There is a growing logjam of arms control treaties waiting for approval in both the Russian State Duma and the U.S. Senate. Without decisive action, this logjam will probably prevent approval by the world's two largest military powers of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II) of 1993, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty of 1996 (CTBT), amendments to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and the protocols of the Treaty of Pelindaba (creating an African nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ)) and the Treaty of Rarotonga (creating a South Pacific NWFZ) before the end of the century. It will also prevent progress towards START III and further bilateral nuclear reductions.

Superpresidentialism, ambiguous federalism, the weakness of political parties and labor and civic organizations, the inordinate strength of big business, and the virtual absence of the rule of law represent major blemishes on Russia's nascent democracy. . . [But] in bemoaning Russia's slow start in consolidating a liberal democracy, we must not forget the important progress made in establishing an electoral democracy in Russia.

The 1996 presidential election marked the end of polarized politics in Russia. If between 1990 and 1996 electoral politics have been contests between "communists" and "democrats," the next national elections will have a different logic. The threat of communist restoration died in the ballot box in 1996, but so, too, did anti-communism.

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Last week, two critical elections took place, one for governor in Nizhny Novgorod and one for mayor in Samara. These elections took on much greater significance than a typical regional election in that they filled offices vacated by two new deputy ministers in the current government: First Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov and Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Sysuyev. Since both Nemtsov and Sysuyev are considered leaders of Russia's "second liberal revolution," elections in Nizhny and Samara effectively served as referenda on the present government. Consequently, supporters and opponents of the current regime devoted inordinate amounts of time, organizational resources and money to their campaigns.

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"Claim-Making and Large-Scale Historical Processes in the Late Twentieth Century," held March 7-9, 1997, at Stanford University, was an experimental workshop to preview the dimensions on the eve of the twenty-first century that the MacArthur Foundation Consortiumon Challenges to the Study of International Peace and Cooperation, will explore over the next three years: war and institutions of violence; globalization; society and the ecosphere; and identity and social power. The idea was to examine these dimensions as large structural macro-historical processes and also to look at how these processes are immanent in the political and cultural claims made by contending actors. All of the workshop panels brought out issues of several dimensions. The first panel, on Globalization and Social Claims, looked at processes of globalization and also at society and the ecosphere. The second panel, State Formation and Claim-Making, focused on the dimensions of war and institutions of violence and also identity and social power. The third panel, Identities and Social Power, was on that dimension, largely in the context of globalization. The fourth panel, a roundtable on Claims to Sovereignty in the Former Soviet Union, was most related to the dimension of war and institutions of violence.

The author concludes that strategy posited on the unchanging character of the differences that have separated Russia and the West is a self-fulfilling prophecy. The trouble with a status quo strategy is that it offers no vision of the opportunities available to construct a
security system in which power is constrained not just by countervailing power but by the exercise of democratic control over national decisions. Security in Europe is not just a question of military limitations and reductions. The essence of European security and the key to achieving a stable peace lies in the process of creating an inclusive community of
democratic nations.

Late last year, we noted the tenth anniversary of what was probably the most remarkable of all the meetings between an American president and his Soviet counterpart, the Reykjavik Summit of October 1986. History has shown that Reykjavik was a true turning point. Three major treaties between the United States and the Soviet Union were negotiated by the end of 1992; they resulted in substantially reduced levels of nuclear weapons. That happened as the Cold War was ending and, as the Russians say, it was no coincidence. A dramatic change in the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States made it possible. A readiness, both in Washington and in Moscow, to open a new chapter in their relationship prepared the way.

The world has moved on. The Soviet Union no longer exists. But can we say that the world has been freed from the incessant and pervasive fear of nuclear devastation? Not yet, as this report will show. Persuading three newly independent states to eliminate the nuclear weapons they inherited in the collapse of the Soviet Union was a major achievement. Cooperating with Russia to tighten controls over fissile materials has made a real difference in terms of international security. But illicit trafficking in nuclear materials is still a potential problem and this has happened just as a more brutal form of terrorism, more willing to engage in mass murder, has made its appearance. This threat requires a wide spectrum of responses, but at the heart of it is the need for strict controls over nuclear weapons and fissile materials from the laboratory to the missile silo and every point in between.

The idea of a safer strategic environment involving progressively less reliance on nuclear weapons is still valid and must be pursued. Abolishing nuclear weapons is a feat beyond our present capacity to achieve, but we can go much further than we have to date in eliminating these weapons. The recent U.S.-Russian summit meeting in Helsinki made a start in that direction.

The American relationship with Russia is one among many that require careful tending. It is one of the few that can be said to be vital. We can reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in the Russian-American relationship and that would open the door to many opportunities now denied us.

This discussion focuses on U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Korea relations and how the two interact. The U.S.-Japan review of the 1978 Defense Guidelines also will be considered, in terms of what it does and does not entail and in terms of its application to the security of the Korean peninsula and, more broadly, Asia.

An underlying theme of this presentation is that the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Korea relationships can survive and prosper only if the United States, Japan, and Korea share some degree of confluence of views on relations with China. There are common objectives in Northeast Asia shared not only by the United States, Japan, and Korea, but by China, Russia, and perhaps even North Korea. Many of these objectives concern the Korean peninsula, where all of the powers want stability and no one wants to see war. From a theoretical viewpoint, everyone is looking toward a "soft landing" and eventual peaceful reunification. Sometimes the visceral South Korean view seems to differ, and some of the Republic of Korea's policies may be in contradiction with the stated desirable outcome; this may cause tension in the U.S.-Korea alliance in the future.

The desire for a soft landing does not mean that the major powers are pushing to hasten reunification. Ironically, the country least anxious to see it, namely China, is the one least often accused of trying to prolong separation of the two Koreas. South Koreans accuse Japan of trying to keep Korea divided, and whenever the United States talks with North Korea, it is similarly charged. That is not the policy direction of either Japan or the United States; in fact, the Koreans seem not to need help from the outside to be hostile to each other.

Published as part of the "America's Alliances with Japan and Korea in a Changing Northeast Asia" Research Project.

As a result of the rapid changes following the breakup of the Soviet bloc, there were suddenly new markets of hundreds of millions of people, covering a large portion of the earth, containing large fractions of many of the world's natural resources, possessing extensive research and production capacity, with a highly educated workforce, and utilizing many advanced technologies. Russia contained a large fraction of these factors, especially those oriented toward high technology, and hence it behooves international companies to formulate and implement strategies for doing business in Russia.

This particular study was undertaken because the quest for cooperative ventures has been a major portion of the strategy of many Russian defense enterprises and U.S. companies in addressing these changes. We deemed it important to gain a better understanding of the factors affecting companies' and enterprises' decisions regarding cooperative ventures and some of the determinants of success, as well as to analyze strategies for U.S. companies and Russian enterprises contemplating or participating in cooperative ventures.

The conclusions in this report are based on case-study interviews with companies and enterprises engaged in cooperative ventures. All of the Russian enterprises in our study, with the exception of some start-ups, had been heavily involved in military work; the American companies were from both the military and civilian sectors.