In Political Change in China: Comparisons with Taiwan, CDDRL's Democracy in Taiwan program marshals commentary from leading experts on what lessons, if any, Taiwan's experience of democratization might hold for China's future. The volume was co-edited by Larry Diamond and includes a chapter by Weitseng Chen, one of CDDRL's 2007-08 Hewlett Fellows.

The Stanford Program on International and Cross-Cultural Education has taken on world religions, Russian leaders and Aztec history. Now it's boiling down the glory and controversy of China's history, culture and politics in time for the Summer Olympics in Beijing.

Helping to make the scholarship and research at Stanford's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies accessible to younger learners, the program, known by its acronym "SPICE," has developed a multimedia curriculum for middle and high school students that introduces them to the sights and sounds of China through the prism of the upcoming Olympics.

"The Road to Beijing" includes a documentary featuring cellist Yo-Yo Ma and musicians from the Silk Road Ensemble discussing how they blend traditional Chinese and classical music, and a documentary developed by NBC that showcases Olympians planning to compete in the August games. The package also offers an interactive website and professional development material for teachers.

The curriculum can be tailored for use in a single day or during several classes.

"We want to make Stanford faculty's scholarship accessible to a younger and broader audience," said Gary Mukai, director of SPICE. "We have a number of China specialists on campus, and we want to spread the knowledge of Stanford to other schools."

SPICE has been offering curriculum packages to middle and high school students for the past three decades, covering topics such as Islam, the span of Soviet and Russian leaders from Lenin to Putin and the political geography of Europe.

While "The Road to Beijing" uses the Olympics to hook student interest, it also offers lessons on the political, social and environmental criticism facing China.

"That's one of the richest parts of the curriculum," Mukai said. "It engages students and gets them to think about critical issues."

The teacher guides and documentaries are free on the SPICE website, http://spice.stanford.edu. More written materials, CD-ROM PowerPoints and DVDs of the documentaries cost $34.95.

TheStanford Program on International and Cross-Cultural Education (SPICE) develops innovative materials on key issues in international affairs for K-14 students in the United States and independent schools abroad. Multidisciplinary SPICE materials serve as a bridge between classrooms of receptive students and teachers and FSI scholars and collaborative partners. SPICE offered a number of important new publications for an emerging generation of scholars this year.

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As with all SPICE projects, collaboration with scholars and other experts on the Cultural Revolution was essential to the development of this unit. Andrew G. Walder, former director of the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, served as principal advisor and was instrumental in the conceptualization of the curriculum. Connie Chin of Stanford’s Center for East Asian Studies translated entries from a Chinese textbook that students compare with textbooks of Taiwan and the United States. Jiang, a local author and survivor of the Cultural Revolution, oversaw the development of a lesson that features her book, Red Scarf Girl. Jiang worked with many Chinese who provided their own memoirs of the Cultural Revolution for the curriculum, exposing students to first-hand experiences of Chinese youth during this time.

Another new SPICE unit, titled Tea and the Japanese Tradition of Chanoyu, results from a collaboration with the Urasenke Foundation of Kyoto, Japan. This unit traces the history of tea from its origins in China 5,000 years ago to modern times, with an emphasis on its prominent role in Japan. By the 16th century, Japan’s tea practice had become formalized by Sen Rikyu, who integrated art, religion, social interaction, and economics into his tea practice. He so revolutionized chanoyu that he is universally recognized as the most important tea master who ever lived. The Urasenke School of Tea was established by one of his descendants some 400 years ago, and the Sen family has continued to pass on its way of tea for 16 generations.

SPICE worked with two of Sen Rikyu’s descendants, Great Grand Master Sen Soshitsu XV and Grand Master Sen Soshitsu XVI Iemoto, to develop this unit. Each wrote a personal letter, expressing their excitement about introducing American students to a cherished Japanese tradition. Grand Master Sen Soshitsu XVI Iemoto says, “In the age of globalization, there is a great need for truly international people, that is, those who understand and appreciate their own culture as well as that of others, and those who value both the diversity of mankind and the universality of the human spirit. These are the people who will enrich and reinvigorate our global society in the future.” His father, Great Grand Master Sen Soshitsu XV, adds, “I am very happy to have been involved with this project which, I pray, will help to contribute to world peace and goodwill through my motto ‘Peacefulness through a Bowl of Tea.’”

