This program will bring together some of the world's leading experts on Southeast Asia and democracy to consider critical questions facing the region. Has the American model of democracy become tarnished in Asia, and is the Chinese model of authoritarian capitalism of growing appeal and significance? What are the dimensions and implications of Islamicization for Southeast Asia? What are the prospects for cleaning up notoriously corrupt party politics? Will the military ever be driven out of politics in places like Thailand and the Philippines? Is the American-led "war on terror" helping stabilize politics in the region, or is it exacerbating already serious problems? What do these developments mean for U.S. foreign policy and American influence in Asia?

 

Kishore Mahbubani, one of Asia's leading public intellectuals, is author of the forthcoming The New Asian Hemisphere: the Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East; and Can Asians Think? and Beyond the Age of Innocence: Rebuilding Trust Between America and the World. Now the dean and professor of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore, he served for 33 years as a diplomat for Singapore.

Larry Diamond is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, and the author or editor of more than twenty books, including Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq, and the newly-released The Spirit of Democracy: The Struggle to Build Free Societies Throughout the World.

Donald K. Emmerson has written or edited more than a dozen books and monographs on Southeast Asian politics, including the forthcoming Hard Choices: Security, Democracy, and Regionalism in Southeast Asia and Indonesia Beyond Suharto. His latest publication is titled "Challenging ASEAN" (Jan 2008). He is a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University, where he also heads the Southeast Asia Forum.

Douglas Bereuter (moderator) is president of The Asia Foundation. He assumed his current position after 26 years of service in the U.S. Congress, where he was one of that body's leading authorities on Asian affairs and international relations.

Co-sponsored with the Asia Society; Business Executives for National Security; UC Berkeley Center for Southeast Asian Studies; USF Center for the Pacific Rim; and the World Affairs Council of Northern California.

Click here to listen to the audio recording of this panel discussion.

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Larry Diamond is the William L. Clayton Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, the Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), and a Bass University Fellow in Undergraduate Education at Stanford University. He is also professor by courtesy of Political Science and Sociology at Stanford, where he lectures and teaches courses on democracy (including an online course on EdX). At the Hoover Institution, he co-leads the Project on Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Region and participates in the Project on the U.S., China, and the World. At FSI, he is among the core faculty of the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, which he directed for six and a half years. He leads FSI’s Israel Studies Program and is a member of the Program on Arab Reform and Development. He also co-leads the Global Digital Policy Incubator, based at FSI’s Cyber Policy Center. He served for 32 years as founding co-editor of the Journal of Democracy.

Diamond’s research focuses on global trends affecting freedom and democracy and on U.S. and international policies to defend and advance democracy. His book, Ill Winds: Saving Democracy from Russian Rage, Chinese Ambition, and American Complacency, analyzes the challenges confronting liberal democracy in the United States and around the world at this potential “hinge in history,” and offers an agenda for strengthening and defending democracy at home and abroad.  A paperback edition with a new preface was released by Penguin in April 2020. His other books include: In Search of Democracy (2016), The Spirit of Democracy (2008), Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (1999), Promoting Democracy in the 1990s (1995), and Class, Ethnicity, and Democracy in Nigeria (1989). He has edited or coedited more than fifty books, including China’s Influence and American Interests (2019, with Orville Schell), Silicon Triangle: The United States, China, Taiwan the Global Semiconductor Security (2023, with James O. Ellis Jr. and Orville Schell), and The Troubling State of India’s Democracy (2024, with Sumit Ganguly and Dinsha Mistree).

During 2002–03, Diamond served as a consultant to the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and was a contributing author of its report, Foreign Aid in the National Interest. He has advised and lectured to universities and think tanks around the world, and to the World Bank, the United Nations, the State Department, and other organizations dealing with governance and development. During the first three months of 2004, Diamond served as a senior adviser on governance to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad. His 2005 book, Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq, was one of the first books to critically analyze America's postwar engagement in Iraq.

Among Diamond’s other edited books are Democracy in Decline?; Democratization and Authoritarianism in the Arab WorldWill China Democratize?; and Liberation Technology: Social Media and the Struggle for Democracy, all edited with Marc F. Plattner; and Politics and Culture in Contemporary Iran, with Abbas Milani. With Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset, he edited the series, Democracy in Developing Countries, which helped to shape a new generation of comparative study of democratic development.

