On February 10, 2014, Pascal Lamy, the former Director-General of the World Trade Organization, visited Stanford University as a special guest of The Europe Center and the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.

During his two-term tenure at the helm of the WTO (from 2005 to 2013), Mr. Lamy successfully guided the organization through complex changes in the regulation of international trade. Among his many achievements, he oversaw the systematic integration of developing countries into positions of political leadership in the world economic order.

Prior to the WTO, Mr. Lamy served as the European Commissioner for Trade, the CEO of the French bank Crédit Lyonnais, and in the French civil service. 

Mr. Lamy has been decorated with medals of honor from countries ranging from France to Mexico, and has received honorary degrees from eight universities around the world. He has authored several books, including recently, The Geneva Consensus: Making Trade Work for All.

In his farewell statement as the Director-General, Mr. Lamy said in July 2013: “Together, we have strengthened the WTO as the global trade body, as a major pillar of global economic governance. Despite the heavy headwinds and the turmoil in the global economy as well as on the geo-political scene, together we have made this organization larger and stronger.”

Mr. Lamy drew on these experiences to offer insights related to the designing of global governance during his visit to Stanford.

He first participated in a lunchtime question and answer roundtable with undergraduate students. Stephen Stedman, Deputy Director of the Center for Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, moderated the event. Among other topics, Mr. Lamy spoke about the necessary mix of economic, social, and political policies that determine the efficacy of free trade as an engine of global economic growth. 

Mr. Lamy then delivered a public lecture, titled “World Trade and Global Governance,” before an audience of over a hundred members of the Stanford community.

In this talk, Mr. Lamy outlined a statement of his own thinking about the future of global governance and international trade, and described what remains to be done in addressing the challenges of globalization. Additionally, he reflected on the features of modern politics that create governance gridlock and thwart global oversight, and identified how progress can be made in overcoming impediments to policy action at the international level.

Mr. Lamy’s lecture focused on three overarching points. First, notwithstanding some setbacks, governments and international organizations have achieved major successes in regulating the liberalization of global trade. Tariffs are on average lower than ever before, and governments did not raise tariffs during the recent financial crisis as they did during the Great Depression.

The WTO has played a central role in facilitating regulatory convergence in international trade. Institutional features such as the organization’s dispute resolution mechanisms have deterred nations from enacting unilateral forms of protectionism. Additionally, by “naming and shaming” nations that raise tariffs during economic crises, the WTO has prevented reversals to autarky in the global economy.

These policies have had a salutary effect because free trade and open markets enhance economic competitiveness, generate growth, and raise welfare standards around the world.

Second, despite these successes in the governance of international trade, challenges remain. A new feature of the global economy is that protectionism based on economic objectives has been replaced by “precautionism” based on normative prerogatives. For example, competing national perspectives on product standards such as those related to safety or labor norms thwart efforts to achieve consensus on trade regulation.

Genetically modified foods represent one example of globally traded products that are held to different normative standards by different countries. Disputes over regulating the global production and distribution of these products are therefore less likely to be resolved by traditional negotiation mechanisms.

Third, in order to overcome this governance gridlock and achieve regulatory convergence, we need to bring together stakeholders from the public and private sector to build coalitions that jointly negotiate conflicts in matters of global governance.

For example, the “C20-C30-C40 Coalition of the Working” that comprises the 20 largest countries, the 30 largest companies, and the 40 largest cities in the world is currently striving to overcome regulatory gridlock on climate change. This coalition can define carbon emissions targets, supervise urban infrastructure projects, and evaluate progress on energy and environmental objectives.

Mr. Lamy reiterated that trade can only serve as an engine for economic development if governments and international institutions enact economic and social policies that reflect the preferences of a broad swath of global stakeholders. Only by adapting the governance structures of the twentieth century to respond to the challenges of the twenty-first century, can we overcome new forms of policy gridlock at the international level.

Mark Peattie, Ph.D., noted scholar of Japanese Imperial history, died peacefully, surrounded by family on January 22, 2014 in San Rafael, California; he was 83. 

Peattie was born in Nice, France, to expatriate writers Donald Culross and Louise Redfield Peattie on May 3, 1930. He returned to the United States with his parents and his two brothers, Malcom R. Peattie and Noel R. Peattie. He grew up in Santa Barbara, where he graduated from Laguna Blanca School. He went on to get a B.A. in history at Pomona College. He served in the U.S. Army from 1952 to 1954, including an assignment in counter-intelligence in Europe.

