In February 1986, Scot Marciel was driving home after midnight and went past what he assumed was just another protest near military facilities in downtown Manila. The gathering, less than a year into his first overseas assignment with the Foreign Service, turned out to be the early days of the Philippine People Power revolution, leading to the end of the Ferdinand Marcos regime. This was just one of several times during his 35-year career in the State Department that Marciel would find himself witnessing historic moments in Southeast Asia and in the U.S. relationship with the countries of the region.

That illustrious career includes being the first U.S. diplomat to work in Hanoi since the end of the Vietnam War and serving as the first U.S. ambassador for ASEAN Affairs and as U.S. ambassador to Indonesia and Myanmar.

Marciel, Oksenberg-Rohlen Fellow at FSI and affiliated with APARC, has distilled his experiences and observations into his new book, Imperfect Partners: The United States and Southeast Asia (Shorenstein APARC/ Rowman & Littlefield, 2023). In it, he offers his on-the-ground account of the ups and downs of critical U.S. relationships in the region — focusing on the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Indonesia — and examines the role of ASEAN and China’s influence in Southeast Asia.

To mark the book’s release, we talked with Marciel about recent events in the region and his views on how the United States should approach Southeast Asian countries in the context of China’s efforts to sow closer ties with them. Watch the conversation:

A Return to the Philippines

The Philippines under President Ferdinand “Bong Bong” Marcos, Jr. is now allowing U.S. forces expanded access to four of its bases. Marciel, who first met Marcos, Jr. as the provincial governor of Ilocos Norte in 1985, expressed some surprise at the Philippine president’s rapid shift to strengthen the country’s alliance with the United States. He noted, however, that even in the last year of the Duterte presidency, which frequently was at odds with the United States, there was some recognition in the Philippines that the relationship with China wasn’t bearing the fruit that had been anticipated. Marciel also pointed out that the deal with the United States does not mean Marcos has abandoned China: he is still working on keeping the relationship with Beijing healthy and visiting Japan, another important partner.

Although there is some Philippine civil opposition to the renewed presence of U.S. forces, Marciel believes that the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) will provide an opportunity for a “more modern and equal partnership,” and hopefully one that can supplant memories of the U.S. colonial history in the Philippines.

Southeast Asian Charm Competition?

As concern continues to rise about a possible invasion of Taiwan by the People’s Republic of China, some have questioned the effectiveness of the U.S. capability to compete with China, particularly in terms of a diplomatic offensive. Marciel responded to a recent New York Times article on U.S. and Chinese efforts to “woo” Indonesia. As China continues to seal trade deals in Southeast Asia, some of which are part of its Belt and Road Initiative, we asked whether the United States can compete with China’s free-flowing cash.

Marciel, taking a step back, cautions that “Indonesia is not a prize to be won,” and that we should not be “scoring diplomatic relations like a sporting event” when we look at improving ties with the countries of Southeast Asia. Indonesia, for example, has a long history with the Non-Aligned Movement, so while it attempts to attract foreign investment, it will resist aligning with any one major power. China tends to offer attractive investment packages with minimal conditions, but “you can’t always count on those investments to happen,” notes Marciel, and even when they do, there can be issues with corruption, as well as social and environmental consequences. The United States tries to put together investments that consider issues like labor and the environment, but Marciel believes that “sometimes we aim a little high” and the conditions make U.S. offerings less attractive.

The Continuing Crisis in Myanmar

We spoke with Marciel just after the second anniversary of the 2021 coup in Myanmar. He began his term as U.S. ambassador to that country in 2016, just before Aung Sang Suu Kyi’s new government was about to take office. As he puts it, it was a time of “euphoria,” not only in Myanmar but also in terms of U.S. hopes for democracy there. It turned out to be a difficult four years for Myanmar and Marciel, as the Rohingya crisis repeatedly erupted and the Myanmar military reacted with violent operations that drove hundreds of thousands of Rohingya out of Myanmar. As Marciel relates in his book, he soon found that even using the word “Rohingya” in U.S. embassy statements could create a diplomatic crisis.