As the world’s most dynamic and rapidly advancing region, the Asia-Pacific has commanded global attention. Business and policy leaders alike have been focused on the rise of China, tensions on the Korean peninsula, Japan’s economic recovery and political assertiveness, globalization and the outsourcing of jobs to South Asia, Indonesia’s multiple transitions, competing forces of nationalism vs. regionalism, and the future of U.S.-Asia relations.

What is the near-term outlook for change in the region? How might developments in the economic, political, or security sphere affect Asia’s expected trajectory? And how will a changing Asia impact the United States? These were among the complex and challenging issues addressed by a faculty panel from the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) and the Eurasia Group at the Asia Society in New York on January 23, 2006.

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Q. COIT BLACKER: WHAT IS THE MOST DIFFICULT, CHALLENGING ISSUE YOU SEE?

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A. HARRY HARDING:

In China, we are seeing a darker side of the Chinese success story. Millions of people have been lifted out of poverty, China's role in international affairs is on the rise, and China is an increasingly responsible stakeholder in an open, liberal global economy. Yet, the world is now seeing the problems China's reform program has failed to resolve. China's new five-year plan seeks to address a number of these issues, providing a plan for sustainable economic development that is environmentally
responsible and addresses chronic pollution problems, for a harmonious society that
addresses inequalities and inadequacies in the provision of medical care, insurance
and pension systems, and for continuing technological innovation, as part of China's
quest to become an exporter of capital and technology.

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The world should be deeply concerned about developments on the Korean peninsula. Two pressing issues are U.S. relations with South Korea and the nuclear crisis with the North. It is not clear when or whether we will see a solution. Time may be against the United States on the issue. China and South Korea are not necessarily willing to follow the U.S. approach; without their cooperation, it is difficult to secure a successful solution. The younger generation emerging in South Korea does not see North Korea as a threat. Our own relations with South Korea are strained and we are viewed as preoccupied with Iraq and Iran, as North Korea continues to develop nuclear weapons.

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In Southeast Asia, a key problem is uneven development, both in and between the political and economic spheres. Potentially volatile contrasts are seen throughout the region. Vietnam is growing at 8 percent per year, but will it become a democracy? It has not yet. Indonesia has shifted to democracy, but absent faster economic growth, that political gain could erode. Indonesia's media are among the freest in the region;
multiple peaceful elections have been held--a remarkable achievement--and nearly all Islamists shun terrorism. Older Indonesians remember, however, that the economy
performed well without democracy under President Suharto. Nowadays, corruption
scandals break out almost daily, nationalist and Islamist feelings are strong, and the
climate is not especially favorable to foreign investment. While Burma's economy
lags, its repressive polity embarrasses the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN). How long can the generals in Rangoon hold on? Disparities are also
international: dire poverty marks Laos and Cambodia, for example, while the
Malaysian and Thai economies have done well.

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Japan is a "good news/bad news" story. The good news is that Japan has found a new security niche since the end of the Cold War. Previously, when a security problem loomed "over the horizon," they expected us to take care of it while, if prodded, they increased their financial support for U.S. troops stationed in Japan. During the first post-Cold War conflict in the Persian Gulf, Japan had neither the political consensus nor the legal framework to permit a sharing of the risks, as well as the costs, and this cost them politically. Since then, they have passed legislation that permits them to participate in U.N. peacekeeping activities, contribute noncombat, logistic, and other services to "coalition of the willing" operations, and even dispatch troops to join reconstruction activities in Iraq. Clearly, their more ambitious role is helping to make the U.S.-Japan alliance more balanced and more global.The bad news is a reemergence of stronger nationalist sentiment in Japan and more generally in Northeast Asia. In part this is attributable to the collapse of the Left in Japanese politics since the mid-1990s. This has left the Conservatives more dominant, and they are less apologetic about Japanese conduct in the 1930s and 1940s, more inclined to regard North Korea and China as potential threats, more assertive with respect to territorial issues, less sensitive to their neighbors’ reactions to Prime Ministerial visits to Yasukuni Shrine, and more eager to be regarded as a “normal” nation. Many Asians see the United States as pushing Japan to take on a more active security role and, in the context of rising Japanese nationalism, are less inclined to view the U.S.-Japan alliance as a source of reassurance.

