Growing economic ties and a new interest in cultural exchanges are bringing the countries of Northeast Asia closer together. Yet wounds from past wrongs -- committed in times of colonialism, war, and dictatorship -- are not fully healed. All nations have some sense of victimization -- Japan vis-à-vis the United States and Russia, and China and Korea vis-à-vis Japan -- and often blame others, rather than taking responsibility.

As with many other cases around the world, reconciliation between countries in the region first occurred between governments. Japan established diplomatic rapprochement with countries it had once invaded or colonized: with the Republic of China in 1952, with the Republic of Korea in 1965, and with the People's Republic of China in 1972.

Yet Northeast Asian nations have failed to come to terms with the past. Japan paid no reparations to its former colonies -- though it gave "grants and aid" to South Korea for normalizing their relations -- and China and Korea were excluded from the

San Francisco Treaty that settled Japanese war crimes and atrocities. Historical issues such as disputed territories and Japan's colonial rule were largely swept under the rug in the Cold War system.

The failure to address historical injustice and to reconcile differing views of the past has strained Sino-Japanese relations and friction between Japan and South Korea over Japan's colonial past remains intense. Even South Korea and China are sparring over the history of the ancient kingdom of Goguryeo. In addition, Taiwan is immersed in a reexamination of the past. The history question touches upon the most sensitive issues of national identity and now fuels the fires of nationalism in Northeast Asia.

In Korea, nationalism has offered a framework for dealing with victims of historical injustice such as the comfort women and forced laborers. It forces issues to be framed in binary opposition -- victims vs. aggressors -- and leaves little room for any alternative. Koreans are reluctant to acknowledge their atrocities during the Vietnam War, but readily criticize similar acts committed by the U.S. during the Korean War. Disputes over the kingdom of Goguryeo reflect lingering irredentist Korean nationalism as well as China's rising nationalism.

In Japan, uncertainties and anxieties created by the post-Cold War security environment and a decade of economic stagnation provided a fertile ground for nationalist politics. Nationalist scholars are making headway in producing textbooks to "make Japanese proud of themselves." Increased official use of such symbols as the flag and the national anthem used by imperial Japan are part of Japan's quest to become a "normal nation." The goodwill generated by Prime Minister Abe's visit to China and South Korea soon after taking office, suggesting a conciliatory policy toward Asia, has been undermined by his recent remarks on the comfort woman issue. If there is any difference between Korea and Japan, it is that the left in Korea -- as opposed to the right in Japan -- is at the forefront of nationalist politics.

China is promoting nationalism to bolster social and political cohesion. Beijing needs a new unifying force to mobilize the nation in pursuit of common goals, such as economic modernization, and the "glue" is nationalism. In the post-Tiananmen era, the Chinese leadership appealed to nationalism (patriotism) to shore up their tainted legitimacy. Nationalism also underpins Chinese foreign policy, both in the region and elsewhere. Territorial disputes, human rights issues, nonproliferation issues -- all of these touch the nationalist nerves of Chinese leaders in Beijing. They do not want to jeopardize relations with their Asian neighbors, but neither do they want to lose face.

Thus, despite increased intra-Asian trade, cultural exchanges, and talk about an East Asian community, Korea, Japan, and China all still find politics of national identity appealing. After all, nationalism is not only about ideology, but also thrives on narrowly defined "national interests." Disputed territories always serve as symbols of national sovereignty that cannot be compromised. The mutual suspicion of Japan and China over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and other territorial waters, as well as the recent escalation of Japan-Korean tension over Dokdo/Takeshima are but two potent reminders.

There is widespread recognition of the need for reconciliation and the final resolution of historical injustices. But there is a fundamental obstacle to reconciliation -- the existence of divided, even conflicting, historical memories. All of the nations involved are bound by very distinct perceptions of history, often contradictory and separated by different accounts of the past and of the context of events. These perceptions are deeply imbedded in public consciousness, transmitted by education, popular culture and through the mass media.