Even with the horrific Rohingya genocide, Marciel cautiously notes that by 2020, when he left the country, most people in Myanmar had more opportunity and freedom under four years of a democratically elected government—the Rohingya themselves being the obvious exception. But in 2021, the “military coup basically eliminated that hope and opportunity.”

Marciel doesn’t hold much hope for an end to the coup anytime soon, but he does see at least one “positive development” over the last two years. During the worst of the Rohingya crisis, many in the majority Bamar community did not believe the reports of massacres, or even worse, did not care. But now, after two years of military rule, “more and more Myanmar people are explicitly recognizing the legitimate grievances and the suffering of many of the ethnic minority populations, including the Rohingya, over the past years, and [there is] some recognition that they were fed a lot of propaganda for a long time about what was really happening.”

Establishing Relations with Vietnam

One of Marciel’s great success stories is the normalization of U.S. ties with Vietnam. It was an improbable success with any number of obstacles likely to prevent it from happening, not the least being the debate about the fate of U.S. prisoners of war and servicemen reported as missing in action. Saigon fell in 1975, and yet in 1995, just 20 years later, diplomatic relations were restored and the U.S. embassy opened in Hanoi.

According to Marciel, it took patience, pragmatism, but also the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. No longer able to rely on Soviet help for their economy, the Vietnamese became more open to work with the United States, particularly on POW-MIA issues, allowing Vietnamese imprisoned in re-education camps to flee the country, and withdrawing Vietnamese forces from Cambodia.

Marciel sees the U.S.-Vietnam relationship today as a “good-news story” that shows the degree of progress that can be attained when two countries are willing to be rational and work together. The United States still has significant concerns about human rights in Vietnam yet “both sides have agreed to talk about that issue, but not let it define or limit the relationship excessively.”

How the United States Can Improve Relations in Southeast Asia

When pressed for a prescription on what the United States can do to further improve its relationships with the countries in the region, Marciel said, “In brief, show up and engage consistently, with humility, and with a focus on the countries that we’re talking to, not on China, because what they’re looking for, for the most part is, ‘Can we count on the United States being a long-term partner?’”

By ensuring the reliability of the partnership, countries in Southeast Asia have more freedom of maneuver, and they can, if necessary, be more capable to “make decisions China might not like.” The flip side of that—the failure to show up at presidential and high governmental levels, like what happened during the Trump administration—means “you’ve undone all the good that you had done in previous years by investing in those relationships.” The price of isolationism, of neglecting U.S. diplomatic relations in Southeast Asia, is that those countries lose confidence in the United States as a reliable partner. 

Following an impromptu video shoot of the audience and brief introduction, Dr. Fukuyama turned the time over to FSI Director Michael McFaul, who delivered the keynote remarks to the graduating class.

Dr. McFaul reflected on the unique journey the 2022 class, from beginning with Zoom classes and remote learning to finally reconvening in-person for projects like the Policy Change Studio capstones and events like former president Barack Obama’s visit to FSI in April 2022.

“You all look better in three dimensions compared to two dimensions,” McFaul assured everyone. He went on to share four lessons he hopes will resonate with the newest FSI alumni:

1. Do Something, Don’t Be Something

The first lesson Dr. McFaul imparted to the graduates was to frame their goals and careers in terms of actions, not titles.

“Don’t think of your career as a place to be,” he said. “Think of your career as an action verb. Figure out what you want to do, then fit the jobs, the companies, and future degrees around those action verbs, not the other way around.” He stressed that any particular job title matters much less than a commitment to a mission, a set of values, or clear, concrete policy things you want to do.

2. Embrace both Uncertainty and Rejection

Speaking from his personal experience, Dr. McFaul shared how his first career plan following his DPhil degree from Oxford ended as a complete bust. As a fresh, young academic, he applied to 22 jobs, and was rejected from all of them. But while his immediate plans may have stalled, the rejections gave him a front row seat to the 1990-91 protests in Moscow, the fall of the Soviet Union, and the burgeoning calls for democratic change in Russia, all which altered the course of his academic, professional, and political life.

