The Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) at Stanford University has awarded six seed grants in the first round of funding from the Global Underdevelopment Action Fund. The grants are intended to jumpstart early-stage multidisciplinary research projects that tackle persistent problems of global underdevelopment. The Action Fund, which is supported by expendable gifts from FSI donors, matching funds from the Office of the President, and FSI, grew out of the Institute's spring 2010 conference on Technology, Governance, and Global Development, which featured keynote speaker Bill Gates, together with leaders from business, government, and nonprofit organizations, the media, and the academic community, to examine novel integrative approaches to poverty alleviation and human development around the world. The Action Fund projects range across disciplines, focusing primarily on problems in developing and transitioning societies. The majority of the projects have a health dimension, reflecting the degree to which poor health outcomes mirror a country's development status.

"Stanford is uniquely placed among American universities to bring cutting edge research to bear on practical problems of development.  No other institution has lower barriers to multidisciplinary work.  The Action Fund award recipients are drawn from many different parts of the university but united in their concern for promoting development," said Stephen D. Krasner,  the Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations, Senior Associate Dean of the Social Sciences at H&S, and deputy director of FSI.

Six multidisciplinary research teams led by Stanford faculty from across the university will receive a total of $236,000 in seed grants. The projects were selected by a faculty committee chaired by Stephen Krasner, with a focus on early-stage, multidisciplinary, policy-relevant research. All, projects are required to have a training component for Stanford undergraduate or graduate students.

The award-winning projects and their principal investigators are:

• Explaining and Improving U.S. Global Health Financing
  Eran Bendavid, assistant professor of medicine and affiliate in FSI’s Center for Health Policy. Co-investigator: Rajaie Batniji, postdoctoral fellow, Department of Medicine. With a sharp divergence between justifications for global health funding and the countries and diseases to which funding is disbursed, this study will conduct a quantitative analysis of the determinants of U.S. financing for the 171 countries receiving development assistance for health in 2009. The project seeks to identify the key drivers for U.S. global health financing by country and facilitate research on how to make global health financing work better. 
• Peasants into Democrats: Evaluating the Impact of Information on Local Governance in Mali
  James D. Fearon, professor of political science. Co-investigator and trainee: Jessica Gottlieb, PhD student in political science. Recent research suggests that enhancing voter information holds promise for increasing government accountability in new democracies. This project will undertake a field experiment in Mali, a model of an underperforming new democracy, to test the theory that information that sufficiently raises citizen voter expectations of government performance can have an important effect on governance. It will examine the impact of an intervention that provides citizens with a civics course on voter and government behavior.
  
• Effects of “Best Buy Health and Nutrition Toolkit” for Improving Educational Outcomes in Rural China
  Scott Rozelle, FSI Senior Fellow. Co-investigator and trainee: Paul H. Wise, professor of pediatrics, FSI senior fellow, and Patricia Foo, MD/PhD student, economics. Studies show high levels of anemia, nearsightedness, intestinal worms, and poor health and sanitation among children in China’s rural boarding schools. This project will measure initial health and nutrition levels of students in a randomized control setting, and deploy a set of affordable and sustainable interventions in treatment schools that includes multivitamins, eyeglasses, deworming medication, and nutrition and sanitation training. The project will then assess what works and what does not by comparing improvements in academic performance in treatment and control groups. The results of this experiment are intended to inform education and nutrition policy in China at the central and provincial levels.
  
• Controlling Drug-Resistant Tuberculosis: A Cooperative Agenda for China and North Korea
  Gary K. Schoolnik, professor of medicine and microbiology and immunology, and FSI senior fellow. Co-investigator: Sharon Perry, senior research scientist, Department of Medicine and FSI/CISAC. Rates of tuberculosis, a disease that thrives on poverty, malnutrition, and interrupted medical care, are now among the highest in the world in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea), elevating the risk of an epidemic of drug-resistant strains and a spread into China. This project represents a unique historical opportunity to examine the relationship between food security, malnutrition, and the epidemiology of tuberculosis in a present-day famine.