The most daunting task is coming to a common understanding of the past. Whereas a shared view of the past (World War II at least) served to unify (Western) Europe after two devastating wars, history still divides these three close Asian neighbors. Reconciliation has been "thin," and the history issue continues to mar regional cooperation. To achieve a "thicker" reconciliation, they need to move beyond nation-state-oriented, binary victim/aggressor concepts and approaches, and understand reconciliation as a mutual, interactive process. Citizens' groups, NGOs, victim-activist groups -- be they domestic, transnational, or international, and regardless of political orientation -- should be more actively involved.

Second, Northeast Asian nations must recognize that elements in their shared past may contribute to promoting regional reconciliation. China, Japan, and Korea often argue over history, but it is nonetheless true that elements in their past may also contribute to a regional identity. Coping with Western influence since the 19th century is but one area of common ground. Their experience of building modern nation-states and economies is another example. There exist ample cases and instances of common experiences that can be readily used to formulate a shared view of Northeast Asia's modern history.

Third, we need to encourage and teach critical and independent thinking to young Asians about their respective pasts. In particular, we need to cultivate a mutually acceptable, new national history of each country, resituated in a shared regional identity. Nationalism, regionalism, and internationalism will always coexist, but they need not contradict one another. In this critical time of change and desire to cultivate a shared view, we need to redefine these mutually reinforcing ideologies beyond a narrow, exclusive sense of nation.

Ultimately, building a vision for Northeast Asia's future beyond narrow national and political interests requires enlightened political leadership. Unfortunately, until now, the region has not seen such a visionary leader who is committed to cultivating regional reconciliation. On the contrary, many leaders have politicized the history problem for domestic, nationalist consumption. Interpretations of the past are unavoidably political, producing divided memories, and there is strong temptation to politicize the process for current ideological purposes. However tempting, politically convenient, and even psychologically satisfying it may be to blame others, such an approach will neither heal past wounds nor provide a foundation for the future. We need political leadership that can build public support for sometimes unpopular policies aimed at regional reconciliation.

Reprinted with permission from the Korea Herald.

The 14th Informal APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting concluded on Nov. 19, 2006, and the participants had their photo taken in colorful Vietnamese traditional costumes called ao dai. Still in the shadow of the congressional election failure, President George W. Bush, realizing that a stable Asia is very important for the U.S. geostrategy, took advantage of the occasion to enhance the prestige of the United States. Just as American experts said, the Bush administration has probably become a lame duck now, but even a healthy duck needs to find a quiet pond.

"APEC's uniquely trans-Pacific character is an important political reason for U.S. to strengthen the group," Donald Emmerson, director of the Southeast Asia Forum of Shorenstein APARC at Stanford University, explained. "While APEC has lagged, East Asian regionalism has boomed. That has been good for East Asia. But U.S. and East Asian interests alike could be hurt if the Pacific Ocean ends up being split between rival Chinese and American spheres of influence."

However, the U.S. effort to save the Doha Round of trade talks with the Asia-Pacific Free Trade Agreement has yielded little. The Doha Round aimed to remove trade barriers in the world but was suspended due to some countries' agriculture protection policies. Washington had wanted to model the Doha Round upon the Asia-Pacific Free Trade Agreement. But U.S. officials never expected that there would be so many differences among the Asia-Pacific leaders, and that the economic development of Pacific Rim countries differ in thousands of ways. Despite the fact that the Hanoi Statement reiterated that supporting the Doha Round was APEC's priority, no material progress has been made.

"The U.S. is urging a last ditch effort to restart the talks through APEC," Professor Charles Morrison, president of the East-West Center located in Hawaii, says. "Whether or not APEC can do more than make a rhetorical statement of support is unsure. I feel that the APEC economies should agree to prepare new offers within a short period of time -- three weeks, for example -- to challenge the Europeans, Brazilians, Indians and others."

