This interview first appeared in the Brazilian newspaper Folha de S.Paolo, on April 6. The following English version was generated using machine translation and subsequently edited for accuracy and clarity.

WASHINGTON — The tariff hike against all countries announced last week by President Donald Trump may bolster China's image, but that doesn't mean China or any other country is poised to replace the United States, says Thomas Fingar, Shorenstein APARC Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute at Stanford University.

Fingar, a former chief of the State Department's China Division, among other roles in the U.S. Foreign Service and national intelligence, believes that Trump's tariffs will be bad for all nations.

"I hesitate to predict how other countries will react, except that this has more or less given everyone an incentive to bypass the U.S.," he tells Folha.

Donald Trump announced tariffs this week against virtually every country. China has already announced retaliation, imposing a 34% tariff on American products. Are we facing a trade war?

I don't think the war metaphor works for me. I don't know what Trump is trying to do. One could say that this is a game of imposing an outrageous tariff in the hope that specific targets, which are basically all countries, might give in to what they say are their demands. In doing so, they would reduce barriers to trade with the United States. To me, it doesn't make sense with the vast majority of targets of the 10% tariffs.

Why?

I hesitate to predict how other countries will react, except that this has more or less given everyone an incentive to bypass the U.S., to make the U.S. a supplier of last resort, to hold the line, to have a kind of united front to compete with each other.

If the assessment is that the Dutch or the French or the Germans or the Brazilians or somebody else is talking about doing something to eliminate a 10% tariff to gain a comparative advantage in accessing the U.S. market, if that's the logic, then fine. Maybe there's something rational about that, but I think it's more likely that the targets of those low tariffs are just getting together.

My main trade competitor has the same or higher tariffs levied against them. Why should I give in if we are competing on a level playing field?

I think Trump is going to make the U.S. pay a huge geopolitical price. But what he thinks he will gain from this, I don't know. Is it likely that he will achieve anything really significant from it? I doubt it.

You mentioned a geopolitical price tag for the United States. What would it be?

The tendency of much of the world, most of the time, was to try to work with the United States, to the extent that they couldn't automatically do what Washington wanted, but they were inclined to cooperate because they saw it as benign, if not beneficial, to their interests. I think Trump has reversed that. This is going to lead to a disinclination to work with us, an incentive to try to bypass us. I think the inclination now is going to be: I'm not going to vote with the Americans, I'm going to look elsewhere first, for my investment, for my capital, for the market, for what I'm doing, for partners.

But I don't think that these measures are necessarily going to play in favor of any particular country. Maybe China in some places, the European Union in some places, Japan in some places. It's going to be a very different environment for the United States, for American companies and diplomats to operate in. It's going to be much more difficult.

This tariff strategy that you say is hard to understand is seen by some analysts as part of Trump's isolationist policy.

As my kids would say, this is so last century. This is really 19th century, the idea of bringing industries, manufacturing back to the United States. Very little manufacturing, I think, is going to come back to the United States. We have 4% unemployment. We can't fill the jobs that we have now, imagine bringing back manufacturing of basic commodities like shoes, toys, that kind of thing.

That left the United States a long time ago and went to Japan, moved from Japan to Taiwan, moved from Taiwan to South Korea, moved from South Korea to somewhere else, and then moved to China and then to Vietnam. Those things are not coming back here because there's not enough profitability to justify investing in robots and mechanizing those things to bring them back to the United States. Our workforce is small relative to the size of the economy. It's not coming back.

It's already moving from China because labor costs are so high. The fallacy in Trump's logic is that things like furniture, construction, textiles, clothing, and manufacturing would come back. And the people who would actually do the work are the people he's persecuting with his ridiculous immigration policies.

Trump has argued that he imposed the tariffs to curb alleged abuses against the United States that would benefit China. Is he containing Beijing with this move?