“From uncertainty can come opportunity, and from setbacks can come second — and dare I say, better  — chances,” he reminded the graduates.

3. Continue to Invest in Connections

McFaul’s third piece of advice was a cautionary story of what not to do. “After my time at Stanford and Oxford, I didn’t invest time in maintaining friendships, and I regret that,” he candidly told the audience.

He stressed that these connections are not only for the purpose of networking and professional development, though those kinds of connections can lead to instrumental things. But more importantly, McFaul advised the students to develop and nurture relationships with fantastic, interesting people for the sake of allowing those connections to enrich and deepen the well-being and richness of their lives.

4. Keep in Touch with Stanford

Looking across the crowd, Dr. McFaul said, “Most of you are second years. Some of you are fifth years. I am a forty-first year student here at Stanford. I really love learning, and there’s no better place to learn than Stanford.”

He urged the graduates to remain active and invested in the community they have been a part of the last two years. “You have access to some of the most talented professors in the world. Use it! Don’t forget about it,” counseled McFaul.

On to the Future

Building on Dr. McFaul’s remarks, Soomin Jun, the student speaker at the diploma ceremony, asked her fellow classmates to look to the future with a determination to stand up for values and rights, and to not lose the compassion and empathy that have bonded them together as a cohort.

“Let’s not forget to humble ourselves and do good for those next to us and in our communities,” she said. Jun continued, “Let’s not forget that we are far more capable of achieving anything beyond anyone’s imagination. Voice up and stand up for your values and ideas.”

As the 2022 class moves on from their time as MIP students at FSI, five will be staying at Stanford to pursue further studies in political science, environment and resources, public policy, and journalism. Others will remain in the greater Bay Area working on technology policy, energy policy, digital privacy, and statistical programming. Others are heading from the West Coast to the East to work in government, international development, and policy analysis, while four of the class members will be continuing their military careers in Texas, Washington State, Kentucky, and Kosovo.

Wherever they’re bound, the Master’s of International Policy Class of 2022 will not soon be forgotten.

“This class is special to me,” Michael McFaul said. “We here at FSI and MIP have tried to lean into you, and you have repeatedly shown that you are a special class and special group of people together at a special time, and we all feel bonded with you.”

This interview with Scot Marciel was originally published by The Irrawaddy. Marciel, who served as U.S. ambassador to Myanmar from March 2016 through May 2020, is a visiting practitioner fellow on Southeast Asia at APARC. His forthcoming book, Imperfect Partners: The United States and Southeast Asia, which interprets the region and its relations with the United States historically and at present, will be published by APARC later this year.

Since it seized power in February 2021, Myanmar’s military regime has ignored international calls to end its use of violence, release political prisoners and negotiate with its opponents. Some Western nations have applied sanctions, while powerful neighbors India and China have largely sought to protect their own interests. Regional bloc ASEAN has been split, with some members seeking to engage the junta and others calling for contact with the shadow National Unity Government. The Irrawaddy spoke to Scot Marciel, former United States ambassador to Myanmar (2016-20) and currently a Visiting Scholar at Stanford University’s Walter Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, about the current state of regional and international efforts to tackle the Myanmar crisis.

The Irrawaddy: There have been many tragic stories in Myanmar since the coup. It is not enough to just pressure the regime to change its behavior or to make concessions. Can you talk about how the international community and regional groupings such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) should assist the Myanmar people?