United States Steps Out to "Please" ASEAN

Seventeen years after its establishment, APEC now plays a decisive role in the international political arena. It has 40 percent of the world's population, 48 percent of the world trade volume and 56 percent of the world GDP. Since 1989, the economy in this region has grown by 26 percent, compared to only 8 percent economic growth rate in the rest of the world. With the double advantage of economic strength and rapid growth, China, being one of APEC's main economies and its "engine," has fully taken the limelight. On the other hand, the United States has been weighed down with countering terrorism in the Middle East.

"China has done very well in enhancing its relations with Southeast Asia in recent years," Sheldon Simon, professor of the Program in Southeast Asian Studies at Arizona State University, points out. "China has not only established a free trade forum for China and ASEAN countries, but also helped and influenced the area with its economy and culture. But I think that the United States has realized the importance of this area and come back to fasten its friendly relationship with the region."

The United States coming back to Southeast Asia and repairing its relations with the ASEAN countries is partly activated by China's increasing influence in the area.

"The naissance and growth of some democratic countries in Southeast Asia has received sympathetic response of democratic values from Washington," said Simon. "With the traditional friendly relations between the area and the United States, these countries value their friendship with the United States sometimes more than the trust in their neighboring countries. Geopolitics is also very important factor. The Asia-Pacific area is a very important to the world economy and the U.S. power structure. Therefore, the United States will not easily give it up."

Another motive for the United States to foster closer relations in the area is the common interest of countering terrorism. There are still some terrorist groups in Indonesia, the Philippines and southern Thailand.

"President Bush has a perfect attendance record at APEC meetings (Clinton missed two of them), which says that he does take APEC seriously and believes Asia is important to U.S. interests," Ralph Cossa, president of the Pacific Forum Center for Strategic and International Studies, said in an interview with the Washington Observer Weekly.

Besides attending the APEC summit meetings annually, Washington has recently activated several plans to "please" the ASEAN countries, including setting up a ministerial dialogue system with them and a platform for maintaining contact at the deputy finance minister level, even increased exchanges at the deputy defense secretary level.

The extent of U.S. efforts to foster cordial relations with Southeast Asian countries can also be seen in the increasingly friendly U.S.-Vietnamese economic and trade relations. The Bush administration is not only supporting Vietnam to enter the WTO, but has even proposed giving Vietnam Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) status.

"The reason that Bush failed to bring the gift of PNTR status to the APEC Hanoi summit is that the Congress dominated by the Republicans was lacking efficiency and could not pass the proposal in time," Simon explained. "But I think that it will be passed as soon as possible in the next month or by the Democrats who begin to dominate the Congress from next January."

Simon and Cossa both admit that Burma is an unharmonious element in U.S. relations with ASEAN. The Burmese dictatorial military government is really the most typical negative example of democracy for the United States. But ASEAN countries are reluctant to see Burma "punished" by the United States for ideological reasons. So Burma has become a sensitive issue in U.S.-ASEAN relations.

"This is a good way for him to interact with ASEAN since Myanmar is not there and this issue does not have to be addressed," said Cossa.

Simon, an expert of Southeast Asia affairs, points out ASEAN countries should be happy about the advantage they have with China and the United States vying for their attention. Being able to juggle the two big powers, Southeast Asia has gained many practical interests and financial aid for its economy, trade, security, culture and education.

"In a short period, there will not be any serious interest conflicts in the triangle balance of China, the United States and ASEAN," Simon told the Washington Observer Weekly. "ASEAN countries' only worry, if there is any, is an accidental spark in the U.S.-China military interaction in Southeast Asia such as the confrontation across the Taiwan Straits."

Turning the Asia-Pacific into a "Gigantic Enterprise?"

"The United States wants to demonstrate its continuing interest in the Asia-Pacific region. It is urging for a study of an Asia Pacific free trade area and support for an APEC business card, and both shifts of approach, illustrate its interest in and support for the APEC process," said Morrison.

An important subject for the APEC Hanoi summit is the "active discussion" of establishing an APEC free trade region. Former U.S. President Bill Clinton proposed for the first time in 1993 the setting up of such an economic zone. Before Bush's visit, Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Karan Bhatia suggested that establishing an APEC free trade zone would be a subject worth serious discussion. But his proposal did not receive a warm response from the host. The Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister Le Cong Phung stressed that establishing a free trade zone is a long-term objective and will not affect progress of negotiations with the WTO or other bilateral trade agreements.

