Stanford Korean Studies Program associate director David Straub was interviewed April 14 for KEMS TV on his observations and experiences in thirty-plus years of working on Korean affairs for the U.S. Department of State and at Stanford University, including his views on North Korea policy.

A year has passed since the South Korean warship Cheonan sank into the depths of the Yellow Sea, an event attributed to an attack from North Korea and one that rekindled afresh the ongoing tensions between South and North. In that time, Pyongyang has transmitted confusing signals to the world about the strength of its leadership and its intentions toward South Korea, including publishing photos of a steely but frail-looking Kim Jong Il alongside his young heir apparent Kim Jong Un and unexpectedly attacking Yeonpyong Island in late November. It is clear that the Kim Jong Il regime still maintains strong control over its citizens and that the country's nuclear program continues to grow. Nevertheless, there are hints of instability and signs of information from the outside world trickling into North Korea that point to coming change.

During an April 21 television interview, visiting fellow Sang-Hun Choe, an International Herald Tribune journalist with many years of experience reporting on North Korea, addressed the complexity of the country's current political situation, noting the lack of firsthand information and the mixture of fear and genuine belief motivating adherence to the longstanding official party line. Choe emphasized the importance for the countries most closely tied to North Korean political developments—especially South Korea, the United States, and China—to consider the key questions regarding the future of North Korea, including what shape a transfer of power or a regime collapse could take.

Media coverage of North Korea

Reporting on North Korea is no simple matter, due in large part to the government's tight control on the flow of information in and out of the country. "North Korea is so closed that it is almost impossible for journalists to gather firsthand information," stresses Choe. Television and radio broadcasts and the internet are closely monitored in North Korea, and there is a recent move to confiscate mobile phones as they are smuggled into the country.

Choe suggests that a journalist's own interests and the political agenda of his or her country often shape the angle of their coverage of North Korea. For example, the U.S. media tends to focus on North Korean nuclear developments and the resumption of the Six Party Talks, a reflection of the official U.S. defense agenda. Reporting in South Korea is not quite as straightforward. "South Korea's relationship with North Korea is very complex," Choe states. While there is deep resentment toward North Korean attacks on the South, there is also a sense of shared Korean identity that influences South Korean news coverage of North Korea, he says.

Juche and the Kim family dynasty

Tapping into the deeply rooted sense of nationalism that emerged in Korea as a result of great power competition over the peninsula, North Korea's founder Kim Il Sung masterfully applied the principle of juche to found his family's political dynasty. "It [‘juche'] is very difficult to translate," says Choe. "One of the most common English translations is ‘self reliance,' but that does not really explain everything. It is more like ‘in our own way of living' or ‘in charge of our own fate.'"

North Korean citizens do not mindlessly follow the official party ideology, stresses Choe. Some people are motivated by fear of punishment, while others firmly believe in juche. "We have to take these two elements into account when we try to understand North Korea," he says. "There is fear, but there is also pride in their system. Whether you call it ‘brainwashing' or not, it is the reality."

Kim Jong Il's apparently failing health and heir Kim Jong Un's youth and lack of experience weigh heavily on the minds of political analysts. Photos suggest that Kim Jong Il is recovering from a stroke, a fact confirmed several months ago by the South Korean government. According to Choe, the key question now is how long Kim Jong Il will live. "[He] did not expect that he would have a stroke," he says, "so the transition [of power] is being prepared in a hurry." Kim Jong Il's own rise to power was gradual and he held numerous political positions over the years. Despite being made a military general in September, Kim Jong Un's political experience is comparatively limited.

Future concerns and possible scenarios

Despite uncertainties about the transfer of power in North Korea, recent reports suggest that the country continues to develop its nuclear program. In addition to the regional security concerns this poses, the nuclear accident in Japan this March raises environmental safety questions. For example, how would North Korea prepare for or respond to damage to a nuclear facility caused by a natural disaster? "Despite being a very technologically advanced country, Japan has still had a lot of difficulties dealing with its nuclear disaster," Choe emphasizes.