Marciel: I would offer two thoughts. First, I don’t think you can expect ASEAN to solve this problem, certainly not by itself. The ASEAN Five-Point Consensus, while it’s done with very good intentions, not only are the points not being implemented, they are actually not appropriate for the situation in Myanmar in my view. So it is a mistake to dwell on the Five-Point Consensus. I don’t really blame ASEAN too much for that because the junta is refusing to be reasonable at all and make any kind of concessions. Second, as Malaysia’s foreign minister has suggested publicly, more engagement with the National Unity Government (NUG) and other figures opposed to the junta is really important. I am pleased to see that [US] Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman met with Zin Mar Aung [the NUG foreign minister, on Aug. 12] in Washington. I think there needs to be more engagement with the NUG and other actors, recognizing that trying to convince the generals to hold talks with those who oppose them is not really a very useful way of going about things.

The Irrawaddy: Do you think the NUG is the best option, aside from Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) and other stakeholders, in terms of whom the US and ASEAN should be engaging with?

Marciel: I know some people have not been fully satisfied with the NUG. I understand that, but it’s certainly one important factor that has a lot more legitimacy than the junta for sure. I think it is useful to engage with the NUG, but also with actors who are seeking to return the country to a democratic and peaceful path.

The Irrawaddy: When we talk about ASEAN there are some criticisms because so far the Five-Point Consensus as you said is going nowhere, but people keep talking about it. We, ourselves, have become the hostages of the consensus. Beyond ASEAN, there has also been some criticism that the US and other Western countries are outsourcing the Myanmar crisis to ASEAN. We know that ASEAN is toothless and powerless, and so far has achieved little on Myanmar. Why has the West outsourced the problem to ASEAN?

Marciel: To be fair, at least for the United States, I don’t think the United States is necessarily expecting ASEAN by itself to solve the problem. The truth is I don’t know any outside player that can solve the problem. ASEAN can help. This goes back to, among other things, the Five-Point Consensus. It’s not just that the points aren’t being implemented, they really aren’t appropriate for the situation. A ceasefire… OK If the military stops all violence and allows peaceful protests, that would be useful. But does anyone really think that is going to happen? Second, dialogue, my sense is, again I can’t speak for the Myanmar people, but it seems people aren’t interested in negotiating and compromising with the military junta. They want them out of power. And I think the international community should be supporting those efforts, rather than proposing and calling for some kind of dialogue that is completely unrealistic, at least at this time.

The Irrawaddy: In the past, the US has played a major role in promoting democracy, freedom and federal union in Myanmar. You know in 2008-09, we had Kurt Campbell, one of the key architects of the pivot to Asia and of course specific Myanmar policies of principled engagement, and the carrot-and-stick approach, where sanctions were imposed but also with the incentive that if reforms took place, the sanctions would be eased. There was very consistent and intense communication with the-then regime and the opposition in Myanmar. Do you think that, in coordination with ASEAN, the US can work on Myanmar issues with the same vigor and energy as it did in the late 2000s?

Marciel: It’s a good question. It’s very clear that the US and the Biden administration remain very supportive of efforts to help the country go back to democracy and peace and federal union. But my sense is that it’s hard to figure out what they can actually do to make that happen. There’s not a lot of easy choices, whether it’s the United States or ASEAN, because the generals do not seem interested in doing anything positive, they are just holding onto power. We’ve seen what they are willing to do to their own people for the sake of holding power. And it narrows the space for diplomacy, certainly. I would have a very hard time if I were still in the government saying we should engage with the junta and try to create incentives for them because I think there is no chance, absent them feeling much more pressure, that they are willing to seriously consider changing their approach.

The Irrawaddy: Do you think there should be more sanctions, more pressure, including maybe an arms embargo? What about ASEAN and other countries like China, Thailand, and India?

Marciel: There is no great option right now. I don’t believe there is, at this point at least, any opportunity for dialogue that will return the country to a democratic path or democratic federalism. I don’t think the military can restore stability and govern the country effectively. So the best possible scenario is for the military to face so much pressure, that they then begin to look for a way out. So yes, I think maximum pressure, both internally and externally, on the military whether it’s by sanctions or other means is the best chance of achieving progress, though it won’t be easy.