Q. COIT BLACKER: WHAT ARE THE COMPETING AND CONFLICTING TENSIONS BETWEEN REGIONALISM AND NATIONALISM?

A. HARRY HARDING:

In China, there has been a resurgence of nationalism over the past 10 to 15 years. Since the end of the Maoist era and the beginning of the reform movement, the leadership has embraced nationalism as a source of legitimacy, but this is a double-edged sword. It places demands on the government to stand up for China’s face, rights, and prestige in international affairs, especially vis-à-vis Japan, the United States, and Taiwan, at times pushing Beijing in directions it does not wish to go.

A. DONALD EMMERSON:

In Indonesia, it is important to distinguish between inward and outward nationalism. Outward nationalism was manifest in Sukarno’s policy of confrontation with Malaysia. ASEAN is predicated on inward nationalism and outward cooperation. Nationalist feelings can be used inwardly to motivate reform and spur development. But there are potential drawbacks. Take the aftermath of the conflict in Aceh. The former rebels want their own political party. Hard-line nationalists in the Indonesian parliament, however, are loath to go along, and that could jeopardize stability in a province already exhausted by civil war and damaged by the 2004 tsunami.

A. GI-WOOK SHIN:

Korea is a nation of some 70 million people, large by European standards, but small in comparison to the giants of Asia, especially China, India, and Russia, making Korea very concerned about what other countries are doing and saying. Korea is currently undergoing an identity crisis. Until the 1980s, the United States was seen as a “savior” from Communism and avid supporter of modernization. Since then, many Koreans have come to challenge this view, arguing that the United States supported Korean dictatorship. Koreans are also rethinking their attitudes toward North Korea, seeing Koreans as belonging to one nation. This shift has contributed to negative attitudes toward both the United States and Japan

Q. COIT BLACKER: GENERATIONAL CHANGE IS ALSO A MAJOR ISSUE IN CHINA, THE DPRK, AND JAPAN. WHAT DOES IT BODE FOR POLITICAL CHANGE?

A. MICHAEL ARMACOST:

Japan has had a “one and a half party system” for more than half a century. Yet the Liberal Democratic Party has proven to be remarkably adaptive, cleverly co-opting many issues that might have been exploited by the opposition parties. It is clearly a democratic country, but its politics have not been as competitive as many other democracies. As for the United States, we have promoted lively democracies throughout the region. But we should not suppose that more democratic regimes will necessarily define their national interests in ways that are invariably compatible with ours. In both Taiwan and South Korea, to the contrary, democratic leaderships have emerged which pursue security policies that display less sensitivity to Washington’s concerns, and certainly exhibit little deference to U.S. leadership.

A. GI-WOOK SHIN:

In both North and South Korea, a marked evolution is under way. In the South, many new members of the parliament have little knowledge of the United States. Promoting mutual understanding is urgently needed on both sides. In the North, the big question is who will succeed Kim Jong Il—an issue with enormous implications for the United States.

A. DONALD EMMERSON:

Indonesians have a noisy, brawling democracy. What they don’t have is the rule of law. Judges can be bought, and laws are inconsistently applied. The Philippines enjoyed democracy for most of the 20th century, but poverty and underdevelopment remain rife, leading many Filipinos to ask just where democracy has taken their nation.

A. HARRY HARDING:

China has seen a significant increase in rural protests. There has been an increase in both the number of incidents and the level of violence. People are being killed, not just in rural areas, but also in major cities like Chengdu. We are seeing a new wave of political participation by professional groups, such as lawyers and journalists, galvanizing public support on such issues as environmental protection, failure to pay pensions, confiscation of land, and corruption. A new generation has been exposed to the Internet, the outside world, and greater choice, but it is not yet clear at what point they will demand greater choice in their own political life.

