Stanford University

Leadership in Transition: Heterodox Pathways to Good Governance in Post-Suharto Indonesia

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What makes some governments perform better than others? With rising levels of decentralization and local democracy, the focus of "good governance" is increasingly shifting from national to subnational levels. While much of the existing development literature remains preoccupied with formal institutional and society-centered explanations, there is growing evidence that local policy reforms are strongly affected by informal norms and elite-centered processes.

Post-Suharto Indonesia, a country with one of the most pronounced shifts to democratic decentralization anywhere in recent history, is a case in point. Drawing on empirical comparisons across ten districts (comprising 1000 business surveys and 150 interviews), Dr. von Luebke argues that societal pressures are often less significant in explaining policy differences than the quality of local government leadership. In the early transition to democracy, local firms, associations, and district councils continue to be constrained by collective action and political incentive problems. Local government leaders, on the other hand, have wielded historically strong formal and informal powers and stand, for better or worse, at the gateway to local policy reform. Motivated by direct elections and prospective donor funding, some district heads have become catalysts for better governance by introducing informal public-private dialogues, innovative monitoring instruments, and meritocratic promotion schemes. In response to current development debates, these findings highlight the importance of government leadership as an often underestimated policy determinant that can compensate for weak societal checks in periods of transition from authoritarian rule.

Christian von Luebke is completing a book manuscript titled “Heterodox Governance: The Political Economy of Local Policy Reform in Post-Suharto Indonesia.”  He has been awarded a 2009-2011 German Science Foundation Fellowship for a follow-up project incorporating cases from the rest of Southeast Asia and China.  In 2001-2006 he worked in rural Indonesia as a technical advisor for the World Bank and the German Development Agency. He holds a Ph.D. in public policy from the Crawford School of Economics and Government at the Australian National University.

Daniel and Nancy Okimoto Conference Room

Christian von Luebke

Shorenstein APARC
Stanford University
Encina Hall E301
Stanford, CA 94305-6055

(650) 726-0685 (650) 723-6530
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Visiting Scholar, 2009-12
CvL_APARC_Photo_-_Oct_2010_2.jpg MA, PhD

Christian von Luebke is a political economist with particular interest in democracy, governance, and development in Southeast Asia. He is currently working on a research project that gauges institutional and structural effects on political agency in post-Suharto Indonesia and the post-Marcos Philippines. During his German Research Foundation fellowship at Stanford he seeks to finalize a book manuscript on Indonesian governance and democracy and teach a course on contemporary Southeast Asian politics.

Before coming to Stanford, Dr. von Luebke was a research fellow at the Center of Global Political Economy at Waseda (Tokyo), the Institute for Developing Economies (Chiba), and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Jakarta). He received a JSPS postdoctoral scholarship from the Japan Science Council and a PhD scholarship from the Australian National University.

Between 2001 and 2006, he worked as technical advisor in various parts of rural Indonesia - for both GTZ and the World Bank. In 2007, he joined an international research team at the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) analyzing the effects of public-private action on investment and growth.

Dr. von Luebke completed his Ph.D. in 2008 in Political Science at the Crawford School of Economics and Government, the Australian National University. He also holds a Masters in Economics and a B.A. in Business and Political Science from Muenster University.

His research on contemporary Indonesian politics, democratic governance, rural investment, and leadership has been published in the Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, Contemporary Southeast Asian Affairs, Asian Economic Journal, and ISEAS. He regularly contributes political analyses on Southeast Asia to Oxford Analytica.

Christian von Luebke 2008-2009 Shorenstein Fellow Speaker Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
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Leading Pacific Rim universities collaborate on population health research

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The Asia Health Policy Program hosted meetings of the Association of Pacific Rim Universities World Institute (AWI, www.apru.org/awi) public health research project, February 24-25 at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. Stanford University is a member of the Association of Pacific Rim Universities, and the Asia Health Policy Program coordinates with others on the steering committee for the AWI public health project. The project brings together scholars from leading Pacific Rim universities to focus on comparative study of chronic non-communicable disease – the number one cause of premature death worldwide – in selected Pacific Rim cities (Beijing, Danang, Hangzhou, Hong Kong, Singapore, Jakarta, Makassar, Nanjing, Sydney, Taipei, Vientiane and Wuhan).

