This article was written by Dr. David Grossman, founding Director of BAYCEP and SPICE, and draws on a conference paper that he presented in 1978. The updated excerpt and photos (taken in 1974 in the People's Republic of China) were reprinted with permission from Dr. Grossman. Dr. Grossman was the Director of SPICE from 1976 to 1988. This is the first of several articles—focusing on the 50-year history of SPICE—that will be posted this year. 

Prior to World War II, the systematic study of Asia in American schools was rare. Studies of school textbooks found that the few references to Asia were marked by paternalism and stereotypes at best, and by racism and imperialist assumptions at worst. Following U.S. involvement in World War II and the Korean War, there was a notable increase in Asian studies at the collegiate level. At the pre-collegiate level, however, this growing attention to Asia was largely reflected in the addition of a Cold War dimension to the civics curriculum. In this context, China was typically studied as a geopolitical adversary, portrayed even more negatively than the Soviet Union.

In February 1972, a dramatic shift occurred in the tone of U.S.–China relations as a result of President Richard Nixon’s surprise visit to China. This watershed moment generated a surge in public demand for more current and reliable information about China and created new opportunities for reconsidering how China might be taught in American schools.

Image

While the roots of the Bay Area China Education Project (BAYCEP) can be traced to earlier initiatives, the pivotal moment in its development was the June 1972 Wingspread Conference, “China in the Schools: Directions and Priorities.” Previous meetings addressing China education had been convened by professional organizations such as the Association for Asian Studies (AAS), but what distinguished the Wingspread Conference was its timeliness. The three sponsoring organizations—the National Committee on U.S.–China Relations, the Center for War/Peace Studies, and the Johnson Foundation—shared a widely held belief that the moment was ripe for a focused effort to improve education about China in American schools.

One of the central themes of the Wingspread discussions was a critique of prevailing models of scholar–teacher interaction, particularly the assumption that scholars should serve merely as visiting lecturers. Conference participants urged China scholars to become more attentive to the needs of teachers and school systems and to conceive of their work as part of a reciprocal, two-way process. In perhaps the most influential proposal to emerge from the conference, Yale historian Jonathan Spence called for the development of a cohort of “scholar consultants” who would be both substantively knowledgeable and pedagogically sensitive. This idea would become a cornerstone of BAYCEP.

Ultimately, BAYCEP was the only program to emerge directly from the Wingspread Conference. As early as August 1972, Stanford professor John Lewis convened a meeting of San Francisco Bay Area educators and scholars focused on “Teaching China in the Schools.” This group subsequently submitted a proposal to the National Endowment for the Humanities under the auspices of the National Committee on U.S.–China Relations. The proposal was successfully funded and outlined a pilot project designed to strengthen humanities teaching in Bay Area schools by creating new mechanisms of cooperation between university scholars and pre-collegiate educators. It emphasized the educational value of Chinese history, society, and culture for enhancing multicultural education and sought to organize locally available resources on China through consultancy relationships, training programs, and curriculum materials that could later be adapted for use in other communities and fields of study.

The transition from this broad mission statement to a fully functioning program was not linear. Stakeholders debated the project’s target audience, the selection of appropriate content, and staff qualifications. Acceptance of a China-focused initiative in schools was by no means assured; at one point, a district superintendent rejected participation on the grounds that the project constituted “Communist propaganda.” The underlying challenge was to design a China-focused program that was both curriculum-relevant and pedagogically sound.

In this regard, BAYCEP’s most innovative component was the development of an associate, or “scholar intern,” program intended to strengthen links between universities and schools. Graduate students and recent graduates in Chinese studies or related education programs were appointed as project associates. These associates underwent intensive training and mentoring to familiarize them with effective pre-collegiate teaching methods and available instructional resources, which were notably scarce at the time. They then worked directly with teachers through professional development workshops, helping translate scholarly knowledge into classroom practice.

Although BAYCEP was not initially conceived as solely a curriculum development project, the need for instructional materials soon became apparent. In collaboration with university scholars and classroom teachers, the project first produced guides to recommended resources on China. As these guides proved necessary but insufficient, BAYCEP later developed instructional units on topics such as the Chinese language, family life, education, sports, and stereotyping. As with the professional development workshops, careful attention was given to both substantive content and pedagogical effectiveness.

True to its original mission, BAYCEP emerged as a model for linking university scholarship with pre-collegiate education. In subsequent years, parallel projects focusing on Japan, Latin America, Africa, and Eastern and Western Europe were initiated. Together with BAYCEP, these initiatives were brought under a common umbrella in 1976, enabling collaboration and cross-fertilization across area studies. This umbrella program—the Stanford Program on International and Cross-Cultural Education (SPICE)—continues to operate to this day.