WHAT WOULD YOU ADVISE THE PRESIDENT ON U.S. POLICY TOWARDS ASIA?

In the lively question-and-answer session, panelists were asked, "Given the chance to talk to the U.S. President about change and improvement in U.S.-Asia policy, what would you say?"

MICHAEL ARMACOST: I am struck by a mismatch between our interests and our strategy in Asia. In some respects our Asia policy has become something of an adjunct of our policy toward the Middle East-where we confront perhaps more urgent, if not more consequential, concerns. Asia is still the most dynamic economic zone in the world; it is the region in which the most significant new powers are emerging; and it is where the interests of the Great Powers intersect most directly. Also, it is an area where profound change is taking place swiftly. We are adapting our policies in Asia to accommodate current preoccupations in the Muslim world, rather than with an eye to preserving our power and relevance in Asia.

HARRY HARDING: It is striking how much Asian nations still want us around- as an offshore balancer and a source of economic growth. Yet they want us to understand the priorities on their agenda as well as our own. We are seen as obsessed with terrorism and China. We should exhibit more support for Asian institution building, as we have with the European Union. We also need to get our own economic act together-promoting education, stimulating scientific research and technological innovation, and reducing our budget deficits-and quit resting on past laurels. Requiring Japan to accept U.S. beef exports and then sending them meat that did not meet the agreed-upon standards has been a setback for our relations, since the Japanese public regards the safety of its food supply as critically important.

DONALD EMMERSON: Most opinion-makers in Southeast Asia are tired of Washington's preoccupation with terrorism. To be effective in the region, we must deal-and appear to be dealing-with a wider array of economic, social, and political issues, and not just bilaterally. The United States is absent at the creation of East Asian regionalism. For various reasons, we were not invited to participate in the recent East Asia Summit. Meanwhile, China's "smile diplomacy" has yielded 27 different frameworks of cooperation between that country and ASEAN. We need to be more, and more broadly, engaged.

MICHAEL ARMACOST: The establishment of today's European community began with the historic reconciliation between France and Germany. I doubt that a viable Asian community can be created without a comparable accommodation between China and Japan. Some observers believe that current tensions between Tokyo and Beijing are advantageous insofar as they facilitate closer defense cooperation between the United States and Japan. I do not share that view. A drift toward Sino-Japanese strategic rivalry would complicate our choices as well as theirs, and I hope we can find ways of attenuating current tensions.

Discussions began, tentatively at first, as the delegates slipped into the roles they had been assigned and for which they had prepared for several months. The tension mounted as they anticipated meeting with their heads of state, to whom they would propose their country’s goals for the upcoming U.N. Security Council meeting.

Thus began the Third Annual IDL Student Conference in International Security, sponsored by the Initiative on Distance Learning (IDL). IDL offers Stanford courses in international security to nine Russian universities via distance-learning technologies. Its annual conference brings together top students and instructors from each of the participating universities with students and faculty from Stanford. This was the first year that the conference centered on an international security simulation, led by political science professor Scott D. Sagan, director of CISAC, and Coit D. Blacker, director of FSI. Sagan has been conducting such security simulations for eight years at Stanford and other U.S. universities.

This year’s simulation scenario was the referral of Iran to the U.N. Security Council by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for failure to fully disclose its nuclear activities. Council delegates convened in the Russian provincial capital of Yaroslavl, 150 miles northeast of Moscow, due to “security concerns”— as they were informed—about U.N. headquarters in New York.

Delegates’ opening statements reflected a wide range of views on Iran’s status with the IAEA. The U.S. delegation called for sanctions and showed little interest in negotiation. “We find the Iranian regime corrupt and repressive,” said Oleg Borisov, head U.S. delegate and a student at Petrozavodsk State University. He added, rather menacingly, “The United States is not intending to use military force unless Iran keeps up its nuclear capability and continues to support terrorism.”

