Structural Change and the Future of Indian Agriculture
Binswanger-Mkhize's talk will look at past and likely future agricultural growth and rural poverty reduction in the context of the overall economy of India, in which growth has accelerated sharply since the 1980s, but agriculture still has not followed suit. Despite slow growth, urban-rural consumption, income and poverty differentials have not risen. This is because urban-rural spillovers have led to a sharp acceleration of rural non-farm growth and income. Binswanger-Mkhize proposes an optimistic vision can be realized if agricultural growth accelerates, high and widely shared economic growth leads to strong spillovers to the rural economy, and the rural non-farm sector continues to flourish. This would enable the rural sector to keep up with income growth in the urban economy and rural poverty would rapidly decline. However, if agricultural growth fails to accelerate, and overall economic growth falters, a more pessimistic vision is also possible. Binswanger-Mkhize will also discuss the role of prices and wages in determining agricultural growth, rural poverty and nutrition, and the two interlinked income parity issues: rural-urban and agricultural-non-agricultural incomes parity.
Marianne Banziger, Deputy Director, Research & Partnership at International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT) will provide commentary.
Bechtel Conference Center
Patterns of Elderly Life Expectancy in Three Chinese Cities: Hong Kong, Shanghai and Taipei
Life expectancy at aged 65 is remarkably similar in the three Chinese cities of Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Taipei, even though the cities differ in levels of socioeconomic development, health systems, and other factors. Edward Jow-Ching Tu will discuss research that aims to understand this phenomenon. Despite unprecedented increases in life expectancy and attainment of similar current levels of life expectancy, the cities differ in the contributions of changes in major causes of death to the improvements in life expectancy among the elderly. Tu and colleagues have explored several possible determinants of these different patterns and trends in the three cities, including socioeconomic development, health service delivery systems, cause-of-death classification systems, and competing risks from cardiovascular disease and other diseases. Their analysis suggests that the effect of equity of health service delivery has become more important over time.
Edward Jow-Ching Tu is a senior lecturer of demography in the Division of Social Science at Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. His work is focused on the impact of fertility, mortality, and migration on socio-economic changes in East Asia countries with special emphasis on nations experiencing a transition from planned economy to market economy; on causes and impacts of mortality changes and health transition on aging societies; and on the causes of lowest-low fertility in many East Asia countries. He has several active research projects ongoing in China, Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. He holds graduate degress from West Virginia University, the University of Pennsylvania, and the University of Tennessee (Knoxville). Tu has worked extensively in Asia, and has served as an adjunct professor and taught in many universities in China, including Peking University, Peoples University, Nankai Univerity, and Fudan University. He had served as a senior research scientist at the New York State Health Department and as a research fellow (full professor) at the Institute for Social Sciences and Philosophy at Academia Sinica. Tu has also taught at the State University of New York in Albany.
Philippines Conference Room
The Governance Project
he Governance Project at Stanford University's Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law seeks to better conceptualize and measure governance. Initially, it will seek to understand how it functions in two societies — the Peoples Republic of China and the United States. Led by FSI senior fellow and CDDRL faculty member Francis Fukuyama, the project begins with the premise that governance is a characteristic of modern polities concerning the delivery of public services that is different from either democratic institutions or the rule of law.
The term “governance” has been widely used in both development studies and comparative politics in recent years with the resurgence of interest in the role of institutions in broader socioeconomic development. This has led to an explosion of writing and research on the topic, as well as the development of quantitative indicators of “good governance” and their incorporation into aid policies like the Millennium Challenge Corporation.
Nonetheless, there is still no consensus on exactly what constitutes governance – indeed, there exists considerable confusion – and therefore on how it can be measured. Many definitions of governance are very expansive and include virtually any coordinating activity performed by any social organization.
This project will focus on the administrative capacities of states to deliver public goods and services. While broader definitions have their uses, state capacity remains a critical determinant of many social outcomes, both in the developing and developed worlds.
Moreover, there has been little systematic effort to look at the empirical relationship between governance so defined and democracy. In particular, we need to ask whether the quality of governance is helped or hurt by the advent of institutions of democratic accountability. (Indeed, this problem is exacerbated by the tendency of many observers to include accountability and legal institutions in their definitions of governance, as in the term "democratic governance.") While there are opinions and theories on the relationship between democracy and governance (e.g., that greater transparency and accountability will improve the quality of governance), it is not possible at this juncture to prove that this is true on a global basis.
The project will look specifically at how governance works in both China and the United States. China has a long historical tradition of strong centralized governance, but no formal mechanisms of accountability or a strong rule of law. The United States - by contrast - has traditionally had a weak state (when compared to other developed democracies), and powerful legal and democratic institutions. In light of the conceptualization of governance developed in the course of the project, researchers will explore the strengths and weaknesses of these two systems, and whether there are actually any similarities not just in the problems but in the governance structures that have evolved.
The project will involve a speakers series, as well as workshops to be held both in China and at Stanford's Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law.
