On February 25 and 26, the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law at Stanford University, in partnership with the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, hosted a symposium titled, "Addressing the Accountability Gap in Statebuilding: The Case of Afghanistan." This event brought together leading experts, government officials, diplomats, practitioners, and academics to examine the problems of accountability, corruption, and election fraud that have risen in the wake of international statebuilding efforts in Afghanistan.

This unique forum allowed participants-both Afghan actors and members of the international community- who are heavily involved in building the institutions of the Afghan state, to participate in an honest exchange with their peers to surface challenges and generate recommendations to improve the practice of statebuilding moving forward. 

Panels were designed around the following questions: how to establish accountability in statebuilding, address electoral fraud evidenced in 2009 and 2010, manage powerbrokers who monopolize informal governance networks, coordinate anti-corruption efforts, and develop a political strategy for Afghanistan's future. What surfaced throughout these presentations and discussion was the issue of the "double compact" in Afghanistan-the failure of Afghans to self-govern and the failure of the international community to construct the institutions of a functioning state.

Participants proposed a new framework for governance that adopts a more participatory approach with the international community, Afghan government, and the public as equal partners in statebuilding endeavors. While challenges emerged there were also a number of key recommendations and strategies proposed  that can be pioneered by this influential group of policymakers and practitioners to ease the transition of responsibility to the Afghan government in 2014.  

The keynote address was delivered by former Afghan Minster of Finance and 2009 presidential candidate Dr. Ashraf Ghani, to an audience of more than 100 students and members of the local community. Dr. Ghani provided an honest and pragmatic account of the parallel and conflicting systems driven by the international community, which have given rise to systemic failure and corruption in Afghanistan.

"We are dealing with a crooked playing field," Dr. Ghani said recognizing that both the Afghan and international community were jointly responsible for this outcome. "When the field itself is crooked the nature of reform and change that we must initiate are very different. "

Dr. Ghani spent considerable time discussing the outsourcing of development to Washington-based firms that manage million dollar contracts and outsource technical work to foreign technocrats. This in Dr. Ghani's opinion does little to strengthen the internal capacities of the state, provide training opportunities to Afghans or allocate resources effectively to the general public.

Dr. Ghani stressed the importance of speaking honestly about these dysfunctions in the development system, "We need to start talking truth to each other if we are going to deal with this phenomenon. This double failure now is the genesis of the present."

Dr. Ghani channeled the sentiments of the Afghan public into the room by emphasizing the uncertainty that defines their lives. "Today it is the sense of injustice that drives conflict," Dr. Ghani said. "The level of conflict is driven by injustice. What Afghans yearn for is normalcy-the sense that the lives of our children and grandchildren will be better and what my generation endured will not be repeated."

The level of conflict is driven by injustice. What Afghans yearn for is normalcy-the sense that the lives of our children and grandchildren will be better and what my generation endured will  not be repeated.                    -Dr. Ashraf Ghani 

 Looking forward, Dr. Ghani advised that accountability mechanisms and feedback loops must be implemented to ensure that the necessary auditing and accounting mechanisms are in place to control corruption and ensure transparency. In addition, he called for one coherent system of rules that must be developed and agreed upon to govern development and prevent parallel systems from circumventing these rules. Finally, he advised adopting national programs that model the success of the National Solidarity Program, which reduced child mortality rates by 16%.

Dr. Ghani commented on the unique position that Afghanistan occupies at the crossroads of Asia, in the middle of "four huge hubs of change," China, India, Russia, and the Gulf. "A new regional era has to be created, if France and Germany could overcome hundreds of years of conflict we must create another sense of opportunity."

Dr. Ghani concluded by placing the hope and responsibility for Afghanistan's future in the hands of its younger generation, "We must talk about the generation compact in Afghanistan, our sons and daughters-both literal and figurative-are the source of growth and the source of dynamism...The women of Afghanistan, the youth of Afghanistan, and the poor of Afghanistan are the three numerical majorities that have been reduced to political and economic minority. Without investing in women, investing in youth and tackling the challenge of poverty, we are not going to have stability."

