Nuclear Developments in North Korea
Former British ambassador on North Korea's citizens, reform and engagement
Hallmarks during the first year of young North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s reign range from a much-publicized failed rocket launch to the appearance (and then disappearance) of an attractive, stylish wife by his side. Such events have prompted questions about the new leader’s intentions for the future, including the possibility of reform.
But there is another side to the Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK) that often goes overlooked: its 20 million ordinary citizens. Only Beautiful, Please, a new book by former British diplomat John Everard, delves into the daily life of North Koreans and examines the challenges of developing successful diplomatic relations with the country.
Everard was Britain’s ambassador to North Korea between 2006 and 2008 and is a former Pantech Fellow of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute of International Studies. He presented highlights from his book, and offered his insight into current North Korea events during a seminar at Stanford on Oct. 26.
In a recent interview, Everard discussed his book, the prospect of reform in North Korea, and important considerations for engagement with the isolated country.
What is the significance of the book’s title?
A friend visiting me from the U.K. was pursued by a group of North Koreans who were convinced he had photographed things that did not show the DPRK in the best light. An army officer was eventually summoned, and after examining the pictures he concluded there was nothing offensive in them. As he returned my friend’s camera, he turned to me and said in his best English: “Only beautiful, please.” He meant that he wanted us to only photograph beautiful things in the DPRK.
I took this for the title because it says quite a lot about how the DPRK likes to hide the negative aspects of life there, and to portray itself as a country where only good things take place.
What do you most hope readers will take away from your book?
I hope readers will come away with the understanding that the DPRK is a real country, where real people live. North Korea is different from other countries in many important ways, but its citizens are much more preoccupied with everyday things like marriage, how their kids are getting on at school, and what they are having for supper, than they are about politics and denuclearization. It is a country with over 20 million people, and I hope their lives and happiness are not overlooked as the international community engages with the DPRK to seek long-term solutions to the difficult problems it poses.
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What are the most important needs of North Korea’s citizens?
North Koreans are people like the rest of us, and they have the same physical and emotional needs. They need enough to eat, which is a need not always met. They also need to have normal social interactions. Friendships are very important in the DPRK, even if they are somewhat different than friendships in more open societies. North Koreans also have their self-respect and pride. They are a proud people, and as information about the outside world leaks into the DPRK and they learn how poor and backward their country is they feel quite disoriented. They will need to hold onto their self-respect through what is likely to be a very difficult period in the coming years.
There has been significant speculation in recent months about the possibility of reform in North Korea. Have we seen any tangible signs of plans for reform?
There have been indications that Kim Jong Un had been planning some limited economic reforms, including allowing farmers to retain a certain percentage of their produce after giving part of it to the state. But the most recent report suggests that this plan has stalled after the government realized there would be a poor harvest this year. They have decided it is more important to feed the military than it is to implement economic reforms at this point in time.
Another type of reform is the possibility of greater cultural opening. Mickey Mouse appeared in front of the DPRK leadership at a concert a few weeks ago, for example, and there is also the appearance of Ri Sol Ju, Kim Jong Un’s wife. She is a very presentable young woman, and dresses smartly, (and without wearing the traditional Kim badge). But there have been no further appearances of Mickey Mouse, and Ri Sol Ju has not appeared in public for several weeks. I suspect that these reforms, too, have been put on hold.
These are two quite different types of reform that do not depend on each other, and it is not clear if either of them is going to move forward.
In terms of easing diplomatic relations with North Korea, do you think that reform would pave the way or are there other issues to keep in mind?
If reform does indeed take place – I have my doubts – it might not be the kind of reform that would help improve relations with the DPRK. Economic reform does not necessarily translate into a greater readiness for meaningful dialogue with the international community.
A crucial point is that there are certain aspects of the DPRK regime that are extremely difficult to change. I argue in my book that the DPRK cannot conduct any kind of meaningful economic reform along the lines China did because to do so would erode the regime’s economic power over its citizens. The regime views this power as intrinsic to its survival. It also cannot allow greater openness because that would allow in new ideas to which the regime has no answer. It will be politically very difficult, and even dangerous, for the regime to encourage the greater openness we have seen in other reforming economies.
The DPRK regime is likely to continue broadly along the lines we have seen for many decades now. Although many people were hoping that Kim Jong Un would bring reforms, and perhaps even better relations with the West, as time passes it seems less likely that these hopes can be realized.
What should the international community keep in mind in its relations with North Korea?