Beyond its immediate contributions to China education, BAYCEP’s enduring legacy lies in its redefinition of the relationship between universities and pre-collegiate schools. By institutionalizing the role of the scholar consultant and embedding graduate students and recent graduates within K–12 professional development, BAYCEP moved beyond episodic outreach toward a sustained, collaborative model of knowledge exchange. Its emphasis on pedagogical relevance, mutual learning, and curriculum integration anticipated later approaches to public scholarship and teacher professionalization in area studies. The success of BAYCEP also demonstrated that international and cross-cultural education could be both academically rigorous and responsive to local educational contexts, even amid political uncertainty. As the foundational program within what became SPICE, BAYCEP served not only as a prototype for subsequent regional initiatives but also as a durable model for translating university-based scholarship into meaningful educational practice—an approach that continues to shape international education well beyond its original historical moment.

To stay informed of SPICE news, join our email list and follow us on Facebook, X, and Instagram.

The January 3, 2026, U.S. “Operation Absolute Resolve” in Venezuela to capture and remove President Nicolás Maduro has raised urgent questions about its repercussions for the U.S.-China competition, Taiwan Strait security, American strategic priorities in the Indo-Pacific region, and U.S. allies and partners.

In two new episodes of the APARC Briefing series, Stanford scholars Larry Diamond, the Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Democracy at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) and William L. Clayton Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, and APARC faculty affiliate Oriana Skylar Mastro, a center fellow at FSI, join host Kiyoteru Tsutsui, the director of APARC, to unravel what happened in Venezuela and the implications of the U.S. actions in Latin America for Taiwan, security and alliances in the Indo-Pacific, and U.S. relations with stakeholders in the region.

Both scholars agree that the U.S. mission in Venezuela is a precedent that likely emboldens rather than deters China in its Taiwan calculus, warning that the shift it represents in U.S. national security policy might detract from American capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region at a crucial moment. They also provide sobering advice for U.S. allies struggling to adjust to rapidly shifting geopolitical realities under the second Trump administration.

A Shocking Action in World Affairs

There is no dispute that the Maduro government has been deeply authoritarian, deeply corrupt, and deeply illegitimate, says Diamond, author of Ill Winds: Saving Democracy from Russian Rage, Chinese Ambition, and American Complacency. Yet the United States “has probably violated international law to intervene forcibly in the internal affairs of Venezuela and remove its political leader," creating enormous implications for the international community. If it does not pursue a strategy of systemic democratic change in Venezuela, “all of this will have been for naught, and it will have paid a tragic price in terms of international precedent and international legitimacy,” Diamond argues.

Beijing is already using the operation as a "discourse power win," depicting the United States as crushing sovereignty and international law, Mastro notes. Moreover, in addition to Venezuela, President Trump continues to make statements about Greenland, reiterating its importance for U.S. national security and his interest in acquiring the territory, which has alarmed European partners and exacerbated strains with NATO.

“For the first time since WWII, some European countries have declared the United States to be a security threat,” Mastro says. “So I am curious to see if the Chinese try to bring along the Venezuela case as well, to convince U.S. allies and partners to distance themselves from the United States, which would have significant repercussions for the global order and for the United States' role in it.”

A Risky Strategic Reorientation

By unilaterally bypassing international norms to wield power in its own "backyard," the United States may have set a precedent that China can now exploit to justify its own ambitions in Taiwan as a legitimate exercise of regional dominance.

Diamond remarks on this line of thought: “If the United States, as a hegemon, can just do what it wants to arrest and remove a leader, in its kind of declared sphere of influence, what's to stop Xi Jinping from doing the same in his sphere of influence, and with a democratic system in Taiwan, whose sovereignty he does not recognize?” 

On the other hand, many commentators have argued that Operation Absolute Resolve serves as a deterrent to Chinese aggression. Granted, there is no doubt that the operation was a remarkably successful military attack showcasing the capabilities of U.S. special forces, notes Mastro, who, alongside her academic career, also serves in the United States Air Force Reserve, for which she currently works at the Pentagon as deputy director of research for Global China Strategy. Nevertheless, she emphasizes that the United States cannot carry out a similar attack in Asia.

“There is no situation in which we ‘neutralize’ Chinese air defenses and then somehow do some sort of infiltration,” says Mastro, author of Upstart: How China Became a Great Power. The U.S. intervention in Venezuela, therefore, “does not tell us a lot, operationally, about what the United States is capable of in a contingency via China.”