In 1955, after completing his M.A. in history at Stanford University, Peattie began his career as an American cultural diplomat with the U.S. Information Agency. He began his stint in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, where he served for two years. His nine years in Japan started in Sendai; in Tokyo he trained intensively in Japanese language before serving as director of the American Cultural Center in Kyoto.

In 1967, after serving a final year in diplomacy in Washington, D.C., his love of history called him to the world of academia. After earning his Ph.D. in modern Japanese history from Princeton University, he taught at Pennsylvania State University, the University of California – Los Angeles and the University of Massachusetts in Boston. For many years, Peattie was a research fellow at the Edwin O. Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies at Harvard University. He was also a senior research staff member of the Hoover Institute on War, Revolution, and Peace, before becoming a visiting scholar at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University.

His publications include The Battle for China: Essays on the Military History of the Sino-Japanese War of 1937–1945, Stanford University Press; Sunburst: The Rise of Japanese Naval Air Power, 1909 –1941, Naval Institute Press; Nan'yō: The Rise and Fall of the Japanese in Micronesia, 1885–1945, University of Hawaii Press; Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887–1941 (with David C. Evans), U.S. Naval Institute Press; The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931–1945 (with Peter Duus and Ramon H. Myers), Princeton University Press;The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945, Princeton University Press; and Ishiwara Kanji and Japan's Confrontation with the West, Princeton University Press.                                                                 

Peattie was married to the late Alice Richmond Peattie for 52 years and is survived by his daughters Victoria Peattie Helm of Mercer Island, Washington; Caroline Peattie of Mill Valley, California; son David Peattie of Berkeley, California; nieces Dana VanderMey and Hilary Peattie, both of Santa Barbara; and grandchildren, Brendan Shuichi, Marcus Takeshi, Kylie Max, Kai Schorske, and Jessica Susan.

Mark Peattie passionately believed in sensible handgun control laws to reduce deaths and injuries.  In lieu of flowers the family requests donations be directed to www.bradycampaign.org.

Services will be held at a later date. Please sign the online guestbook to see updated service information at www.cusimanocolonial.com.

REAP co-director Scott Rozelle begins a ten-part series for Caixin Magazine titled, "Inequality 2030: Glimmering Hope in China in a Future Facing Extreme Despair." Rozelle explains why continued high income inequality could spell trouble for China's future growth and stability.

REAP co-director Scott Rozelle begins a ten-part series for Caixin Magazine titled, "Inequality 2030: Glimmering Hope in China in a Future Facing Extreme Despair." Rozelle explains why continued high income inequality could spell trouble for China's future growth and stability.

To read the column in Chinese, click here.

> To read Column 2: China's Inequality Starts During the First 1,000 Days, click here. 

> To read Column 3: Behind Before They Start - The Preschool Years (Part 1), click here. 

> To read Column 4: Behind Before They Start - The Preschool Years (Part 2), click here.  

> To read Column 5: How to Cure China's Largest Epidemic, click here.

> To read Column 6: A Tale of Two Travesties, click here. 

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Inequality 2030:

Glimmering Hope in China in a Future Facing Extreme Despair

Column 1: Introduction and why we need to worry about inequality

Inequality is underrated

China’s growth slowed in 2012 and in the first half of 2013. And, the world is holding its collective breath. Can China’s once white-hot economy be re-ignited and continue to blaze ahead? Or has its economy finally begun its inevitable slow down, a braking that all countries that reach middle income levels of development experience.

While the financial pundits and economic crystal ball gazers are focused on growth rates and world economy spillovers, we are worrying about another indicator: China’s level of inequality. In fact, we believe that what happens to inequality in the future is probably more important in the long run than growth. Whether high or low, we believe the nation’s income distribution will be one of the most important determinants of the quality of life in China in the 2030s.

Why is inequality more important than growth? Of course, nominally both are important. China needs to maintain 6 to 8 percent over the next 10 years. China needs to continue to grow 4 to 6 percent until 2030. However, we believe that as China’s economy matures over the next two decades, growth will slow. The growth rates of healthy, developed economies are never more than 2 to 3 percent. This slowing is inevitable. It is a done deal. Inequality, on the other hand, could be high or low. And, if it is high: China could be in for a troubled adulthood. It could even be headed for stagnation. High inequality could even lead to collapse and the loss of all things good that have been built up over the past three decades.

