Energy and Environment Building
473 Via Ortega
Stanford CA 94305

(650) 721-6207
0
Professor, Earth System Science
Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Senior Fellow at the Stanford Woods Institute for the Environment
Senior Fellow at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR)
Affiliate, Precourt Institute of Energy
shg_ff1a1284.jpg PhD

David Lobell is the Benjamin M. Page Professor at Stanford University in the Department of Earth System Science and the Gloria and Richard Kushel Director of the Center on Food Security and the Environment. He is also the William Wrigley Senior Fellow at the Stanford Woods Institute for the Environment, and a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) and the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy and Research (SIEPR).

Lobell's research focuses on agriculture and food security, specifically on generating and using unique datasets to study rural areas throughout the world. His early research focused on climate change risks and adaptations in cropping systems, and he served on the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fifth Assessment Report as lead author for the food chapter and core writing team member for the Summary for Policymakers. More recent work has developed new techniques to measure progress on sustainable development goals and study the impacts of climate-smart practices in agriculture. His work has been recognized with various awards, including the Macelwane Medal from the American Geophysical Union (2010), a Macarthur Fellowship (2013), the National Academy of Sciences Prize in Food and Agriculture Sciences (2022) and election to the National Academy of Sciences (2023).

Prior to his Stanford appointment, Lobell was a Lawrence Post-doctoral Fellow at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. He holds a PhD in Geological and Environmental Sciences from Stanford University and a Sc.B. in Applied Mathematics from Brown University.

CV
Date Label
-

The nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula is one of the greatest challenges facing the global non-proliferation system. Yet the very root of that issue reaches far beyond the non-proliferation system. The Six-Party Talks, involving North Korea, South Korea, the United States, Russia, Japan, and China, bring hope for a peaceful solution between these nations. However, the continued strategic mistrust between the United States and North Korea casts an uncertain light on the struggling negotiations. Yang Xiyu will speak about the challenges of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula, the profound mutual mistrust between the US and North Korea, and China's role in the Six-Party Talks. He will also discuss a possible solution.

Before coming to Shorenstein APARC as a visiting scholar, Yang Xiyu was Director of the Office for the Korean Peninsula Issues in Chinese Foreign Ministry. The office was set up in January 2004, when Dr. Yang was its first director to deal with the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula, as well as, affairs relating to the Six-Party Talks. He began his involvement in issues related to the Korean Peninsula in 1994, when he worked in the Chinese Embassy in the United States. During the following years, he took part in the launch of the Four-Party Talks, and was the representative for the Chinese side in the working level meeting of the talks, as well as, a member of the Chinese Delegation in the Four-Party Talks that were held in New York and Geneva.

He was awarded the National Award for Outstanding Contribution to Social Science Studies by the State Council of China, and the Honorable Allowance for National Distinguished Experts.

Philippines Conference Room

Xiyu YANG Visiting Scholar Speaker Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
Seminars
-

The disarmament euphoria of the first post-Cold War years has been replaced with enhanced attention to nuclear weapons. In the place of traditional missions assigned to nuclear weapons during the Cold War, new ones have emerged or became relatively more prominent--limited use in primarily conventional conflicts. The enhanced role of nuclear weapons is likely a result of the emergence of a new international system following the hiatus of the post-Cold War period. With the end of the Cold War, the primary mission of nuclear weapons, mutual strategic deterrence of two opposing poles of the international system, largely exhausted itself, leading to hopes that nuclear weapons would lose relevance. The disarmament momentum has, however, largely exhausted itself, at least in its traditional forms and priorities, as the emerging new international system is giving rise to threats and challenges that seem to require a "nuclear response". The emergence of a new, limited-use mission assigned to nuclear weapons increases the likelihood of actual use of nuclear weapons. The increase is modest--perhaps from effectively zero in the last years of the Cold War to maybe 2-3 percent in the future--but an increase nonetheless.

