China's economy has averaged an impressive 9 percent annual growth over the past 30 years. In a recent Policy Review article, Henry S. Rowen says that as a result of this growth major political and economic changes are possible in China before 2020.

Since Kim Jong Il’s death on Dec. 17, North Korea has a young new leader: Kim’s 28-year-old son Kim Jong Un. What does the new leadership hold in store for the future of the Korean Peninsula, U.S.-Korea relations, and the stability of Northeast Asia? David Straub, who attended the seventh U.S.-Korea West Coast Strategic Forum in Seoul just days before Kim’s death, shares highlights from the Forum and offers insight into the current North Korea situation.

Straub is associate director of the Korean Studies Program at Stanford University and a retired senior U.S. foreign service official with over 30 years of Northeast Asia experience.

The U.S.-Korea West Coast Strategic Forum is held semi-annually, alternating between Stanford and the Sejong Institute in Seoul.

The West Coast Forum opened with a discussion about the current situation in North Korea. After Kim Jong Il’s death, how much do you think that picture will change?

Most Forum experts believe there will be relative stability in North Korea for some time to come.

The reason Kim Jong Il chose Kim Jong Un as his successor is because he is the least controversial person in North Korea to succeed him. Anyone else would be the object of great suspicion and jealousy within the elite there.

North Korea has already had one succession—from founder Kim Il Sung to his son Kim Jong Il—and that went smoothly. The succession from Kim Jong Il to his youngest son Kim Jong Un is natural within that context—it is a dynastic succession. As with other dynastic successions, the easiest person to accept is normally someone who represents a continuation of the person in power.

Do you foresee possible areas for improvement in relations between North and South Korea or for negotiations over North Korea’s nuclear program?

Apr. 15 is the 100th anniversary of Kim Il Sung’s birth, which is going to be a large celebration. North Korea probably will want to commemorate it without a lot of distractions. The North Korean leadership also wants to provide more food and supplies to its people, and provocations toward South Korea would make it harder to get international aid. 

A number of Forum experts are concerned that North Korea might conduct another nuclear or long-range missile test this year. Most tests so far have not been fully successful, so from a military and technology perspective they probably want to try again. North Korea has been slapped with international trade sanctions for its previous tests, but China has always stepped in to help. Sanctions will probably not deter the North Koreans from conducting future tests.

As far as inter-Korean relations are concerned, it is unlikely that North Korea will take any major new initiatives toward the South. The leadership does not like conservative South Korean President Lee Myung-bak because he came into office saying that he would not continue giving large-scale aid to North Korea until it abandoned its nuclear weapons program. That was contrary to the Sunshine Policy of his two progressive predecessors.

President Lee’s term is almost up, and South Korea will hold a hold a presidential election on Dec. 19 this year. North Korea probably hopes that the progressives will win the election and restore the Sunshine Policy.

Will North Korea be a major issue for debate in South Korea’s upcoming 2012 presidential election?

Current polling shows that North Korea is the top concern of only 8 percent of the South Korean electorate. As in the past, the main issues for voters there are the economy, their standard of living, and social welfare issues. North Korea will not be the top issue unless something very dramatic happens between now and the election. On the other hand, if the race is close, feelings about North Korea policy could help to decide the outcome.

Among South Korean citizens, is there more fear or hope—or maybe a mixture of both—about North Korea’s new leadership?

Recent opinion polls show that 80 percent of South Koreans feel that North Korea will not give up its nuclear weapons. There is not much reason for optimism. That being said, most South Koreans are concerned about North Korea’s 2010 attack of Yeonpyeong Island and hope for improved relations. And, of course, Kim Jong Un is a different leader and most South Koreans hope he will move in a more positive direction. But they feel it is unlikely to happen in the next few years—if ever.

Does uncertainty over the future of North Korea have the potential to impact or strengthen any aspects of the U.S.-South Korea alliance?

