Stanford students now can choose Korea track as a major. Dafna Zur, assistant professor of East Asian languages and cultures, says "the major we've created responds to the interest we've sensed on campus and gives students the opportunity to explore Korea in a truly interdisciplinary way."

The full article is available here.

The U.S.-Asia Security Initiative at Stanford’s Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, in collaboration with the Japan Center for International Exchange, has published a report highlighting the findings from its Inaugural U.S.-Japan Security Workshop, a Track 1.5 dialogue in Tokyo that convened government and military officials from the United States and Japan, as well as scholars and regional experts, in May 2016.

The report, titled “Japan’s Evolving Defense Policy and U.S.-Japan Security Cooperation: Expectations versus Reality,” examines recent changes in Japan’s defense policy and the implications of these revisions on the U.S.-Japan alliance and regional security.

Sections of the report include:

• American and Japanese Perspectives on the Security Trends in Asia
• The Impact of the New Security Policy on U.S.-Japan Security Cooperation Efforts
• Defense Cooperation and Weapons Development & Acquisition
• Conclusions—Facing the Policy and Operational Challenges Head-On

Rising tensions in Asia underscore a need for expanded security cooperation. The report is offered as a tool to American and Japanese policy researchers and practitioners who seek to study and address the evolving security environment and what the future holds for the alliance.

The report may viewed by clicking here.

As a new U.S. administration assumes office next year, it will face numerous policy challenges in the Asia-Pacific, a region that accounts for nearly 60 percent of the world’s population and two-thirds of global output.

Despite tremendous gains over the past two decades, the Asia-Pacific region is now grappling with varied effects of globalization, chief among them, inequities of growth, migration and development and their implications for societies as some Asian economies slow alongside the United States and security challenges remain at the fore.

Seven scholars from Stanford’s Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) offered views on policy challenges in Asia and some possible directions for U.S.-Asia relations during the next administration.

View the scholars' commentary by scrolling down the page or click on the individual links below to jump to a certain topic.

U.S.-China relations

U.S.-Japan relations

North Korea

Southeast Asia and the South China Sea

Global governance

Population aging .

Trade

U.S.-China relations

By Thomas Fingar

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Alarmist predictions about China’s rise and America’s decline mischaracterize and overstate tensions in the relationship. There is little likelihood that the next U.S. administration will depart from the “hedged engagement” policies pursued by the last eight U.S. administrations. America’s domestic problems cannot be solved by blaming China or any other country. Indeed, they can best be addressed through policies that have contributed to peace, stability and prosperity.

Strains in U.S.-China relations require attention, not radical shifts in policy. China is not an enemy and the United States does not wish to make it one. Nor will or should the next administration resist changes to the status quo if change can better the rules-based international order that has served both countries well. Washington’s objective will be to improve the liberal international system, not to contain or constrain China’s role in that system.

The United States and China have too much at stake to allow relations to become dangerously adversarial, although that is unlikely to happen. But this is not a reason to be sanguine. In the years ahead, managing the relationship will be difficult because key pillars of the relationship are changing. For decades, the strongest source of support for stability in U.S.-China relations has been the U.S. business community, but Chinese actions have alienated this key group and it is now more likely to press for changes than for stability. A second change is occurring in China. As growth slows, Chinese citizens are pressing their government to make additional reforms and respond to perceived challenges to China’s sovereignty.

The next U.S. administration is more likely to continue and adapt current policies toward China and Asia more broadly than to pursue a significantly different approach. Those hoping for or fearing radical changes in U.S. policy will be disappointed..

Thomas Fingar is a Shorenstein Distinguished Fellow and former chairman of the U.S. National Intelligence Council. He leads a research project on China and the World that explores China’s relations with other countries.

U.S.-Japan relations

By Daniel Sneider

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Three consecutive terms held by the same party would certainly preserve the momentum behind the ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy of the last few years, especially on the security front. Still there are some dangers ahead. If Japan moves ahead to make a peace treaty with Russia, resolving the territorial issue and opening a flow of Japanese investment into Russia, that could be a source of tension. The new administration may also want to mend fences early with China, seeking cooperation on North Korea and avoiding tensions in Southeast Asia.