Nikolai Sokov is a senior research associate at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies. He graduated from Moscow State University in 1981 and subsequently worked at the Institute of USA and Canadian Studies and the Institute of World Economy and International Relations in Moscow. From 1987-92 he worked at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union and Russia, dealing with nuclear arms control; he participated in START I and START II negotiations as well as in a number of summit and ministerial meetings. Sokov has a Ph.D. from the University of Michigan (1996) and a Soviet equivalent of a Ph.D. (Candidate of Historical Sciences degree) from the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (1986). Sokov has published extensively on international security and arms control; he is the author of "Russian Strategic Modernization: Past and Future" (Rowman and Littlefield in 2000) and co-author and co-editor of the first college-level textbook on nuclear nonproliferation regime in Russian (PIT-Center, 2000 and 2002).

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room

Nikolai Sokov Senior Research Associate Speaker the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute
Seminars
Authors
News Type
Q&As
Date
Paragraphs
In this Q&A session from the Council on Foreign Relations (reprinted in the New York Times), Shorenstein APARC visiting professor David Kang -- together with other experts on the region -- comments on South Korea's increasing independence from the United States, and other issues related to the "North Korea problem."

What is South Korea's strategic posture in East Asia?

After the Korean War ended in 1953, South Korea and the United States established a political and security alliance that has lasted more than half a century. "For a number of decades, South Korea primarily defined itself as a U.S. ally, with the enemy to the north," says Donald Gregg, president of the Korea Society and a former U.S. ambassador to Korea. However, South Korea is now trying to create a new role for itself in Asia. Seoul is exploring a growing economic relationship with China--which passed the United States in 2003 to become South Korea's largest trading partner--and its policy of engagement and growing cooperation with North Korea is pulling it away from the United States. "All we know for sure is that South Korea's role is no longer junior partner to the U.S.," says David Kang, a visiting professor of Asian studies at Stanford University. "The days when they would just unquestioningly follow the U.S. are over."

Kang and other experts say Seoul is beginning to shift its focus towards increasing regional ties with its Asian neighbors. The U.S.-South Korea relationship, while still strong, is not as exclusive as it has been in the past. "South Korea is still an ally of the United States ... nevertheless, it has been the most active country in promoting East Asian cooperation and integration, and will probably continue to do so," says Charles Armstrong, professor of history and director of the Center for Korean Studies at Columbia University.

What are South Korea's biggest foreign policy challenges?

Dealing with North Korea while preserving its relationship with the United States, maintaining relations with Japan, and addressing potential long-term military or economic threats from China, experts say. But "the major issue for Seoul is overwhelmingly North Korea, and everything else gets filtered through that lens," Kang says. South Korea looks to its northern neighbor with the goal of eventual reunification, and therefore seeks economic cooperation and political engagement to smooth relations and slowly move down that path. The United States, on the other hand, is primarily seeking to prevent North Korea from gaining nuclear weapons, and has refused to engage with Pyongyang until that issue is resolved.

Other experts see a disconnect between how South Korea views its role in the region and how other nations see it. South Korean officials talk of playing a "balancing" or mediating role in regional disputes, including tensions between China and Japan and the nuclear standoff between the United States and North Korea. But South Korea's "actual ability to mediate and balance is limited," says Armstrong. And while South Korean President Roh Moo-Hyun has expressed hopes of building Seoul into a logistics and business hub for the region, existing tensions on the peninsula--including international fears that North Korea is amassing a nuclear arsenal--cloud any long-term economic plans. As things stand, South Korea has the world's 11th largest economy, but not a corresponding level of political clout.

How is South Korea dealing with North Korea?