  
• Political Causes of Russia’s Public Health Crisis
  Kathryn Stoner, FSI senior fellow. Co-investigator: Rajaie Batniji, postdoctoral fellow, Department of Medicine. In spite of the economic advances and increases in GDP since the collapse of communism, Russia suffers from a range of dismal public health outcomes reminiscent of a much poorer country. This study seeks to understand what role political factors play in the country’s high adult mortality rate and declining life expectancy by mining World Bank and World Health Organization data and examining how Russians access healthcare services and information

  
• Factors Affecting Adoption and Ongoing Use of Improved Biomass Stoves in Karnataka and Maharashtra, India
  Frank Wolak, professor of economics and FSI senior fellow. Co-investigator: Mark C. Thurber, research scholar, FSI/Program on Energy and Sustainable Development. Burning of biomass in traditional stoves is associated with a host of ills among an estimated 2.5 billion people around the world, even though cleaner and more efficient technologies exist that could mitigate the problems. This study will examine what factors affect cooking mode choice and utilization, with the objective of developing an econometric model that is useful for efforts that encourage the adoption of improved biomass stoves. The project also seeks to offer insights on poorly understood processes of technology adoption among poor populations and to understand the magnitude of health, development, and environmental benefits that might be achievable.

With a Republican majority in the U.S. House of Representatives and anticipation building in Beijing for a change in leadership in 2012, domestic politics in both countries are playing a major role in the bilateral relationship. On the eve of his own milestone—his 80th birthday—John W. Lewis, one of the world’s foremost China scholars and the director of CISAC's Project on Peace and Cooperation in the Asian-Pacific Region, discussed the direction of the U.S.-China relationship, the importance of dialogue between the two powers, and the potentially rocky road ahead. Excerpts:

CISAC: The conventional wisdom seems to be that relations between the two countries are not very good and getting worse. Can you provide some context?

Lewis: There have been many, many times when the relationship has been worse. The fundamentals in U.S.-China relations, in my view, have over time gradually gotten better. Both sides recognize that there is a complementarity in their relations in the Pacific. There is a kind of synergy that is very important, and when things get bad, as they are now certainly—or not good—both sides try to keep the genie in the bottle. Several things are important: even though the Chinese think we made the Taiwan problem worse with the sale of $6.4 billion worth of advanced weapons, the Cross-Strait relationship is actually pretty good. That ingredient in our relationship with China is not a serious problem. The issues that we have are not abnormal in big power relationships.

What is so sad at this point is that the militaries on both sides—the Pentagon and the People's Liberation Army—they both want to have a serious engagement with each other. They want to have a security relationship with us, but we have these constant issues such as the South China Sea and the Yellow Sea. It changes every day, but now they say they want to put the USS George Washington in the Yellow Sea, or what the Koreans call the West Sea. It's stupid militarily and it's provocative from the Chinese point of view, and you can't defend it other than that the South Koreans want it. And from the Chinese point of view, they cannot imagine why during the calm periods with North Korea, for example, we don’t try to take advantage of that, why we don’t try to make progress in the Six-Party talks. So they see this constant set of problems that project into China that do affect U.S.-China relations. Add into that the political rhetoric in this country, the loss of jobs to China, for instance. It's a big political deal in the United States now. With China, there are endless things we could do. But politically Obama will not do it because he’s going to take a hit domestically. The anger against China is so strong in Washington, and perhaps in the rest of the country, whether it’s because of human rights or questions related to their currency exchange rate. But again, the fundamentals are quite different. They are actually pretty sound.

CISAC: China is gearing up for a major transition of power. How will this affect the relationship?

L: Now that Xi Jinping has been made vice chairman of the Central Military Commission it’s pretty clear that the jockeying is already moving in the direction [that he will succeed President Hu Jintao]. Can something happen? The Chinese always worry, as any politician would, about the next round. So they’re not going to make any mistakes, and they’re not going to do anything that gets themselves off track. They cannot back down [on foreign policy]. No one can back down against the United States or anyone else, particularly now with the Japanese. They’re going to come right at the Japanese.

CISAC: So the transition makes things more difficult?

