Shorenstein APARC
Stanford University
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Lee Kong Chian NUS-Stanford Distinguished Fellow on Southeast Asia
Angie_BioPhoto_Adjusted.jpg MA, PhD

Angie Ngoc Trần is a professor in the Division of Social and Behavioral Sciences and Global Studies at California State University, Monterey Bay (CSUMB).  Her plan as the 2008 Lee Kong Chian National University of Singapore-Stanford University Distinguished Fellow is to complete a book manuscript on labor-capital relations in Vietnam that highlights how different identities of investors and owners—shaped by government policies, ethnicity, characteristics of investment, and the role they played in global flexible production—affect workers’ conditions, consciousness, and collective action differently.

Tran spent May-July 2008 at Stanford and will return to campus for the second half of November 2008.  She will share the results of her project in a public seminar at Stanford under SEAF auspices on November 17 2008.

Prof. Trần’s many publications include “Contesting ‘Flexibility’:  Networks of Place, Gender, and Class in Vietnamese Workers’ Resistance,” in Taking Southeast Asia to Market (2008); “Alternatives to ‘Race to the Bottom’ in Vietnam:  Minimum Wage Strikes and Their Aftermath,” Labor Studies Journal (December 2007); “The Third Sleeve: Emerging Labor Newspapers and the Response of Labor Unions and the State to Workers’ Resistance in Vietnam,” Labor Studies Journal (September 2007); and (as co-editor and author) Reaching for the Dream:  Challenges of Sustainable Development in Vietnam (2004).  She received her Ph.D. in Political Economy and Public Policy at the University of Southern California in 1996 and an M.A. in Developmental Economics at USC in 1991.

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South East Asia Forum Director, Donald Emmerson discusses what impact, if any, there will b e on US-North Korean relations and ASEAN-North Korean relations once Pyongyang signs the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation at next week's Southeast Asian regional security meeting in Singapore.
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It was meant to be a celebration not a showdown, let alone a showdown that the brutal junta in Burma (Myanmar) would win. In August 2007, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) turned forty. On November 20, to mark the occasion, the heads of government of the association's ten member states-Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam-met in Singapore for the thirteenth ASEAN Summit. A day later the heads of government from Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea joined them for the third East Asia Summit (EAS).

The summitry had three purposes. The first was to commemorate ASEAN's first forty years. From only five members at its inception in 1967, the association had by 1999 grown to encompass all of Southeast Asia's formerly quarrelsome states. For the first time in the region's history, a single indigenous organization could claim to stand for all of Southeast Asia-albeit only by overlooking just how variously accountable ASEAN's diverse regimes were to the peoples whom they presumed to represent.

But ASEAN was not content to rest on these laurels. The second reason for the summitry in Singapore was to prepare the organization for the future. The ASEAN summit's peak event was to be the unveilingand signing of a first-ever charter for the organization.

Finally, the packed schedule in Singapore was meant to project the best possible image of ASEAN to the assembled foreign guests and the wider world. By inaugurating a charter meant to enhance the association’s effectiveness, the organizers of the celebrations hoped to belie Western criticism that ASEAN was little more than a “talking shop.” They also hoped that showcasing the charter would distract attention from the presence in Singapore of ASEAN’s most widely castigated member, Burma, and thereby gain some relief from Western charges of guilt by association with that pariah state.

It was not to be. The summit was convened and the charter was signed. Plans to implement the ASEAN Economic Community were announced. But the Burmese junta stole the spotlight from these accomplishments in a way that tainted the anniversary, embarrassed the association in front of its foreign guests, and reminded analysts just how tenuously regionalism is related to democracy in Southeast Asia.

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Donald K. Emmerson
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A new era is under way for global high-technology innovation and entrepreneurship, marked by the rise of Greater China. During the past several decades, Taiwan, Singapore, and others have developed as centers in key information communications technology (ICT) industries. More recently, from Beijing to the Pearl River Delta, markets for new products are expanding, competencies in new technologies are growing, and a new generation of high-technology regions is emerging. All these signs point toward China as a rising powerhouse, accelerating the shift of locus for the global high-technology arena across the Pacific.