"Regarding the study of the Asia Pacific free trade area, a number of economies were skeptical because it would be such a large undertaking," said Morrison. A similar plan was once axed in an APEC ministerial statement and the leaders attending this summit do not seem to have much interest in it.

Simon explained Bush's thinking on the subject: "Washington reiterated its intention to establish an Asia-Pacific free trade zone in order to save the precarious WTO Doha Round. Breaking the tariff barriers in the Asia-Pacific region will help continue to press relevant countries to concede in granting agricultural tax subsidies and hopefully open the door to the Doha Round."

The five-year Doha Round was suspended in July this year because six major WTO members -- the United States, the European Union, Japan, Australia, Brazil and India -- failed to reach agreement on market access for agricultural and non-agricultural products. Given the situation, the organizer said that the informal APEC economic leaders' meeting would provide a "good opportunity" to help restore the Doha Round talks. However, the Hanoi summit joint declaration just vaguely indicated that APEC will pursue further integration on issues such as energy in 2007. It would be extremely optimistic to expect that APEC will be able to remove all the tariff barriers in the region before 2010. Although the area produces 50 percent of the world's economic value, the styles and stages of economic development, the cultural backgrounds and political systems of the countries in the region vary a great deal, making it very difficult for these Asian countries to eliminate all these discrepancies and become fully integrated.

"Out of different worries, many Southeast Asian countries are actually not interested in the proposal though they do not speak out. Or we may say that it's not time yet now to change the Asia-Pacific region into a gigantic enterprise," Simon told Washington Observer Weekly.

Quite apart from who concedes what in return for what concession over the APEC free trade mechanism, the question arises: What geographical scope should a regional trade arrangement have? Who should be a party to the agreement and who should not?

There would appear to be three different ideas on the table: (a) the APEC-wide free trade area that the United States proposed at the recent summit in Hanoi; (b) the East Asia Summit-wide framework that Japan reportedly favors, which would include ASEAN + 6 (China, Japan, South Korea, India, New Zealand, Australia) but not the United States; and (c) the ASEAN Plus Three (China, Japan, South Korea) context that China seems to prefer, in which the exact positions of Tokyo and Beijing are not entirely clear.

"Without discussing the merits or demerits of each of these arrangements, suffice it to note that since ASEAN is common to all of them, the net effect of these alternative ideas is to strengthen the negotiating position of ASEAN," said Emmerson. "Then again, ASEAN will not necessarily be unified as to its preference for the three proposals. It will be interesting to look for the positions to be taken by individual ASEAN countries and for their collective effort to arrive at a single negotiating position, e.g., in the run-up to the ASEAN summit and the second the East Asia Summit in the Philippines next month."

Cossa has hope for 2007. "The U.S. in particular would like to see APEC moving faster, and will look ahead to next year, with Australia in the chair, for some real progress."

American Public Doesn't Share Washington's Interest in Southeast Asia

The prospect of economic and strategic cooperation brought about by APEC made for a lively week in Southeast Asia. But it stirred little response in the United States. According to the interviewed experts of Southeast affairs, the American public is still haunted by the situation in Iraq and the mid-term election. Even the U.S. media framed the event as Bush's first visit to a foreign country since the Republicans were defeated in the mid-term election.

"Because of the Congressional election, President Bush will want to show leadership rather than simply respond to the new Congress. Both Doha and the nuclear proliferation issue are examples," said Morrison.

Cossa holds a different view: "I don't think the elections will have any major impact on what Bush does or how he does it during this trip. Iraq is his legacy. What he does in Asia can make things better or worse at the margins but will likely be overshadowed by Iraq."

Simon echoed the sentiment. "On one hand, the Republican Party's defeat in the election cannot directly influence Bush's trip to Asia. On the other hand, Bush's economic achievements in the Southeast region will not add to his political record. In Asia, only the North Korea issue may sway the public opinion in the United States."