Through a policy of active engagement. In 1998, Former President Kim Dae-Jung introduced the "Sunshine Policy" aimed at improving ties with North Korea while assuring Pyongyang that Seoul is not trying to absorb it. Since then, "the degree of economic interaction between south and north has substantially increased," Armstrong says. Kim and North Korean President Kim Jung-Il met at a historic summit in 2000, and increasing progress has been made on a range of issues, from economic--increased rail links and joint projects like the Gaesung industrial complex--to social and symbolic, including cross-border family visits and Korean athletes marching together under a single flag at the Olympics. Trade between the two countries reached $697 million in 2004, and South Korea is now Pyongyang's second-largest trading partner after China.

South Korea sees engagement with North Korea as yielding far more benefits than confrontation. "South Korea is reorienting itself toward reconciliation and eventual reunification of the peninsula," Gregg says. South Korean officials say reunification would reduce the burden on each side of maintaining huge armies, help improve living standards, draw international investment, create employment, and help avert the worst possibility: open war on the Korean peninsula.

What is South Korea's relationship with China?

South Korea is developing increasingly warm relations with its giant western neighbor. "There is a real fascination with China in South Korea, and the flow of investment, exports, students, tourists, and businessmen going to China from South Korea has exploded in the last several years," Armstrong says. Bilateral trade between Seoul and Beijing reached $90 billion in 2004, a 42 percent increase from 2003. The two countries also agree politically on issues ranging from opposition to Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni war shrine, to accord on how to deal with North Korea's nuclear ambitions. China is also choosing the path of engagement with North Korea, and helping Pyongyang find a "Chinese way" to develop: that is, increasing economic openness without sacrificing political control. "On the whole, [South Korea and China] see pretty much eye to eye on the major geopolitical issues," Kang says.

Beijing, like Seoul, is investing in North Korea, which has ample natural resources--including coal, iron, and gold--and a low-cost labor force. In 2003, Chinese investment in North Korea was $1.1 million; in 2004, it ballooned to $50 million; and in 2005, it was expected to reach $85-90 million. The volume of trade between China and North Korea reached $1.5 billion in 2005, making Beijing Pyongyang's largest foreign trading partner. North Korean leader Kim Jung-Il, who rarely travels, emphasized Beijing's importance to his country by visiting China in January.

South Korea is positioning itself to be closer to an ascendant China, but trying to do it without jeopardizing existing ties with the United States. South Korea's biggest worry, experts say, is being pulled into a conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan.

What's the relationship like between South Korea and Japan?

"Very bad at the moment in terms of public diplomacy and popular opinion," Columbia University's Armstrong says. South Korean wariness of Japan dates back at least to 1910, when imperial Japan invaded Korea and ruled it as a colony for thirty-five years. During the occupation, Japanese efforts to suppress Korean language and culture earned Korean enmity. During World War II, the Japanese practice of using "comfort women"--women from occupied countries, mostly Korea, who were forced to serve as prostitutes for the Japanese army--increased the anti-Japanese feeling.

South Koreans, and others across the region, are also infuriated by Koizumi's annual visit to the Yasukuni shrine. The site honors more than two million Japanese war dead, but includes the remains of more than a dozen convicted war criminals. South Korea also has disputes with Japan over territory. Both countries claim a group of islands--and the fishing and mineral rights around them--in the Sea of Japan that the Koreans call Dokdo and the Japanese call Takeshima. And many critics in South Korea and across Asia accuse Japan of whitewashing its wartime atrocities in its grade-school textbooks.

But much of the South Korean conflict with Japan may be for domestic political consumption, some experts say. "Under the surface, I would say the degree of interaction [between Seoul and Tokyo] remains high and, in the economic realm, is rather good," Armstrong says.

How is South Korea dealing with the United States?

While experts say most South Koreans still consider the U.S.-Korean alliance the backbone of their security relationship, time has passed and attitudes are shifting. A new generation of South Koreans, assertive and nationalistic, are less mindful of the Korean War--and less grateful for American intervention in the conflict that left nearly three million Koreans dead or wounded--and more resistant to what they see as a U.S. attempt to impose its values and Washington's singular focus on terrorism. The United States has opposed South Korean engagement efforts with North Korea, and has also moved to increase its ties with Japan. The Bush administration's foreign policy, including the war on terror, its punitive stance toward North Korean nuclear weapons, and particularly the invasion of Iraq, is highly unpopular in South Korea, according to opinion surveys there.