More troubling, Mastro identifies the Venezuela operation as demonstrating a fundamental shift in U.S. strategic priorities, with the raid conducted just weeks after the Trump administration released its 2025 National Security Strategy, which prioritizes restoring “American preeminence in the Western Hemisphere.” Mastro characterizes it as “the one region where U.S. dominance faces no serious challenge.” Thus, Venezuela suggests “the Trump administration means business about the renewed focus on the Western Hemisphere, and, unfortunately, that makes me concerned that there might be strategic neglect of the Indo-Pacific moving forward,” she points out.

Diamond stresses that, virtually throughout the entire presidency of Xi Jinping, dating back to 2012, China has been rapidly building up its military capabilities, prioritizing those specifically suited for coercing, isolating, or potentially seizing Taiwan. Against this backdrop, “I am much more fearful about the future of Taiwan in the week following U.S. military action on January 3 in Venezuela than I was before that action.” 

Mastro agrees with this assessment about the ripple effects of the operation in Venezuela. “I would say that it probably emboldens China.”

Frank Advice for U.S. Allies

For U.S. allies in the Indo-Pacific, including Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia, as well as allies and partners in Europe, both scholars offer pragmatic counsel for coping with the Trump administration.

Diamond urges U.S. allies to manage Trump diplomatically while staying focused on core interests, namely, prioritizing the preservation of the alliances and strengthening autonomous defense capabilities to demonstrate commitment and hedge against potential U.S. retrenchment.

“It takes constant, energetic, proactive, imaginative, relentless, and in some ways deferential working of the relationship, including the personal relationship between these leaders and Donald Trump [...] The future will be better if the leaders of these countries internalize that fundamental lesson about Trump.”

Mastro is equally direct about the limited alternatives ahead of U.S. allies: "You don't really have an option. That Chinese military – if it gives the United States problems, it definitely gives you problems. There's no hope for a country like Taiwan without the United States. There's no hope for Australia without the United States."

Counterintuitively, U.S. assertiveness may indicate its insecurity about the balance of power with China. “It seems to me that the United States also needs to be reassured that our allies and partners support us [...] And if we had that confidence, maybe the United States would be less aggressive in its use of military force.”

Watch the two APARC Briefing episodes:

🔸 What the U.S. Raid in Venezuela Means for Taiwan and Asia - with Larry Diamond >

🔸 Does Venezuela Provide China a Roadmap for Taiwan? – with Oriana Skylar Mastro >

David Meale, former U.S. diplomat and current consultant, offered a cautiously optimistic perspective on U.S.-China relations at an APARC China Program seminar, arguing that despite significant tensions, there remains substantial room for what he calls “managed rivalry”—a relationship that is neither warm nor easy, but constructive enough for both countries to serve their populations and address global challenges. Drawing on his 33 years in the U.S. Foreign Service, he traced the evolution of U.S.-China relations over the past three decades and assessed current trajectories, bringing both diplomatic experience and fresh insights from private sector concerns to his analysis.

Three Decades of Evolving Relations
 

His entry into China-focused diplomacy came in 1995 when he was assigned to Hong Kong during the handover. During that era and through the early 2000s, U.S. policy operated under the assumption that China would gradually embrace the post-war rules-based international order shaped largely by the United States. The thinking was that China would develop a self-interest in preserving this order, becoming a constructive, if not easy, partner. This belief undergirded the strong U.S. effort to bring China into the World Trade Organization in 2001.

During his service as an Economic Officer in Taiwan in the 2000s, Meale witnessed the merging of talent from Asia and the United States that built China’s electronics manufacturing industry. Five percent of Taiwan’s workforce had moved to the mainland; there were even Shanghainese dialect programs on Taiwanese television at night for those dreaming of seeking their fortunes through cross-strait opportunities. Although there was tension with the Chen Shui-bian administration, there was a surprising amount of positivity in Taiwan about the mainland. That, of course, has now changed.

The Obama administration continued to work within the framework of bringing China into the existing international order, even as concerns grew. The approach aimed to convince China to preserve and, if necessary, shape this order, while using it to constrain China when necessary, as demonstrated by the attempt to resolve the South China Sea dispute involving the Philippines through the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

The Trump administration marked a decisive shift. Meale noted that Trump openly discarded the goal of integrating China into the existing order, instead pursuing aggressive trade policies, technology restrictions, and explicit framing of China as a threat. The Chinese hoped the Biden administration would turn this around, but it instead maintained this posture, pursuing an “invest, align, compete” strategy—investing in the United States, aligning with allies, and defining the relationship as a competition.

Trump 2.0 brought “Liberation Day,” which Meale sees as the belief that the U.S. place in the world needs to be corrected; the United States is economically overextended, the trade imbalances and the associated debt cannot continue, and the supply chain vulnerability from COVID must be addressed. Tariffs were ratcheted up, and both sides imposed export controls. 