Remedial learning about Inequality and the Middle Income Trap

So what allows some countries to successfully transition from middle to high income? Solid banking practices: important. Good corporate governance: a must. Competition policy: few would argue. In this part of the column we want to put forth an argument that an equitable income distribution is also a necessary ingredient for long-run, stable growth. The basis of this statement is an empirical regularity that characterizes nearly every case of successful development (during the shift from middle to high income) in the last half of the 20^th century.

Since 1945, we can divide the world into three groups of countries. The high income countries, like the US, the UK, Germany and France; the poor and chronically underdeveloped; and the new members of the OECD club. Somewhat surprisingly, over the past 70 years, there have been only 15 or so countries that have graduated from poor to middle to high income. The list includes two East Asian countries/regions (South Korea and Taiwan); four Mediterranean countries (Portugal; Spain; Greece and Israel); six Eastern European countries (Croatia; Slovenia; Slovak Republic; Hungary; Czech Republic and Estonia; and two other countries (Ireland and New Zealand).

Most salient for our column is that in the case of all of these successful countries an equitable income distribution is feature they all share. This is true goingback as early in their development paths as possible. Using a popular measure of inequality, the Gini ratio (where 0 is perfect equality and 100 is perfect inequality), it can be shown that the average Gini ratio of the new members of the OECD club is only 33, a level of the Gini that is relative low. The range of the Gini measures for these successfully graduating countries is from 26 to 39. Not one of the Gini ratios is more than 40. Such a pattern of income distributions suggests that, on average, those countries that were successful in moving from low to middle to higher income not only share a common growth path, successfully took them from middle to high income, all of the nations did so with fairy low levels of inequality.

Such low levels of inequality for the successfully developed countries can be seen to be in stark contrast to the countries in the world that grew, hit middle income status and then ultimately stagnated or collapsed. Argentina, Brazil, Iraq and Mexico are examples of countries that had rapid spurts of growth, joined the ranks of the world’s middle income countries, only to find their growth aspirations squashed. These countries all were striving to become high income, industrialized, developed countries. At some point during the past 70 years, however, each of these countries experienced either dire collapse or long and frustrating stagnation.

What is a characteristic that all of these failed-to-move-up-from-middle-income countries share? When comparing the Gini ratios of these wannabe-but-never-made-it nations with those that successfully graduated, there could not be a greater contrast. Whereas there were no successful developed countries with a Gini ratio over 40, there were no countries that experience growth and stagnation/collapse with Gini ratios under 40. The Gini ratios of Brazil and Mexico and Iraq were all around 50.

So where is China on this list? China’s level of inequality, according to one of the most complete and internationally comparable study done at Beijing Normal University by Professor Li Shi and his colleagues, is among the highest in the world. As of 2007, it was 50 (or 49.7 to be precise). Between 2003 and 2007 it rose more than any country in the world. Others say it is higher—see the work of Li Gan from Sichuan University. Hence, although China has attained middle income status in the past decade, it also is part of a group of countries that is trying to transition to high income status at levels of inequality which have not ever been associated with successful transition—at least not in the past 70 years.

What is the problem with high inequality?

So why is it that inequality is so inimical for a middle income country striving to reach high income? We believe the reason is twofold. The first has to do with the inevitability of growth slow down and expectations. When a country is growing fast (as countries can do when they are moving from poor to middle income—as China has been over the past three decades), even if there is a high level inequality, most people in society have expectations that they will be better off if they stick inside the system. In China during the past several decades, even for those at the lower end of the income distribution, their standard of living is higher now than 10 years ago. Relying on extrapolations from the past, most people believe that they will continue to become better off. At the very least they will tell you that they expect their children will be able to live a better life in the future.

High growth has made these rising expectations possible—even for the poor. There has been enough for all to “go around.” Hence, with positive expectations about being able to get better in the future, even facing long working hours, cruel living conditions and low wages, individuals have chosen to work “inside the system.” For most, working in the system mean that they get a job, save as much as possible and look forward to making even more and having more savings in the future.

This whole system, however, is predicated on growth trickling down to the poor. If growth slows, it is possible that the expectations may not be realized. We believe that it is these expectations that have produced the glue holding society together—despite the high levels of inequality.  The key question or the real fear is that when expectations are popped, individuals may decide to opt out of the system into the informal or even the gray/black economy.