The contours of the nature and pace of this change are already evident in some ICT industries but have yet to be fully analyzed. The Stanford Program on Regions of Innovation and Entrepreneurship (SPRIE) (SPRIE) is leading a research program to advance the understanding of the dynamic systems of innovation and entrepreneurship that drive China’s ascendance in high technology and its implications for the global knowledge economy.

CHINA'S QUEST FOR INDEPENDENT INNOVATION

No longer satisfied with China’s role as the world’s factory, Chinese government leaders have declared that zizhu chuangxin (“homegrown” innovation) is the watchword for the future. They are sounding an urgent call to reduce dependence on foreign technology and build China into an “innovation-driven economy.” As President Hu Jintao said, “homegrown innovation” is the “core of national competitiveness”— the path to sustainable economic prosperity and global leadership.

Last May, SPRIE co-sponsored Greater China's Innovative Capacities: Progress and Challenges, a two-day, invitation-only workshop at Tsinghua University in Beijing that attracted scholars from Europe, the U.S., and Asia, as well as Chinese industry leaders and government policymakers. More than 70 participants tackled topics such as indicators of innovative capacity (patent data and journal citations, for example), reforms of Chinese research institutions to spur commercially useful innovation, and the changing roles for innovation of the state, multinational corporations (MNCs), and domestic firms.

A few numbers illustrate China’s progress over the past decade. Total R&D spending nearly tripled, reaching 1.3 percent of GDP in 2005, even while GDP doubled. China is now ranked third worldwide in overall R&D spending (after the U.S. and Japan), with targets to increase spending to 2 percent of GDP by 2010. Science and engineering PhDs more than doubled between 1996 and 2005. And China’s growth rate of U.S. patents granted has eclipsed Japan, Taiwan, or Korea, with an even steeper trajectory in Chinese-authored science and technical publications in international journals.

Yet, according to SPRIE Co-Director Henry S. Rowen, “the highest value-added work in China still is done largely in foreign-invested companies and increasingly in firms led by returnees who have been educated and worked abroad. Currently most R&D is focused on incremental improvements of existing products and services. Nevertheless, the key building blocks are in place for increasing technology contributions.” At MNC R&D centers like Nokia and Microsoft, top Chinese teams are beginning to contribute to worldwide product design and research. Through interviews at more than 75 firms in Beijing and Shanghai, SPRIE researchers have identified emerging competencies at some of the best domestic research labs and companies, ranging from multimedia chip design to communication equipment.

Huawei, the telecommunications networking giant with 2005 revenues of $5.9 billion, reports consistently spending more than 10 percent of sales on R&D. Boasting more than 10,000 researchers in China plus R&D centers in Bangalore, Silicon Valley, Dallas, Stockholm, and Moscow and 3,600 patent applications in 2005, the company epitomizes China’s growing pursuit of low-cost innovation, not just low-cost manufacturing and services.

However, obstacles to China’s drive for innovation are not trivial. Many Chinese institutions, though improving, still fail to provide an environment conducive for innovation, including a competitive and open system for R&D funding or effective intellectual property protection. As SPRIE associate director Marguerite Gong Hancock observes, “The current gold rush mentality for quick profits runs counter to breakthrough technology innovation that is typically the result of patient investments in research with long-term and uncertain payoffs. To date, some of the most innovative bright spots are not in disruptive technologies but in processes, services, and business models.”

One notable obstacle confronting Chinese high-tech firms is a leadership talent shortage, a problem that is the focus of another SPRIE research initiative.

HIGH-TECHNOLOGY LEADERSHIP IN GREATER CHINA

Since 1999, founders have led 24 Chinese firms to IPOs on NASDAQ. From this unprecedented number of startups to a rising class of billion-dollar giants going global, high-tech companies in China have a dramatically intensifying need for leadership.