The big challenge, however, will be guiding the TPP through Congress. While there is a strong sentiment within policy circles in favor of rescuing the deal, perhaps through some kind of adjustment of the agreement, insiders believe that is highly unlikely. The Sanders-Warren wing of the Democratic party has been greatly strengthened by this election and they will be looking for any sign of retreat on TPP. Mrs. Clinton has an ambitious agenda of domestic policy initiatives – from college tuition and the minimum wage to immigration reform – on which she will need their support. One idea now circulating quietly in policy circles is to ‘save’ the TPP, especially its strategic importance, by separating off a bilateral Japan-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. Tokyo is said to be opposed to this but Washington may put pressure on for this option, leaving the door open to a full TPP down the road. .

Daniel Sneider is the associate director for research and a former foreign correspondent. He is the co-author of Divergent Memories: Opinion Leaders and the Asia-Pacific Wars (Stanford University Press, 2016) and is currently writing about U.S.-Japan security issues.

North Korea

By Kathleen Stephens

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From an American foreign policy perspective, North Korea policy challenges will be inherited by the next president as “unfinished business,” unresolved despite a range of approaches spanning previous Republican and Democratic administrations. The first months in a new U.S. president’s term may create a small window to explore potential new openings. The new president should demonstrate at the outset that North Korea is high on the new administration’s priority list, with early, substantive exchanges with allies and key partners like China to affirm U.S. commitment to defense of its allies, a denuclearized Korean Peninsula and the vision agreed to at the Six-Party Talks in the September 2005 Joint Statement of Principles. Early messaging to Pyongyang is also key – clearly communicating the consequences of further testing or provocations, but at the same time signaling the readiness of the new administration to explore new diplomatic approaches. The appointment of a senior envoy, close to the president, could underscore the administration’s seriousness as well as help manage the difficult policy and political process in Washington itself.

2017 is a presidential election year in South Korea, and looks poised to be a particularly difficult one. This will influence Pyongyang’s calculus, as will the still-unknown impact of continued international sanctions. The challenges posed by North Korea have grown greater with time, but there are few new, untried options acceptable to any new administration in Washington. Nonetheless, the new administration must explore what is possible diplomatically and take further steps to defend and deter as necessary. .

Kathleen Stephens is the William J. Perry Distinguished Fellow and former U.S. ambassador to the Republic of Korea. She is currently writing and researching on U.S. diplomacy in Korea.

Southeast Asia and the South China Sea

By Donald K. Emmerson

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A new U.S. administration will be inaugurated in January 2017. Unless it wishes to adapt to such outcomes, it should:

(1) renew its predecessor’s refusal to endorse any claim to sovereignty over all, most, or some of the South China Sea and/or its land features made by any of the six contending parties—Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam—pending the validation of such a claim under international law.

(2) strongly encourage all countries, including the contenders, to endorse and implement the authoritative interpretation of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) issued on July 12, 2016, by an UNCLOS-authorized court. Washington should also emphasize that it, too, will abide by the judgment, and will strive to ensure American ratification of UNCLOS.

(3) maintain its commitment to engage in publicly acknowledged freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) in the South China Sea on a regular basis. Previous such FONOPs were conducted in October 2015 by the USS Lassen, in January 2016 by the USS Wilbur, in May 2016 by the USS Lawrence, and in October 2016 by the USS Decatur. The increasingly lengthy intervals between these trips, despite a defense official’s promise to conduct them twice every quarter, has encouraged doubts about precisely the commitment to freedom of navigation that they were meant to convey.

(4) announce what has hitherto been largely implicit: The FONOPs are not being done merely to brandish American naval prowess. Their purpose is to affirm a core geopolitical position, namely, that no single country, not the United States, nor China, nor anyone else, should exercise exclusive or exclusionary control over the South China Sea.

(5) brainstorm with Asian-Pacific and European counterparts a range of innovative ways of multilateralizing the South China Sea as a shared heritage of, and a resource for, its claimants and users alike. .

Donald K. Emmerson is a senior fellow emeritus and director of the Southeast Asia Program. He is currently editing a Stanford University Press book that examines China’s relations with Southeast Asia.