This year, the U.S. and South Korean administrations will likely focus on managing the North Korean situation and continue to prioritize the U.S.-South Korea alliance. The two countries closely cooperate on North Korea policy.

The real question for the alliance in terms of North Korea policy will be who is elected as president in both countries. If a progressive South Korean candidate wins, that person will probably pursue some variation of the Sunshine Policy. Especially if a Republican is elected in the United States, we may see echoes of the difficult U.S.-South Korea relationship we had during the George W. Bush administration.

If President Obama is re-elected, another South Korean Sunshine Policy would also pose challenges. The administration has taken a very firm position that the United States will not significantly improve relations with North Korea until it gives up its nuclear weapons program. South Korea’s Sunshine Policy focuses on embracing North Korea in the hope that relations will improve over time and that North Korea will eventually voluntarily give up its nuclear weapons in that long-term context. 

China, the country in Northeast Asia with the most influence over North Korea, recently issued a statement in support of Kim Jong Un. Does this signify any major change in relations between these two countries?

The Chinese government has particular interest in North Korea. China is focused on developing its own economy, including the relatively poor northeastern area that borders North Korea. The last thing China wants is instability on the Korean Peninsula, which would detract from its economic development.

China does not believe it can force North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons without risking instability. In the absence of progress in the Six Party negotiations over North Korea’s nuclear program, China has unilaterally increased economic and diplomatic support for North Korea. Its support is independent of who serves as the North Korean leader.

China tried very hard to get Kim Jong Il to open up the North Korean economy more, but did not succeed, primarily because Kim feared that doing so would also allow in more outside information and undermine his regime. China probably hopes that the younger Kim Jong Un may eventually have not only the power but also the desire to reform the economy.  

More than 100 delegates gathered in Taipei on December 14th to attend the 2011 ITRI-SPRIE Forum on “Interdisciplinary Collaboration for Smart Green Innovation”, jointly organized by Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI) and the Stanford Program on Regions of Innovation and Entrepreneurship (SPRIE). Industrial Economics & Knowledge Center (IEK) of ITRI and SPRIE have collaborated since 2004 to conduct research and convene policymakers, executives and researchers at international forums in Taipei, Beijing, and at Stanford creating a platform between Taiwan, mainland China, and Silicon Valley to advance innovation and economic growth.

Focusing on strategies for commercialization of green technologies, the one-day Forum, sponsored by Taiwan’s Department of Industrial Technology (DoIT) at Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA), attracted a crowd of senior executives of large enterprises and clean-energy startups in Taiwan, local government officials, think-tank experts and academics from local research institutions and universities. The discussion included the importance of information technologies in reducing carbon emissions and the opportunities this presented to Taiwan given its strengths in IT.

The event follows SPRIE’s international forum on Innovation Beyond Boundaries: Partnerships for Advancing Smart, Green Living, held on June 29th and 30th, 2011 at Stanford University.

Executive Yuan Minister without Portfolio Jin-fu Chang opened the Forum at Taipei International Convention Center. The keynote address was delivered by Professor Dan Reicher, executive director of Stanford University’s Steyer-Taylor Center for Energy Policy and Finance, former Department of Energy assistant secretary under the Clinton administration and member of President Obama's transition team. In his keynote presentation entitled “Clean Energy: The Intersection of Technology, Policy and Finance”, Professor Reicher pointed out the importance of government support of energy technology commercialization, including new financial models for technology application and smart standards for energy efficiency.

The invitation-only morning panel discussion, chaired by MOEA Vice Minister Jung-Chiou Huang, covered a range of issues, including public-private partnerships for technology innovation and market applications, policies to boost smart green innovative competitiveness, and central/local collaboration schemes to achieve smart green city and industry development.

During the afternoon session open to the public, Stephen Su, General Director of IEK, argued that Taiwan holds enormous potential to become an innovation base for smart green technologies, with its strong foundation in the ICT industry and advanced supply chain management. He noted this could be a new potential industry for Taiwan and Silicon Valley to collaborate after the semiconductor industry to extend the advantages of regional competitiveness.