 

Ambassador Michael H. Armacost, Acting Director of the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, welcomed the participants -- researchers and deans of schools of public health from China, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Singapore, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Australia. During the deliberations, the participants agreed to establish a program of research and development to prepare tools for use by health systems worldwide to implement best practice in chronic disease prevention and management through four areas of research: risk factor surveillance; assessment of costs and organization of services; change management to implement best practice; and monitoring and evaluation.

 

The previous meeting of the AWI public health project was held in November 2008 in Singapore. The next meeting will be held in June 2009 at Johns Hopkins University (an Invited Member of the Association of Pacific Rim Universities World Institute).

 

On February 23, prior to the public health project meetings, the Asia Health Policy Program also hosted the planning meetings for the AWI 2009 public health workshop, to be held at Johns Hopkins University June 24-26, 2009.

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Defeating Islamist Radicalism: Building a Global Counter-extremism Network

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C. Holland Taylor is an expert on Islam and the process of Islamization in Southeast Asia, having lived, studied and worked in the Muslim world, from Iran to Indonesia, over a period of more than four decades.  

Mr. Taylor established LibForAll Foundation (www.libforall.org) in 2003, together with former Indonesian president Kyai Haji Abdurrahman Wahid, whom the Wall Street Journal has called "the single most influential religious leader in the Muslim world" and "easily the most important ally the West has in the ideological struggle against Islamic radicalism." Under their leadership, LibForAll has grown into the leading NGO developing and operationalizing successful counter-extremism strategies worldwide.

Their inspiration lay in the heroic example of President Wahid's own 16th century Javanese ancestors, whose deft use of soft and hard power defeated Muslim extremists, and guaranteed freedom of religion for all Javanese, two centuries before the Bill of Rights led to the separation of church and state in the U.S.

Based on lessons derived from this struggle, LibForAll is forging a Global Rahmatan lil ‘Alamin ("Blessing for All Creation") Counter-Extremism Network of top Muslim opinion leaders in the fields of religion, education, pop culture, government, business and the media, who are joining to proclaim, with one voice, that radical Islam has no theological validity, and thereby mobilize the "great silent majority" of moderate, peace-loving Muslims to reject the extremists' ideology of hatred and violence. 

This strategy has resulted in a number of world-class achievements, causing Wall Street Journal foreign columnist Bret Stephens to proclaim: "LibForAll is a model of what a competent public diplomacy effort in the Muslim world should look like."

In his presentation, Mr. Taylor will explain key elements of LibForAll's ground-breaking strategy and present examples of world class achievements, including: a "musical jihad" against religious hatred and terrorism; development of the first part of a unique 26-episode counter-extremism television/video series (Ocean of Revelation); and convening an historic religious summit where top Muslim leaders condemned the evils of Holocaust denial - generating worldwide publicity that effectively countered the December 2006 Holocaust denial conference in Tehran.

Mr. Taylor's work with LibForAll follows a career as a successful entrepreneur and global telecom executive, during which he served as CEO of USA Global Link, and was credited by numerous leading publications as one of the essential catalysts in the deregulation of the global telecommunications industry.

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Encina Ground Floor Conference Room

C. Holland Taylor Chairman and CEO Speaker LibForAll Foundation
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Mark Thompson

Shorenstein APARC
Stanford University
Encina Hall E301
Stanford, CA 94305-6055

(650) 725-6459 (650) 723-6530
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MarkThompson[1].JPG PhD

Professor Thompson builds on Barrington Moore's insight that there are different "paths to the modern" world. Thompson's manuscript explores alternatives to the familiar South Korean-and Taiwan-based model of "late democratization." According to that model, political pluralism follows a formative period of economic growth during which labor is demobilized and big business, religious leaders, and professionals depend upon and are co-opted by the state.

Thompson argues that even when these preconditions are in place, democratization need not follow. Singapore is an illuminating case in point. The autocratic growth model pays insufficient attention to politics, including the sometimes crucial role of student activists in challenging developmental authoritarianism and triggering a democratic transition, as in Indonesia. As political actors, students (rather than a progressive bourgeoisie) may fill the oppositional vacuum created by the preconditions that characterized predemocratic South Korean and Taiwan.

In his critique of Northeast Asian-style, post-authoritarian "late democratization" and its emphasis on economic growth as the driver of political change, Professor Thompson uses evidence drawn from paired comparisons of Vietnam with China, Hong Kong with Singapore, and between South Korea and Taiwan on the one hand and other major Southeast Asian cases on the other.