Global governance

By Phillip Y. Lipscy

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Global economic activity is increasingly shifting toward Asia – most forecasts suggest the region will account for about half of the global economy by the midpoint of the 21^st century. This shift is creating important incongruities within the global architecture of international organizations, such as the United Nations, International Monetary Fund and World Bank, which are a central element of the U.S.-based international order and remain heavily tilted toward the West in their formal structures, headquarter locations and personnel compositions. This status quo is a constant source of frustration for policymakers in the region, who seek greater voice consummate with their newfound international status. 

The next U.S. administration should prioritize reinvigoration of the global architecture.  One practical step is to move major international organizations toward multiple headquarter arrangements, which are now common in the private sector – this will mitigate the challenges of recruiting talented individuals willing to spend their careers in distant headquarters in the West. The United States should join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, created by China, to tie the institution more closely into the existing architecture, contribute to its success and send a signal that Asian contributions to international governance are welcome. The Asian rebalance should be continued and deepened, with an emphasis on institution-building that reassures our Asian counterparts that the United States will remain a Pacific power. .

Philip Y. Lipscy is an assistant professor of political science and the Thomas Rohlen Center Fellow. He is the author of the forthcoming book Renegotiating the World Order: Institutional Change in International Relations (Cambridge University Press, 2017).

Population aging

By Karen Eggleston

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China’s recent announcement of a universal two-child policy restored an important dimension of choice, but it will not fundamentally change the trajectory of a shrinking working-age population and burgeoning share of elderly. China’s population aged 60 and older is projected to grow from nearly 15 percent today to 33 percent in 2050, at which time China’s population aged 80 and older will be larger than the current population of France. This triumph of longevity in China and other Asian countries, left unaddressed, will strain the fiscal integrity of public and private pension systems, while urbanization, technological change and income inequality interact with population aging by threatening the sustainability and perceived fairness of conventional financing for many social programs.

Investment in human capital and innovation in social and economic institutions will be central to addressing the demographic realities ahead. The next administration needs to support those investments as well as help to strengthen public health systems and primary care to control chronic disease and prepare for the next infectious disease pandemic, many of which historically have risen in Asia. .

Karen Eggleston is a senior fellow and director of the Asia Health Policy Program. She is the editor of the recently published book Policy Challenges from Demographic Change in China and India (Brookings Institution Press/Shorenstein APARC, 2016).

Trade

By Yong Suk Lee

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Anti-globalization sentiment has ballooned in the past two years, particularly in regions affected by the import competition from and outsourcing to Asia. However, some firms and workers have benefited from increasing trade openness. The U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement of 2012, for example, led to substantial growth in exports in the agricultural, automotive and pharmaceutical sectors. Yet, there are winners and losers from trade agreements. Using an economist’s hypothetical perspective, one would assume firms and workers in the losing industry move to the exporting sector and take advantage of the gains from trade. In reality, adjustment across industries and regions from such movements are slow. Put simply, a furniture worker in North Carolina who lost a job due to import competition cannot easily assume a new job in the booming high-tech industry in California. They would require high-income mobility and a different skill set.

Trade policy needs to focus on facilitating the transition of workers to different industries and better train students to prepare for potential mobility in the future. Trade policy will also be vital in determining how international commerce is shaped. As cross-border e-commerce increases, it will be in the interest of the United States to participate in and lead negotiations that determine future trade rules. The Trans-Pacific Partnership should not simply be abandoned. The next administration should educate both policymakers and the public about the effects of trade openness and the economic and strategic importance of trade agreements for the U.S. economy.

Yong Suk Lee is the SK Center Fellow and deputy director of Korea Program. He leads a research project focused on Korean education, entrepreneurship and economic development.

Speaking at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center on Tuesday, U.S. Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus underscored the importance of partnerships in the Asia-Pacific region and need for an adaptable force to meet the rapidly changing security environment around the world.

Mabus began by recognizing William J. Perry, a Stanford emeritus professor and former U.S. secretary of defense, with a Distinguished Public Service Award for his exceptional record of public service and collaboration on alternative energy initiatives, and set the stage for a conversation on innovation in the Navy and Marine Corps.

Throughout his remarks, Mabus highlighted the challenges of preparing for today’s security landscape and offered examples of how the Navy engages them.

The Navy must not be complacent in its ways, he said, especially in a context of eroding trust in multilateral institutions, unpredictable threats, and increasing competition for resources as sea levels rise.