South Koreans are also increasingly demanding more control over their country's military and political affairs. In 2004, the United States returned several military bases to Korean control, and agreed to withdraw 12,500 of the 37,500 U.S. troops currently stationed in Korea by 2008. U.S. officials, including Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, had been pushing for South Korea to take more of a role in the defense of the Korean peninsula, to free up U.S. forces for deployment elsewhere. But, all differences aside, Seoul is still eager to cooperate with the United States. South Korea, with some 3,000 troops in Iraq, is the third-largest member of the U.S.-led coalition there, behind the United States and Britain.

What is the recent history of the region?

Poised between China and Japan, fought over by the United States and Russia, the Korean peninsula long has played a central role in Asia's geopolitical affairs. After World War II, Japanese colonial rule gave way to U.S. and Soviet trusteeship over the southern and northern halves of Korea, respectively. The peninsula was divided at the 38th Parallel. In 1948, the southern Republic of Korea and the northern Democratic People's Republic of Korea, under Kim Il-Sung, were established.

In 1950, North Korean forces invaded South Korea, starting a conflict that brought in China on the North Korean side and a U.S.-led UN coalition on the South Korean side. While an armistice was agreed to in 1953, a formal peace treaty was never signed. In 1954, the United States agreed to help South Korea defend itself against external aggression in a mutual defense treaty. U.S. troops have been stationed in Korea since then. In addition to this important security relationship, shared interests in the last fifty years have included fighting communism and, since the 1980s, establishing a strong democracy and fostering economic development. However, in recent years strain has emerged on a range of issues, none more important than how to handle Pyongyang.

All News button
1
Authors
Michael A. McFaul
News Type
Commentary
Date
Paragraphs
Since coming to power in 2000, Russian President Vladimir Putin has had one clear central objective: strengthening the Russian state, at home and abroad. For Putin, Russia's second post-Soviet leader and a former KGB official, the disappearance of the Soviet Union in 1991 was a tragedy that produced anarchy, corruption, instability and uncertainty. He pledged to end the chaos by restoring the state power that had been lost under his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin. Everything else, such as free-market economic reforms or careful, balancing diplomacy, was a means to this end.
All News button
1
Authors
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

His Excellency Sir David Manning, British Ambassador to the United States, delivered the 2006 Frank E. and Arthur W. Payne Distinguished Lecture: "Energy: A Burning Issue for Foreign Policy," on Monday, March 13, 2006 at 4:30 p.m. in the Bechtel Conference Center at Encina Hall.

Sir David Manning has been Her Majesty's Ambassador to the United States of America since September 2, 2003.

Sir David Manning's Biography:

2003 - present: Washington, USA (Ambassador)

2001 - 2003: Foreign Policy Adviser to the Prime Minister

2001: UK Delegation NATO Brussels (Ambassador)

1998 - 2000: Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Deputy Under-Secretary)

1995 - 1998: Tel Aviv, Israel (Ambassador)

1994 - 1995: Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Head of Policy Planning Staff)

1994:UK member of Contact Group on Bosnia (International Conference on Former Yugoslavia)

1993 - 1994: Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Head of Eastern Department)

1990 - 1993: Moscow, Russia (Counselor, Head of Political Department)

1988 - 1990: Counselor on loan to Cabinet Office

1984 - 1988: Paris, France (1st Secretary)

1982 - 1984: Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Deputy Head of Policy Planning Staff)

1980 - 1982: Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Soviet Department, later Eastern Department)

1977 - 1980: New Delhi, India (2nd later 1st Secretary)

1974 - 1977: Warsaw, Poland (3rd later 2nd Secretary)

1972 - 1974: Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Mexico/Central America Department)

1972: Entered Foreign and Commonwealth Office

All News button
1
-

Minxin Pei is a senior associate and director of the China Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington DC. He received his Ph.D. in political science from Harvard University in 1991 and taught politics at Princeton University from 1992 to 1998. His main interest is U.S.-China relations, the development of democratic political systems, and Chinese politics. He is the author of From Reform to Revolution: The Demise of Communism in China and the Soviet Union (Harvard University Press, 1994) and China's Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy (Harvard University Press, forthcoming).