I don't think he really cares about containing China. But the answer is no. These moves boost China's image. Beijing has seized on the rhetoric of defending the open, globalized international trading order that the United States has attacked. They will take advantage of that as much as they can. I don't think the tariffs are part of the U.S. rivalry with China. China's rise has not disadvantaged the United States economically — it has done so to Japan, and, to some extent, South Korea and Taiwan, but not the United States. So Trump is using this argument with false, exaggerated, and distorted statements.

Could we witness a change in the world order, the end of the American era and the beginning of a Chinese era?

No.

Not even as a consequence of tariffs?

Absolutely not. Part of the problem is that China's economy is closed. One of the reasons is that it doesn't have a consumer society because people don't have enough income. That's because of the amount of wealth that the state extracts to pay for high-speed rail, military structures, and energy development. Some of that is good, some of it is excess.

U.S. tariffs won’t create a market that can rival the size and influence of the United States. It would have to be somewhere else that is very rich, and China is not very rich. China is barely in the middle-income category, it has a per capita income at a level that Mexico has been at for decades. It's not binary. So, the U.S. retreat from its leadership position in the world order, which I don't necessarily see as a bad thing, doesn't automatically hand that role over to China, Russia, the European Union, Japan, Brazil, the BRICS, or any other set of players.

Can China gain ground by investing more in countries that are affected by tariffs?

China has invested more in countries that are affected by tariffs, like Indonesia and Vietnam. These countries are very wary of Chinese investment for various historical reasons, and to some extent for ethnic reasons. But China is actually cutting back on its overseas investments because its own population is asking: Why are we giving money to countries that are richer than us? That is a reasonable question.

They have real problems meeting the expectations, demands, and needs of their own population, which is now largely urban. The cities have to function, you can't say, "Go back to the farm and do sustainable agriculture." That phase is long gone in China. So they have to spend more. Half of the population still has rural identity cards. That means they don't get free education beyond primary school. That means 50% of the future workforce won't have more than a primary school education. This is a country with enormous challenges. Can they manage them? Probably yes, but there is not much room for maneuver. Their own slowing economy will be hurt by these tariffs. I don't think that's Trump's intention, but it will hurt them.

What impact might the tariffs have on Brazil and Latin America? Do you think China will become more attractive?

I don't know specific commodities from specific places, but my general starting point is that a 10% distribution across Latin America won't have much of an impact on the price for consumers in those countries. You'll export the same amount; we'll pay more for whatever the commodity is, flowers from Colombia, grapes, wine from Argentina or Chile. Since the tariff is general, it doesn't give Chile an advantage on wine over Argentina, because they both have the same amount. Most of what Latin America exports to the United States doesn't go to China.

In short, what are the main consequences of tariffs in terms of the geopolitical landscape and the domestic landscape?

It destabilizes the international trading system that has benefited most countries for a long time. It will force adjustments, that is number one. And number two is that it undermines the image of the United States, and therefore its influence as a stabilizing, predictable, and broadly beneficial member of the international community. It disrupts economies and undermines American influence and attractiveness.

In the end, does anyone benefit from Trump's tariff policies?

No one. This is not a policy that works to anyone's obvious benefit. It upsets everyone. And there is no alternative to the United States, in the sense that the Soviet Union was during the Cold War. China is not that, and China does not want to be that.

The following is a guest article written by Geunhyung Kim, a student from South Korea studying at the Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies at Waseda University in Japan. Geunhyung enrolled in the 2025 SPICE/Stanford–Waseda Intensive Course: Exploring Peace in East Asia and Beyond Through the Lenses of Cultural Understanding, Education, and International Relations, which was organized by SPICE and Waseda’s Faculty of Social Sciences and taught by Meiko Kotani. The course brought together students from the Graduate School of Social Sciences, the School of Social Sciences, the Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, the School of International Liberal Studies, and the School of Political Science and Economics. With participants from Japan and international students representing 10 different countries, the course created a truly dynamic and diverse learning environment.