L: Absolutely, and it’s true in the United States. Obama's looking at the election and he's going to do everything he can to move to the right and look like he’s really tough on all the things the Republicans can hammer him on. That’s going to shape how the Chinese pick their leadership in 2012. Their selection will come at about the same time as ours in 2012—the campaigns will be simultaneous—and it’s too bad. If we become very nationalistic, it’s going to look very hostile to them. And we’re going to be wagged by the Japanese and South Korean dog, and this great power, the United States, is going to look helpless to them. China is offering opportunities to solve problems and we are not prepared to take them, and they're saying, ‘are you not willing to talk to us?’?

An international forum on North Korea was held in Palo Alto on October 26, 2010, in an effort to educate the public on reunifying the two Koreas. The San Francisco Chapter of the National Unification Advisory Council organized the forum. Approximately 150 audience members heard panelists speak about the economic, social, and political challenges that face South Korea today in its preparation for a peaceful reunification, as well as about their visions for the future of North Korea.

Gi-Wook Shin, the director of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), moderated the presentations and the panel discussion. The panel of four experts included John Everard, 2010-2011 Pantech Fellow at APARC and a former British ambassador to North Korea, speaking about diplomacy and security; Greg Scarlatoiu, director of public affairs and business issues at the Korea Economic Institute, on economic issues; Sang-Hun Choe, 2010-2011 Fellow in Korean Studies at APARC and a reporter at the International Herald Tribune, on factionalism; and Jung Kwan Lee, the South Korean Consul General in San Francisco, on South Korea's policy toward North Korea.

Everad analyzed North Korea's development during the Cold War of a diplomatic technique by which it repeatedly attempted to play one ally off against another in its relationships with the Soviet Union and China. While arguing that North Korea continues to make effective use of this technique against South Korea, the United States, and the European Union, Everad noted that North Korea's current political uncertainty, following the succession, and its ongoing economic concerns will together create a situation in which it may be very difficult for North Korea to maintain political solidarity.

Scarlatoiu, meanwhile, contended that North Korea's is a post-Stalinist, neo-patrimonial economy. Thus, with recent efforts such as the 2002 market reforms and the 2009 currency reform, the North Korean regime has found itself confronted with a major dilemma. According to Scarlatoiu, while economic reforms are necessary to the long-term survival of the regime, they could also lead to the regime's collapse. This predicament, he added, must be considered as the regime undergoes a leadership transition in the succession to Kim Jong-un.

Choe spoke on the process of succession to Kim Jong-un as well, pointing out that while Kim Jong-un is indisputably the heir to the leadership of North Korea, he has yet to prove his competency as North Korea's future leader. In addition, Choe emphasized that difficulties judging North Korea's intentions and anticipating its behavior stem from the outside world's inability to understand the North Korean leadership and the goals that it truly has in mind.

Finally, Lee stressed that the basic objectives of South Korea's policy on North Korea are to promote a common prosperity and to peacefully resolve North Korean nuclear issues. However, he also made it clear that the South Korean government is seeking to keep North Korean nuclear issues distinct from the issue of inter-Korean relations.

The world first became concerned about North Korea's nuclear development program in 1989 through satellite photos of a facility under construction near the town of Yongbyon. Since then, there have been on-again, off-again negotiations with North Korea by the United States, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and other countries in the region to halt and dismantle North Korea's nuclear weapons program.

A consistent strategy focused on dialogue and diplomacy is essential to get out of the current quagmire, urged Song Min-soon, a member of the Korean National Assembly and a former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, at a Korean Studies Program public seminar on October 18. Although the United States and the ROK must lead efforts, China's active involvement is also crucial. Resolving the nuclear issue is necessary to help ensure the long-term peace and prosperity of not only the Korean Peninsula but also the entire East Asia region.

Song explored reasons why previous negotiation attempts failed, especially the lack of a shared vision among the concerned countries for the future of the peninsula and region. He suggested that this rendered China less willing to play a stronger role in the negotiations. The imbalance of power among the negotiating countries is another significant factor. North Korea's only effective bargaining card is its nuclear weapons program, argued Song, while countries like the United States have the capability to offer or withhold important aid, such as energy and development assistance.