To examine how China’s high-tech executives are facing this challenge, SPRIE partnered with Heidrick & Struggles, a leading executive search firm, to conduct more than 100 interviews with executives at both domestic and multinational high-tech firms operating in China.

Leaders face what Nick Yang (MS ’99), founder of wireless service provider KongZhong, described as “uncharted waters.” They must create a cadre of top leaders and managers in the face of an acute shortage of seasoned managers and globally capable executives. As John Deng, founder and CEO of Vimicro (a fabless semiconductor company with $396 million market cap), said, “I don’t lack other things, such as funding, infrastructure, or government relations. What I lack now is people.”

SPRIE Co-Director William F. Miller commented, “Interestingly, not one interviewee expressed an intention to adopt a management model that diverges significantly from the dominant global model,” a model defined by competencies well documented as key among U.S. and European executives. Based on the SPRIE-Heidrick study, some of these competencies currently are both more critical and more difficult to find in China: the ability to drive results, achieve customer orientation, provide visionary leadership, create organizational buy-in, model key values, and delegate and empower. The best leaders not only are seeking these competencies in senior executives but also cascading these attributes throughout their organizations.

The impact ripples throughout the talent pipeline, from recruiting to retaining to developing key people. High-tech leaders in China are deploying a wide range of new tactics. Miller noted, “To address pressing leadership shortages, executives are devoting an unusually large amount of their time and attention to talent and human resource issues.” As Mary Ma, CFO of computer giant Lenovo, stated, “I have become an HR manager. I spend 30 percent of my time on people and succession issues.” And the best companies are systematically using their best leaders to mentor and mold the next generation of professionals—the mid-level managers and team leaders, who are mobile, scarce, and frequently lack the full set of skills needed to drive results.

Emerging trends in leadership among China’s hightech executives may be a good harbinger, pointing to how and where this influential generation of China’s high-tech leaders are steering their firms—firms that have been charged with the task of leading China’s future economic growth.

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Major economic reforms are often politically difficult, causing pain to voters and provoking unrest. They may be opposed by politicians with short time horizons. They may collide with the established ideology and an entrenched ruling party. They may be resisted by bureaucrats and by vested interests. Obstacles to major economic reform can be daunting in democratic and autocratic polities alike.

And yet, somehow, past leaders of today's Asian dragons did implement vital economic reforms. The paper recounts the political maneuvers used by leaders of economic reform in Asia during these pivotal eras: China under Deng Xiaoping; India in the 1990s; Thailand under General Prem Tinsulanonda; Vietnam's Doi Moi; South Korea under Park Chung Hee; and Singapore under Lee Kuan Yew.

The last part of the paper classifies these maneuvers as responses to the main political barriers to reform. It serves as a "playbook" of tactics for economic reformers. For example, to overcome ideological baggage, the reformers packaged reforms as means to strengthen the party in power. They reformed gradually, initially seeking win-win compromises. They blessed pro-market violations as pilot projects. They even created new provinces to dilute the anti-reform vote.

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Major economic reforms are often politically difficult.  They may cause pain to voters and provoke unrest.  They may be opposed by politicians whose time horizons are shortened by electoral cycles.  They may collide with the established ideology and long-standing practices of an entrenched ruling party.  They may be resisted by bureaucrats who fear change, and by vested interests with stakes in the status quo.  Obstacles to major economic reform can be daunting in democratic and autocratic polities alike. 

And yet, somehow, past leaders of today's Asian dragons did manage to get away with critical and creative economic reforms.  Sly political foxes nudged their countries onto high-growth paths toward global renown as economic dragons.  What lessons can be learned from their experiences?  Are tactics that worked in authoritarian systems applicable to democratic ones, and vice versa?  Can one identify a set of stratagems that would amount to an equivalent, for economic reformers, of the advice Machiavelli gave political princes? 