While North Korea's juche ideology continues to legitimize the Kim family dynasty, Choe suggests that the current system cannot last forever, especially with the country's ongoing food shortages and the significant regional economic and political developments of the past few decades. "If you look at Northeast Asia, all of the other former communist countries are more or less thriving by adopting market reforms/economies, and North Korea is left alone," he says. "It is a very poor, isolated country in a very well-to-do neighborhood of the world—it cannot last forever."

Choe downplays the possibility of an Egypt-style revolution in North Korea, but suggests that China, South Korea, and the United States should consider the potential scenarios for the future of North Korean politics. "The big question is when and how change will come," he states. "If the regime collapses, will there be some kind of power struggle between factions? Is China going to intervene?"

China does not necessarily support North Korea's political decisions, including its nuclear program and economic policies, Choe suggests, but the collapse of North Korea could lead to a mass exodus of refugees into its northeastern provinces. Furthermore, he says, "Another concern for China is what will happen on the Korean Peninsula if North Korea collapses. Is South Korea going to take over the northern half of the peninsula and create one unified Korea, or is America? China might not be happy to have a small, but well-to-do pro-America unified Korea right on its border . . . That explains its attitude seemingly ambiguous [toward North Korea.]"

It is certain that the current North Korean political situation is a very puzzling and complex one, with apparently more questions than answers at this time. As Choe suggests, it is most important now for the world—especially China, South Korea, and the United States—to examine the possible future issues and scenarios facing North Korea, and to identify the related key questions in an effort to prepare for the inevitable change that will one day come.

A full recording of Choe's interview is available online at the KEMS TV website (Korean language).

 

"As with the collapse of the Berlin Wall more than two decades ago, the reverberations of the 'Arab Awakening' are being felt well beyond the Middle East," said Asia Foundation president David D. Arnold during his May 4 talk at Stanford about the recent uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East. He suggested that for countries in Asia and other parts of the world, the uprisings are a reminder that a strong economy is not a replacement for good governance and that democracy can take place anywhere in the world. In Asia, the Asia Foundation blog, provides an overview of Arnold's talk supplemented by essays, including "Worlds at Stake in Arab Reform" by Southeast Asia Forum director Donald K. Emmerson and "The 'Libya Model' and What’s Next in North Korea" and "Springtimes of Political Reform: Looking to East Asia for Clues to Democratic Consolidation" by former Pantech Fellow Scott Snyder. The full audio of Arnold's Stanford talk is now available online.

On Friday, April 1, Stanford University hosted twelve North Korean officials making an unprecedented economic tour of the United States. Organized by Professor Susan Shirk of the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, the two-week tour of American businesses and academic institutions was an opportunity for the visitors to see firsthand what improved relations with the United States might mean in terms of economic cooperation.

The North Koreans included senior and mid-level officials responsible for economic, trade, financial and foreign affairs. Their visit took place despite the lack of diplomatic relations between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the continuing U.S. and UN sanctions against the country for its development of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles.

Welcoming the visitors to a luncheon in Encina Hall, David Straub, associate director of the Korea Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC), briefed them on the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University (FSI) and its research centers, including Shorenstein APARC and the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC). Straub also introduced representatives from FSI and the School of Medicine who have been involved in policy, academic, and humanitarian engagement projects with the DPRK.

Mr. Henry S. Rowen, co-director of the Stanford Program on Regions of Innovation and Entrepreneurship (SPRIE), then outlined the history and organization of Stanford University and its leading role in the development of Silicon Valley. Mr. John Sandelin, senior associate emeritus of the Stanford Office of Technology Licensing, described the university's policies on sharing university-generated intellectual property with the private sector. Following the presentations, American guests at the luncheon, including CISAC's Dr. William J. Perry and Dr. Siegfried S. Hecker, had informal discussions with their North Korean tablemates about the possibilities of, and obstacles to, economic collaboration between the two countries.

The North Koreans' visit to Stanford concluded with a stop at the Hoover Tower observation deck for a panoramic view of the Stanford campus, where they were able to see how Stanford graduates had developed Silicon Valley literally around the campus. DPRK delegation members expressed appreciation for the hospitality they were shown at Stanford and underlined their hopes for economic exchanges with the United States.

