Western analysts have become increasingly alarmed with Russia's assertive foreign policy -- in both the economic and the political/strategic spheres -- toward the new states of the former Soviet Union. Many have cited Russia's military interventions in Georgia, Tajikistan, and Moldova as signals of Russia's new imperialist designs. Russian policy toward the Baltic states has also spurred alarm. While Russian troops pulled out of the Baltic states as planned, the Russian Foreign Ministry has nonetheless threatened economic sanctions against Estonia and Latvia if citizenship rights for Russians are not further delineated in these states. Beyond the territory of the former Soviet Union, Russian assertiveness regarding sanctions against Serbia, NATO expansion, and arms trade with developing countries has compelled several analysts to speak of a renewal of Russian expansionist tendencies and hence a return of Cold War tension between West and East.

Special report from a conference hosted by Stanford University's Center for International Security and Arms Control on "Nationalism, Ethnic Identity, and Conflict Management in Russia Today" on January 24-26, 1995. The four main topics addressed were problems of federalism and power-sharing between Moscow and the Russian republics; the results from a study of the attitudes of Russians and non-Russians in several republics toward political and economic reforms; the use of force to resolve disputes within the Russian Federation and the Commonwealth of Independent States; and the causes and consequences of the Chechnya crisis.

Despite the alarmist cries in the West over the outcome of Russia's election on Sunday, the overall balance in Parliament between the Communists and nationalists, on one hand, and the broad reformist middle, on the other, will not change.

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The increasing prospect of a communist and nationalist victory in Russia's parliamentary elections this month has fueled doubts about whether Russia's presidential election, scheduled for next June, will take place.

Even before President Boris Yeltsin's latest heart attack, the odds were only 50-50 for a democratic transfer of power, which has never occurred in Russia or the Soviet Union. There is a determination to preserve the status quo on the part of those who have prospered under Yeltsin's reign - whether Russia's new banking tycoons, gas and oil executives or the entourage of Kremlin aides that surrounds Yelstin. Re-electing Yeltsin, of course, has been their preferred strategy.

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Initially printed as "Signal Our Support for Democracy," Los Angeles Times, December 11, 1995.

Michael McFaul comments that the process leading up to the parliamentary vote on Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin's government in Jul 1995 suggests that the future of Russia's fragile democracy may not be so bleak.

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After Chechnya, many analysts predicted that Russia's flirtation with democracy was over. However, the process leading up to the parliamentary vote of no confidence in Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin's government last week suggests that the future of Russia's fragile democracy may not be so bleak. In fact, the so-called governmental crisis of the last two weeks has demonstrated that respect for the democratic process by Russian politicians is greater now than perhaps at any time in Russian history.

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On December 10, 1994, Russian president Boris Yeltsin ordered Russian armed forces into the Republic of Chechnya. For eight weeks thereafter, the Russian military waged a poorly organized but brutally destructive assault on the Chechen capital of Grozny.

In this paper, we investigate the extent and likely impact of employee ownership on the transition process under way in Central and Eastern Europe. Despite the fact that political realities in most of the region imply that sales or transfers to employees often represent a significant privatization path, much of the literature on economic reform has been critical of the potential role of employee ownership in enterprise restructuring (for example, Blanchard et al., 1991), although the ownership form also has a few proponents (for instance, Ellerman, 1990). The relative merits and differences in behavior of employee-owned firms compared with "conventional" capitalist firms in market economies have received considerable attention in the Western literature (for example, Bonin and Putterman, 1987; Bonin, Jones, and Putterman, 1992; Hansmann, 1990; Pencavel and Craig, 1994). What is not yet well understood is the particular strengths and deficiencies brought by employee ownership to the process of transition itself. Our attempts to answer this question provide the conceptual framework in this paper against which actual privatization programs in various countries are evaluated and against which hypotheses about relative performance may derived and tested.

The tasks of preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention are neither self-evident nor value-neutral, as some of their proponents seem to believe. Diplomacy that aims to resolve long-standing conflicts may have to take sides and coerce powerful parties into concessions. Diplomacy that aims to manage conflict so that it does not become violent may have to sacrifice a quest for justice in deference to the powerful. Prevention might conflict with important national and even global interests. If, as President Clinton has suggested many times, the primary American interest in Bosnia is thwarting the spread of the war, then the arms embargo has been an unqualified success. If, however, the primary American and global interest has been denying Serbian aggression and upholding the principle of Bosnian sovereignty, then the embargo has failed.

A focus on prevention ignores the role that conflict plays in driving political change in societies. For grievances to be redressed, they must be vocalized. If they are vocalized, those with a stake in the status quo will attempt to suppress them. Often the balance of change depends on the ability of the grieved to amplify the conflict to increase their support. If we have learned anything from the disparate cases of conflict resolution in recent decades -- the civil rights movement in the United States, the fight for human rights in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the fight for national self-determination in the Middle East, the fight against apartheid in South Africa -- it is that some conflicts must be intensified before they are resolved.

Preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention do not lessen the difficulty of choices for leaders, nor do they really lessen costs. For either to succeed, policymakers must still spell out their interests, set priorities among cases, and balance goals with resources. The president will still need to educate the American people about the rationale behind a policy and convince them of the need for action. Absent well-defined interests, clear goals, and prudent judgment about acceptable costs and risks, policies of preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention simply mean that one founders early in a crisis instead of later.

This report is the result of a CISAC-sponsored workshop in which several American companies doing business with military research and production enterprises could have more detailed interchanges with other American companies in a systematic way, and the results could be analyzed and reported.  The primary objective was to find successful approaches that could be applied to other ventures.  A secondary objective was to illuminate critical points for further collaboration and study.