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At Stanford, in addition to his work for the Southeast Asia Program and his affiliations with CDDRL and the Abbasi Program in Islamic Studies, Donald Emmerson has taught courses on Southeast Asia in East Asian Studies, International Policy Studies, and Political Science. He is active as an analyst of current policy issues involving Asia. In 2010 the National Bureau of Asian Research and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars awarded him a two-year Research Associateship given to “top scholars from across the United States” who “have successfully bridged the gap between the academy and policy.”

Emmerson’s research interests include Southeast Asia-China-US relations, the South China Sea, and the future of ASEAN. His publications, authored or edited, span more than a dozen books and monographs and some 200 articles, chapters, and shorter pieces.  Recent writings include The Deer and the Dragon: Southeast Asia and China in the 21st Century (ed., 2020); “‘No Sole Control’ in the South China Sea,” in Asia Policy  (2019); ASEAN @ 50, Southeast Asia @ Risk: What Should Be Done? (ed., 2018); “Singapore and Goliath?,” in Journal of Democracy (2018); “Mapping ASEAN’s Futures,” in Contemporary Southeast Asia (2017); and “ASEAN Between China and America: Is It Time to Try Horsing the Cow?,” in Trans-Regional and –National Studies of Southeast Asia (2017).

Earlier work includes “Sunnylands or Rancho Mirage? ASEAN and the South China Sea,” in YaleGlobal (2016); “The Spectrum of Comparisons: A Discussion,” in Pacific Affairs (2014); “Facts, Minds, and Formats: Scholarship and Political Change in Indonesia” in Indonesian Studies: The State of the Field (2013); “Is Indonesia Rising? It Depends” in Indonesia Rising (2012); “Southeast Asia: Minding the Gap between Democracy and Governance,” in Journal of Democracy (April 2012); “The Problem and Promise of Focality in World Affairs,” in Strategic Review (August 2011); An American Place at an Asian Table? Regionalism and Its Reasons (2011); Asian Regionalism and US Policy: The Case for Creative Adaptation (2010); “The Useful Diversity of ‘Islamism’” and “Islamism: Pros, Cons, and Contexts” in Islamism: Conflicting Perspectives on Political Islam (2009); “Crisis and Consensus: America and ASEAN in a New Global Context” in Refreshing U.S.-Thai Relations (2009); and Hard Choices: Security, Democracy, and Regionalism in Southeast Asia (edited, 2008).

Prior to moving to Stanford in 1999, Emmerson was a professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, where he won a campus-wide teaching award. That same year he helped monitor voting in Indonesia and East Timor for the National Democratic Institute and the Carter Center. In the course of his career, he has taken part in numerous policy-related working groups focused on topics related to Southeast Asia; has testified before House and Senate committees on Asian affairs; and been a regular at gatherings such as the Asia Pacific Roundtable (Kuala Lumpur), the Bali Democracy Forum (Nusa Dua), and the Shangri-La Dialogue (Singapore). Places where he has held various visiting fellowships, including the Institute for Advanced Study and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. 



Emmerson has a Ph.D. in political science from Yale and a BA in international affairs from Princeton. He is fluent in Indonesian, was fluent in French, and has lectured and written in both languages. He has lesser competence in Dutch, Javanese, and Russian. A former slam poet in English, he enjoys the spoken word and reads occasionally under a nom de plume with the Not Yet Dead Poets Society in Redwood City, CA. He and his wife Carolyn met in high school in Lebanon. They have two children. He was born in Tokyo, the son of U.S. Foreign Service Officer John K. Emmerson, who wrote the Japanese Thread among other books.

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Volunteers from the University's Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) and Hands-on Bay Area came together last night for "Bring Me A Book" Volunteer Night. The event took place at the Bring Me A Book headquarters in nearby Mountain View, where the volunteers had dinner and learned about the organization.

Denise Masumoto, Shorenstein APARC's manager of corporate relations, headed the 20 volunteers from APARC, who are visiting fellows doing research at Stanford for a year and represent countries including China, India, Japan and the Philippines. Masumoto said APARC became affiliated with the Bring Me A Book Program when she found the program online and thought it represented an integral part of American lifestyle and culture. She also hoped that it could "encourage the visiting fellows to volunteer in other ways in their own countries."