At the other end of the spectrum, Venezuela, Pakistan, and Iraq indicated no willingness to consider sanctioning Iran. China urged delegates to “choose the only right option—diplomacy.”

By the end of the two-day session, delegates had overcome seemingly intractable differences during four intensive legal drafting sessions. The council’s resolution gave Iran three months to comply with IAEA demands and provided for Iran to obtain enriched uranium from Russia, with the production, transport, and waste disposal to occur on Russian soil under IAEA controls.

As a learning experience, the simulation is well matched to the IDL program’s goal of fostering critical analysis among a new generation of students in post- Soviet Russia. FSI director Coit Blacker wants to develop future generations of diplomats and policymakers whose worldview is shaped “by how they think, not what they’re told to think.”

After the session ended, students reflected on what they had learned. Putting themselves in others’ shoes seemed the most valuable aspect for many. Natasha Pereira-Klamath, one of the Stanford undergraduates who participated in the Yaroslavl simulation as a representative of the Russian Federation, said she was surprised at the “extent to which people reflected the views of their (assigned) countries.” This was echoed by other students, who expressed their surprise at how easy it was to begin thinking as a representative of another country, although their official position might be very different from their own.

“I’m glad to see the resolution passed today,” said Homkosol Bheraya, an exchange student from Thailand who attends Ural State University. “I hope that in the real world this can happen someday.” Perhaps she will be in a position to advance that goal. “My dream,” she said, “is to one day work for the IAEA.”

The International Outreach Program at Stanford University (IOP) began as a pilot joint venture between FSI and the Stanford Center for Innovations in Learning (SCIL), under the auspices of the Stanford International Initiative. IOP was designed to serve as a bridge between Stanford University and international universities and educational institutions, especially in Africa, South America, and Asia. The program’s mission is to facilitate teaching and other outreach collaborations in each of the three primary themes of the International Initiative—security, governance, and human well-being—and international collaborations in other relevant areas. During the initial startup phase, IOP facilitated collaborations between Stanford and universities in South Africa (ELISA— eLearning Initiative in South Africa, focusing on using mobile devices to support Stanford courses on International Security and the Environment) as well as in China (adapting innovative computer-based learning materials to teach biology to undergraduate students).

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UC is collaborating with IOP on a proposed $10 million, five-year program to allow Stanford experts and graduate students to work with their Chilean counterparts to design and test new mechanisms to deliver state-of-the-art teacher professional development programs in literacy and mathematics. The group of Stanford experts include Coit D. Blacker, Guadalupe Valdes, Shelley Goldman, Rachel Lotan, Aki Murata, Duarte Silva, and Martin Carnoy.

Another project between Stanford and UC explores the joint development of new models for initial teacher education. In July 2006, Rachel Lotan, director of the Stanford Teacher Education Program (STEP), joined Reinhold Steinbeck, IOP co-director, to meet with members of UC’s School of Education in Santiago. UC is particularly interested in working with STEP on addressing some key issues confronting initial teacher education—pedagogic content knowledge; linkages between theoretical and practical dimensions of teacher training; and the strategic character of university-schools linkages for providing contexts for teacher training. The planned collaboration would include training sessions of teacher educators and program administrators from Universidad Católica at Stanford and in Santiago and would also utilize distance-learning technologies.

IOP is exploring a new collaboration between Stanford and UC’s new center for international studies led by Dr. Juan Emilio Cheyre, a noted reformer of the Chilean Army. Michael A. McFaul, deputy director of FSI, and Katherine M. Kuhns, director of FSI’s Initiative on Distance Learning (IDL), met with Cheyre and other university leaders in July 2006.

IOP is enthused about facilitating this potential collaboration, which would allow Stanford to make a major contribution toward capacity building in teacher education and international studies at UC and across Chile.