Mark R. Thompson is a professor of political science at the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg in Germany.  A Chicago native, he took his first degree in religious studies at Brown University followed by postgraduate work at Cambridge University and the University of the Philippines.  Fascinated by Philippine people power, he wrote his dissertation at Yale University on the anti-Marcos struggle (Yale University Press, 1996). After moving to Germany, he witnessed popular uprisings in East Germany and Eastern Europe, inspiring him to conceptualize democratic revolutions in essays later published as a book (Routledge, 2004).  He is in residence at Stanford as Lee Kong Chian Distinguished Fellow in Southeast Asian Studies from February through April 2009.

Lee Kong Chian NUS-Stanford Distinguished Fellow on Southeast Asia

Late Democratizers? Developmentalism in Pacific Asia

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Some theorists of modernization have influentially claimed that successful "late industrialization" led by developmental states creates economies too complex, social structures too differentiated, and (middle-class-dominated) civil societies too politically conscious for non-democratic rule to be sustained.  Probably nowhere has this argument-that democratic transitions are driven by economic growth-been more celebrated than in Northeast and Southeast Asia (Pacific Asia).  South Korea and Taiwan, having democratized only after substantial industrialization, seem to fit the narrative well.  Prof. Thompson will argue, however, that "late democratizers" have been the exception rather than the rule.  Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand democratized much earlier in the developmental process, before high per capita incomes were achieved.  Malaysia and especially Singapore are more wealthy than they are democratic.  The communist "converts" to developmentalism, China and Vietnam, are aiming for authoritarian versions of modernity.  "Late democratization" via modernization is only one scenario.  The experiences of Pacific Asia support Barrington Moore's thesis that there are other "paths to the modern world." 

Mark R. Thompson is a professor of political science at the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg in Germany.  A Chicago native, he took his first degree in religious studies at Brown University followed by postgraduate work at Cambridge University and the University of the Philippines.  Fascinated by Philippine “people power,” he wrote his dissertation at Yale University on the anti-Marcos struggle (Yale University Press, 1996). After moving to Germany, he witnessed popular uprisings in East Germany and Eastern Europe, inspiring him to conceptualize “democratic revolutions” in essays later published as a book (Routledge, 2004).  He is in residence at Stanford from February through April 2009.

Daniel and Nancy Okimoto Conference Room

Mark Thompson 2008-09 Lee Kong Chian NUS-Stanford Distinguished Fellow Speaker Stanford University
Seminars

Cambodia: Past, Present, and Future

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Two images tend to dominate conceptions of the modern Cambodian experience.  Angkor represents heaven, referring to the magnificent temples that capture Cambodia's past glory and future aspirations.  Angkar represents hell, referring to the merciless Khmer Rouge organization that littered the countryside with corpses in the late 1970s.  In many respects, contemporary Cambodian life can be seen as a difficult journey from Angkar toward Angkor.

This panel will discuss challenges that Cambodians face as they seek to move from a dark modern past to a brighter future.  It will address a number of critical questions.  The panel will begin by putting Cambodia's transition in modern historical context.  How have the country's politics and society evolved since the demise of the Pol Pot regime thirty years ago?  How did the Khmer Rouge tribunal take shape, and why has that forum been the subject of such intense political contestation?  The panel will then shift to an analysis of the present day.  How are Cambodians coming to terms with the country's tragic history on personal and societal levels?  What are their views on the adequacy and effectiveness of the Khmer Rouge tribunal in advancing justice, human rights, and other ends? Lastly, the panel will focus on problems beyond the Khmer Rouge legacy.  What are the principal contemporary barriers to democracy and development under the Hun Sen government?  What are the keys to overcoming those obstacles?

About the Panelists
Joel Brinkley assumed his post at Stanford in 2006 after a 23-year career with The New York Times, where he was a reporter, editor and foreign correspondent.  He has won a Pulitzer Prize and many other reporting and writing awards.  He writes a nationally syndicated weekly op-ed column on foreign policy and has reported from over 50 foreign countries.  He has a long-standing interest in Cambodia, which is the subject of his latest book.