SPRIE faculty co-directors William F. Miller and Henry S. Rowen also shared their views and experience on public-private partnerships for green growth and strategies for innovation at the Forum.

The Forum concluded that transferring technologies to industry for society’s use and benefit is in the common interest of government, research institutions and enterprises. It will also continue to act as the engine of knowledge-based economies and innovative growth. Low-carbon economic development will rely on integration of interdisciplinary innovation, and the implementation of technology commercialization, in order to amplify the benefit of R & D investment.

Major Taiwan media outlets such as the United Daily News, Central News Agency and Mechanical Tech. Magazine all covered the event.

As the world reacts to the death of Kim Jong Il, Stanford’s Gi-Wook Shin talks about the transition of power in North Korea. He discusses what’s in store for relations between Pyongyang and Washington, and what to expect of what is perhaps Kim’s most troubling legacy: his nuclear weapons program.

Shin is a senior fellow at Stanford's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and director of FSI's Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and its Korean Studies Program. The sociology professor is also the Tong Yang, Korea Foundation, and Korea Stanford Alumni Chair of Korean Studies.

Kim Jong Il’s son, Jong Un, is set to take over North Korea’s leadership. What do we know about him, and what can we expect from his leadership?

Unlike his father, who had been groomed as a successor for many years, Kim Jong Un was designated as a successor only recently. As a result, it is questionable whether he is ready to take over the failing regime. Kim Jong Il’s death was not entirely unexpected, but still came sooner than many experts had thought.

Jong Un is only 28 years old without much experience in politics and governance and has not yet been able to consolidate his power. Although his status as a new leader is not likely to be challenged, it won’t be easy at all to establish himself as a strong leader like his father, let alone like his grandfather, Kim Il Song. 

In the years to come, his in-laws—such as Jang Seong Taek—will play an important role behind Kim. The military will also be a key player in the post-Kim Jong Il era.

You were in South Korea when Kim Jong Il died. What was the mood and reaction to the news?

People were taken by surprise but there was no panic. The government is handling the situation well, while many citizens wonder what will happen to North Korea with the passing of Kim Jong Il.

How can the United States deal with this transition in power? Will there be any change in relations between Washington and Pyongyang?

Representatives of North Korea and the U.S. recently met in Beijing to discuss food aid and nuclear issues. There was some optimism with the prospect to improve the bilateral relations. However, any direct talks between the two countries to discuss major issues will be on hold for a while as the northern regime mourns the loss of its leader and focuses on internal stability. The U.S. should pay keen attention to the transitional process and needs to support a smooth transition in power. That should entail close collaboration with neighboring countries, especially South Korea and China. And it should include providing food aid that the U.S. has been considering.

How does Kim Jong Il's death fit in with other key political transitions happening throughout the world in the coming year?

There is a great deal of uncertainty on the Korean peninsula. Besides this transition in power in North Korea, there will also be power transitions in China and Russia next year. And there will also be presidential elections in the U.S., South Korea, and Taiwan in 2012. Japan may have a new prime minister too, adding more uncertainty to the situation. 

On the other hand, uncertainty does not necessarily mean a crisis—it is unlikely that the North will provoke tensions on the peninsula. The coming year is a very important one for North Korea as it celebrates itself as a “mighty, prosperous nation.” But it faces many challenges.

I don’t expect any significant change in inter-Korean relations until perhaps 2013, when South Korea elects a new administration and North Korea is stabilized with a new political leadership. 

What does Kim Jong Il’s death mean for North Korea’s nuclear program?

North Korea has nuclear weapons and an enriched uranium program that could produce nuclear bombs. Very few expect the North to give up its nuclear bombs. Added uncertainty over the transition of power and heightened concern about regime survival will only increase the value that North Korea sees in possessing nuclear weapons.