Song advocated a firm, direct approach, stating that the United States has not adopted a real strategy for effecting nuclear disarmament. Instead, it has opted for the "slogan" of "strategic patience." He cautioned against taking a hard line, such as the current ROK administration is pursuing. Song expressed the hope that the United States would focus more on developing a well-planned diplomatic strategy for resolving the nuclear issue and that the ROK would adopt a more conciliatory approach toward North Korea.

To move forward in the Six-Party Talks-negotiations among the United States, the ROK, North Korea, China, the Russian Federation, and Japan-and effectively resolve the North Korea nuclear issue, Song made several recommendations. He pointed to the long-term benefit of building trust incrementally by fulfilling small, strategic commitments to North Korea. To balance the asymmetry of negotiating cards, Song suggested that the other countries proceed with fulfilling their commitments and allow North Korea more time to fulfill its own obligations. Bringing China fully on board by building a logical basis for its involvement is also a crucial element of the negotiations, he offered. Finally, Song asserted that the United States, the ROK, and China must develop a shared, solid vision for peaceful coexistence on the peninsula, taking into account different scenarios and the roles each country should play.

Song expressed confidence that the approach he outlined would not only eventually resolve the nuclear issue but would also open the way for stability and prosperity for everyone in East Asia, including North Korea.

The North Korean leader Kim Jong-il and his youngest son and presumed successor, Kim Jong-un, jointly attended military maneuvers on an unspecified date. This was the first official outing of the 27-year-old youngest son of the "Dear Leader." These maneuvers were held just before the Sunday celebration of the 65th anniversary of the founding of the Workers Party of Korea. David Straub, associate director of the Korean Studies Program at Stanford University, discussed the informal transfer of power that took place last week.

What was learned last week about the succession to Kim Jong-il in North Korea?

The maneuvers confirmed with near certainty the past few years of speculation that the third son of Kim Jong-il has been informally designated as his successor. This process is now public. This is the first time that the name of Kim Jong-un has been published in North Korea. However, as long as his father is alive and can govern, he will remain in power. But, clearly, his health is not good. This official outing of the son seems in preparation for the possibility that Kim Jong-il may die suddenly. Kim Jong-il suffered a stroke in 2008, after which he disappeared for several months. Upon his return, he had lost weight and appeared stiff and impaired on his left side.

Was Kim Jong-un touted as the successor?

There were no signs until a few years ago. First, it was Kim Jong-nam, the eldest son, who was favored. Officially, he fell out of the race when he was caught entering Japan with a forged passport. At the time, he told Japanese officials he wanted to take his son to Tokyo Disneyland [the target of an attempted contract killing by Kim Jong-un in 2008, the eldest now lives happily in Macao, ed.]. It is then the second son, Kim Jong-chol, who was poised to be the successor. But in Pyongyang, it was thought that he was not sufficiently ambitious and aggressive. Then, all eyes turned to Kim Jong-un, who has the personality of his father: ambitious, aggressive, and ruthless.

The main question then was how Kim Jong-un would be promoted. Most observers were betting on a gradual process. In this sense, it is not really surprising. He was appointed as a four-star general, which is a mostly symbolic distinction. He was also made vice-president of the Central Military Party. This underscores how strong the military is in North Korea. What surprised me most is that the younger sister of Kim Jong-il was also appointed as a four-star general. In line with the predictions of observers, Kim Jong-il has mobilized his immediate family to create a sort of regency capable of supporting his son in the event of his sudden death.

What is known about Kim Jong-un?

He was probably born in 1983 or 1984. However, the regime may try to say he was born in 1982. In Chinese culture-and also in North Korea-numbers are significant. Kim Il-sung, his grandfather, was born in 1912. Kim Jong-il was born in 1942. That would put Kim Jong-un in a kind of celestial lineage. It is almost certain that he attended school in Switzerland, where he was a quiet student. He had a false name, Pak-un, and one or two close friends. He also liked basketball. He then returned to Pyongyang. Some unconfirmed reports say he studied at a military university. A few years ago, it was said he had been appointed to the office of the Workers Party and the office of National Defense Committee, which is the highest organ of power in North Korea.