Seth Mydans (2009 Shorenstein Journalism Award recipient) Since taking up his post as the New York Times Southeast Asian correspondent in 1996 he has covered the fall of Suharto and rise of democracy in Indonesia; the death of Pol Pot, the demise of the Khmer Rouge and the trauma and slow rebirth of Cambodia; repeated attempts at People Power in the Philippines; the idiosyncracies of Singapore and Malaysia; the long-running political crisis in Thailand and the seemingly endless troubles of Myanmar.

John Ciorciari is a National Fellow at the Hoover Institution and was a 2007-08 Shorenstein Fellow at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center.  He is also Senior Legal Advisor to the Documentation Center of Cambodia, an independent institute dedicated to promoting memory and justice with respect to the abuses of the Khmer Rouge regime.

Philippines Conference Room

Joel Brinkley Lorry I. Lokey visiting professor in the Department of Communication Speaker Stanford University
Seth Mydans Southeast Asia correspondent Speaker New York Times & International Herald Tribune

John Ciorciari

Hoover Institution
Stanford, CA 94305

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Affiliate - Southeast Asia Forum
CiociariHeadshot.jpg JD, PhD

John D. Ciorciari was a Shorenstein Postdoctoral Fellow at Shorenstein APARC for 2007-2008.  Dr. Ciorciari will remain at Stanford for the academic year 2008-09 as a National Fellow of the Hoover Institution. His current research centers on the alignment policies of small states and middle powers in the Asia-Pacific region. He focuses particularly on the phenomenon of "hedging," whereby secondary states pursue a balance of security and autonomy vis-a-vis the great powers.

Dr. Ciorciari also has interests in international human rights law and international finance. Before coming to Stanford, he served as Deputy Director of the Office of South and Southeast Asia at the U.S. Treasury Department. He has published articles on the reform of the Bretton Woods institutions and is currently undertaking a project on financial cooperation in East Asia.

In addition, he serves as a Senior Legal Advisor to the Documentation Center of Cambodia, which assists the Khmer Rouge tribunal and conducts research into the history of Democratic Kampuchea. He has published a range of scholarly works on international criminal law and the Khmer Rouge accountability process.

Dr. Ciorciari received an AB and JD from Harvard, where he was editor-in-chief of the Harvard International Law Journal. He received his MPhil and DPhil from Oxford, where he was a Fulbright Scholar and Wai Seng Senior Research Scholar.

John Ciorciari National Fellow, Hoover Institute Speaker Stanford University
Conferences
Shorenstein Journalism Award

Continuity and Change in Southeast Asia: 2009 Shorenstein Journalism Award:

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The Shorenstein Award, which carries a cash prize of $10,000, honors a journalist not only for a distinguished body of work, but also for the particular way that work has helped American readers to understand the complexities of Asia. It is awarded jointly by the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University, and the Shorenstein Center on Press, Politics, and Public Policy in the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.

This year’s recipient is Seth Mydans. Seth Mydans covers Southeast Asia for The New York Times and the International Herald Tribune from his base in Bangkok, Thailand. Since taking up the post in 1996 he has covered the fall of Suharto and rise of democracy in Indonesia; the death of Pol Pot, the demise of the Khmer Rouge and the trauma and slow rebirth of Cambodia; repeated attempts at People Power in the Philippines; the idiosyncracies of Singapore and Malaysia; the long-running political crisis in Thailand and the seemingly endless troubles of Myanmar.

In the 1980s he covered the fall of Marcos and struggles of Corazon Aquino in the Philippines and was in Burma for the massacres that led to the emergence of Aung San Suu Kyi and the current junta.
        
He worked for a construction company in Vietnam during the war after graduating from Harvard, and has followed the Vietnam story since then, through the exodus of refugees, to their resettlement in the United States, to the shaping of a new post-war Vietnam.

Levinthal Hall

Seth Mydans Southeast Asia Correspondent Speaker The New York Times and the International Herald Tribune
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Shorenstein Journalism Award

Larry Diamond: How to save democracy

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Larry Diamond
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Bush gave democracy promotion a bad name, Larry Diamond writes in Newsweek. The new administration needs to get it right.

The new U.S. President will face more than one kind of global recession. In addition to the economic downturn, the world is suffering a democratic contraction. In Russia, awash with oil money, Vladimir Putin and his KGB cronies have sharply restricted freedom. In Latin America, authoritarian (and anti-American) populism is on the rise. In Nigeria, the Philippines and once again in Pakistan, democracy is foundering amid massive corruption, weak government and a loss of public faith. In Thailand, the government is paralyzed by mass protests. In Africa, more than a dozen fragile democracies must face the economic storm unprepared. And in the Middle East—the Bush administration's great democratic showcase—the push for freedom lies in ruins.