The Irrawaddy: We have a powerful neighbor, China, which shares a long border with Myanmar. We also have our neighbor Thailand, which is absorbing refugees, migrant workers, and asylum seekers. Because of the crisis, they are also sharing the burden. Obviously, China is always supportive of those in power, whether it is the regime or a democratic government. If China and Thailand don’t make any moves, don’t apply any external pressure, it is hard to see any policy of maximizing pressure on the regime working. Do you agree?

Marciel: I agree that there are limits in terms of external pressure. That’s why there is no easy answer. It seems that China is willing to support the junta even though nearly the entire population of Myanmar opposes that. I don’t think that is likely to change. On Thailand, I hope that the Thai authorities will see that the longer the military is in power, the more problems there are going to be across the border, including refugees and instability. And the Thais, I think, will have an interest in pressing in their own way, pressing the military to look for a way out, because otherwise this crisis is going to continue and Thailand’s going to suffer from some of these cross-border challenges, including very serious humanitarian issues.

The Irrawaddy: We have heard that the regime is not happy with the idea of—the wording is quite sensitive—a humanitarian corridor. But Thailand will have to play a key role if cross-border assistance and humanitarian assistance are to reach a large number of Myanmar people. What are your thoughts on that, as the US has made at least four high-ranking official visits to Thailand since the coup? Should the Biden administration engage and cooperate with the Thai government to provide assistance?

Marciel: There is a lot of discussion between the US and Thai officials on this. I don’t know the substance of those discussions. I am not sure what exactly has been said. But to me the United States and Thailand, even if we may have somewhat different views on the coup and the junta, we should try to find a way to work together at a minimum to address the serious humanitarian need right along the Thai border and just across the border. You know it is not easy for Thailand as a neighbor of Myanmar having to deal with the junta. But I think there are ways that this could be done carefully and I assume that these discussions are happening between the United States and Thailand. I hope that they lead to greater and more successful efforts to get humanitarian assistance to the border and across the border on behalf of Myanmar people.

The Irrawaddy: Not only Thailand but, since 1988, the US has also been one of the more generous countries in taking Myanmar refugees and asylum seekers from the Thailand-Myanmar border. This time, again, we see the educated people, the middle class, technicians, professionals, artists, media, and IT people leaving Myanmar. It is a brain drain for Myanmar, but a brain gain for the countries they go to. Do you agree that those people are hugely beneficial to those societies?

Marciel: Yes, I agree. I think, the US processing of…I hate to sound bureaucratic, but you know working to welcome refugees is not a fast process, because there are so many refugees around the world who are seeking asylum in the United States and other places. The US does, as you said, have a long record of accepting and welcoming refugees from Burma/Myanmar. I expect that will continue. I mean, it serves one aspect. A lot of people want to go back to the country and contribute, but right now the conditions aren’t right. For those who definitely want to leave, I think the United States will continue to welcome them. But there is a process because there are so many refugees around the world now.

The Irrawaddy: In Myanmar, as in any country, the people need a professional military, but not the one we have right now. That’s why people have taken up arms against it and the regime. You wrote an article about the Myanmar military last year. Can you talk about reform in the military and security sector?

Marciel: It is too bad that the situation has reached the point that people feel like they have no choice but to take up arms. I don’t judge them for that. It is unfortunate. But the military took away the peaceful option for people to protest or express their views against the junta. It is understandable why a number of people have taken up arms. I wrote the article because I was hearing from some people in the region and around the world saying well, the Myanmar military is an essential institution and one of the country’s few unifying institutions. I disagree. In theory, it should be a unifying institution, but it hasn’t been one. It’s been one that has been a source of so much division and so much conflict. I am sure that there are individuals in the military who would like to work in a professional military but, at least at the leadership level, the culture of brutality and impunity is so deeply ingrained that I don’t think you can reason with these generals. I think Myanmar does need a military, but a dramatically reformed military that will be answerable to the civilian government and that, over many years, will adopt a very different culture and will respect human rights instead of waging war on the people.