Arroyo will recount the crafty political maneuvers used by leaders of economic reform in Asia during these pivotal eras:  China under Deng Xiaoping; India in the 1990s; Thailand under General Prem Tinsulanonda; Vietnam's Doi Moi; South Korea under Park Chung Hee; Malaysia under Mahathir Mohamad; and Singapore under Lee Kuan Yew.  Arroyo's remarks will be drawn from the paper he has been writing at Stanford on "The Political Economy of Successful Reform: Asian Stratagems," which he describes as "a playbook of useful maneuvers for economic reformers."

Dennis Arroyo is presently on leave from his government post as a director of the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) of the Philippines.  He has held consultancies with the World Bank, the United Nations, and the survey research firm Social Weather Stations, and has written widely on socioeconomic topics.  His critique of the Philippine development plan won a mass media award for "best analysis."  He has degrees in economics from the University of the Philippines.  

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Dennis Arroyo 2007-2008 Shorenstein APARC/Asia Foundation Visiting Fellow Speaker Shorenstein APARC
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During the Cold War, China was regarded in many corners of Southeast Asia as a sponsor of subversion and communist insurgency. Until the “four modernizations,” its anemic economy and limited ability to project power offered little incentive for Southeast Asian governments to cozy up to Beijing. Relations were often frosty or worse. Clearly, times have changed. Essentially all of the states in Southeast Asia have robust diplomatic and economic engagements with the PRC. Yet security concerns have not evaporated. Most Southeast Asian governments now embrace China, but “hedge” by setting up fall-back security options with the United States and other partners in case the PRC becomes more menacing.

This seminar will explore some of the nuances in Southeast Asian “hedging” strategies. How do various governments view China’s intentions and capabilities? How have they variously sought to engage the United States and others to gain and retain security without antagonizing Beijing? How do these strategies relate to multilateral diplomacy in ASEAN and related forums, and how do they affect the overall “balance of power” in the Asia-Pacific region? Lastly, what pitfalls might hedging entail? These questions are critical, because the reaction of Southeast Asian states to China’s rise will have a major effect on the shape and stability of regional security for years to come.

John D. Ciorciari is a 2007-08 Shorenstein Fellow and is currently completing a manuscript entitled Hedging: Southeast Asian Alignments with the Great Powers since the Fall of Saigon.  He has extensive work experience in Southeast Asia, both as an academic and as a U.S. government official.  He also served as a Visiting Fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies in Singapore in 2003-04.  He holds a JD from Harvard Law School and DPhil from the University of Oxford.

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CiociariHeadshot.jpg JD, PhD

John D. Ciorciari was a Shorenstein Postdoctoral Fellow at Shorenstein APARC for 2007-2008.  Dr. Ciorciari will remain at Stanford for the academic year 2008-09 as a National Fellow of the Hoover Institution. His current research centers on the alignment policies of small states and middle powers in the Asia-Pacific region. He focuses particularly on the phenomenon of "hedging," whereby secondary states pursue a balance of security and autonomy vis-a-vis the great powers.

Dr. Ciorciari also has interests in international human rights law and international finance. Before coming to Stanford, he served as Deputy Director of the Office of South and Southeast Asia at the U.S. Treasury Department. He has published articles on the reform of the Bretton Woods institutions and is currently undertaking a project on financial cooperation in East Asia.

In addition, he serves as a Senior Legal Advisor to the Documentation Center of Cambodia, which assists the Khmer Rouge tribunal and conducts research into the history of Democratic Kampuchea. He has published a range of scholarly works on international criminal law and the Khmer Rouge accountability process.

Dr. Ciorciari received an AB and JD from Harvard, where he was editor-in-chief of the Harvard International Law Journal. He received his MPhil and DPhil from Oxford, where he was a Fulbright Scholar and Wai Seng Senior Research Scholar.

John Ciorciari 2007-2008 Shorenstein Fellow Speaker
Seminars
This program will bring together some of the world's leading experts on Southeast Asia and democracy to consider critical questions facing the region. Has the American model of democracy become tarnished in Asia, and is the Chinese model of authoritarian capitalism of growing appeal and significance? What are the dimensions and implications of Islamicization for Southeast Asia? What are the prospects for cleaning up notoriously corrupt party politics? Will the military ever be driven out of politics in places like Thailand and the Philippines? Is the American-led "war on terror" helping stabilize politics in the region, or is it exacerbating already serious problems? What do these developments mean for U.S. foreign policy and American influence in Asia?