"It is an honor to host the students of Stanford's Asia-Pacific Research Center," said Bring Me A Book volunteer coordinator and community outreach manager Montez Davis. "Since many of these volunteers have families, this is the perfect way for them to experience first hand the difference you can make in the future success of a child all through volunteer work."

Bring Me A Book began with Judy Koch's mission to provide easy access to the best childrens' books and to inspire reading aloud with children. The foundation aims to provide brand-new books of the best quality to children who do not have the means to obtain them otherwise.

"We believe that every child deserves books of the same quality," said Bring Me A Book office manager Erin Smith.

Bring Me A Book is affiliated with volunteer corporations such as CISCO, Google and Starbucks, as well as other non-profit organizations. Hands-on Bay Area is a non-profit organization that aims to make volunteer work easy and accessible, organizers said.

Davis hosted the event along with Donovan Cook '66, director of development for Bring Me A Book. The pair began by giving the volunteers a brief tour around the headquarters and updating the volunteers on their latest plans.

The organizers mentioned projects including the recent distribution of Karen Ehrhardt's This Jazz Man to Oakland Public Schools like the Martin Luther King, Jr. Elementary School and the recent openings of Bring Me A Book in places such as Hong Kong, Malawi, Mexico and the Philippines.

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We are pleased to announce the first article of the new academic year in our series of Shorenstein APARC Dispatches. This month's piece comes from Dr. John D. Ciorciari, one of this year's Shorenstein Fellows. Dr. Ciorciari's current research centers on the alignment policies of small states and middle powers in the Asia-Pacific region. He also has interests in international human rights law and international finance. In this piece, Dr. Ciorciari shares some comments on "Myanmar After the Saffron Revolution."

In late September, tens of thousands of Buddhist monks took to the streets of Myanmar, leading the largest uprising against the ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) since 1988. A sharp and sudden hike in fuel prices sparked the protests, but to the regime's many critics, the revolt displayed the depth of popular discontent with economic mismanagement, corruption, and political repression in Myanmar. Images of unarmed monks confronting the feared tatmadaw (armed forces) won the protesters considerable moral support from abroad, as did a public appearance by Aung San Suu Kyi. Some observers anticipated that the "saffron revolution" would lead to the overthrow of the regime, as occurred during the "rose," "orange," and "tulip" revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan.

The tatmadaw responded swiftly and brutally, however. Troops imposed tight curfews, raided pagodas, and used clubs and tear gas to disperse protesters. In a matter of days, the armed forces killed numerous demonstrators, arrested or detained thousands more, and re-imposed control. The saffron revolution thus appears to have subsided, and the outlook is not promising for advocates of regime change or dramatic policy shifts in Myanmar.

The episode did reveal some minor cracks in the SPDC edifice. Colonel Hla Win, a longtime senior member of the junta, reportedly defected into an ethnic Karen rebel-controlled area and is seeking political asylum after defying an order to massacre a group of monks. At least one senior army official has leaked incriminating evidence to the press, and a foreign ministry official resigned at the government's "appalling" response to the protests. Prime Minister Soe Win has been hospitalized with leukemia for months. Rumors even swirled of a coup. Nevertheless, SPDC chairman Than Shwe, his deputy Maung Aye, and other cabinet members appear to have closed ranks, and the SPDC looks quite firmly entrenched.

International responses to the uprising and military response have been mixed. Western governments and activist groups quickly condemned the SPDC and pushed the regime to open dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi's opposition National League for Democracy. U.S. President George W. Bush announced tighter sanctions shortly after the crackdown began. Japan--which has favored engagement in the past--is now considering sanctions and has demanded an explanation and an apology for the shooting of a Japanese journalist.

To dampen international pressure, the SPDC allowed Nigerian diplomat Ibrahim Gambari to enter the country as a UN special envoy. Gambari has met with both Than Shwe and Aung San Suu Kyi to convey the UN's concerns about the crackdown. The SPDC has also appointed retired general U Aung Kyi as an official interlocutor with Aung San Suu Kyi and has made gestures of conciliation to the clergy. However, the Myanmar leadership has rebuffed demands for more serious political dialogue or far-reaching policy reforms.