His research has been published in Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs, The National Interest, Modern China, China Quarterly, Journal of Democracy and many edited books. His op-eds have appeared in the Financial Times, New York Times, Washington Post, Christian Science Monitor, and other major newspapers.

Philippines Conference Room

Minxin Pei Senior Associate and Director, China Program Speaker Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Seminars
-

Since the accession of ten new member states the European Union has launched a new effort to draw its neighbors, from Ukraine to Morocco, closer to the EU. This engagement goes beyond trade and aid to include participation in various internal EU policies and programs but stops short of offering full membership. Economic and political governance are high on the agenda. Bertin Martens will explain how this effort reinforces previous policies and could contribute to real change in the political and economic landscape around the EU.

Bertin Martens is Regional Economist for the Middle East & South Mediterranean in the European Commission's Directorate General for External Relations. He joined the European Commission in 1990 and has worked on various assignments in Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe before. He holds a PhD in Economics from the Free University of Brussels and has been a Visiting Fellow at George Mason and Stanford universities. His academic research interests focus on institutional economics and governance.

CISAC Conference Room

Bertin Martens Speaker European Commission
Seminars
Authors
Daniel C. Sneider
News Type
Commentary
Date
Paragraphs

Pre-emption used to be the watchword of Bush foreign policy. The world's sole superpower would not hesitate to wield force against an imminent threat to its security. The old doctrines of the Cold War era -- of containment and deterrence of a potential enemy -- were disdained as weakness.

Now, facing the most serious national security challenge since the end of the Cold War -- the nuclear weapons programs of Iran and North Korea -- the administration is reaching back to those oldies but goodies.

The determination of Iran and North Korea to develop nuclear weapons has so far been largely unchecked by this administration. The North Koreans, since breaking out of the freeze agreed to during the Clinton administration, have been steadily producing plutonium, and presumably warheads. The Iranians, after the election of hard-line President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, reversed their deal to suspend uranium-enrichment activities, the crucial step toward nuclear weapons.

Diplomatic negotiations in both cases have produced little movement. But a military strike on their nuclear facilities is almost inconceivable. The danger of potentially horrendous retaliation and the sapping of American will and resources in Iraq have almost killed that option.

"As shaky as a policy of containment is, it is certainly preferable to confrontation, 'rollback,' or 'regime change' through military force,'' wrote conservative national security expert Thomas Donnelly in a recent analysis. "Containment is, in fact, regime change by tolerable means, and the solution to the problems of Iran and North Korea lie in an indirect approach.''

While we try to contain a nuclear Iran and North Korea, suggested Donnelly, we should surround Iran with movements for democratic change in Iraq and Afghanistan. North Korea, he believes, will be changed through Chinese influence.

Donnelly cautions that there may be circumstances when containment proves even more risky than intervention -- say if Iran tries to slip nuclear materials to Islamist terrorists. Iran is less stable than the Soviet Union, though it is worth remembering that the first 15 years of the Cold War brought us to the brink of nuclear war once and close to it several times.

For the administration, this is a stealth policy shift. That is no surprise. It flows directly from the mess in Iraq, a mistake the administration can never really acknowledge.

For those who once touted American global domination, it is still hard to face the reality that containment is impossible without allies and partners. By ourselves, we cannot press those regimes by cutting off their access to investment and advanced technology.

The administration is rightly moving to take Iran to the United Nations Security Council to seek a mandate to enforce the demands of the International Atomic Energy Agency. North Korea is undoubtedly watching this carefully.

