This paper discusses several possible offensive applications of an SDI system or parts thereof--whether implemented by the US or the USSR. An effective ballistic missile defense may not make nuclear weapons impotent; rather, a BMD may have the opposite effect if used to suppress the ICBM deterrent of an adversary. The lower demands of an offensive system compared to a defensive system suggest that the offensive uses may in fact be favored in the implementation of SDI.

also in Franklin A. Long, Donald Haffner, and Jeffrey Boutwell (eds.), Weapons in Space, W.W. Norton & Co., 1986, pp. 257-278; exerpted in P. Edward Haley and Jack Merritt (eds.) Strategic Defense Initiative: Folly or Future?, Westview Press, 1986, pp. 139-150

This report analyzes a simulation, conducted in the spring of 1984 at Stanford University, of a hypothetical U.S.-Soviet crisis in Germany.  The simulation was organized by the Center for International Security and Arms Control as a part of the course, Political Science 138B, "Arms Control and Disarmament Seminar."

The purpose of this study is not to predict whether or not inadvertent war in Europe will occur but to understand how it might possibly occur and how better to avoid it.  The utility of the crisis simulation lies in the insights it provides regarding (1) difficult policy dilemmas likely to be experienced at many points in a crisis and (2) possibilities for misperception, misjudgment, and escalation that inhere in the process of interaction between the two sides in a crisis.

On October 30, 1984, a workshop met at the Stanford Center for International Security and Arms Control to examine near-term prospects for and alternative approaches to strategic defense. This report provides the results of that examination and thus represents the consensus of the signatories on a limited set of high-priority objectives and activities in strategic defense.

An earlier study by the Center gave a critical assessment of the President's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). One of its recommendations was an unspecified, treaty-consistent research and development (R&D) program in antiballistic missile (ABM) defense at "a level not very different from recent amounts." Because such an effort is also proposed herein, the present report may in that one sense be seen as a logical complement to the earlier study. However, not all of the members of this workshop endorse all of the conclusions of that study. Also, the present report is limited to the ABM research and development the United States should be pursuing in the near term (5-10 years).

This study by an eminent scientist, a former U.S. arms control official and a specialist on Soviet defense policy at Stanford, is strongly critical of President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative, popularly known as "Star Wars," whether it is viewed as transcending deterrence through a nearly foolproof defense or, as more recently argued, as enhancing deterrence through a partial defense. The authors review the proposed technologies, as well as the countermeasures by which offensive systems could offset defensive systems, and question the technological feasibility and the cost assumptions. They confirm the findings of other reports. But the principal value of this one is in its discussion of the political effects upon the Soviet Union, U.S. allies, and arms control negotiations. Strategic stability would be impaired, it is argued, if in the absence of a major new arms control agreement both sides built up their offensive forces while simultaneously developing their new defense capabilities. The impact upon European and Asian allies would be decoupling, pushing them into new nuclear programs and to questioning American guarantees. One need not agree with the conclusions of this study to recognize its merits. A most useful contribution to what will surely be a growing debate.

--Foreign Affairs

A paperback edition with a new introduction was published in 1984.

In early 1983, members of Stanford University's Center for International Security and Arms Control met to discuss ideas on the establishment of a joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. center to support cooperative efforts to prevent accidental nuclear war. William Perry (former Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering) began the discussion by outlining several measures he felt could help to reduce the risk of nuclear war by accident or miscalculation. Calling attention to the earlier proposals of Senators Gary Hart, Sam Nunn, and Henry Jackson, he endorsed the concept of a joint accidental nuclear war prevention center as a mechanism to support efforts of the two superpowers to prevent or reduce the likelihood of the outbreak of nuclear war. Most notable in this regard was his personal experience of an erroneous warning of a large-scale Soviet missile attack on the U.S., which resulted from a NORAD computer malfunction. Information exchanges and consultation to clarify circumstances surrounding an accident - or the misperceptions that might result from one - could be facilitated by a number of different types of centers that have been suggested. Perry described one possible configuration for such a center, consisting of two stations, jointly staffed and located in Washington and Moscow.

Members of the Stanford Center met again in June 1983 to examine in more detail the issues raised by this idea and similar ones, and possible next steps involved in implementation. This paper reports on research in progress on this subject. In addition to the Perry contribution, much of the conceptual analysis of the missions of a joint center derives from the work of Alexander George on crisis prevention and crisis management.' Those elements of the research covering the technical and 'mechanization' requirements are contributed by Elliott Levinthal and Ted Ralston. Lastly, the suggested negotiating approach derives from the experiences and thinking of Sidney Graybeal, former U.S. Commissioner of the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC).

The development of thermonuclear weapons marked one of the major turning points in the history of Soviet-American strategic arms competition. In his book The Advisors Herbert York enhances our understanding of this turning-point by showing that the first Soviet thermonuclear device, which was exploded on 12 August 1953, was not a superbomb but had a different configuration and a substantially lower yield. York's analysis is important because it makes it possible to assess more accurately the progress of the Soviet nuclear weapons development in the 1950s, and to understand more clearly the nature of Soviet-American strategic arms competition.

The object of this note is to make public a document which gives more detailed information about Soviet nuclear weapons test in the 1950s. The data given here support York's analysis.