A degree of Chinese and Russian protection has helped shield the SPDC from international pressure. China and Russia vetoed a U.S.-sponsored UN Security Council resolution demanding that the SPDC free all political prisoners. Officials in Beijing and Moscow argued that the unrest was an "internal matter" unsuited for Security Council action. Their defense of a strong norm of sovereignty--rooted largely in their fear of similar Western attacks--provides political cover for the SPDC. Their objection to isolating Myanmar economically also makes it unlikely that a program of enhanced U.S. and European sanctions will bring the junta to its knees. As long as Myanmar's neighbors do business with the SPDC, it will probably survive.

To date, divergent foreign policy priorities have conspired against a genuinely multilateral policy to drive reform in Myanmar. For China, Myanmar is a strategic gateway to the East Indian Ocean and a source of prized raw materials, as well as a political ally on issues of state sovereignty. India and Thailand have also been loath to cut off or alienate their troublesome neighbor. India has little ideological affection for the SPDC but rejects sanctions and has responded quietly to recent events in Myanmar. Indian officials view Myanmar as an important regional pivot with China and a source of natural resources. Thai policymakers, worried about refugees and instability in ethnic minority enclaves along the border, have tended to prioritize stability over reform in relations with the SPDC. Both India and Thailand derive considerable economic benefits--both legal and illicit--from an open border. In addition, they fear that using their limited leverage to attack the junta will drive it further into China's embrace.

The governments of other member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have split on the issue. Indochinese states defend Myanmar's sovereignty, while the Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia have been more openly critical. With a bit of diplomatic legerdemain, Singapore expressed ASEAN's grave concern to Myanmar, speaking as the Association's chair. Discourse in regional think tanks suggests that a growing number of Southeast Asian officials advocate Myanmar's suspension from ASEAN. Although suspension would push Myanmar even further into the margins of international society, it would be unlikely to unseat the SPDC. Isolation also bears obvious risks; cloning North Korea is not in any ASEAN government's interest.

Most analysts agree that China holds the key to improving the prospects for reform, development, and democracy in Myanmar. Indeed, a change in Chinese policy would increase the likelihood of tougher Indian and ASEAN stances, since a fear of encouraging close Sino-Myanmar ties helps justify their existing approaches. The possibility of embarrassment at the upcoming Olympic games provides a short-term incentive for China to press the SPDC for better governance. A longer-term incentive will be to secure the countries' shared border, which is plagued by narco-trafficking, illegal migration, and ethnic conflict. Finally, China has an incentive to build its credibility as a constructive force in Southeast Asia and beyond. Chinese officials have led a well-documented "charm offensive" in the region, both bilaterally and through multilateral institutions, to build influence. To the extent that ASEAN governments make reform in Myanmar a priority, China can show itself to be a responsible stakeholder in Southeast Asia's future.

In the near term, a coalescence of the policies of regional powers is unlikely. Moreover, strong regional pressure does not guarantee seismic policy shifts in Myanmar. The SPDC's harsh response to the protests--like its 2006 decision to move the national capital to a remote area--testifies to considerable paranoia. Still, the outside world has economic, security, and moral reasons to hold Myanmar to higher standards of governance. The pace and direction of change will depend only marginally on the severity of Western sanctions, which bite but do not cripple the regime. Western governments' ability to identify common objectives and forge cooperation with Asian partners will be more determinative. Ultimately, the development of concerted action by relevant Asian states is likely to be the rate-limiting step in the equation. The saffron revolution suggests that many domestic actors are prepared to assume risks to promote reform if Myanmar's neighbors take a tougher stand and help provide the enabling conditions for change.

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Shorenstein APARC Dispatches are regular bulletins designed exclusively for our friends and supporters. Written by center faculty and scholars, Shorenstein APARC Dispatches deliver timely, succinct analysis on current events and trends in Asia, often discussing their potential implications for business.