Preventing the unthinkable ongoing crisis with Tehran is not the first time Washington has faced a hostile government attempting to develop nuclear weapons. Nor is it likely to be the last. Yet the reasoning of U.S. officials now struggling to deal with Iran’s nuclear ambitions is clouded by a kind of historical amnesia, which leads to both creeping fatalism about the United States’ ability to keep Iran from getting the bomb and excessive optimism about the United States’ ability to contain Iran if it does become a nuclear power.

A U.S. official in the executive branch anonymously told the New York Times in March 2006, “The reality is that most of us think the Iranians are probably going to get a weapon, or the technology to make one, sooner or later.” Military planners and intelligence officers have reportedly been tasked with developing strategies to deter Tehran if negotiations fail.

Both proliferation fatalism and deterrence optimism are wrong-headed, and they reinforce each other in a disturbing way. As nuclear proliferation comes to be seen as inevitable, wishful thinking can make its consequences seem less severe, and if faith in deterrence grows, incentives to combat proliferation diminish.

Deterrence optimism is based on mistaken nostalgia and a faulty analogy. Although deterrence did work with the Soviet Union and China, there were many close calls; maintaining nuclear peace during the Cold War was far more difficult and uncertain than U.S. officials and the American public seem to remember today. Furthermore, a nuclear Iran would look a lot less like the totalitarian Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China and a lot more like Pakistan, Iran’s unstable neighbor—a far more frightening prospect.

Fatalism about nuclear proliferation is equally unwarranted. Although the United States did fail to prevent its major Cold War rivals from developing nuclear arsenals, many other countries—including Japan, West Germany, South Korea, and more recently Libya—curbed their own nuclear ambitions.

THE REASONS WHY

The way for Washington to move forward on Iran is to give Tehran good reason to relinquish its pursuit of nuclear weapons. That, in turn, requires understanding why Tehran wants them in the first place.

Iran’s nuclear energy program began in the 1960s under the shah, but even he wanted to create a breakout option to get the bomb quickly if necessary. One of his senior energy advisers recalled, “The shah told me that he does not want the bomb yet, but if anyone in the neighborhood has it, we must be ready to have it.” At first, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini objected to nuclear weapons on religious grounds, but the mullahs abandoned such restraint after Saddam Hussein ordered chemical attacks on Iranian forces during the Iran-Iraq War.

The end of Saddam’s rule in 2003 significantly reduced the security threat to Tehran. But by then the United States had taken Iraq’s place. In his January 2002 State of the Union address, President Bush had denounced the governments of Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as members of an “axis of evil” with ties to international terrorism. After the fall of Baghdad, an unidentified senior U.S. official told a Los Angeles Times reporter that Tehran should “take a number,” hinting that it was next in line for regime change.

Increasingly, Bush administration spokespeople advocated “preemption” to counter proliferation. When asked, in April 2006, whether the Pentagon was considering a potential preventive nuclear strike against Iranian nuclear facilities, President Bush pointedly replied, “All options are on the table.”

AGREED FRAMEWORK IN FARSI

A source of inspiration for handling Iran is the 1994 Agreed Framework that the United States struck with North Korea. The Bush administration has severely criticized the deal, but it contained several elements that could prove useful in the Iranian nuclear crisis.

After the North Koreans were caught violating their NPT commitments in early 1993, they threatened to withdraw from the treaty. Declaring that “North Korea cannot be allowed to develop a nuclear bomb,” President Clinton threatened an air strike on the Yongbyon reactor site if the North Koreans took further steps to reprocess plutonium. In June 1994, as the Pentagon was reinforcing military units on the Korean Peninsula, Pyongyang froze its plutonium production, agreed to let IAEA inspectors monitor the reactor site, and entered into bilateral negotiations.

The talks produced the October 1994 Agreed Framework, under which North Korea agreed to eventually dismantle its reactors, remain in the NPT, and implement full IAEA safeguards. In exchange, the United States promised to provide it with limited oil supplies, construct two peaceful light-water reactors for energy production, “move toward full normalization of political and economic relations,” and extend “formal assurances to [North Korea] against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the U.S.”