Yan Li, Washington Observer weekly - Issue No. 201, November 22, 2006

Reprinted by Permission February 12, 2007.

It is tempting to dismiss President Bush's travel through Southeast Asia as aimless floating by a doubly lame duck. Getting things done will be harder without either the right to run for a third term in 2008 or the support of a legislative majority between now and then. But if that means having to work with others, at home and abroad, these new limits could be a virtuous necessity -- an opportunity to shed his administration's my-way-or-the-highway image and reverse the squandering of American legitimacy and leverage around the world.

Asia is a good place to begin rebalancing U.S. foreign policy because it is huge, it is dynamic -- and it is not Iraq. The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit that the president is attending in Vietnam this weekend includes leaders from 21 economies that jointly account for 56, 48, and 40 percent, respectively, of global GDP, trade and population. Since 1989, the forum's economies have grown 26 percent compared with 8 percent for the rest of the world. The Middle East looks trivial by comparison.

The Middle East also lacks a tradition of successful multilateral cooperation. But if the Arab League has accomplished little, Southeast Asia is an exemplar of regional harmony. Cynical observers may deride as mere "talk shops" the many overlapping frameworks that span or involve Southeast Asia. On its calendar of events in 2005 the Association of Southeast Asian Nations listed 612 meetings. But talking is better than fighting, and no two ASEAN members have made war on each other since the group was formed nearly 40 years ago.

Northeast Asia is another matter. There is no ANEAN -- no Association of Northeast Asian Nations. Mistrust among China, Japan and South Korea is still too deep. But North Korea's decision to rejoin the Six-Party Talks (among China, Japan, Russia, the two Koreas, and the United States) has revived the prospect that these conversations could evolve into a framework for broader security in Northeast Asia. Of the six, all but North Korea will attend the economic summit this weekend in Hanoi. On the sidelines of that event, President Bush and his delegation should discuss with these five counterparts a possible shared strategy on North Korea when the talks reconvene, probably in China later this year.

Another key goal for the president on this trip should be helping to revitalize APEC. The "Doha round" of global trade liberalization has run aground. Without a last-minute push, APEC's goals of "free trade" among advanced economies by 2010 and among developing ones by 2020 will not be met. Meanwhile, bilateral trade agreements among APEC members have proliferated. The result is a "noodle bowl" of inconsistent arrangements that may, on balance, divert as much trade as they create. There is, for example, no consistent definition of the "rules of origin" that determine which items benefit from lowered barriers and which do not. Without lowering the quality of all these many bilaterals to their lowest common denominator -- i.e., the least liberal arrangement any signatory will accept -- an effort should be made to link and standardize them so that trade flows are enlarged and not merely redirected.

This may seem like a non-starter. On Monday, the House of Representatives failed to approve permanent normal trade relations with Vietnam. And that was even before the newly elected and arguably more protectionist Democratic majority is seated in January. But progress can still be made in Vietnam.

An advantage of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit for the United States is that it includes both China and Taiwan, and excludes the repressive regime in Burma. But APEC's uniquely trans-Pacific character is a more important political reason for strengthening the grouping. While APEC has lagged, East Asian regionalism has boomed. That has been good for East Asia. But U.S. and East Asian interests alike could be hurt if the Pacific Ocean ends up being split between rival Chinese and American spheres of influence.

The risk of gridlocked government should not keep the United States from seeking to deepen Asia-Pacific economic and political cooperation. The Bush administration may be a lame duck. But even a healthy duck needs a tranquil pond.

Donald K. Emmerson heads the Southeast Asia Forum in the Shorenstein Asia Pacific Research Center at Stanford University. He wrote this article for the Mercury News which was printed on Sunday, November 19, 2006. Reprinted with permission from the San Jose Mercury News.

The U.S. visit this week by South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun offers yet another opportunity to bemoan the crisis of confidence in our alliance. Anti-American views, particularly among the young, remain widespread in South Korea. On an official level, there are strains over the role of U.S. troops based in Korea and a stark divergence in approaches toward North Korea.

