September's attacks initiated a new era of world politics. As Washington scrambles to build its antiterror coalition, it may be tempted to overlook the antidemocratic excesses of its partners. But this would be a mistake, especially when it comes to Russia. Fortunately, recent poll data reveal an unlikely American ally: the Russian masses, who have grown fiercely democratic and will resist any slide toward autocracy.

Since the attacks on September 11, the Bush administration has seemed as determined as ever to move ahead with a national missile defense system, although it would have done nothing to prevent the attacks. Another question is how the rest of the world views U.S. plans. This article contains a sampling of perspectives from around the world.

"Russian and American leaders have to define a United States-Russian relationship that neither rekindles cold war rivalry nor refuels illusions about alliances and special relationships. More distance than a decade ago might be healthy for the bilateral relationship. Too much distance will be dangerous."

The defeat of the Communist hard-liners' August 1991 coup attempt marked one of the most euphoric moments in Russian history. For centuries, autocrats had ruled Russia, using force when necessary to suppress society. This time, emboldened by liberalization under Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, Russian society organized to resist the use of force by Kremlin dictators. To be sure, all of Russia did not rise up against the coup plotters; only citizens in major cities mobilized. Yet the ripple effects of this brave stance against tyranny in Moscow and St. Petersburg proved pivotal in destroying communism, dismantling the Soviet empire, and ending the Cold War.

A little more than a year ago, the question Who is Vladimir Putin? was rather fashionable. And it was valid, because this former junior-level KGB officer rose to become prime minister and then president of Russia with amazing speed. After winning the March 2000 presidential election, Putin said all the right things about markets and democracy. For anyone who worked to overthrow Soviet communism, the rise to power of an ex-spy in postcommunist Russia could only be interpreted as alarming. Nonetheless, this new, young, and energetic leader inspired hope with his statements about a new beginning for Russia.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union has presented unique opportunities as well as challenges for U.S. national interests and for U.S.-Russian relations--both in traditional security and non-security-related arenas. The last decade of transition has provided an opportunity for improved cooperation between the United States and Russia on both economic and political matters, as Russia has increasingly voiced the notion that "free-market democracy" (Russian-style) is a desired conclusion to its transitional period. Since 1991, there have been many collaborative efforts, involving the U.S. and other countries, aimed at helping to ease the transitional processes and challenges the former Soviet Union (with particular focus on Russia) has faced. Yet these efforts have been easier planned and articulated than accomplished. The task of transitioning from a centrally planned, militarized economy to a free-market, demilitarized democracy has proven to be of enormous magnitude. This includes the related challenge of dealing with the remnants of the former Soviet Union's military-industrial complex.

This paper analyzes past and current U.S. (and a few multilateral) economic, technical assistance, and other programs that have addressed defense and economic adjustment objectives in Russia, as they apply to restructuring the local Russian economies that are highly defense dependent. The purpose is to identify general trends in the approaches that have been more or less successful, given the varying contexts within Russia in which they have been implemented. The paper summarizes the ways each program has been set up for operation and actually has been implemented. Then, the bulk of the paper focuses on assessing some of the approaches that different programs have taken, rather than assessing performance records of individual programs. Having set forth these trends and potential lessons of previous experience, the paper then outlines some guidelines that might improve the development and implementation of future defense and economic adjustment programs. The ultimate purpose of the study is to provide recommendations for the U.S. government as to how its programs in Russia might be structured so that they may better meet both their individual programmatic and overall USG goals.