“You’re not going to be able to tell what those next threats are. You never will. But what you can do is make sure that whatever they are you can respond,” he said. “You’ve got to be flexible.”

Mabus, who has led the Navy administration for the past seven years, said four “Ps” – people, platforms, power and partnerships – have guided his approach to improve force capabilities and rapid-response time.

Reviewing his own record as secretary, he cited updates to policies that extend family leave time, boost diversity in the force, and explore alternative energy sources for Navy aircraft and ships, including the earlier launch of the “Great Green Fleet,” a carrier strike group that uses biofuels.

Partnerships in Asia

Implementing the U.S. rebalance to Asia strategy has been a focus of the Navy’s interaction in the region.

“We’re doing it diplomatically, we’re doing it economically, we’re doing it in every region that we as a government are active in,” said Mabus, who formerly served as U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia and governor of Mississippi.

Sixty percent of the United States naval presence is located in the Asia-Pacific region and it is poised toward growth, Mabus said. Three more guided missile destroyers will be stationed in Japan and be "on station when North Korea launches one of its missiles," he said.

“If something does happen, if a crisis does erupt, we’re already there,” Mabus said, emphasizing the importance of force readiness.

Responding to crises effectively, however, requires an awareness and interoperability between many countries, he said. To practice and prepare, around 500 naval exercises occur between the United States and other countries each year, including Malabar, a trilateral exercise between India, Japan and the United States, and the biannual 27-nation Rim of the Pacific “RIMPAC” exercise, which China joined last year.

South China Sea issues

Answering a question from the audience about fortifications being built by China on land features in the South China Sea, Mabus said, “We don’t think any one country should try and change the status quo.”

Mabus reaffirmed the United States’ commitment to both sail and fly over the land features in accordance with international law. The American naval presence in the region has been there for 70 years and will remain steadfast, he said.

He noted the importance of upholding international law and warned of the dangers of setting a precedent of reinterpreting the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea regarding the South China Sea, attempting to do so would have “a really dramatic impact, not just there, but around the world."

A main goal for the U.S. Navy is to continue engagement between China and the United States, he said. The two countries already collaborate on a number of bilateral measures, such as scheduled passing exercises and visits by the navies to each other’s ports of call.

“What we want China to do is to assume the responsibilities of a naval power, to work with us, and to make sure that freedom of navigation is ensured.”

Gi-Wook Shin, a Stanford professor of sociology and director of Shorenstein APARC, concluded the event by thanking Mabus, and recognized the secretary’s friendship with the late Walter H. Shorenstein, after whom the center was named.

Researchers in the Korea Program regularly contribute to Korean media on the Korean affairs ranging from education and economics to politics and North Korea nuclear issues. The articles are in Korean language.

Nationalist Populism in South Korea (Gi-Wook Shin, August 18, 2019)

The Ambiguous Boundary Between Korean Wave and the Anti-Korean Sentiment (Joyce Lee, May 2, 2019)

Restoring the Dignity of South Korea (Gi-Wook Shin, April 18, 2019)

Happiness and Productivity (Yong Suk Lee, March 21, 2019)

Softness Overcomes Hardness  (Joyce Lee, March 6, 2019)

What should the Hanoi Declaration lay out? (Gi-Wook Shin, February 20, 2019)

What Would an Aged Society Look Like? (Yong Suk Lee, January 23, 2019)

Confront the lure of populism or risk economic failures and the coming of a far-right extremist regime (Gi-Wook Shin, January 17, 2019)

Only a drastic measure towards denuclearization can resolve the current stalemate with North Korea (Gi-Wook Shin, interview with Korea Times, January 10, 2019)

Looking After Myself (Joyce Lee, January 9, 2019)

2018, The Moon Jae-In Government's Progress Report (Gi-Wook Shin, December 27, 2018)

Rethinking North Korean Economy? (Yong Suk Lee, November 29, 2018)

The Dark Side of the Korean Culture of Hierarchy (Joyce Lee, November 14, 2018)

Trump's Second Half (Gi-Wook Shin, November 7, 2018)

How Parents Can Help their Children with Career Planning (Yong Suk Lee, October 17, 2018)

Anticipation and Concerns Mount Ahead of the 3rd Inter-Korean Summit (Joyce Lee, September 19, 2018)