The DPRK has made it abundantly clear it has no intention whatsoever of surrendering its nuclear weapons. It has been hardened in its belief by its analysis of what has happened in the Arab world. Negotiations and talks towards persuading the DPRK to surrender its weapons are doomed to failure. They are not going to do so, and any engagement with the DPRK has to take that as a starting point.
There is a tendency in the United States to see North Korea's foreign relations simply in terms of the U.S.-DPRK relationship (or lack of it). The DPRK’s relations with the United States are indeed very important, but you also have to see the world through the DPRK’s eyes. If you are sitting in Pyongyang, your single most important relationship is with the People’s Republic of China.
Beijing has been deeply concerned about the DPRK’s behavior in a number of areas. Earlier this year, for example, we saw the launch of North Korea’s rocket against China’s express wishes, and the seizure of Chinese fishermen by the DPRK navy. The relationship between the DPRK and China has its difficulties, and one of the big determinants in what happens to the DPRK in the immediate future is going to be the position on the DPRK taken by the incoming Chinese government after the Party Congress in November.
About the Images
Even in central Pyongyang almost any cultivable patch of ground is ploughed for crops, like this one just outside the diplomatic quarter. (Credit: John Everard)
Stalls at Pyongyang spring trade fair -- the dominance of China at these events is clear. (Credit: John Everard)
Dealing with Kazakhstan’s Soviet nuclear legacy
When the Soviet Union dissolved at the end of 1991, the independent Republic of Kazakhstan was left with the world’s fourth largest nuclear arsenal and a huge nuclear infrastructure, including lots of fissile materials, several nuclear reactors, the Ulba Metallurgical Plant, and the enormous Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site. The return of the nuclear weapons to Russia (thanks to former Secretary of Defense William Perry), the transport of vulnerable highly-enriched uranium to the U.S. (Project Sapphire), the disposition of the fast reactor fuel, and upgrading of security and safeguards at its research reactors have been the subject of numerous reports. The story of what has been done with what the Soviets left behind at the test site and the dangers it presented will be the main topic of my presentation. It is a great story of how scientists from three countries worked together effectively among themselves and with their governments to deal with one of the greatest nuclear dangers in the post-Cold War era.
About the speaker: Siegfried S. Hecker is co-director of the Stanford University Center for International Security and Cooperation, Senior Fellow of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and Professor (Research) in the Department of Management Science and Engineering. He also served as Director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory from 1986-1997. Dr. Hecker’s research interests include plutonium science, nuclear weapon policy and international security, nuclear security (including nonproliferation and counter terrorism), and cooperative nuclear threat reduction. Over the past 20 years, he has fostered cooperation with the Russian nuclear laboratories to secure and safeguard the vast stockpile of ex-Soviet fissile materials. His current interests include the challenges of nuclear India, Pakistan, North Korea, the nuclear aspirations of Iran and the peaceful spread of nuclear energy in Central Asia and South Korea. Dr. Hecker has visited North Korea seven times since 2004, reporting back to U.S. government officials on North Korea’s nuclear progress and testifying in front of the U.S. Congress. He is a fellow of numerous professional societies and received the Presidential Enrico Fermi Award.
CISAC Conference Room
Siegfried S. Hecker
CISAC
Stanford University
Encina Hall, C220
Stanford, CA 94305-6165
Siegfried S. Hecker is a professor emeritus (research) in the Department of Management Science and Engineering and a senior fellow emeritus at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI). He was co-director of CISAC from 2007-2012. From 1986 to 1997, Dr. Hecker served as the fifth Director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Dr. Hecker is an internationally recognized expert in plutonium science, global threat reduction, and nuclear security.
Dr. Hecker’s current research interests include nuclear nonproliferation and arms control, nuclear weapons policy, nuclear security, the safe and secure expansion of nuclear energy, and plutonium science. At the end of the Cold War, he has fostered cooperation with the Russian nuclear laboratories to secure and safeguard the vast stockpile of ex-Soviet fissile materials. In June 2016, the Los Alamos Historical Society published two volumes edited by Dr. Hecker. The works, titled Doomed to Cooperate, document the history of Russian-U.S. laboratory-to-laboratory cooperation since 1992.
Dr. Hecker’s research projects at CISAC focus on cooperation with young and senior nuclear professionals in Russia and China to reduce the risks of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism worldwide, to avoid a return to a nuclear arms race, and to promote the safe and secure global expansion of nuclear power. He also continues to assess the technical and political challenges of nuclear North Korea and the nuclear aspirations of Iran.