The Chinese hit back hard; Chinese officials are very proud of China’s pushback against an unchecked Trump. China’s economic growth is forecast at 5 percent this year, and the feeling from China is that it has shown the world the United States cannot push it around.

Looking ahead to 2026, Meale is optimistic. There will undoubtedly be crises that pop up: the Chinese will overreach on rare earth elements, and the United States will take an economic action that the Chinese did not plan on. Meale sees this as the “sine curve” of the U.S.-China relationship. There’s a crisis, tensions rise, there’s a response, and things eventually cool down. The curve goes up and down, but very little gets resolved.

Sign up for APARC newsletters to receive our event invitations and guest speakers' insights >

China's Current Challenges
 

China, Meale noted, effectively contains two economies: one serving approximately 400 million people who are producing world-class products with perhaps the world's best industrial ecosystem and impressive infrastructure, and another economy serving the rest of China's population, which has improved significantly over recent decades but relies heavily on informal work and the gig economy.
China faces deep structural problems, including a property sector crisis that has destroyed significant household wealth, an economy structured excessively around investment rather than consumption, youth unemployment reflecting a mismatch between graduating students and available jobs, and "involution" (neijuan, 内卷)—a race to the bottom in sectors where government incentives have driven overcapacity. China's reliance on export-led growth comes at a time when its overcapacity is increasingly unwelcome not just in developed countries but across the global South.

These challenges, Meale argues, will not result in a financial crisis or recession, but rather chronic headaches that will affect its foreign relations. Growth will continue, albeit at a slower pace, and the country will have significant work ahead to address inequality and structural imbalances.

On the question of Taiwan, Meale pushed back against predictions of imminent Chinese military action, particularly speculation about 2027 as a critical year tied to the 100th anniversary of the People's Liberation Army. He argued that, right now, one of China’s top goals is to avoid being drawn into a Taiwan conflict. China has recently purged nine senior military officials and is dealing with serious problems in its military. Five years from now, however, the situation could look quite different.

Defining End States and Finding Common Ground
 

Meale concluded by outlining what he believes each side seeks as an end state, arguing that these visions, while different, are not irreconcilable. Rather than global domination, he argued China seeks a world that works for what it calls "grand rejuvenation." This means overcoming the century of humiliation, reunifying with Taiwan, and living safely and securely on its own terms. China wants recognition as a global power, dominance in its near seas, freedom from technology containment, elimination of shipping chokepoints, access to markets, and the ability to pursue relationships with ideologically aligned countries.

The United States, meanwhile, accepts that competition with China is permanent but seeks a predictable China. U.S. goals include protecting advanced technology where it has an advantage, avoiding supply chain vulnerabilities, shaping Beijing's choices without attempting to control them, maintaining the Taiwan status quo until it evolves in a mutually and naturally agreed way, and ensuring fair trade to address what it sees as a stacked deck in current trade relationships. The United States also wants to prevent China from enabling adversaries, as seen in Chinese firms rebuilding Russia's military-industrial complex while maintaining nominal neutrality on Ukraine.

These end states, Meale acknowledged, collide in many ways but not in absolute ways. He sees substantial room for leader-driven, managed rivalry that can function constructively. This rivalry will not be easy or warm, but it can allow both countries to serve their populations while cooperating where global interests align.
 

Key Takeaways  
 

• The “integrated China” assumption is over. U.S. policy no longer aims to bring China into the existing international order, marking a fundamental shift from decades of engagement strategy.
• China's economy faces structural challenges, not a crisis. China will continue to grow, but must address inequality, overcapacity, and wealth destruction from the property crisis.
• Taiwan timing matters more to Beijing than deadlines. China seeks to control when and how the Taiwan issue is resolved, preferring not to be forced into premature action.
• Managed rivalry is possible. Despite significant tensions and incompatible elements of each side's goals, there remains space for constructive competition. While the relationship between the world's two largest economies will stay competitive and often contentious, it need not become catastrophic.
   

The Economist included SCCEI Co-Director Hongbin Li's new book in their lineup of the best books of 2025. Here's what they had to say:

"The Highest Exam: How the Gaokao Shapes China. By Ruixue Jia and Hongbin Li with Claire Cousineau. 

The gaokao—China’s university entrance exam—shapes much of the country’s society, from pay to politics. Read this thoughtful book to learn how the test is the first of many tournaments in which the Chinese have to compete over the course of their lives."

See the full list: https://www.economist.com/culture/2025/11/20/the-best-books-of-2025