This portrait of a troubled alliance is often contrasted with a supposed golden age in U.S.-Korean relations during the Cold War. But that view obscures a history of sharp disagreement between the two allies. It is a mythical past that stands in the way of repairing our alliance today. In reality, Korean nationalism and American strategic policy goals have often clashed. Differences over North Korea have arisen repeatedly. And anti-Americanism has been a feature of Korean life for decades.

This was true from the earliest postwar days, in a relationship born out of a fateful and poorly considered decision to divide Korea, after decades of Japanese colonial rule, into American and Soviet zones of occupation. Syngman Rhee, South Korea's first leader, was often at odds with his American backers. Washington feared Rhee would provoke a war with the communist North, even after the end of the Korean War.

Relations with Park Chung Hee, who came to power in a military coup in 1961, were even thornier. Park was a fierce Korean nationalist and, according to a close former aide, uncomfortable with Americans. The two countries collided over North Korea policy, economic goals, human rights and democracy.

In the 1970s, South Koreans developed deep doubts about the durability of the alliance, an uneasiness fed by the Vietnam debacle and the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea. Park defied U.S. pressure in declaring martial law in 1972, junking the constitution and jailing leading opposition figures. He launched a secret campaign of influence-peddling and bribery of American congressmen to counter U.S. criticism of his policies.

While Park feared abandonment by the United States, North Korea's Kim Il Sung worried that China, after developing ties to Washington, might sell him out. Thus Park, even though he had been the victim of two assassination attempts by North Korea, reached out to Pyongyang. During high-level talks in 1972, there was a remarkable shared belief that the major powers were the obstacle to Korean reunification.

The most alarming sign of an alliance in crisis was Park's dangerous decision to develop nuclear weapons, made in secret in 1971 after Richard Nixon's withdrawal of one of the two American infantry divisions. According to my research, American officials became alarmed over the seriousness of this effort when a young CIA agent provided evidence of a crude design for a nuclear warhead.

In the spring of 1975, my father, the late ambassador Richard Sneider, sent a top-secret cable to Washington calling for an urgent review of the U.S.-South Korean alliance. Korea was "no longer a client state," he wrote, but was "well on its way to middle power status with ambitions for full self-reliance including its own nuclear potential."

Sneider recommended creation of a new partnership, one more akin to our alliances with NATO or Japan. He also pushed for quiet but tough diplomacy to dissuade Park from heading down the nuclear road. That campaign succeeded finally, but not before my father warned Park that the entire security alliance was jeopardized.

Park was assassinated in 1979 by his own intelligence chief, who claimed to have acted at American instigation. The charge was false, but it remains widely believed in Korea. The perilous state of our alliance reached a peak with the Kwangju uprising against military rule the following year, when hundreds of Koreans were killed by troops deployed with the alleged acquiescence of the United States.

Dispelling the myth of the previous golden era in U.S.-Korean relations does not mean that our relations lacked a foundation of shared interest or that the difficulties we face today are not serious. The gap over how to handle the threat from the North is certainly wider and more evident than in the past. And the democratization of South Korea makes our differences visible and harder to manage.

As policymakers from both countries meet this week, they need to take a deep breath and remember that our alliance survived tremendous stresses in the past. The task before us is not to focus on our divergence but to pick up the challenge left unmet 30 years ago -- to define the basis for a long-term relationship that is durable and reciprocal and that finally sheds the shackles of dependency.

Today, the Senate Intelligence Committee will begin questioning Air Force Gen. Michael Hayden, nominated to be director of the Central Intelligence Agency, about the National Security Agency's collection of U.S. citizens' telephone records.

The scrutiny of the NSA is deserved, but the Senate and the American public may be missing a broader and more disturbing development. For the first time since the Civil War, the United States has been designated a military theater of operations. The Department of Defense -- which includes the NSA -- is focusing its vast resources on the homeland. And it is taking an unprecedented role in domestic spying.