Dr. Hecker joined Los Alamos National Laboratory as graduate research assistant and postdoctoral fellow before returning as technical staff member following a tenure at General Motors Research. He led the laboratory's Materials Science and Technology Division and Center for Materials Science before serving as laboratory director from 1986 through 1997, and senior fellow until July 2005.
Among his professional distinctions, Dr. Hecker is a member of the National Academy of Engineering; foreign member of the Russian Academy of Sciences; fellow of the TMS, or Minerals, Metallurgy and Materials Society; fellow of the American Society for Metals; fellow of the American Physical Society, honorary member of the American Ceramics Society; and fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.
His achievements have been recognized with the Presidential Enrico Fermi Award, the 2020 Building Bridges Award from the Pacific Century Institute, the 2018 National Engineering Award from the American Association of Engineering Societies, the 2017 American Nuclear Society Eisenhower Medal, the American Physical Society’s Leo Szilard Prize, the American Nuclear Society's Seaborg Medal, the Department of Energy's E.O. Lawrence Award, the Los Alamos National Laboratory Medal, among other awards including the Alumni Association Gold Medal and the Undergraduate Distinguished Alumni Award from Case Western Reserve University, where he earned his bachelor's, master's, and doctoral degrees in metallurgy.
Memory and National Identity in North Korean Cultural Production
This conference will bring together scholars of North Korea who will debate various aspects of North Korean culture from historical, comparative, and multidisciplinary perspectives. The prominence of North Korea in world news and the media cannot be understated; yet at a time when much of the analytic energy goes into trying to predict North Korea’s next political move, to assess its military and economic strategies, or to determine the extent of an ever-growing Chinese influence, more attention needs to be paid to its expressions of art, literature, and performance culture that continues to be produced for both internal and external consumption. The presentations in this conference engage with music, graphic novels, art, science fiction, film, and ego-documents with an attempt to illuminate the ways in which North Korea remembers its past, asserts itself in the present, and imagines its future even while outside influences increasingly disrupt its once-hermetically sealed borders.
This event is co-sponsored by the Korean Studies Program at APARC and the Center for East Asian Studies (CEAS). RSVP Required.
Please register at http://ceas.stanford.edu/events/event_detail.php?id=2969.
For questions and details, please contact Marna Romanoff at romanoff@stanford.edu.
Philippines Conference Room
North Korea: Diplomatic Prospects in the Coming Year
A yearlong U.S. effort to engage nuclear-armed North Korea culminated in the announcements by Washington and Pyongyang of the so-called “Leap Day” understanding on February 29. A fortnight later, North Korea announced it would launch a multi-stage rocket carrying what the reclusive state said was a civilian satellite. After an intensive four weeks of public and private calls on Pyongyang from the other five members of the Six-Party Talks not to proceed, the April 13 launch failed, but triggered unanimous censure from the 16-member UN Security Council. Ambassador Davies will describe the talks leading to the Leap Day understanding, the fallout from North Korea’s aborted launch, and where this leaves our efforts to hold Pyongyang to its denuclearization and other promises. He will also discuss Washington’s views of new leader Kim Jong Un, the likelihood of change in North Korea, and diplomatic prospects in this season of political transition in key Six Party states.
Glyn Davies, a career member of the Senior Foreign Service, was appointed by Secretary of State Clinton as Special Representative for North Korea Policy in November 2011.
Ambassador Davies joined the Foreign Service in 1980 and has served in numerous posts in Washington and overseas, including the position of Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs from 2007 to 2009. From 2009 to 2011, he was U.S. Permanent Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency and United Nations agencies in Vienna.
Ambassador Davies holds a BS in Foreign Service from Georgetown University and a masters degree from the National War College in Washington, D.C.
Philippines Conference Room
In-depth on life in North Korea
The Election That Could Reorder South Korea’s Politics
This year is one of elections and leadership changes throughout the Asia-Pacific region.
Earlier in 2012, Taiwan reelected President Ma Ying-jeou to a second term. North Korea and
Russia have already seen transfers of power this year; it will be China’s turn in the fall. The United States holds its presidential election in November. And South Korea will elect a president in December. Individually and collectively, these leadership changes hold crucial implications for Northeast Asian nations as well as the United States.
In this article, Gi-Wook Shin explores the possible implications of South Korea's upcoming presidential election.
Limited reform expected in North Korea