The most recent previous visit to Stanford by a DPRK delegation took place in January 2008, when CISAC Professor John W. Lewis, Shorenstein APARC director Gi-Wook Shin, and the School of Medicine's Dr. Sharon Perry hosted five public health officials for discussions about collaboration on tuberculosis control. Out of that visit evolved Stanford's DPRK Tuberculosis Project, which, in association with the DPRK Ministry of Public Health and NGO partners, is developing the country's first laboratory with the capacity to diagnose drug-resistant tuberculosis.

North Korea conducted its first nuclear weapons test in October 2006, prompting the UN Security Council to establish military and economic sanctions in an effort to block further development of the country's nuclear program. After North Korea conducted another test in May 2009—a move that U.S. President Barack Obama described as "directly and recklessly challenging the international community"—the UN Secretary General, at the request of the Security Council, convened a Panel of Experts to advise and assist the UN committee that enforces the sanctions (the "1718 Committee," after the UN Security Council Resolution that brought it into being).

John Everard, 2010-2011 Pantech Fellow with the Stanford Korean Studies Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) and former UK Ambassador to North Korea, left Stanford at the end of March to take up a position with the panel.

The seven-member panel comprises independent experts from the Security Council's five permanent member countries—China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States—and from South Korea and Japan. Some experts come from academic institutions while others have been lent to the panel by national governments. As part of its efforts to advise the 1718 Committee, the panel often travels to inspect banned goods—such as materials that could be used for nuclear purposes—in intercepted cargo shipping to or from North Korea. 

During his diplomatic service in North Korea from 2006 to 2008, Everard closely observed and took photographs of the details of everyday life, discovering that the mindset of ordinary people frequently does not match official government ideology. "There is an openness toward warm relations with Americans if political relations improve," he says. Everard is currently working on completing a book describing his observations of the everyday life of non-elite North Koreans, as well as his experience as a foreigner living in North Korea. It also addresses how North Korea as a country has evolved over the past sixty years and provides suggestions for how better to deal with its government.

Although Everard looks forward to his new position with the Panel of Experts, he will not soon forget his time at Shorenstein APARC. "It has been a great experience," he emphasizes. "It has been a real delight to be surrounded not just by this beautiful architecture and the wonderful facilities that Stanford has, but also by the very friendly, very intelligent people here."

When major political change in North Korea will occur is difficult to predict, but it is inevitable, suggests David Straub, associate director of the Stanford Korean Studies Program. In a March 21, 2011, Seoul Shinmun op-ed, Straub urges, "Since we cannot predict exactly when or how change will come to North Korea or what its nature will be, South Koreans and their allies and friends abroad need to begin to prepare now for many possibilities." English- and Korean-language versions of the text are both available. The op-ed is part of a continuing series on this issue.

Sooner or later, I believe, there will be major change in North Korea. The system may be very strong, but it is also very brittle. Without democratic electoral processes and free speech, smooth and gradual adjustments cannot be made to meet changing circumstances and the needs of the people.

-David Straub
Korean Studies Program
In the mid-1990s, after the death of Kim Il Sung, I heard many top U.S. officials, speaking privately, predict that the North Korean regime would collapse in a matter of just a few years, if not months. I was younger then and assumed they knew what they were talking about. They didn't. They didn't know much about North Korea. They simply compared it to the situation in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, where communist regimes had just collapsed, and thought the same thing would happen in the very different circumstances of North Korea. Everyone was saying it would happen, so it must true, people assumed. Americans don't like the North Korean regime, so wishful thinking also contributed to this consensus among Americans.

These days, as another leadership succession is underway in North Korea, many people again are speculating about the "collapse" of the Pyongyang regime. The fact of the matter is that no one, not even in Pyongyang, really knows what is going to happen there. I believe there could be dramatic change in the regime in North Korea even as you are reading this, but I also believe it is possible that the regime could last many decades more.

A former colleague, Bill Newcomb, recently compared the situation in North Korea to the buildup of pressure along a fault zone. No one, he noted, can predict when a particular earthquake will occur and how large it will be, but scientists today can say with confidence that a major earthquake will inevitably occur in a certain area eventually. Pyongyang is indeed like that.

Sooner or later, I believe, there will be major change in North Korea. The system may be very strong, but it is also very brittle. Without democratic electoral processes and free speech, smooth and gradual adjustments cannot be made to meet changing circumstances and the needs of the people.