 

Kishore Mahbubani, one of Asia's leading public intellectuals, is author of the forthcoming The New Asian Hemisphere: the Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East; and Can Asians Think? and Beyond the Age of Innocence: Rebuilding Trust Between America and the World. Now the dean and professor of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore, he served for 33 years as a diplomat for Singapore.

Larry Diamond is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, and the author or editor of more than twenty books, including Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq, and the newly-released The Spirit of Democracy: The Struggle to Build Free Societies Throughout the World.

Donald K. Emmerson has written or edited more than a dozen books and monographs on Southeast Asian politics, including the forthcoming Hard Choices: Security, Democracy, and Regionalism in Southeast Asia and Indonesia Beyond Suharto. His latest publication is titled "Challenging ASEAN" (Jan 2008). He is a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University, where he also heads the Southeast Asia Forum.

Douglas Bereuter (moderator) is president of The Asia Foundation. He assumed his current position after 26 years of service in the U.S. Congress, where he was one of that body's leading authorities on Asian affairs and international relations.

Co-sponsored with the Asia Society; Business Executives for National Security; UC Berkeley Center for Southeast Asian Studies; USF Center for the Pacific Rim; and the World Affairs Council of Northern California.

Click here to listen to the audio recording of this panel discussion.

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Kishore Mahbubani author and dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy Speaker National University of Singapore

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Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
William L. Clayton Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution
Professor, by courtesy, of Political Science and Sociology
diamond_encina_hall.png MA, PhD

Larry Diamond is the William L. Clayton Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, the Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), and a Bass University Fellow in Undergraduate Education at Stanford University. He is also professor by courtesy of Political Science and Sociology at Stanford, where he lectures and teaches courses on democracy (including an online course on EdX). At the Hoover Institution, he co-leads the Project on Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Region and participates in the Project on the U.S., China, and the World. At FSI, he is among the core faculty of the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, which he directed for six and a half years. He leads FSI’s Israel Studies Program and is a member of the Program on Arab Reform and Development. He also co-leads the Global Digital Policy Incubator, based at FSI’s Cyber Policy Center. He served for 32 years as founding co-editor of the Journal of Democracy.

Diamond’s research focuses on global trends affecting freedom and democracy and on U.S. and international policies to defend and advance democracy. His book, Ill Winds: Saving Democracy from Russian Rage, Chinese Ambition, and American Complacency, analyzes the challenges confronting liberal democracy in the United States and around the world at this potential “hinge in history,” and offers an agenda for strengthening and defending democracy at home and abroad.  A paperback edition with a new preface was released by Penguin in April 2020. His other books include: In Search of Democracy (2016), The Spirit of Democracy (2008), Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (1999), Promoting Democracy in the 1990s (1995), and Class, Ethnicity, and Democracy in Nigeria (1989). He has edited or coedited more than fifty books, including China’s Influence and American Interests (2019, with Orville Schell), Silicon Triangle: The United States, China, Taiwan the Global Semiconductor Security (2023, with James O. Ellis Jr. and Orville Schell), and The Troubling State of India’s Democracy (2024, with Sumit Ganguly and Dinsha Mistree).

During 2002–03, Diamond served as a consultant to the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and was a contributing author of its report, Foreign Aid in the National Interest. He has advised and lectured to universities and think tanks around the world, and to the World Bank, the United Nations, the State Department, and other organizations dealing with governance and development. During the first three months of 2004, Diamond served as a senior adviser on governance to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad. His 2005 book, Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq, was one of the first books to critically analyze America's postwar engagement in Iraq.