At the end of the two day symposium, participants collectively called for a comprehensive political strategy to facilitate the peaceful and legal transfer of power in 2014, which marks the end of President Karzai's term in office. With this important milestone in the near future, the international community remains committed to working with their Afghan counterparts to introduce political reform measures that will strengthen accountability mechanisms between the Afghan state and society. 

As Dr. Ghani eloquently stated at the end of his presentation, "We have to have an agenda of the future, we must engage in writing the history of the future."

It took just 29 days for President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali to flee Tunisia after mass protests erupted in the country.  Twenty-three years of authoritarian rule crumbling in less than a month is rather remarkable, especially considering the relative “calm” that had prevailed in Tunisia during those two decades.

Tunisia rarely hit the headlines then. No Islamists threatening to overtake the government (the Islamist al-Nahda party was outlawed in 1991). No terrorist networks causing security concerns (the exception being the sole attack on a synagogue in 2002 which catalyzed stepped up security measures). No strategic interests for the USA to speak of. And Ben Ali’s regime succeeded in marketing Tunisia as a safe tourist haven. Cities like Hammamet allowed tourists to be parachuted into newly built all-inclusive resorts that could have been anywhere in the world. There was even a custom-built, sanitized version of a traditional medinah in Yasmine Hammamet, which reminded one more of the artificiality of the world landmarks in Las Vegas than of real North African souks.

Tunisia’s sanitized image was also due to a severe crackdown on freedom of expression, as the country had one of the highest levels of media control—especially of the internet—in the world.

But what Ben Ali’s flight showed is how fragile the foundations of his rule were. So vulnerable that, in contrast to Iran and Egypt’s leaders’ resilience in the face of mass protests, he quickly offered one concession after another before completely giving up, making it clear that he was in fear for his life.

What will happen next in Tunisia is uncertain. The Tunisian opposition is divided into groups with wildly different agendas, from the Islamists of al-Nahda to the secular reformists of the Congress for the Republic headed by Moncef Marzouki. There is no political figure who can be clearly envisaged to become the next Tunisian president, and the way the balance will tip—will there be democracy, or another authoritarian regime of a merely different kind?—is unpredictable. But the clearest lessons that have emerged from Tunisia so far are that there is a real democratic potential in the Arab world and that authoritarian regimes in the region are not always what they appear to be. Those lessons are important on two fronts:

On the foreign policy front, the Tunisian uprising seems to have catalyzed US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to make the US administration’s boldest verbal statement thus far on the need for reform in the Arab world. Describing the political order of some Arab countries as “stagnant”, Clinton, on a visit to Bahrain on January 13, said that “This is a critical moment and this is a test of leadership for all of us”.

The United States is continuously criticized by democracy experts for favoring stability over the risks of democracy in the Arab world, and for backing up authoritarian leaders—whether directly or indirectly—for fear of having to deal with an unfavorable alternative (namely, an Islamist government, as in Egypt or Syria). Tunisia should be a relatively easy case for the United States in this context, a litmus test of putting one’s money where one’s mouth is. But it also shows how applauding stability can make countries like the United States blind to the democratic potential lurking beneath the façade of seemingly impenetrable regimes.

Western governments—including that of the United States—have mostly publicly congratulated the Tunisian people on their uprising, and France and other European countries refused Ben Ali entry on Friday when his plane was looking for a place to land. This reaction has been met with cynicism by Hizbullah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, a man who, since 2006, has been working to build up his credentials as the only credible Arab leader in the present time.  In a speech on Sunday, Nasrallah was quick to point out the irony of Ben Ali’s lack of welcome in the very countries which he had “served” throughout the duration of his rule.  So, on the regional front, the case of Tunisia unveils how quickly US opponents like Nasrallah can capitalize on short-sighted foreign policy. Nasrallah’s statement paints Western support for authoritarian Arab leaders as a house of cards that can crumble with the slightest shake—a warning to the West and Arab leaders reliant on Western support alike.