The second problem with high income inequality is that it often is accompanied by high inequality in education, nutrition and health. So why is this a problem? In a high income, developed economy, by definition wages are high. Because wages are high, however, employers will demand that employees are equipped with the requisite skills—math, language, science, English, computer skills—to perform tasks that create earnings that help offset the high wages. If individuals do not have such skills, employers may take actions to layoff such employees or not hire them in the first place. Employers will look to replace labor with capital and/or move low-skilled jobs off shore. The problem with many countries that have grown fast from poor the middle income and are currently trying to push onto high income status is that there was a disconnect between what students learned in the previous decade or so and what job skills are needed. If a high enough proportion of the labor force is not equipped with the skills needed for a high wage economy, a share of the labor force might become unemployable. As before, if this polarization of the labor force occurs, the only choice of those that are unemployable by the formal labor force would be to move into the informal labor force and/or gray/black economy.

While all economies have such polarized segments of their economy, there are several problems facing middle income countries—especially those that had grown fast in recent years. Dealing with large shares of population in an informal economy requires lots of resources—for unemployment insurance, disability, retraining, health, etc. Since these countries have not yet graduated to high income status, by definition, their level of wealth might make it difficult to spend large sums of money to contain disruption out of the informal economy. If the disruption continues, it can lead to escalating violence and unrest, which will require even more resources to contain. Ironically, the very disruption that is being created by the slowing growth could very well lead to a further slowing of growth if fewer resources are spent on productive investments (instead of containment) and if the disruption itself diminishes interest in investment inside the country. In addition, many of those in the informal economy may exhibit particularly unsatisfied behavior (read anger and disaffection) since the may well feel their original expectations were undermined by the formal establishment. If the size of this part of the population is big enough, the country could find itself atop a powder keg.

In summary, then, the problem with inequality is complicated but real. Inequality in the face of slow growth can lead to unfulfilled expectations and diminished opportunities. Individuals can be polarized into two groups: those inside the system and those outside the system. If inequality is particularly great, the number of those outside the system could be large. Since middle income countries are not rich yet, resources may be insufficient to contain the anger and violence of those in the gray/black economies and/or support the needs of those in the informal economy (who are not contributing a lot to the overall economy). If the disruption is large enough, there could be negative feedback onto growth which could serve to further exacerbate the problem. An end point of stagnation or collapse is certainly plausible.

Our column’s real title: 10 ways to battle inequality; 10 ways to save China’s future

This column is going to be a series of ten articles about China’s inequality. It is a column about how managing that inequality may mean the difference between a bright and vibrant China in 2033 and a China teetering on the edge of collapse. Despite the potential doom, however, this is a column of hope because we believe inequality can be managed—given aggressive, enlightened and motivated decisions TODAY … or at least in the very near future.

However, this column is not about inequality today. We are not going to analyze the accuracy of the estimates of income inequality produced by the China National Bureau of Statistics. We are not going to vote for the higher estimate of Li Shi and his group from Beijing Normal University or the even higher one from Sichuan University’s Li Gan. We are simply going to live with the status quo, one that virtually everyone agrees with: China’s income distribution in 2013 is highly unequal.

Instead we are going to be writing about inequality tomorrow. However, one of the most basic axioms of poverty economics—especially given China’s high inequality today—means that we need to be engaged in this battle against high inequality tomorrow today. The axiom that we are talking about has been made famous both by Nobel Laureates who are spinning their advice for the global economy and by retiring economic planners-cum-policy makers as they write their memoirs. The iron rule of income distribution—lets call this Axiom 1, at some point in the future is:

Tomorrow’s income inequality = Today’s income inequality + Today’s human capital inequality.

This simple formula, above all, embodies on important lesson. Tomorrow’s income inequality is what we are interested in. The first installment of our column today has tried to motivate that this has to be low – or at least not too high – for China to enjoy long-run sustained growth and stable prosperity. We also know—by assumption or by common sense—that Today’s income inequality is high. Hence: to get to where we want to go—that is, low income inequality in the 2030s—we have one and only one degree of freedom. We need to put tremendous attention on reducing human capital inequality today.