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Unarmed mass uprisings, celebrated as "people power" revolutions, have ended authoritarian regimes in various countries. But have these movements ushered in polities that fulfilled democratic expectations? The record is disappointing, and especially so in the Philippines after the ouster of President Ferdinand Marcos. Why? Much of the answer lies in the ability of elites to ride, hijack, and redirect the trajectories of "people power" movements. Such elites take advantage of the tension between the regular politics of stable institutions and the irregular politics of extraordinary moments. The large mobilizations associated with "people power" cannot be sustained for long periods. The masses will soon delegate power to, and rely on, their leaders, who will represent them as the polity settles down to the business of normal--institutional--politics. The very minute the new regime is inaugurated, it ceases to be revolutionary and starts to be conservative. It has a country to run, and state power to defend and consolidate, for its enemies are not likely to have given up. The institutional technology of popular rule has yet to be developed beyond grand first principles and banal motherhood statements. The supposedly revolutionary leaders of the new regime lapse into using the already well known methods of minority or elite rule. But recourse to such stratagems may in time trigger the formation of new "people power" movements against these self-entrenched incumbents--prolonging the cycle and preventing the conversion of contingent power into legitimate authority.

Amado Mendoza's current research is on the political economy of organized crime and anti-state violence in the Philippines. His many writings on that country include a book-in-progress on tax reform and two edited volumes, Debts of Dishonor (1992) and From Crisis to Crisis: A History of BOP [Balance of Payments] Crises in the Philippines (1987). He has been a visiting scholar at Tufts University, the Jean Monnet Institute, the University of Turku (Finland), and the Amsterdam Insti¬tute for International Relations. In addition to pursuing his academic career, he has worked as a business journalist, a merchant banker, a stockbroker, and on development issues for an NGO.

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Amado M. Mendoza, Jr Associate Professor in Political Science and International Studies Speaker University of the Philippines
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Tectonic shifts have underscored the gradual Islamization of mainstream politics in contemporary Malaysia. This is so despite popular media representations of the country as an epitome of moderate and progressive Muslim governance -- a portrayal regularly belied by the actions of its leaders as well. Recently, these shifts have been expressed in heated debates over apostasy, religious freedom, and constitutional rights. Insofar as the media have acknowledged Islamization, they have attributed it to the Islamist opposition party (PAS). Prof. Liow will show, however, that the ruling party (UMNO) has proven no less strident in expressing its own Islamist predilections, with significant implications for the dynamics of UMNO-PAS relations and, beyond them, the country's political future.

Joseph Chinyong Liow is head of research at S. Rajaratnam School of International

Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. His books include Muslim

Resistance in Southern Thailand and Southern Philippines: Religion, Ideology, and Politics (2006); The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations: One Kin, Two Nations (2005); and (as co-editor) Order and Security in Southeast Asia (Routledge 2006). He is associate editor of Asian Security, and guest-edited "Internal Conflicts in Southeast Asia: The Nature, Legitimacy and Changing Role of the State," a special issue of that journal (2007). He has published numerous articles on Malaysian politics and the conflict in Southern Thailand. His PhD is from the London School of Economics and Political Science.

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Nae-Young Lee is a Professor of the Department of Political Science and Director of Asiatic Research Center at Korea University. He also serves as Director of Center for Public Opinion Research at the East Asia Institute, and an Executive Board Member of the Korean Political Science Association. Professor Lee received his Ph. D. from the University of Wisconsin-Madison and was a professor at Kyung Hee University, a research fellow at the Sejong Institute, and a member of the Presidential Policy Planning Committee.

As an expert on Korean and Comparative Politics, Electoral Studies, East Asian Political Economy, he has coauthored and edited various books and published numerous articles in international and Korean scholarly journals. His recent works include 5.31 Local Elections and Changing Korean Voters (2007), Is Rising China Threat or Opportunity?: Analysis of Cross-National Opinion Survey (2007), Changing ROK-US Alliance and Public Opinion (2005), Democratization and Historical Rectification in East Asia: Comparison of South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand (2004), 2002 Presidential Election and Tasks of Roh Moo-hyun Government (2003), Dilemma and Choice of Roh Moo-hyun Government (2003), "Issues and Partisan Realignment in South Korea" (2007), "Changes in Korean Public Perception of the U.S. and Korea-U.S. Relations" (2005) and "Fluctuating Anti-Americanism and the Korea-U.S. Alliance" (2004).