It may be legal. But it circumvents three decades of efforts by Congress to restrict government surveillance of Americans under the guise of national security. And it represents a profound shift in the role of the military operating inside the United States. What's at stake here is the erosion of the principle, embedded in the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act, that the U.S. military not be used for domestic law enforcement.

When the administration declared the United States to be a theater of military operations in 2002, it created a U.S. Northern Command, which set up intelligence centers in Colorado and Texas to analyze the domestic threat. But these are not the military's only domestic intelligence efforts. According to the Congressional Research Service, the Pentagon controls "a substantial portion" of U.S. national intelligence assets, the traditional turf of the FBI and CIA.

In 2003, Congress created the job of undersecretary of Defense for intelligence to oversee the department's many intelligence bodies -- including a new entity called Counterintelligence Field Activity, or CIFA.

CIFA was ordered to maintain a "domestic law-enforcement database" on "potential terrorist threats" to U.S. military installations, and it began collecting information on U.S. citizens.

In 2005, a presidential commission suggested that CIFA, set up as a clearinghouse for information, be empowered to conduct domestic investigations into crimes such as treason, espionage and terrorism. Astoundingly, the commission declared that such an expansion of military powers would not require congressional approval; a presidential order and Pentagon directive would suffice. One Defense Department program feeding information to CIFA is TALON (Threat and Local Observation Notice), which is supposed to obtain data from "concerned citizens and military members regarding suspicious incidents" that could herald terrorist attacks. But the military appears to have interpreted its mandate broadly. A TALON report was filed on a protest against "war profiteering" by Halliburton, Newsweek reported. The protesters alleged the defense contractor overcharged for food for U.S. troops in Iraq.

Counterintelligence reports were also filed on New York University's OUTlaw, a decades-old organization of openly gay law students. "The term 'outlaw' is a backhanded way of saying it's all right to commit possible violence," concluded one misguided military investigator in a document obtained last month under the Freedom of Information Act." NBC reported that about four dozen TALON database entries on "suspicious incidents" were not about terrorism but about opposition to the Iraq war and military recruiting.

These misguided military forays into domestic surveillance harken back to Vietnam War-era abuses. This time, they are the result of a much broader intelligence-gathering effort by the military on U.S. soil. President Bush said last week, "We're not mining or trolling through the personal lives of millions of innocent Americans." But a 2004 survey by the General Accounting Office found 199 data-mining operations that collect information ranging from credit-card statements to medical records. The Defense Department had five programs on intelligence and counterterrorism.

The Defense Intelligence Agency, created in 1961 to provide foreign military intelligence, now uses "Verity K2" software to scan U.S. intelligence files and the Internet "to identify foreign terrorists or Americans connected to foreign terrorism activity," and "Inxight Smart Discovery" software to help identify patterns in databases. CIFA has reportedly contracted with Computer Sciences Corp. to buy identity-masking software, which could allow it to create fake websites and monitor legitimate U.S. sites without leaving clues that it had been there. The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency is collecting data from 133 U.S. cities; intelligence sources told the Los Angeles Times that, when collection is completed, the agency would be able to identify occupants in each house, their nationality and even their political affiliation.

In 2002, the Defense Department launched the granddaddy of all data-mining efforts, Total Information Awareness, to trawl through all government and commercial databases available worldwide. In 2003, concerned about privacy implications, Congress cut its funding. But many of the projects simply transferred to other Defense Department agencies. Two of the most important, the Information Awareness Prototype System and Genoa II, moved to NSA headquarters.

The Pentagon argues that its monitoring of U.S. citizens is legal. "Contrary to popular belief, there is no absolute ban on intelligence" agencies collecting information on Americans or disseminating it, says a memo by Robert Noonan, deputy chief of staff for intelligence. Military intelligence agents can receive any information "from anyone, any time," Noonan wrote.

Throughout U.S. history, we have struggled to balance security concerns with the protection of individual rights, and a thick body of law regulates domestic law enforcement agencies' behavior. Congress should think twice before it lets the behemoth Defense Department into domestic law enforcement.