Ali, can be part of a larger reconciliation strategy. But the circle of punishment must be drawn narrowly. It may even help the transition to drive a wedge between a few old-regime cronies and the bulk of the establishment, many of whom may harbor grievances against "the family."

A transitional government should aim for inclusion, and should test the democratic commitment of dubious players rather than inadvertently induce them to become violent opponents. However, groups that refuse to renounce violence as a means of obtaining power, or that reject the legitimacy of democracy, have no place in the new order. That provision was part of the wisdom of the postwar German constitution.

Transitions are full of opportunists, charlatans and erstwhile autocrats who enter the new political field with no commitment to democracy. Every democratic transition that has endured - from Spain and Portugal to Chile, South Africa and now hopefully Indonesia - has tread this path.

Fragile democracies become stable when people who once had no use for democracy embrace it as the only game in town.