China and the World: Interactions between China and Other Northeast Asian Countries
China’s “rise” has elicited envy, admiration, and fear among its neighbors and more distant countries. Much of what has been written about the modalities and impact of China’s increased activism on the world stage comes close to depicting what has happened (and what presumably will happen in the future) as determined almost entirely by goals, approaches, and instruments conceived in Beijing and implemented as designed by their Chinese authors. Such descriptions and explanations minimize or ignore the other side of the equation, namely, what individuals, corporate actors, and governments in other countries do to attract, shape, exploit, or deflect Chinese involvement. The "China and the World" project will redress the imbalance by examining the actions of China’s partners and ways in which initiatives and reactions from partners have shaped Chinese policy and the outcome of engagements with other countries.
The ultimate objective of this study is to understand and anticipate China’s behavior on the world stage. But China’s objectives, methods, and impacts vary from one region to another, and differences between regions are as interesting and as important as are practices and patterns common to all parts of the globe. Describing and explaining regional differences (as well as differences among countries in the same region) is therefore a useful, if not necessary, prerequisite for examining behavior and interactions at the global level.
North America, to be sure, is arguably the most important partner and shaper of China’s international behavior in the decades since Deng Xiaoping launched the policy of “reform and opening” that has transformed China. The reason for not focusing specifically on the United States in this study is that U.S.-China relations have been studied more extensively than any other Chinese relationship. However, the extent and nature of U.S. relations with countries in all regions make it imperative to consider U.S.-China relations in each region and their role, if any, in shaping China’s relationships with other countries.
The “China and the World” project will focus initially on Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. China has a long history and deeply varied relationship with these two regions. At the next stage, the project will examine China’s relationship with South Asia. Additional regions, such as Central Asia, may be added.
The project will begin with a one-and-a-half day workshop on March 19–20, 2012, convened in Beijing at the new Stanford Center at Peking University. It will focus on China’s relationships with Japan, Korea, and Russia in Northeast Asia. The participation of scholars from Southeast Asia and North America will help ensure that the core questions developed at the workshop are broadly applicable to other regions as well.
Stanford Center at Peking University
REAP in Caixin: China's Poor Face World's Highest High School Tuition
Recent news from Caixin.net
To illustrate the worst-case scenario for China in the near future, Scott Rozelle pulls up a picture from Mexico. It's a completely barren manufacturing warehouse, abandoned after wages in Mexico rose to more than four dollars per hour.
Following its manufacturing moment in the 1980s, Mexico has been struggling to create jobs in part because 40 percent of its workers lack a high school education, the Stanford University Professor of Economics said.
Contrast this to South Korea, where almost the entire workforce has attained a high school degree. After manufacturing jobs left South Korea in the 1980s, he said, well-educated workers were able to upgrade to technical jobs like chip manufacturing and computer assembly.
The question for China is: South Korea or Mexico? Rozelle said.
With rising labor costs, China is under pressure to upgrade from low-cost manufacturing to high-tech production. But it's still an open question as to whether China's labor force will have the education levels to take on these new roles, or if the jobs will move elsewhere as they did from Mexico in the last few decades.
The odds are stacked against China. In some parts of the country, China's labor force more resembles Mexico's than South Korea's, with about 40 percent of workers in the poorest rural areas (China's 592 "nationally-designated poor counties," as deemed by China's anti-poverty authorities) lacking a high school education, Rozelle said.
Furthermore, the financial hurdles to attaining higher education are the highest in the world, illustrated most recently by a series of studies conducted by the Rural Education Action Project (REAP)—an umbrella group that includes Rozelle's Stanford University, Tsinghua University, the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Peking University and the Xi'an-based Northwest University.
In one REAP study of 62 nations, China claimed the highest tuition price for public rural high schools: $160 per student per semester, not including costs like housing and everyday living expenses. This is nearly three times the world's second-highest tuition in Indonesia, which also fully subsidizes the education costs of children under the poverty line.
It's also a stark contrast to the fact that the vast majority of nations—93 percent of those studied—fully subsidize education, including places like Brazil, India and Kenya.
The high costs of education will become even more problematic, Rozelle said, once China's economy begins to restructure towards higher-value production. If the skill levels of the labor force cannot keep up, China will be caught in a middle-income trap, he said, possibly leading to high unemployment and social strife—not unlike what is plaguing Mexico now, he said.
Even a small subsidy could push thousands of students into high school. In REAP's most recent study, Rozelle and his colleagues took 250 junior high classes in Shaaxi Province and selected the two poorest students from each, providing one with a 1,500 to 2,500 yuan subsidy. The survey revealed that 51 percent of students who had received the subsidy were admitted to high school in the fall of 2010, while only 38 percent without the subsidy enrolled.
To some degree, the Chinese government has recognized the importance of limiting the costs of education. In 2009, officials enacted a policy to reduce high school tuition costs, providing 20 percent of students in central regions and 30 percent in the China's western parts with scholarships ranging between 1,000 and 3,300 yuan annually.
But the policy has proved somewhat illusory: In its 2011 survey of more than 3,000 students in Shaanxi Province, REAP discovered that less than five percent of the targeted students had actually received the subsidies.