As the evening ended, there was a moment when one of the Ukrainian students came to me to tell me that he was so sorry for #WhatsHappeningInMyanmar. I told him, “Thank you. I am sorry too. I can only imagine what you are going through.” In response he asked, “But you feel it, yeah?”

For a moment, we stood there, teared up, in silence. It was simply powerful. I felt understood. I felt the support. And this was all while I was trying my best to not make this about Myanmar and to give them space for their own grief and trauma. It was not empty words of sympathy. It was a shared moment.

This is why across-movement international solidarity is important. When you are in it together, when vocabulary falls short to describe the immense trauma you are going through, when you are far from home watching your home burn, it’s the tears, it’s the silence, it’s the tremor in your voice, it’s a hug — that reminds you are not alone.

Living By the Ideals of Democracy

In political science classes at Stanford, we talk a lot about the ideals of democracy and legitimacy, about sovereignty and independence. Ukrainians don’t just talk about these ideas— they live by them.

A week ago, Russia invaded my home, bringing war to a peaceful democracy. Since then, my days and nights have been full of fear. However, my experience as a Ukrainian living abroad doesn't compare to what my friends and family are going through back home. Even under the constant threat of enemy fire, they still manage to help — collecting humanitarian aid,organizing transportation, coordinating national and local volunteering networks.

This way of living did not begin this month. For centuries, my nation has fought heroically for our independence and distinct cultural identity: our people defended Ukrainian symbols in the face of repressions, broke free of the Soviet Union, and shook off dictators time and time again to re-establish our democracy. For the first time, the world sees our fight. You see us face devastation the post-WWII world vowed would never happen again. As Russians bomb cities —destroying kindergartens, hospitals, orphanages, and schools — you witness our resilience. You watch our people take to the streets and stand against the occupying forces trying to enter our cities, singing the national anthem and telling Russians to leave our land.
 

This time, our fight is global, and, Ukrainians abroad are united in the fight. In under a week, the Ukrainian community at Stanford has launched a Joint Statement on Russia's War Against Ukraine, obtaining more than 800 signatures so far. We created the StandWithUkraine website with resources in 15 languages on organizations accepting donations, volunteering opportunities, reliable information sources, and templates for political advocacy.

The broader Stanford community has inspired me with their support as well. I appreciated Prof. McFaul's event that brought Ukrainians and MIP students together, especially because it demonstrated the FSI's community's unique ability to help. I hope that this potential can result in concrete actions, including further advocacy, donations, and volunteering. As scholars who have devoted their lives to the study of democracy, your time to act is now: join the fight to save Ukraine and Europe.

Uniting Abroad and at Home

As students of international policy, it is easy to distance ourselves from conflicts around the world. We are taught to examine them analytically through an international relations lens, hypothesizing what might be motivating a leader like Putin, Xi, or Biden to act in a certain way. But having the chance to hear from Ukrainian students and leaders across the Stanford community bridged what we study in the classroom and read in the news with what is actually happening to families and friends on the ground.
 

Listening to their stories and learning how we can assist, as policy students and citizens, was a reminder that we are not powerless — public opinion and advocacy can push policymakers to stand up for democracy and against violations of sovereignty and human rights.

Unfortunately, there have been too many instances of unnecessary fighting and occupying of foreign land, including by my own country the United States. The international community has shown that it can unite and respond when a foreign state violates international laws and norms – and we must not forget this should future invasions occur anywhere around the world.

Doing All We Can

The tragedy that is unfolding in Ukraine hits especially close to home for me both physically and emotionally – even more so after hearing all the touching stories of our Ukrainian friends at professor McFaul’s house.

I am from Estonia, another country unlucky enough to have an aggressive Russia as a neighbor. Should Putin meet any success in Ukraine, my homeland very well may be picked as the next target. Ironically enough, Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has only made NATO stronger, and as a member of the alliance, we should feel safe. But I also cannot overlook the irony and am even ashamed that the cost of NATO unity seems to be the complete destruction of Ukraine, who is essentially doing the fighting for all of us. Thousands of Ukrainian lives have ended, and millions will be emotionally damaged forever.