Who now heads North Korea? What is the power structure like?

The general view is that Kim Jong-il is the supreme leader-an absolute dictator-and he has tremendous latitude. He bases his legitimacy on the fact that he is the son of the founder of the regime. But nobody can run a country alone. He must therefore take into account various factors. In North Korea in recent decades, the military has played a growing role and seems to occupy a dominant place today.

A university professor based in South Korea believes that the regime in Pyongyang has greatly copied Japanese pre-war fascism, even though Korea fought against imperialism. The scheme is based on a totalitarian structure, relying in particular upon the military. Information is very strictly controlled and the population is monitored, as in East Germany. The structure remains very closed, and the leadership is afraid to open up to the outside world and receive investment or foreign aid. Finally, family occupies an important place. North Korea is part of China's cultural sphere, with a strong presence of Confucianism. The notion of the state is close to the family structure model. The king is seen as the head of the family.

Does a period of transition put the regime in danger? What took place before?

It is inevitable that one day a regime that is so rigid and incapable of transformation will suffer major changes. However, we cannot say when or what form this will take. But it is clear that unusual things can happen during a period of change like this. The last transition was very similar to the current process. The difference is that Kim Jong-il had been clearly designated as the successor by his father and he had decades to gradually gain experience and consolidate his power within the system. Kim Jong-il managed most affairs of state since 1980, when the last Workers Party meeting was held. He was the de facto leader for 14 years. When his father died in 1994, however, he took three years to formally become established as the leader. The difference today is that Kim Jong-il suffered a stroke in 2008. Some people in North Korea are afraid that his son had not had enough time to prepare for power. Kim Jong-un must particularly ensure that the military is loyal to him. That is why he was made a general.

What legacy does he leave his son Kim Jong-un?

Although North Korea has said for decades that it follows the principles of juche or self-sufficiency, it largely sustained itself during the Cold War by trade with the USSR and its satellite states, and China. It received much help. Now that the USSR has collapsed and China has turned to a market economy, the economic situation in North Korea has become untenable. The country suffered a terrible famine in the mid-1990s. Nobody knows for sure how many people died, but it was certainly several hundred thousand. Some say that there were more than one million deaths, out of a total population of 22-23 million people. The government then had to loosen its grip on the system. This has helped the country recover. Today, access to basic resources is much better in North Korea than it was fifteen years ago.

The country was also helped by foreign aid from Japan, South Korea, the United States, and China. Now, because of the crisis over its nuclear program, the only foreign aid that comes into Pyongyang is from China. The North Korean regime faces a dilemma: its only resource is its workers. It fears opening up to accept foreign capital and technology, which would expose the people to outside reports that fundamentally contradict the regime's decades-old claims. That is why the few commercial contacts are with ideologically similar countries, like Syria or Iran. As for the industrial project in Kaesong near the border between North and South, it is very closely monitored by the authorities.

What is the situation at the diplomatic level?

North Korea has no close allies in the world. It cooperates with Cuba, Syria, or Iran, but these countries are isolated. Their relationship is either rhetorical or in connection with the nuclear program. As for its neighbors, North Korea does not like them. The South is seen as an existential threat; it is another Korean state, comprising two-thirds of the Korean nation, and has been a phenomenal success. The situation is different with China. Officially, both countries are driven by an eternal friendship, but this is based primarily on strategic considerations. Nevertheless, China provides a lifeline to North Korea.

Finally, I think in the last two decades, Pyongyang has toyed with the idea of a strategic alliance with the United States to counterbalance Chinese influence. But for domestic political reasons and because of the situation of human rights in North Korea, the Americans have never pushed this idea further. The North Koreans have realized that this strategic relationship was probably a dream.

The fundamental problem behind all of this is due to an accident of history. After the liberation of the peninsula from Japanese occupation in 1945, the division between the Soviets and Americans-for practical reasons-was not intended to be permanent. Today, there are two states, each of which thinks that it best represents the Korean nation and that  it should be in charge of the affairs of the peninsula in its entirety. It is a zero-sum game. All issues about the current succession flow from this.