What a difference eight years makes. Following the 2000 U.S. presidential election, Russian President Vladimir Putin offered a new disarmament initiative that called for reducing U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals to 1,500 warheads apiece. Although that statement was basically ignored--at the time, Washington was embroiled in the recount saga--Putin's proposal remained the official Russian position on disarmament in subsequent years.

Fast-forward to this recent president election. Instead of calling for reductions in nuclear weapons in the aftermath of Barack Obama's victory, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev threatened to move short-range ballistic missiles to the Kaliningrad region if Obama proceeds with installing missile defense installations in Poland and the Czech Republic. Thus, he quickly presented Obama with his first major foreign policy test--how to handle the issue of missile defense in Europe, the biggest irritant in U.S.-Russian relations. He also seemed determined to demonstrate that Russia is going to be a difficult and capricious partner for the new U.S. administration.

So far, the Obama team has shown great care in dealing with the thorny issue of missile defense in Europe. During the campaign, they deliberately avoided making any critical statements on the European system to avoid alienating Polish voters in battleground states such as Pennsylvania. And now that the election is over, we're hearing that they're telling the eager Polish government that their general position on missile defense--it should be deployed only "when the technology is proved to be workable"--applies to the European part of the system as well. This isn't good news for missile defense in Europe, since its technology is "workable" only in a narrow sense, if at all.

Of course, this story is far from over. If the Obama administration decides not to deploy interceptors and radar in Europe, it opens itself to a charge of yielding to Russian pressure--especially from Republicans, for whom missile defense is a signature issue. The plan to deploy missile defense in Europe also has supporters in Poland and the Czech Republic; both governments seem to believe that the presence of U.S. personnel on their soil would provide them a security guarantee far stronger than NATO membership. Finally, Russia isn't exactly interested in seeing the issue disappear: The system presents no threat whatsoever, but the controversy allows the Kremlin to score lots of rhetorical points.

Finding a solution that calms the waters and satisfies everyone won't be easy. But it's not impossible either. One thing the new administration must avoid is getting into a discussion with Russia about whether Washington has the right to deploy its military facilities in Poland and the Czech Republic, or whether Russia should have the right to veto such a decision. While a legitimate discussion, we know that it's not going to get us anywhere.

Therefore, we need to take the dispute in a different direction. Instead of arguing about the terms and conditions of missile defense deployment, Washington should accept Moscow's standing offer to use its early warning radars in Armavir and Gabala to build elements of a joint monitoring system. The offer still seems to be on the table, although Russia has been far less enthusiastic about it since the United States made clear that this joint system wouldn't replace the missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic.

The problem with those sites might seem serious, but it can be solved. A year ago, Washington considered delaying the actual deployment of the interceptors until the ballistic missile threat from Iran (or maybe some other country) becomes evident. Moscow seemed interested, but the United States withdrew the offer. It certainly could be revived now. And I believe such a compromise would satisfy missile defense supporters and skeptics alike and also buy the necessary time to make the issue less sensitive politically. History shows us that once controversy dissipates, legitimate questions can be asked about effectiveness and cost--and on these counts, the current U.S. plan for missile defense in Europe fails in any sober, independent assessment.

What would remain then is a joint U.S.-Russian project in which both countries would work together to monitor missile tests and satellite launches. It's hard to think of a better legacy of the current missile defense dispute.

Siegfried S. Hecker, former director of Los Alamos National Laboratory, and Robert Cowan, a laboratory fellow, have been awarded the 2008 Los Alamos Medal, the institution's most prestigious award.

Established in 2001, the medal is the highest honor the laboratory can bestow upon an individual or small group. Laboratory Director Michael Anastasio will present the medals to Hecker and Cowan during a formal awards ceremony and reception.

Recipients of the award are selected by a review committee on the basis of whether they have "made a contribution that changed the course of science, facilitated a major enhancement to the laboratory's ability to accomplish its mission, had a significant impact on lab sustainability, and established a major direction for the institution or the nation."

Hecker was selected "based on his many important and signature contributions to scientific research as a technical staff member, to the management of science at Los Alamos during his brief but critical leadership of the emergent Center for Materials Science and later as laboratory director, and to national policy, including stockpile stewardship and plutonium aging, engaging Russian nuclear weapons scientists after the collapse of the Soviet Union, promoting the importance of the study of terrorism as an emerging threat, and acting as a senior representative of the nuclear weapons complex in the North Korea nuclear weapons situation," the committee wrote.

Hecker's contributions to the science of plutonium metallurgy and his scientific leadership have been recognized by election to the National Academy of Engineering, as a member of the American Physical Society, as a foreign member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and as a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Hecker also has received the U.S. Department of Energy's E.O. Lawrence Award.

As laboratory director, Hecker helped transition the laboratory to a post-Cold-War environment and promoted collaboration with Russian nuclear laboratories to secure and safeguard the ex-Soviet stockpile of fissile materials. "As both a scientist and as a manager, Hecker was a passionate and eloquent spokesman for science, a legacy that will continue to be felt at Los Alamos for many years," the committee wrote.

Hecker and Cowan join a distinguished coterie of past Los Alamos Medal winners, including Nobel Laureate Hans Bethe, former laboratory Director Harold Agnew and Louis Rosen, father of the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center.