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On June 2, 2007 at Stanford University, the Southeast Asia Service Leadership Network (SEALNet) hosted a well-attended dinner to celebrate its third year of activity and its plans for social service projects in five Southeast Asian countries in Summer 2007.

SEALNet faculty adviser Donald K. Emmerson kicked off the event by congratulating the students on their accomplishments, talents, and enthusiasm. Leadership coach and author Leng Lim, whose Southeast Asia Leadership Initiative fostered the creation of SEALNet in 2004, gave an inspirational talk to the students who would soon leave for Southeast Asia to implement the network's projects. Other speakers included SEALNet Co-Director and Stanford graduating senior Viet Huynh (Stanford 2007) who was thanked for his commitment and service to the organization since its founding.

SEALNet's agenda for 2007 represents a dramatic expansion from the network's first project in Summer 2005. In that year the students delivered a dozen computers to a youth organization in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, and helped local youths learn how to use them. In Summer 2007 the following projects are planned:

Project Cambodia (Phnom Penh, 19 June - 1 July) empowers young Cambodian performing artists and selected high school students to spread awareness of Khmer traditional performing arts among Cambodian youths.

Project Indonesia (Sekayu, South Sumatra, 26 August - 8 September) promotes earthquake and sanitation awareness among members of a vulnerable rural community.

Project Philippines (Cebu, 18 - 29 June) disseminates attractive media messages to raise local and national awareness of the risk of gastrointestinal illness from worms.

Project Thailand (Krabi, 27 August - 7 September) tackles environmental problems and raises ecological awareness among inhabitants of a tsunami-affected area.

Project Vietnam (Ho Chi Minh City, 19 - 30 June) develops a sustainable vocational English program for street children that can help them get jobs in tourism and other service industries.

SEALNet's goals include:

  • Creating a cross-cultural network linking students and professionals interested in social and development issues in Southeast Asia;
  • Empowering students for positive social change through service leadership projects and by inspiring other students to become leaders in their own communities.
  • Working through community service leadership to help make Southeast Asia more united internally and more engaged internationally.
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WASHINGTON, May 24 (IPS) - This year the Association of Southeast Asian Nations celebrates its 40th birthday, and it has big plans. After four decades of being largely a political and security alliance, ASEAN is accelerating its plans for economic integration.

ASEAN leaders are so eager to pull together into an economic community that they recently decided to move the goalposts. The economic benchmarks originally planned for 2020 have been moved up to 2015.

"The mission of this economic community is to develop a single market that is competitive, equitably developed, and well integrated in the global economy," says Worapot Manupipatpong, principal economist and director of the office of the Secretary-General in the ASEAN Secretariat. He was speaking last week at an Asian Voices seminar in Washington, DC, sponsored by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation.

The single market of 2015 would encompass all ten members of ASEAN: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar (Burma), Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. According to the projections of the ASEAN Secretariat, the single market will be accomplished by removing all barriers to the free flow of goods, services, capital, and skilled labor. Rules and regulations will be simplified and harmonised. Member countries will benefit from improved economies of scale. Common investment projects, such as a highway network and the Singapore--Kunming rail link, will facilitate greater trade.

Although there will not be a single currency like the European Union's euro, the ASEAN countries will nevertheless aim for greater currency cooperation.

"ASEAN's process of economic integration was market-driven," says Soedradjad Djiwandono former governor of Bank Indonesia, and it was influenced by the "Washington consensus" favoring increased liberalisation. "It is a very different framework from the closed regionalism of the Latin American model," he continues. With multilateral talks on trade liberalisation stalled, efforts have largely shifted to bilateral negotiations. "There has been a proliferation of bilateral agreements that developed countries use as a way to push a program for liberalising different sectors," Djiwandono concludes.

So far, ASEAN points to increased trade within the ten-member community as an early sign of success. But, overall trade share -- 25 percent -- pales in comparison to the 46 percent share of the North American Free Trade Agreement countries or the 68 percent share of EU countries. And with intra-ASEAN foreign direct investment rather low -- only 6 percent in 2005 -- financial integration lags behind trade integration.