Whether the political earthquake in Pyongyang occurs sooner or later, it is only prudent to prepare thoroughly. The United States and other countries will help the Republic of Korea when dramatic change occurs in North Korea, but it will be the Republic of Korea and the people of North and South Korea who, inevitably, will bear the most risk and stand to gain the most.

Since we cannot predict exactly when or how change will come to North Korea or what its nature will be, South Koreans and their allies and friends abroad need to begin to prepare now for many possibilities. I understand that some South Koreans are concerned that such a discussion will offend and anger Pyongyang and may cause its own problems. But the consequences of not preparing could be far worse. This should not be a matter of pushing for collapse, much less risking war, but for preparing prudently to meet real dangers and real opportunities.

South Koreans need to pool their wisdom and their resources, so that they will be able to respond quickly and effectively no matter what eventually happens in North Korea. There needs to be much more thorough study and debate, both within the government and among the citizenry, about how to deal with various possible crises on the Korean Peninsula, including unification.

I worked on German affairs in the U.S. State Department shortly after German unification, and observed as the government in Bonn, while making heroic efforts, made many serious mistakes. Policies regarding currency unification, wages and pensions, property claims and many other issues caused human suffering and national problems that linger today, twenty years later. How great is the understanding in South Korea among government officials and the public about these issues?

One of the things that many South Koreans seem to have concluded from German unification is that unification will be too risky and too costly. There certainly will be risks and the costs will be great when unification occurs. But unification may occur whether all South Koreans want it or not, and whether they are ready or not. And most costs, if carefully planned, will actually be investments. Moreover, there will not only be risks; there will be opportunities for enormous gain. Unified Korea could be stronger, safer, more prosperous, and happier, not just for the people of North Korea but for all Koreans.

We all remember the earthquake that hit a very poor and unprepared Haiti last year, killing at least 100,000 people and leaving a million homeless. The terrible earthquake that Japan has just experienced was 1,000 times more powerful. Just imagine the consequences if Japan had not prepared as well as it had. It is time for the Republic of Korea to begin to prepare seriously for the eventual political earthquake on the Korean Peninsula.

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[나와 통일]4. 스트라우브 스탠퍼드대 부소장

1994년 김일성이 사망한 뒤, 나는 미국의 많은 고위관리들이 사견으로 북한 정권이 몇 개월내 혹은 몇년 내 붕괴할 것이라고 예측하는 것을 들었다. 그때 나는 그들 스스로가 무엇을 얘기하고 있는지 알고 있다고 추측했다. 그러나 그들은 몰랐다. 그들은 단순히 북한을, 공산주의 정권이 붕괴됐던 소련과 동유럽의 상황과 비교했고, 이 같은 상황이 매우 다른 환경의 북한에서도 발생할 것이라고 생각했다. 미국인들은 북한정권을 좋아하지 않기 때문에 (북한이 망할 것이라는) ‘희망적 생각'(wishful thinking)도 이런 일치된 예측에 기여했다.
▲ 데이비드 스트라우브 스탠퍼드대 아태연구소 한국학 부소장은 남북한의 통일 비용이 결국은 투자가 될 것이라고 강조했다.

요즘 북한에서 권력 승계가 진행되면서, 많은 사람들이 북한 정권의 ‘붕괴'에 대해 다시 추측하고 있다. 이 문제와 관련해 명확한 사실은, 누구도, 심지어 평양에 있는 사람도, 거기서 실제 무슨 일이 일어나고 있는지 정확히 모른다는 것이다. 나는 북한 정권에 상당한 변화가 있을 수 있지만, 그 정권이 수십년 더 지속하는 것이 가능하다고도 생각한다.

●北시스템 강한만큼 깨지기도 쉬워

전직 동료인 윌리엄 뉴콤(전 미 재무부 경제자문관)은 최근 북한 상황을 ‘단층대를 따라 고조되는 압력'에 비유했다. 그는, 누구도 어떤 특별한 지진이 언제 발생할 것이고 얼마나 클 것인지 예측할 수 없지만, 오늘날 과학자들은 대규모 지진이 불가피하게 어느 지역에서 결국 발생할 것이라고 확신을 갖고 말할 수 있다고 지적했다.