If you are following our argument, and if you know anything about the gap between health and education in China today, this column would appear to be one of despair. In fact, this column will fuel that despair. Why? Because are going to show that the human capital gap in China today is ugly. Ugly as in wide. The gap is wide for education. The gap is wide for nutrition. The gap is wide for health. It is wide for babies, preschoolers, elementary school kids, those in middle and high school and for the college-bound. If China does not do anything—and, we mean act seriously—about this gap, and you believe in Axiom 1, it may be time for you to begin to plan for the worst in the coming years.

However, this column will also try to be a source of hope. We will discuss a large number of interventions that work. There are actions that can reduce the human capital gaps at all age levels—from infants to those in elite universities. They are proven. Many are cheap. Many are simple. Some need fundamental rethinking. But, when you add up the price tag of them all and you compare it to the possible costs in the future, we believe a War on Rural Education, Nutrition and Health Inequality is the Best Buy that the government can make.

Stay tuned, then, in the coming months—one column per month. We are going to write about inequality in baby health, nutrition and cognitive abilities between infants in the Qingling Mountains in Southern Shaanxi and China’s tiny princes and princesses in the cities in October. We are going to write about preschool inequality in November. December, January and February will examine the health, nutrition and education crises in poor rural elementary schools and in schools in China’s migrant communities. The rest of the months will talk about inequality in middle school, vocational high school, academic high school and college. There is not a lot of pretty about the gaps that exist in each of these age groups. However, as we stated above, we also will offer solutions—ones that we have evaluated; others that others have initiated. Many of them work. Others need more effort. We will try to inform you of the choices and the hope that can be created by trying. Seriously trying.

Join us for the 4th annual China 2.0 conference on Thursday, October 3 from 9 am - 6 pm at the Frances C. Arrillaga Alumni Center, Stanford University. Be part of the largest annual China tech and business conference hosted by the Stanford Graduate School of Business.

Confirmed Keynote Speakers
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Charles Chao CEO & Chairman of the Board, SINA	Martin Lau President, Tencent	Gary Locke U.S. Ambassador to the People's Republic of China

This year's program will feature keynotes, panels and interactive sessions by executives, young entrepreneurs, and investors from China’s leading (and up and coming) internet, mobile, big data, and e-commerce firms. Government leaders and Stanford faculty will also weigh in on the drivers, dynamics and implications of China’s rise in the digital innovation economy.

Only 500 seats are available for this event which sells out every year. Plan to be part of China 2.0's unique mix of participants--Stanford students, alumni, faculty plus leaders driving the digital innovation economy in China and Silicon Valley.

The Stanford Graduate School of Business’ Greater China Business Club and China 2.0 are partnering to offer additional conference sessions for Stanford students. Details to follow soon.

About China 2.0

China 2.0, an initiative of the Stanford Graduate School of Business, focuses on innovation and entrepreneurship in China by looking at the drivers and dynamics of China as a digital power and its implications for commerce, communications and content in the global economy.

China 2.0 offers students unique educational opportunities, fosters cutting-edge research, connects thought leaders and impacts the next generation of entrepreneurs.

A bridge between China and Silicon Valley, China 2.0 brings together executives, entrepreneurs, investors, policy makers and academicsdriving change on both sides of the Pacific through seminars and the largest annual China technology and business conferences hosted by the Stanford Graduate School of Businessat Stanford and in China.

Audience

In September of 2012, over 600 people attended the China 2.0 conference at the Stanford Graduate School of Business. Approximately 70% of the attendees were from the Stanford community (alumni, students, and faculty). The remaining 30% included attendees from companies/organizations including: Applied Materials, American Express, Cisco, Deloitte, Draper Fisher Jurvetson, eBay, Google, HP, Huawei, Oracle, Qunar.com, Silicon Valley Bank, the U.S. Department of State, and Yahoo!

Media coverage

China 2.0 conferences and research output have attracted broadcast, print, and online coverage from leading media organizations such as: ABC7, All Things Digital, Associated Press, Bloomberg Businessweek, China Daily, The Economist, Financial Times, Forbes, The New York Times, Sina, The Wall Street Journal, and Wired.

For more information, please visit the conference website.

To learn about sponsorship opportunities contact:
Caitlin Johnson at caitlinj@stanford.edu or +1 650.725.3126.

To attend as a media representative contact:
Barbara Buell at buell_barbara@gsb.stanford.edu or +1 650.723.1771.

For general information please email: sprie-stanford@stanford.edu.