“The way for Washington to move forward on Iran is to give Tehran good reason to relinquish its pursuit of nuclear weapons.”By 2002, the Agreed Framework had broken down, not only because Pyongyang was suspected of cheating but also because it believed that the United States, by delaying construction of the light-water reactors and failing to start normalizing relations, had not honored its side of the bargain. When confronted with evidence of its secret uranium program, in November 2002, Pyongyang took advantage of the fact that the U.S. military was tied down in preparations for the invasion of Iraq and withdrew from the NPT, kicked out the inspectors, and started reprocessing plutonium.

President Bush famously promised, in his 2002 State of the Union address, that the United States “will not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons.” Yet when North Korea kicked out the IAEA inspectors, Secretary of State Colin Powell proclaimed that the situation was “not a crisis.” Bush repeatedly declared that the United States had “no intention of invading North Korea.” The point was not lost on Tehran.

If Washington is to offer security assurances to Tehran, it should do so soon (making the assurances contingent on Tehran’s not developing nuclear weapons), rather than offering them too late, as it did with North Korea (and thus making them contingent on Tehran’s getting rid of any existing nuclear weapons). As with North Korea, any deal with Iran must be structured in a series of steps, each offering a package of economic benefits (light-water reactors, aircraft parts, or status at the World Trade Organization) in exchange for constraints placed on Iran’s future nuclear development.

Most important, however, would be a reduction in the security threat that the United States poses to Iran. Given the need for Washington to have a credible deterrent against, say, terrorist attacks sponsored by Iran, a blanket security guarantee would be ill advised. But more limited guarantees, such as a commitment not to use nuclear weapons, could be effective. They would reassure Tehran and pave the way toward the eventual normalization of U.S.–Iranian relations while signaling to other states that nuclear weapons are not the be all and end all of security.

Peaceful coexistence does not require friendly relations, but it does mean exercising mutual restraint. Relinquishing the threat of regime change by force is a necessary and acceptable price for the United States to pay to stop Tehran from getting the bomb.

A new era is under way for global high-technology innovation and entrepreneurship, marked by the rise of Greater China. During the past several decades, Taiwan, Singapore, and others have developed as centers in key information communications technology (ICT) industries. More recently, from Beijing to the Pearl River Delta, markets for new products are expanding, competencies in new technologies are growing, and a new generation of high-technology regions is emerging. All these signs point toward China as a rising powerhouse, accelerating the shift of locus for the global high-technology arena across the Pacific.

The contours of the nature and pace of this change are already evident in some ICT industries but have yet to be fully analyzed. The Stanford Program on Regions of Innovation and Entrepreneurship (SPRIE) (SPRIE) is leading a research program to advance the understanding of the dynamic systems of innovation and entrepreneurship that drive China’s ascendance in high technology and its implications for the global knowledge economy.

CHINA'S QUEST FOR INDEPENDENT INNOVATION

No longer satisfied with China’s role as the world’s factory, Chinese government leaders have declared that zizhu chuangxin (“homegrown” innovation) is the watchword for the future. They are sounding an urgent call to reduce dependence on foreign technology and build China into an “innovation-driven economy.” As President Hu Jintao said, “homegrown innovation” is the “core of national competitiveness”— the path to sustainable economic prosperity and global leadership.

Last May, SPRIE co-sponsored Greater China's Innovative Capacities: Progress and Challenges, a two-day, invitation-only workshop at Tsinghua University in Beijing that attracted scholars from Europe, the U.S., and Asia, as well as Chinese industry leaders and government policymakers. More than 70 participants tackled topics such as indicators of innovative capacity (patent data and journal citations, for example), reforms of Chinese research institutions to spur commercially useful innovation, and the changing roles for innovation of the state, multinational corporations (MNCs), and domestic firms.

A few numbers illustrate China’s progress over the past decade. Total R&D spending nearly tripled, reaching 1.3 percent of GDP in 2005, even while GDP doubled. China is now ranked third worldwide in overall R&D spending (after the U.S. and Japan), with targets to increase spending to 2 percent of GDP by 2010. Science and engineering PhDs more than doubled between 1996 and 2005. And China’s growth rate of U.S. patents granted has eclipsed Japan, Taiwan, or Korea, with an even steeper trajectory in Chinese-authored science and technical publications in international journals.