China and Russia, who have veto power in the Security Council, are reluctantly going along. But they still resist any move to impose economic sanctions against Iran. Nor are the Europeans, Japanese and others who depend on oil and gas from Iran eager to halt their investment and trade.

Similarly in the case of North Korea, the Chinese and South Koreans are not prepared to cut the flow of economic aid and investment into the otherwise isolated North Korean state. This is less a case of economic interests than a fear that sanctions will escalate to greater confrontation, even war.

"The strategic challenge the Bush administration faced was to convince the rest of the world that Iran is more dangerous than the United States,'' says nuclear proliferation expert George Perkovich. "They finally did it -- and it took Ahmadinejad to do it,'' referring to the inflammatory rhetoric, including threats to "wipe Israel off the map,'' issued by the Iranian leader.

The administration made some headway down the same path with North Korea by engaging in direct talks with that regime this past fall, dispelling the image that the United States was unwilling to negotiate. But that progress has been undermined recently because hard-liners inside the Bush administration pulled the plug on such talks.

Managing an effective containment partnership will be a huge challenge. And there is still tremendous resistance inside the administration to engaging and negotiating -- and compromising -- with the enemy. But that was always a part of making containment succeed, even at the height of the Cold War.

Containment is no silver bullet. It is merely, as Donnelly puts it, "the least bad alternative, but not by a lot, and not under all circumstances.'' And right now, it is the only game in town.

All News button
1

History Department
Bldg 200, Room 311
Stanford, CA 94305-2024

(650) 723-9475 (650) 725-0597
0
William H. Bonsall Professor in History
Professor of History
2017_july_nancy_drottningholm_-_nancy_kollmann.jpg PhD

I became interested in Russia at the height of the Cold War and initially studied Russia and Russian with an eye to the foreign service. History lured me way, especially after spending a junior semester at Leningrad State University in 1970 and having the chance to travel around the Soviet Union a bit. In graduate research and since coming to Stanford in 1982, I have focused on the early modern period (from the fourteenth century through the eighteenth). In almost all my work I have been explored the question of how politics worked in an autocracy. Theoretically I am interested in how early modern states, particularly empires, tried to create, at best, social cohesion and, at least, stability, by ritual, ideology, law and the measured use of violence. My early research focused on structures of power at the Kremlin court and the influence of kinship and marriage in politics and on social values from Muscovy to the Enlightenment (Kinship and Politics: The Making of the Muscovite Political System 1987); these themes encouraged my abiding interest in the roles of women in political ideology and practice. I have written two books on legal culture, one on disputes over honor (By Honor Bound 1999) and one on the practice of the criminal law (Crime and Punishment in Early Modern Russia 2012). Here I’ve contrasted the letter of the law with the workings of local courts, how people used the law, how judges and other officials played roles in the system, how the law was written and interpreted. In all this I’ve tried to place Russia in a comparative context where appropriate, trying to break down clichés of Russia being fundamentally different from European history or unknowable.

My current work goes in several directions. One is a turn to the visual -- I have written several articles on the production and use in Russia of icons, frescos and miniatures as a medium for political communication. I am now finishing up a project on images of Russia produced by foreign engravers in early print publications and maps. The tension in these images between stock tropes of the engraver's trade and eye-witness information, is one fascinating aspect; another is the challenge to assess the impact of text and image on the reader. All in all, I have found that most illustrated works about Russia present a more nuanced understanding than the image of “despotism” that has caught a lot of scholarly attention. Finally, I am interested in how Russia functioned as an empire. I recently published a synthetic history (The Russian Empire 1450-1801 2017) of Russia as a “Eurasian politics of different empire,” and I plan to follow up this theme and return to the practice of the law by studying the implementation of Catherine II’s judicial reforms (1775) in the non-Russian provinces.

Affiliated faculty at The Europe Center
Subscribe to Russia and Eurasia