It is no coincidence that the reaction to the developments in Tunisia by other Arab regimes has mostly been to lay low. And here we can find another, more important, house of cards. Ben Ali’s regime has been exposed for the decaying entity that it is, and already copycat protests in other Arab countries—Jordan, Algeria, Egypt, and even Mauritania—have started. While a blanket domino effect across the region is not likely, reformists can take heart from Tunisia’s experience: while an authoritarian regime may appear to be indestructible, it may well be a mere house of cards.    

On July 25, WikiLeaks released a compendium of 91,000 U.S. field reports from Afghanistan covering the years 2004-2010. Thomas Fingar joined a panel of experts and WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange on France 24 for a televised debate, "War and Whistle-blowing," to discuss the significance of the documents. Fingar put the documents in context, stating that it is not the contents of the documents themselves but the sensationalism caused over them that will have an effect.

Francis Fukuyama, one of the world's most prominent experts on democracy, development, and governance has joined Stanford University's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) as the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow, effective July 2010.  He will reside in FSI's Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, and fully engage in the center's research, teaching, and policy missions, CDDRL Director Larry Diamond announced.

I am thrilled to be joining Larry Diamond, Stephen D. Krasner, Kathryn Stoner and other colleagues in CDDRL's research, teaching, and policy engagement," said Fukuyama.  "CDDRL is world renowned for its interdisciplinary programs which bridge academic research and policy analysis - and we need break-through thinking in both to advance political and economic development."
- Francis Fukuyama

Fukuyama comes to FSI from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University, where he was the Bernard L. Schwartz Professor of International Political Economy and director of the International Development Program at SAIS.

"We are thrilled that Frank is joining CDDRL and our quest to understand how countries advance politically and economically and the role governance plays in these interrelated challenges," said Diamond. "His path-breaking work on democracy, governance, and state building, his probing intellect, and his passionate commitment to advance theoretical and practical understanding of development - in all its dimensions - will be wonderful assets to our center and students, to the Freeman Spogli Institute, and to Stanford University."

Fukuyama has written widely on political and economic development. His best-known book, The End of History and the Last Man (Free Press, 1992) made the bestseller lists in the United States, France, Japan, and Italy and was awarded the Los Angeles Times' Book Critics Award and the Premio Capri for the Italian edition.  Fukuyama is also the author of America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy (2006), State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21^st Century (2004), Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution (2002), The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order (1999) and Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (1995).  His new book The Origins of Political Order will be published in March 2011.

"We are delighted to welcome Frank Fukuyama at this dynamic time for FSI, particularly as we launch a new Global Underdevelopment Action Fund, to seed action-oriented, multidisciplinary faculty research projects in support of global development," said FSI Director Coit D. Blacker. "Frank's exemplary scholarship and teaching, and his dedication to the expansion of democracy and development, are an inspiration to Stanford faculty and students, and to leaders in transitioning countries the world over."

Dr. Fukuyama served as a member of the President's Council on Bioethics from 2001-2005. He holds an honorary doctorate from Connecticut College, Doane College, and Doshisha University (Japan). He is a member of the Board of Trustees of the Rand Corporation, and sits on the editorial or advisory boards of The American Interest, the Journal of Democracy, the Inter-American Dialogue, and the New America Foundation.

Fukuyama received a BA in classics from Cornell University and a PhD in political science from Harvard. He was a member of the political science department of the Rand Corporation in 1979-80, from 1983 to 1989 and in 1995-96. In 1981-82 and again in 1989, Fukuyama was a member of the Policy Planning Staff of the U.S. Department of State, specializing first in Middle East affairs and then as Deputy Director for European political-military affairs. From 1996-2000, Fukuyama was the Omer L. and Nancy Hirst Professor of Public Policy at George Mason University.

"I am thrilled to be joining Larry Diamond, Stephen D. Krasner, Kathryn Stoner and other colleagues in CDDRL's research, teaching, and policy engagement," said Fukuyama.  "CDDRL is world renowned for its interdisciplinary programs which bridge academic research and policy analysis - and we need break-through thinking in both to advance political and economic development."