The ASEAN approach differs in several key respects from the EU model, which originated in a 1951 coal and steel agreement among six European nations. ASEAN's origins, in contrast, have been primarily political and security-oriented, observes Donald Emmerson, director of the South-east Asia Forum at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford. "The success attributed to ASEAN is that it presided over an inter-state peace ever since it was formed. There's never been a war fought between ASEAN members."

Also distinguishing ASEAN from EU is the latter's institutionalisation. "ASEAN is radically different," Emmerson continues. "The much discussed ASEAN way is consultation, not even voting, since if they vote, someone will lose. Sometimes the consultation goes on without result. Sometimes decisions are reduced to the lowest common denominator. It also means that rhetoric predominates." This consultative process will be tested in November, when ASEAN leaders gather to adopt a charter, something that the EU has so far failed to accomplish.

Another difference with Europe is the enormous economic disparities among the ASEAN members, with Singapore and Brunei among the richest countries in the world and Laos among the poorest. These economic disparities are reproduced within the countries as well.

Worapot Manupipatpong points to two ASEAN initiatives for closing the gap. There is help for small and medium-sized enterprises. And the Initiative for ASEAN Integration,"basically provides technical assistance to Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar so that they can catch up with the rest of the ASEAN members," he says. "Attention will be paid to where these countries can participate in the regional networks, what comparative advantage they have, and how to enhance their capacities to participate in the regional development and supply chain."

Then there are ASEAN's efforts to address "public bads," according to Soedradjad Djiwandono. "When there is a tsunami or a pandemic," he argues, "the worst victims are the marginalised or the poor. Addressing that kind of issue has some positive impact on reducing inequality."

"The gap between the early joiners and the later joiners will continue to be substantial because ASEAN has always been more of a forum and less of a problem-solving organisation," observes Karl Jackson, director of the Asian Studies Program at the School for Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. "As a result one would expect that these gaps would be closed only as individual countries increase their rates of growth." He attributes the inequality within countries to the middle stage of growth experienced by almost all societies: "Inequality increases before the state becomes strong enough to redivide some of the pie and take care of the gross inequalities caused by rapid economic growth."

ASEAN is banking on financial and trade liberalisation increasing the overall regional pie. On paper it is an ambitious project. But "the low hanging fruit have been plucked," says Donald Emmerson. Tariffs on the "easy commodities" have already been reduced to less than 5 percent. But non-tariff barriers to trade remain, and member countries are very protective of certain sectors.

Also tempering the region's optimism is the memory of the Asian financial crisis. The crisis began in Thailand in 1997 and spread rapidly to other countries in the region. One school of thinking holds that capital mobility -- "hot money" -- either caused or considerably aggravated the crisis. Since the ASEAN integration promises greater capital mobility, will the region be at greater risk of another such crisis?

"One consequence of the economic dynamism of the Asia-Pacific region," notes Donald Emmerson, "is that the accumulation of vast foreign exchange reserves -- obviously in China, but in other countries too -- more than anything else represents an asset that can be brought into the equation as a stabilising factor in the event of a financial crisis." Also, he continues, as a result of the ASEAN plus Three network, which adds China, South Korea, and Japan to the mix, the 13 countries have "made serious headway toward establishing currency swap arrangements that would come into play in an emergency on the scale of an Asian financial crisis."

Karl Jackson also looks to currency reforms as a hedge against future crisis. The Thai baht and the Indonesian rupiah are now unpegged currencies. "You will not have a situation in which the central bank of Thailand loses 34 billion US dollars defending the baht," Jackson argues. "Instead, the baht will appreciate or depreciate according to market forces."

But Jackson still remains cautious about the future. He points to the large number of non-performing loans in the Chinese banking sector. Also, there is "this anomaly of the U.S. absorbing two-thirds of the savings coming out of Asia, plugging it mostly into consumption rather than direct investment," he observes. "Eventually there has to be some kind of readjustment. The real value of the dollar must fall." (END/2007)

Reprinted by permission from IPS Asia-Pacific.

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Newmont Mining, the world's second-largest producer of gold, was acquitted this week by an Indonesian court. The firm, headquartered in Denver, Colorado, was accused of dumping toxic mercury and arsenic waste off Indonesia's Sulawesi Island. Shorenstein APARC's Donald K. Emmerson is interviewed by K. Oanh Ha on KQED's Pacific Time about the court's decision. Listen to the show.
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