Yet, according to SPRIE Co-Director Henry S. Rowen, “the highest value-added work in China still is done largely in foreign-invested companies and increasingly in firms led by returnees who have been educated and worked abroad. Currently most R&D is focused on incremental improvements of existing products and services. Nevertheless, the key building blocks are in place for increasing technology contributions.” At MNC R&D centers like Nokia and Microsoft, top Chinese teams are beginning to contribute to worldwide product design and research. Through interviews at more than 75 firms in Beijing and Shanghai, SPRIE researchers have identified emerging competencies at some of the best domestic research labs and companies, ranging from multimedia chip design to communication equipment.

Huawei, the telecommunications networking giant with 2005 revenues of $5.9 billion, reports consistently spending more than 10 percent of sales on R&D. Boasting more than 10,000 researchers in China plus R&D centers in Bangalore, Silicon Valley, Dallas, Stockholm, and Moscow and 3,600 patent applications in 2005, the company epitomizes China’s growing pursuit of low-cost innovation, not just low-cost manufacturing and services.

However, obstacles to China’s drive for innovation are not trivial. Many Chinese institutions, though improving, still fail to provide an environment conducive for innovation, including a competitive and open system for R&D funding or effective intellectual property protection. As SPRIE associate director Marguerite Gong Hancock observes, “The current gold rush mentality for quick profits runs counter to breakthrough technology innovation that is typically the result of patient investments in research with long-term and uncertain payoffs. To date, some of the most innovative bright spots are not in disruptive technologies but in processes, services, and business models.”

One notable obstacle confronting Chinese high-tech firms is a leadership talent shortage, a problem that is the focus of another SPRIE research initiative.

HIGH-TECHNOLOGY LEADERSHIP IN GREATER CHINA

Since 1999, founders have led 24 Chinese firms to IPOs on NASDAQ. From this unprecedented number of startups to a rising class of billion-dollar giants going global, high-tech companies in China have a dramatically intensifying need for leadership.

To examine how China’s high-tech executives are facing this challenge, SPRIE partnered with Heidrick & Struggles, a leading executive search firm, to conduct more than 100 interviews with executives at both domestic and multinational high-tech firms operating in China.

Leaders face what Nick Yang (MS ’99), founder of wireless service provider KongZhong, described as “uncharted waters.” They must create a cadre of top leaders and managers in the face of an acute shortage of seasoned managers and globally capable executives. As John Deng, founder and CEO of Vimicro (a fabless semiconductor company with $396 million market cap), said, “I don’t lack other things, such as funding, infrastructure, or government relations. What I lack now is people.”

SPRIE Co-Director William F. Miller commented, “Interestingly, not one interviewee expressed an intention to adopt a management model that diverges significantly from the dominant global model,” a model defined by competencies well documented as key among U.S. and European executives. Based on the SPRIE-Heidrick study, some of these competencies currently are both more critical and more difficult to find in China: the ability to drive results, achieve customer orientation, provide visionary leadership, create organizational buy-in, model key values, and delegate and empower. The best leaders not only are seeking these competencies in senior executives but also cascading these attributes throughout their organizations.

The impact ripples throughout the talent pipeline, from recruiting to retaining to developing key people. High-tech leaders in China are deploying a wide range of new tactics. Miller noted, “To address pressing leadership shortages, executives are devoting an unusually large amount of their time and attention to talent and human resource issues.” As Mary Ma, CFO of computer giant Lenovo, stated, “I have become an HR manager. I spend 30 percent of my time on people and succession issues.” And the best companies are systematically using their best leaders to mentor and mold the next generation of professionals—the mid-level managers and team leaders, who are mobile, scarce, and frequently lack the full set of skills needed to drive results.

Emerging trends in leadership among China’s hightech executives may be a good harbinger, pointing to how and where this influential generation of China’s high-tech leaders are steering their firms—firms that have been charged with the task of leading China’s future economic growth.