In the past decade, the breathtaking democratic wave that swept the world during the final quarter of the 20th century reversed course. Making democracy work proved harder than bringing down authoritarian rule. And receptive peoples everywhere were alienated by the arrogance and unilateralism of President George W. Bush's approach, which associated "democracy promotion" with the use of force and squandered America's soft power. Advancing democracy abroad remains vital to the U.S. national interest. But the next president will have to craft a more modest, realistic and sustainable strategy.

It's easy today to forget how far freedom has advanced in the past 30 years. When the wave of liberation began in 1974 in Portugal, barely a quarter of the world's states met the minimal test of democracy: a place where the people are able, through universal suffrage, to choose and replace their leaders in regular, free and fair elections. Over the course of the next two decades, dictatorships gave way to freely elected governments first in Southern Europe, then in Latin America, then in East Asia. Finally, an explosion of freedom in the early '90s liberated Eastern Europe and spread democracy from Moscow to Pretoria. Old assumptions—that democracy required Western values, high levels of education and a large middle class—crumbled. Half of sub-Saharan Africa's 48 states became democracies, and of the world's poorest countries, about two in every five are democracies today.

This great shift coincided with an unprecedented moment of U.S. military, economic and cultural dominance. Not only was America the world's last remaining superpower, but U.S. values—individual freedom, popular sovereignty, limited government and the rule of law—were embraced by progressive leaders around the world. Opinion surveys showed democracy to be the ideal of most people as well.

In recent years, however, this mighty tide has receded. This democratic recession has coincided with Bush's presidency, and can be traced in no small measure to his administration's imperial overreach. But it actually started in 1999, with the military coup in Pakistan, an upheaval welcomed by a public weary of endemic corruption, economic mismanagement and ethnic and political violence. Pakistan's woes exposed more than the growing frailty of a nuclear-weapon state. They were also the harbinger of a more widespread malaise. Many emerging democracies were experiencing similar crises. In Latin America and the post-communist world, and in parts of Asia and Africa, trust in political parties and parliaments was sinking dramatically, as scandals mounted and elected governments defaulted on their vows to control corruption and improve the welfare of ordinary people.

Thanks to bad governance and popular disaffection, democracy has lost ground. Since the start of the democratic wave, 24 states have reverted to authoritarian rule. Two thirds of these reversals have occurred in the past nine years—and included some big and important states such as Russia, Venezuela, Bangladesh, Thailand and (if one takes seriously the definition of democracy) Nigeria and the Philippines as well. Pakistan and Thailand have recently returned to rule by elected civilians, and Bangladesh is about to do so, but ongoing crises keep public confidence low. Democracy is also threatened in Bolivia and Ecuador, which confront rising levels of political polarization. And other strategically important democracies once thought to be doing well—Turkey, South Africa and Ukraine—face serious strains.

This isn't to say there haven't been a few heartening successes in recent years. Indonesia, the world's most populous Muslim country, has become a robust democracy nearly a decade after its turbulent transition from authoritarian rule. Brazil, under the left-leaning Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, has also strengthened its democratic institutions while maintaining fiscal discipline and a market orientation and reducing poverty. In Africa, Ghana has maintained a quite liberal democracy while generating significant economic growth, and several smaller African countries have moved in this direction.

But the combination of tough economic times, diminished U.S. power and the renewed energy of major authoritarian states will pose a stiff challenge to some 60 insecure democracies in Asia, Africa, Latin America and the former Soviet bloc. If they don't strengthen their political institutions, reduce corruption and figure out how to govern more effectively, many of these democracies could fail in the coming years.

Part of the tragedy is that Washington has made things worse, not better. The Bush administration was right that spreading democracy would advance the U.S. national interest—that truly democratic states would be more responsible, peaceful and law-abiding and so become better contributors to international security. But the administration's unilateral and self-righteous approach led it to overestimate U.S. power and rush the dynamics of change, while exposing itself to charges of hypocrisy with its use of torture and the abuse of due process in the war on terror. Instead of advancing freedom and democracy in the Middle East, 2005 and 2006 witnessed a series of embarrassing shocks: Hamas winning in the Palestinian territories and Islamist parties winning in Iraq; Hizbullah surging in Lebanon and the Muslim Brotherhood surging in Egypt. After a brief moment of optimism, the United States backed away and Middle Eastern democrats grew embittered.