Emotionally, witnessing the thousands of casualties on both sides as a result of one man’s idea of a parallel universe and disregard of human life is heartbreaking. I also fear we are on the verge of making the same mistakes we have already made in the past. While the West has already done a lot to help Ukraine, are we doing enough? In a few months, after potentially thousands more innocent people have been massacred, will we be able to look our Ukrainian friends in the eyes and truly say we did all we could? As of now, it seems like the answer is no.
 

We are dealing with consequences, not the cause. While it is controversial to advocate for NATO to get directly militarily involved for the defense of Ukraine, there is a good chance that if we don’t intervene now, we will have to do so at a much higher cost in the future. The risk is huge, given Russia’s nuclear arsenal. In that line of thought, my own Estonia would probably be among the first targets, should a NATO-Russia war break out.

But in moments like this, it is important to have a higher risk tolerance than in times of peace. We are past the diplomatic appeasement period. The Russian Army is not the mighty creature it was portrayed to be and can be defeated. But for that to happen, we must all stand up to it, and support the conditions for the Russian population to stand up and reclaim their country from the dictator. There is no more peace in Europe, and peace elsewhere will also not last if Putin is not stopped now. My heart is broken for Ukraine already. I do not want it to be broken again for Estonia or Latvia, or for Germany and France.

As an international policy student and as a citizen of the free world, I invite all Western decision-makers to ask themselves this: when Ukraine may be in complete rubbles, when a ruthless dictator has gotten his way at the cost of an entire nation and is hungry for more, when the history books are written, will I be able to comfortably say that I did everything I could to prevent it? If the answer is no, then it’s time to get back to work. Long live free Ukraine!

Imagine this.

You were studying or interning abroad. Or you were on a vacation somewhere outside of your home country. You were enjoying life as usual, and suddenly news came in that your country had shut down completely and that the military has taken over the political leadership, arresting hundreds of government officials and other civilians. While you are still in shock, the internet and phone lines were cut off. You have now lost contact with your families and friends. So, there you sat — scrolling through an empty Facebook timeline, with empty hope that there might be some breakthrough access. You dial all the numbers you have available, wishing to hear a familiar voice on the other end, yet only to no avail.

As a Myanmar student abroad, this is only a glimpse of what I have been going through since the military staged a coup d’état on February 1, 2021. Every single day, I am surrounded by the political turmoil and violence that is directly impacting my family and friends in Myanmar. So, when I was choosing an internship for this summer, I made sure to pick an institution where I can work on issues that are close to home. And I have known about the Asia Foundation’s work on Myanmar since a few years ago as I had to use some of their conflict reports for my research projects. So, TAF has been one of my top choices for the summer internship, and I applied to the Asia Foundation’s Conflict and Fragility team in Thailand. Just as I was hoping, with TAF, I am able to work independently on a topic of my interest regarding pre-existing conflict and newly arising political turmoil in Myanmar.

The original hope has been to work in their Thailand office in-person. As summer approached, however, with the restrictions around COVID-19, this plan did not materialize. Instead, working remotely came with its own perks. I could not have imagined going into work on a nine-to-five schedule and pretending as if my beloved home city was not collapsing, which it was. Explosions and assassinations now mark everyday life in my city, Yangon. My close friends have joined armed resistance. Some friends had fled the country, while some got arrested. In July, as the military was rounding up doctors and healthcare workers and shutting down oxygen and other medical supplies, my own mother become ill with COVID-19 and was in critical condition for several days. And she had to get treated at home while running from the military as she was on the watchlist released. As all of this took a tremendous mental toll on me, working from home independently allowed me to be flexible, to be kind to myself, and to work on different projects at my own time. Moreover, I was able to connect with the Burmese community in the Bay Area over the summer, attending Burma-related fundraisers and protests.