Spring on the Korean Peninsula Needs to be hard fought (Gi-Wook Shin, September 5, 2018)

Should we encourage kids to learn coding? (Yong Suk Lee, August 6, 2018)

Some Thoughts on the Korean Value of Saving Face (Joyce Lee, July 16, 2018)

Koreans abroad can play important roles in achieving peace on the Korean Peninsula (Gi-Wook Shin, July 2, 2018)

Withdrawal of US troops from South Korea now becomes an option (Gi-Wook Shin, June 20, 2018)

Trump in Face-Saving Action for Kim (Joyce Lee, June 18, 2018)

South Korea and the U.S. Differ on Priorities for North Korea Policy (Gi-Wook Shin, May 14, 2018)

Is CVID Possible? (Gi-Wook Shin, May 7, 2018)

CVID Faces Challenges (Gi-Wook Shin, May 3, 2018)

The April 27 Korea Summit and the Lingering Question of CVID+α (Gi-Wook Shin, April 30, 2018)

Choices for Your Happiness (Joyce Lee, April 23, 2018)

The Ambiguity of the Moon Government's Goal for the Inter-Korean Summit (Gi-Wook Shin, April 2, 2018)

Korea as a Pacemaker (Gi-Wook Shin, March 13, 2018)

MeToo Movement Should Create Lasting Social Change (Gi-Wook Shin, March 12, 2018)

What's Wrong with Being a Nobody? (Joyce Lee, February 26, 2018)

It's Time to Move Beyond the Political Deadlock of Comfort Women Issue (Gi-Wook Shin, January 15, 2018)

Can the Government Rouse Young Koreans from Their Dreams of Childless Comfort? (Joyce Lee, January 3, 2018)

A Grand Bargain between the US and China Seems More Likely than Ever (Yong Suk Lee, December 25, 2017)

Korea No Longer a Country of Koreans (Rennie Moon, December 11, 2017)

Moon Administration's Diplomatic and Securtiy Strategies (Gi-Wook Shin, November 27, 2017)

Making Little Mr. and Ms. Perfects, But for Whose Sake and at What Cost? (Joyce Lee, November 6, 2017)

Identifying Korea as a Developed Country (Joon Nak Choi, October 30, 2017)

Superficial Korea (Gi-Wook Shin, September 26, 2017)

What Comes After the War of Words Between Trump and Kim Jong-un (Gi-Wook Shin, September 25, 2017)

In the Midst of Rising Fears of War (Joyce Lee, September 12, 2017)

Broken English as the global language (Rennie Moon, August 28, 2017)

'Polifessors' of Moon administration (Gi-Wook Shin, July 24, 2017)

In Anticipation of the Era of Korean Studies (Joyce Lee, July 17, 2017)

Technological Change: Why Korea needs a longer-term perspective on job creation (Yong Suk Lee, June 27, 2017)

Global network of Koreans abroad (Gi-Wook Shin, June 6, 2017)

First summit meeting, not to hurry (Gi-Wook Shin, May 22, 2017)

Korean Americans' love for Korea (Rennie Moon, April 24, 2017)

Trump's anti-immigration stance to be an opportunity for Korea (Gi-Wook Shin, February 27, 2017)

A Labor market by the young, and for the young (Yong Suk Lee, January 30, 2017)

If Korean universities are to succeed with internationalization (Rennie Moon, November 21, 2016)

US presidential election and Korea (Gi-Wook Shin, October 24, 2016)

Political expediency should not block technology innovation (Joon Nak Choi, September 12, 2016)

Strategic policy on inter-Korean relations is essential (Gi-Wook Shin, August 1, 2016)

Is Korea ready to embrace risk and failure? (Yong Suk Lee, June 20, 2016)

Can Pankyo become Silicon Valley in Korea? (Gi-Wook Shin, May 9, 2016)

The Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) has named Yong Suk Lee as the deputy director of its Korea Program for a three-year term, starting Oct. 1.

Lee, the SK Center Fellow in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, will work closely with Director Gi-Wook Shin to continue to expand the program’s research and teaching activities on policy-relevant topics on Korea.

Additionally, Thomas Fingar, a distinguished fellow at Shorenstein APARC, will be the acting director of the China Program when Director Jean Oi is on sabbatical leave during winter quarter this academic year.