Much has been written already about the changed international system of the 1990s, projecting the configuration of a restructured Europe, the future role of the former Soviet republics and the United States, and the emergence of a multipolar world with or without a dominant hegemon. In the search for new structures and explanations, however, it is too often assumed in error that these apply to what we label the "Third World" in the same way that they do to the "North" or the "West."

This book explores the phenomenon of global transformation in the context of the Third World, looking specifically at the preference for more democratic political systems, the emergence of a new international economic order, and the changing forms of conflict, its mitigation, and its resolution. The authors provide major theoretical analyses of these three trends, as well as in-depth case studies that explore specific developments.

This book is essentially a series of case histories of U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms control negotiations, as seen from the American side. It describes the processes of governmental decisionmaking for arms control in Washington, D.C., and the techniques for joint U.S.-Soviet decisionmaking at the negotiating table.

As general counsel of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and member of U.S. delegations to disarmament conferences for eight years, the author was in a unique position to assess the difficulties of fashioning an arms control treaty that could pass muster within the executive branch of the U.S. government, be approved by U.S. allies, be successfully negotiated with the Soviets, and then win the approval of the U.S. Senate. This process will be even more complex now that the United States will face at least four nuclear powers from the former U.S.S.R.

The book has three purposes. The first is to add to the recorded history of the following negotiations: the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, the ABM Treaty of 1972 and its companion SALT Interim Agreements, and the 1987 INF Treaty. The author asks in each case, What did the president and his assistants do (or fail to do) to negotiate a successfulu agreement?

The second purpose is to use the case book approach, common in law schools and business schools, as a teaching device for those who wish to learn how the American government made decisions about arms control negotiations, how U.S.-Soviet negotiators reached decisions, and what the results of the decisions have been.

The book's third purpose is to generalize about what works and what does not work in the complex world of arms control negotiations, including information on the impact of negotiating committees and comparisons of the process for negotiating arms control treaties with that for achieving arms limits through action and reaction, without written agreement. The concluding chapter looks to the future: What changes will occur in the arms control process given the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union?

Stanford University's Center for International Security and Arms Control (CISAC) has undertaken a project to work with elements of the Soviet defense industry to help them convert production from military to civilian uses. In this project we refer to conversion as the use of defense industry facilities, personnel, and/or technology for the production of nondefense products and services. One aspect of this work is to facilitate cooperation between U.S. and Soviet companies. Representative Les Aspin, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee (HASC), asked the Center to initiate this project. The Institute of U.S.A. and Canada Studies (ISKAN) of the Soviet Academy of Sciences is coordinating the Soviet Union's participation.

In recent years issues in international security have been increasingly influenced by economic factors. This is evident in the defense budgets of the major powers as well as in arms transfers to regions such as the Middle East. Furthermore, arms control has taken on a broader meaning, involving unilateral cuts and confidence-building measures to supplement negotiated structural arms-control agreements.

The principal objective of this project is to assist the Soviet defense industry in their defense conversion activities by:

• Analyzing the conversion problem in the Soviet Union and, if appropriate, extracting lessons from the U.S. experience.
• Assisting the Soviets in contacting and exploring cooperative ventures with appropriate U.S. companies.
• Stimulating discussions among Soviet defense experts and U.S. government officials and academics on appropriate changes to trade policy.

This paper deals with defense conversion (broadly interpreted) in the newly independent states (NIS) of the former Soviet Union (FSU), with emphasis on the situation in Russia. Our premise is that economic progress is a sine qua non for political stability and the growth of democratic institutions, and hence for international security. Therefore it is in the best interests of all countries, and primarily the United States, to assist the economic reforms in the NIS. We further believe that the efficient use of a considerable portion of the assets of the military-industrial complex is necessary if the economic reforms are to succeed.

In this paper we analyze some of the major barriers to conversion, and the incentives and problems involved in providing external assistance for this conversion, as well as steps that can only be accomplished internally. The paper includes a description of a project on conversion in the Soviet Union and later in Russia, undertaken in early 1990, at the Center for International Security and Arms Control (CISAC). The work has included interactions between Soviet and Russian industrialists, government officials, and scholars with their counterparts, as well as with members of the legal and financial communities, in the United States. The report also contains a case study of conversion and privatization at one enterprise, the Saratov Aviation Plant. The report concludes with recommendations (summarized below) to both industry and government in the United States and in the NIS. This work has been supported by the Carnegie Corporation of New York.

Since this paper was drafted many of our recommendations have been adopted through policy statements; however, in many cases, realization of these policies is still subject to final congressional action, administrative implementation, IMF negotiations with the governments of the NIS, and legislation by the NIS.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union has brought new nuclear non-proliferation dangers and opportunities. Both revolve around the approximately thirty thousand nuclear weapons and the fissile materials for perhaps ninety thousand nuclear bombs in the former Soviet Union. The weapons are now deployed in only four of the newly independents states - most in Russia, but some still in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. "Loose Nukes" is the colloquial description of one aspect of the new threats.

New positive and negative assurances from all five permanent members of the UN Security Council are now vitally important, not only to provide support to Ukraine and every other non-nuclear-weapons state's legitimate concerns, but to advance the vital goals of nuclear non-proliferation prior to the critical 1995 NPT review and extension conference.

Stanford University's Center for International Security and Arms Control (CISAC) started a project in early 1990 following a proposal from Marshal Akhromeyev,specialadvisor to President Gorbachev and Les Aspin, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee.  The intent was to bring a delegation of Soviet defense executives, government officials and academicians to the United States. The objectives of the project were to study and assi§t the process of demilitarization through the diversion of military production assets, broadly interpreted (facilities, personnl., technology, etc.), and to building a civilian industry and infrastructure. In spite of changes in the project agenda, the objectives remain the same. These objectives are being addressed by informing the debate in the Russian and American
governments as well as in the international financial institutions, recommending innovative conversion efforts, interacting directly with Russian defense enterprises and American companies interested in cooperative business activities, and participating in scholarly analyses through publications and topical conferences.

This report outlines the problems faced by Saratov Aviation Plant (SAP) in its efforts to create an employee-owned joint-stock company in present-day Russia. Many of these problems are technical in nature and are consequences of the underdeveloped legal regime. Perhaps more troubling in the long run are the difficulties of the SAP managers and workers in understanding this new ownership form and their tendency to view it as somehow threatening to them. Complicating the situation further is the persistence of the problems of the old command-administrative system, such as the absence of a stable supply network, an aging capital stock, and a high level of labor turnover.