Additionally, being very familiar with the context of political turmoil in Myanmar, my supervisors were extremely kind and supportive in many ways. From getting feedback about my research proposals and ideas to talking about what is happening in general, I was able to learn about different perspectives on the issues around Myanmar, while also discovering many areas of conflict research that I did not know about before. Their expertise on the conflict issues in the country and the region also helped me to put a check on my own biases when dealing with the issues around Myanmar. I feel so grateful and fortunate to be able to work with my colleagues for this summer, and I could not even imagine working at a different place in this situation.

1. Can you give us an overview of your research and the topics you’re investigating?

My research addresses the following question: Why are some authoritarian regimes more responsive to social unrest than others? While it might seem counterintuitive to think of authoritarian regimes in this light, repression and responsiveness often occur in tandem under authoritarian rule. Centered on a comparison between Vietnam and China, I document the steps that each has taken to address social discontent fueled by pervasive government seizures of rural land. In response to societal input between 2003 and 2017, Vietnam enacted comprehensive and programmatic reforms to reduce the permissible scope for government land expropriation whereas those enacted by China were relatively marginal and piecemeal. At the subnational level, this difference has had important implications for land rights and the security of villagers in both countries. In summary, despite their many similarities, the manner and degree of their responsiveness have varied. My research then traces the historical origins that undergird the political development and institutional character of Vietnam and China’s divergent responsiveness to social unrest. 

2. How did you first become interested in these topics?

My interest in the repressive-responsive character of authoritarian regimes stems from my preoccupation with questions of political legitimacy, societal resistance, and institutional dynamics in authoritarian contexts. One particular experience that stoked my interest was my visit to Wukan, Guangdong in 2016. Wukan was once hailed as an emblematic case of grassroots democracy and accommodation by the Chinese state, when villagers’ outcries against the local government’s seizure of their land resulted in the re-election of the village committee in 2012. Yet, when I visited in 2016, villagers expressed that nothing had changed, and that “everything that could be done has already been done.” This experience led me to question what responsiveness means in authoritarian contexts.

3. During the last year, the world has changed significantly because of the pandemic and fluctuating politics in many nations. Have these changing global situations given you any new insights into your research?

The pandemic has underscored the need for a nuanced and contextual understanding of democracies and non-democracies. For instance, the variation in state responses to COVID-19 suggests that there is no clear correlation between responsiveness or the effectiveness of government responses to COVID-19 and regime types. Consider Vietnam’s proactive approach and success at containing the pandemic as opposed to the US. Other recent developments such as the crackdowns on pro-democracy protests in Thailand and mass protests against the recent military coup in Myanmar showcase how quickly state responsiveness to social demands can erode, even in multi-party states.

4. What has your experience as one of our Shorenstein Fellows been like during this unusual period of time when we haven’t physically been together at APARC?

My fellowship has been remote, and I have therefore needed to be much more proactive to stay as engaged as possible. I have consulted with my mentor often over Zoom, and reached out to other scholars for their feedback and advice on my research. I have also especially appreciated the chance to participate in the China Social Science Workshop, where I've shared my work and learned from other presenters. Other postdoctoral fellows at APARC and I have also gotten together virtually to exchange stories and to share our experiences from this unusual year.  

5. What are some of the things you've done during this past year to give yourself a break from work and have some fun?

Due to the pandemic, I have been living back home to Austin, Texas, since March of last year. The last time that I was home for this long must have been after I graduated from college. So, for the first time in a long time, I've planted tomatoes, eggplants, and sunflowers in our garden, and I've really enjoyed watching them bloom and ripen. With everything growing, it feels like I've spent most of my break in our backyard defending our flowers, fruits, and vegetables from squirrels and bunnies! But luckily I also have our two dogs, Wishie and Sushi, to help me!

6. As the state of the pandemic changes and things in academia and our communities, what are some things you are looking forward to both professionally and personally?

I'm certainly looking forward to having conferences in person again! I'm also still not sure when it will be possible and safe for me to visit Asia again, especially Vietnam and China, but I have missed these places. I'm also learning Khmer this summer, and I'm excited to eventually visit Cambodia to pursue my research there.