평양은 정말로 이런 상황과 같다. 나는 조만간 북한에 큰 변화가 있을 것이라고 생각한다. 북한의 시스템은 매우 강할 수 있지만 역시나 매우 깨지기 쉽다. 민주주의적 선거 과정과 표현의 자유 없이, 사람들의 수요와 변하는 환경을 충족시키기 위한 평탄하고 단계적인 조정은 불가능하다.

평양에서 ‘정치적인 지진'이 조만간 일어나든 아니든, 철저하게 대비하는 것이 현명하다. 미국과 다른 나라들은 북한에 극적인 변화가 일어날 경우 한국을 도울 것이다. 그러나 남한과 남북한 사람들이 불가피하게 가장 위험을 감수하고, 가장 많은 이득도 얻게 될 것이다.

우리는 변화가 언제 어떻게 올지, 그것의 모습이 무엇일지 정확하게 예측하기 어렵다. 때문에 남한 사람들과 동맹국들, 우방들은 지금부터 많은 가능성에 대해 준비해야 한다.

나는 일부 남한 사람들이 그런 논의가 북한을 화나게 할 것이고 북한 내 문제를 유발할 것이라고 걱정하는 것을 알고 있다.

그러나 준비하지 않는 것의 결과는 훨씬 나쁠 수 있다. 이것은 붕괴를 재촉하는 문제가 아니라, 실제로 맞닥뜨릴 위험과 기회에 대해 신중하게 준비해 나가야 하는 문제다.

남한 사람들은 북한에 결국 무슨 일이 발생하든 신속하고 효과적으로 대응할 수 있도록 지혜와 자원을 공유할 필요가 있다. 정부와 민간에서 통일을 포함, 한반도에서 발생 가능한 다양한 위기들에 대해 어떻게 대처할 것인지에 대한 더 많은 철저한 연구와 논쟁이 필요하다.

나는 독일 통일 직후 미 국무부에서 독일 담당 업무를 했다. 당시 독일 정부가 용감하게 노력했지만 심각한 실수를 많이 한 것을 관측했다. 화폐 단일화, 임금, 연금, 재산권 등과 관련된 정책들이 20년이 지난 오늘날에도 맴돌고 있는 국민 고통과 문제를 야기했다. 한국의 관료들과 대중 가운데 이런 문제들에 대해 얼마나 이해하고 있는가?

●신속 대응위한 지혜·자원 공유를

많은 남한 사람들이 독일 통일로부터 결론을 내린 것으로 보이는 것들 중 하나는, 통일은 매우 위험하고 비용이 많이 들 것이라는 것이다. 통일이 이뤄질 때 위험과 비용은 당연히 클 것이다.

그러나 통일은 남한 사람들이 원하든 원치 않든, 준비가 돼 있든 아니든 일어날 수 있다. 그리고, 대부분의 비용은, 주의 깊게 계획된다면, 실제로는 투자가 될 것이다. 게다가 위험만 있는 것은 아니다. 엄청난 이득을 위한 기회도 있을 것이다.

통일된 한국은 단지 북한 사람들뿐 아니라 모든 한국인들을 더 강하고, 안전하고, 번영하고, 행복하게 할 수 있다.

우리는 지난해 준비되지 않은 아이티를 강타한 지진의 엄청난 피해를 기억한다. 최근 일본의 대지진은 아이티 지진보다 1000배 강력했다. 일본이 준비하지 않았다면 어떤 결과가 발생했을지 상상해 보라. 이제 남한은 한반도의 정치적 지진에 대해 심각하게 준비해야 한다.

번역·정리 김미경기자 chaplin7@seoul.co.kr

●약력

▲57 세 ▲미 루이빌대·하버드대 박사과정 ▲주서독 미대사관 근무 ▲주한 미대사관 근무 ▲주일 미대사관 근무 ▲미 국무부 독일팀장 ▲주한 미대사관 공사참사관 ▲미 국무부 한국과장·일본과장 ▲미 존스 홉킨스대·서울대 강의 ▲현재 미 스탠퍼드대 아태연구소 한국학 부소장