This report summarizes analytical work completed on the Trident SLBM nuclear weapons safety issue. First, we evaluated the increase in low levels of risk of death from cancer from potential plutonium dispersal accidents at the Trident base at Kings Bay, Georgia. Specifically, we estimated the number of latent cancer fatalities resulting from a hypothetical worst-case accident involving a 10-kilogram release of weapons-grade plutonium aerosol at Kings Bay with the wind direction toward downtown Jacksonville, located 55 kilometers away. The estimated number of long-term cancer deaths ranges from 5 to 3300 and depends on a number of factors and assumptions including deposition velocity, wind speed and direction, the nature of the plume, and mixing layer height.

Second, we applied a simple, "back ofthe envelope" risk-analytic approach to the Trident safety problem to try to shed some light on the key question: How much should be spent on safety modifications for Trident? Depending on a variety of assumptions and value judgments, our analysis suggests that if one believes that the probability of a serious accident over the 30-year Trident program lifetime is of order 0.01 to 0.10, then an expenditure of $1-5 billion to increase safety is not unwarranted given reasonable estimates of the consequences of such an accident.

Starting in the winter of 1991, the project on Industrial Restructuring and the Political

Economy in Russia at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Arms

Control (CISAC) has provided technical assistance to Mashinostroenie, a large aerospace enterprise engaged in research, design, experimental production, and systems integration of a broad variety of space vehicles and equipment. Officially known as NPO Mashinostroenie, the firm is one of the most prestigious enterprises in the Russian military-industrial complex, with world-class, state-of-the-art technology. The enterprise brings together many of the country's best scientists and engineers, along with management systems to execute their ideas.

Since 1992, the CISAC Defense Conversion Project has been working with the Moscowbased Impuls. Impuls is a medium-sized firm with expertise in control microdevices for the military, such as control heads for guided bombs and detection equipment for various weapon systems. Currently Impuls is working aggressively to break into several commercial high-technology markets.

Given the privileged position of the military-industrial complex in the old Soviet order, many have asserted that the military-industrial complex would be most resistant to radical economic reform. As the coddled employees of the Soviet state, we should expect directors and workers of military enterprises as well as their ministerial superiors to fear liberalized prices, commercial markets, and privatization.

In this book, distinguished U.S. and Russian scholars analyze the great challenges confronting post-Communist Russia and examine the Yeltsin government's attempts to deal with them. Focusing on problems of state- and nation-building, economic reform, demilitarization, and the definition of Russia's national interests in its relations with the outside world, the authors trace the complex interplay between the communist legacy and efforts to chart new directions in both domestic and foreign policy in the years ahead.

Chapter 3 in The New Russia: Troubled Transformation, edited by Gail W. Lapidus.

In this book, edited by Gail W. Lapidus, distinguished U.S. and Russian scholars analyze the great challenges confronting post-Communist Russia and examine the Yeltsin government's attempts to deal with them. Focusing on problems of state- and nation-building, economic reform, demilitarization, and the definition of Russia's national interests in its relations with the outside world, the authors trace the complex interplay between the communist legacy and efforts to chart new directions in both domestic and foreign policy in the years ahead.

Based on interviews with participants and research in newly opened archives, the book reveals how the American atomic monopoly affected Stalin's foreign policy, the role of espionage in the evolution of the Soviet bomb, and the relationship between Soviet nuclear scientists and the country's political leaders.

Because of the Soviet Union's heavy emphasis on military prowess and capability, the military-industrial sector in the Soviet Union (and Russia) was larger than its counterparts in other industrialized societies. In addition to military equipment, it produced almost all civilian products with technology content such as appliances, electronic equipment, and aircraft.

With the ending of the Cold War, support for the military production from this sector was radically deemphasized. The necessary adjustment of the military enterprises to this demand shock has been embedded in far more comprehensive economic reforms. As the country has moved to a market economy and privatized much of its economic potential, the managers of the enterprises have found it necessary to convert most of their output to nonmilitary products and services as well as to restructure the enterprises.

The three major areas of restructuring are (1) the relationships of the enterprises with their owners, (2) the internal organization and operational procedures of the enterprises, and (3) the relations between the enterprises and the employees. The degree of success of the national economic reform program and the health of the economy will depend substantially on the degree of success of the defense enterprises in utilizing their residual assets (human, technological, and physical) to generate profitable economic activity.

This report deals with this economic transition, primarily at the enterprise level. We have met the directors of more than forty defense enterprises and worked with approximately ten of them in considerable detail and six in more detail, having spent between one quarter and one person year with managers from each of the six. The report contains case studies of these six enterprises as well as cross-cutting chapters on four critical aspects of enterprise restructuring--privatization, organization, accounting, and social services. These have emerged as the key factors governing the strategies of the enterprises, and they will be some of the primary determinants of the success or failure of an enterprise.

The Soviet Union's economy was overindustrialized and highly militarized, with a disproportionate share of the military industry located in the Russian Republic. It is therefore not surprising that industrial production, including military production, has dropped sharply in the economic environment of the last few years. Many enterprises are shrinking, but few are failing completely or going into bankruptcy, and there is little disaggregation of large enterprises into smaller legal entities. Thus, with the exception of privatization, the general profile of Russian industry has not changed greatly.

The creation of new entrants (new business entities), to the extent that it is occurring, is one of the more promising aspects of the economic transition. However, the managers of many of the large enterprises resist divesting themselves of segments of their business. They fear that subsequent capitalization will result in a major reduction of value of the parent because the parent's contribution to the capitalized spin-off will not command much equity. Directors recognize the need for decentralization of management and financial responsibility, but many of them prefer to create divisions rather than subsidiaries. They also try to bring outside investment into the entire large enterprise rather than into a subsidiary. It is difficult for small groups of employees to simply leave and form a new (start-up) corporation because of the lack of commercial and social services infrastructure, especially capital markets, and the lack of rights to use state facilities.

Presidential Decree No. 1400 issued September 23, 1993, fundamentally altered the course of Russia's political transition. Debilitating polarization during the two years before between President Boris Yeltsin's government and parliament had resulted in the virtual collapse of the Russian state. As Yeltsin explained when he announced the decree: "All political institutions and politicians have been involved in a futile and senseless struggle aimed at destruction. A direct effect of this is the loss of authority of state power as a whole..."