The new American administration will have to fashion a fresh approach—and fast. That will mean setting clear priorities and bringing objectives into alignment with means. The United States does not have the power, resources or moral standing to quickly transform the world's entrenched dictatorships. Besides, isolating and confronting them never seems to work: in Cuba, for example, this policy has been a total failure. This does not mean that the United States should not support democratic change in places like Cuba, Burma, Iran and Syria. But it needs a more subtle and sophisticated approach.

The best strategy would be to open up such places to the freer flow of people, goods, ideas and information. The next administration should therefore start by immediately lifting the self-defeating embargo on Cuba. It should offer to establish full diplomatic ties with Havana and free flows of trade and investment in exchange for a Cuban commitment to improve human rights. Washington should also work with Tehran to hammer out a comprehensive deal that would lift economic sanctions, renounce the use of force to effect regime change and incorporate Iran into the WTO, in exchange for a verifiable halt to nuclear-weapons development, more responsible behavior on Iraq and terrorism, and improved human-rights protection and monitoring. Critics will charge that talking to such odious governments only legitimizes them. In fact, engaging closed societies is the best way to foster democratic change.

At the same time, the United States should continue to support diaspora groups that seek peaceful democratic change back home, and should expand international radio broadcasting, through the Voice of America and more specialized efforts, that transmits independent news and information as well as democratic values and ideas.

In the near term, however, Washington must focus on shoring up existing democracies. Fragile states need assistance to help them adjust to the shocks of the current economic crisis. But they also need deep reforms to strengthen their democratic institutions and improve governance. This will require coordinated help from America and its Western allies to do three things.

First, they must ramp up technical assistance and training programs to help the machinery of government—parliaments, local authorities, courts, executive agencies and regulatory institutions—work more transparently and deliver what people want: the rule of law, less corruption, fair elections and a government that responds to their economic and social needs. This also means strengthening democratic oversight.

Second, we know from experience that these kinds of assistance don't work unless the political leaders on the receiving end are willing to let them. So we need to generate strong incentives for rulers to opt for a different logic of governance, one that defines success as delivering development and reducing poverty rather than skimming public resources and buying support or rigging elections. This will mean setting clear conditions that will have to be met before economic and political aid is doled out to governments.

The third priority is to expand assistance to independent organizations, mass media and think tanks in these fragile states that will increase public demand for better governance and monitor what governments do. This means aiding democratic professional associations, trade unions, chambers of commerce, student groups and organizations devoted to human rights, women's rights, transparency, civic education, election monitoring and countless other democratic activities. Ordinary people must be educated to know their rights and responsibilities as citizens—and be ready to defend them.

While Western countries have provided this kind of aid for more than two decades, economic assistance handed out at the same time has often undermined democracy efforts by subsidizing corrupt, abusive governments. Aid donors should thus strike a new bargain with recipients, telling them: if you get serious about containing corruption, building a rule of law and improving people's lives, we will get serious about helping you. Those that show a real commitment should get significant new rewards of aid and freer trade. Those unwilling to reform should get little, though the West should continue to fight disease and directly help people in dire need wherever they are.

Finally, the new president should keep in mind the power of example. Washington can't promote democracy abroad if it erodes it at home. The contradictions between the rhetoric of Bush's "freedom agenda" and the realities of Abu Ghraib, Guantánamo, torture, warrantless surveillance and boundless executive privilege have led even many of the United States' natural allies to dismiss U.S. efforts as hypocritical. Thus the new president must immediately shut down Guantánamo and unequivocally renounce the use of torture; few gestures would restore American credibility more quickly. The United States should also reduce the power of lobbyists, enhance executive and legislative transparency and reform campaign-finance rules—both for its own good and for the message it would send.

Make no mistake: thanks to the global economic crisis and antidemocratic trends, things may get worse before they get better. But supporting democracy abroad advances U.S. national interests and engages universal human aspirations. A more consistent, realistic and multilateral approach will help to secure at-risk democracies and plant the seeds of freedom in oppressed countries. Patience, persistence and savvy diplomacy will serve the next president far better than moralistic rhetoric that divides the world into good and evil. We've seen where that got us.

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