Among Diamond’s other edited books are Democracy in Decline?; Democratization and Authoritarianism in the Arab WorldWill China Democratize?; and Liberation Technology: Social Media and the Struggle for Democracy, all edited with Marc F. Plattner; and Politics and Culture in Contemporary Iran, with Abbas Milani. With Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset, he edited the series, Democracy in Developing Countries, which helped to shape a new generation of comparative study of democratic development.

Download full-resolution headshot; photo credit: Rod Searcey.

Former Director of the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law
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Affiliated Scholar, Abbasi Program in Islamic Studies
aparc_dke.jpg PhD

At Stanford, in addition to his work for the Southeast Asia Program and his affiliations with CDDRL and the Abbasi Program in Islamic Studies, Donald Emmerson has taught courses on Southeast Asia in East Asian Studies, International Policy Studies, and Political Science. He is active as an analyst of current policy issues involving Asia. In 2010 the National Bureau of Asian Research and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars awarded him a two-year Research Associateship given to “top scholars from across the United States” who “have successfully bridged the gap between the academy and policy.”

Emmerson’s research interests include Southeast Asia-China-US relations, the South China Sea, and the future of ASEAN. His publications, authored or edited, span more than a dozen books and monographs and some 200 articles, chapters, and shorter pieces.  Recent writings include The Deer and the Dragon: Southeast Asia and China in the 21st Century (ed., 2020); “‘No Sole Control’ in the South China Sea,” in Asia Policy  (2019); ASEAN @ 50, Southeast Asia @ Risk: What Should Be Done? (ed., 2018); “Singapore and Goliath?,” in Journal of Democracy (2018); “Mapping ASEAN’s Futures,” in Contemporary Southeast Asia (2017); and “ASEAN Between China and America: Is It Time to Try Horsing the Cow?,” in Trans-Regional and –National Studies of Southeast Asia (2017).

Earlier work includes “Sunnylands or Rancho Mirage? ASEAN and the South China Sea,” in YaleGlobal (2016); “The Spectrum of Comparisons: A Discussion,” in Pacific Affairs (2014); “Facts, Minds, and Formats: Scholarship and Political Change in Indonesia” in Indonesian Studies: The State of the Field (2013); “Is Indonesia Rising? It Depends” in Indonesia Rising (2012); “Southeast Asia: Minding the Gap between Democracy and Governance,” in Journal of Democracy (April 2012); “The Problem and Promise of Focality in World Affairs,” in Strategic Review (August 2011); An American Place at an Asian Table? Regionalism and Its Reasons (2011); Asian Regionalism and US Policy: The Case for Creative Adaptation (2010); “The Useful Diversity of ‘Islamism’” and “Islamism: Pros, Cons, and Contexts” in Islamism: Conflicting Perspectives on Political Islam (2009); “Crisis and Consensus: America and ASEAN in a New Global Context” in Refreshing U.S.-Thai Relations (2009); and Hard Choices: Security, Democracy, and Regionalism in Southeast Asia (edited, 2008).

Prior to moving to Stanford in 1999, Emmerson was a professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, where he won a campus-wide teaching award. That same year he helped monitor voting in Indonesia and East Timor for the National Democratic Institute and the Carter Center. In the course of his career, he has taken part in numerous policy-related working groups focused on topics related to Southeast Asia; has testified before House and Senate committees on Asian affairs; and been a regular at gatherings such as the Asia Pacific Roundtable (Kuala Lumpur), the Bali Democracy Forum (Nusa Dua), and the Shangri-La Dialogue (Singapore). Places where he has held various visiting fellowships, including the Institute for Advanced Study and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. 



Emmerson has a Ph.D. in political science from Yale and a BA in international affairs from Princeton. He is fluent in Indonesian, was fluent in French, and has lectured and written in both languages. He has lesser competence in Dutch, Javanese, and Russian. A former slam poet in English, he enjoys the spoken word and reads occasionally under a nom de plume with the Not Yet Dead Poets Society in Redwood City, CA. He and his wife Carolyn met in high school in Lebanon. They have two children. He was born in Tokyo, the son of U.S. Foreign Service Officer John K. Emmerson, who wrote the Japanese Thread among other books.

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