This March, I had the privilege of participating in the 2025 SPICE/Stanford–Waseda Intensive Course on “Exploring Peace in East Asia and Beyond Through the Lenses of Cultural Understanding, Education, and International Relations.” It featured insightful lectures from esteemed professors and a former U.S. Ambassador, focusing on cultural understanding, history, and international relations in the Asia-Pacific region.

A key takeaway from the course that will forever resonate with me is the importance of thinking critically and respecting diverse perspectives. Dr. Gary Mukai’s opening lecture laid a foundational understanding of cultural biases and stereotypes, emphasizing the potential harm of psychological mechanisms that simplify complex entities. He highlighted the crucial need for recognizing and overcoming our own cultural biases. In another session, Mr. Rylan Sekiguchi led an exercise where we compared history textbooks from the United States, South Korea, Japan, China, and Taiwan. This activity underscored the significance of critical thinking and demonstrated why historical education is essential. It illustrated how nations, like individuals, possess unique perspectives shaped by distinct histories and experiences. The central challenge we discussed was not the presence of diverse viewpoints per se, but rather how to constructively engage with these differences to foster regional peace. Dr. Shuoyang Meng’s lecture on knowledge diplomacy and transnational academic mobility further inspired me as a student in higher education to act as a knowledge diplomat for peacebuilding. Ambassador Karl Eikenberry’s insights on the evolving U.S.–China security dynamics and broader security issues in the Asia-Pacific region highlighted the necessity of strategic empathy in international relations.

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The most remarkable feature of the 2025 SPICE/Stanford–Waseda Intensive Course was undoubtedly its interactive environment. The program did a great job of bringing together students from diverse cultural backgrounds, including China, Japan, and South Korea, and succeeded in creating a genuinely safe and welcoming space for open discussions on sensitive historical issues. This atmosphere of openness was instrumental in building trust and fostering a deeper understanding among students. This may seem small, but I believe the experience of participating in such a diverse and collaborative setting has profoundly enriched our understanding of international relations and conflict resolution.

Initially, I was a little skeptical and curious about the feasibility of discussing sustainable peace in East Asia, considering the region’s complex history of tensions and territorial disputes. However, SPICE exceeded expectations by providing a thought-provoking and safe platform for these critical discussions.

I would recommend this course to my peers, as it broadens perspectives and equips future leaders with essential skills for meaningful dialogue on peace and cooperation in East Asia and beyond.

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Stanford e-Japan is an online course that teaches Japanese high school students about U.S. society and culture and U.S.–Japan relations. The course introduces students to both U.S. and Japanese perspectives on many historical and contemporary issues. It is offered biannually by the Stanford Program on International and Cross-Cultural Education (SPICE). Stanford e-Japan is currently supported by the Yanai Tadashi Foundation.

In August 2025, the top honorees of the Spring 2024 and the Fall 2024 Stanford e-Japan courses will be honored through an event at Stanford University. SPICE is most grateful to Mr. Tadashi Yanai and the Yanai Foundation for making Stanford e-Japan, including the ceremony in August 2025, possible.

The three Spring 2024 honorees—Aoi Furutani (Saitama Municipal Urawa High School), Komari Machida (Crimson Global Academy), and Sota Tajima (Seiko Gakuin High School)—were selected as the award winners for their coursework and exceptional research essays that focused respectively on “Comparative Analysis of Surrogacy Policies in the United States and Japan: Proposals for Introducing Surrogacy in Japan,” “Futoukou vs. Homeschooling: Exploring Societal Reintegration of Children Outside of Traditional School Systems in Japan and the United States,” and “Synergy in the Stars: How the U.S. and Japan Can Lead the Next Era of Space.”

Ryu Sato (Soka Senior High School) received an honorable mention for his research paper on “Japanese and American Philanthropic Culture in Regard to College Financial Aid.” Sakura Suzuki (Hokkaido Asahikawa Higashi High School) also received an honorable mention for her paper on “Designing School Buildings to Encourage Student Creativity: Comparing Historical Changes in School Buildings in Japan and the United States.”

The three Fall 2024 honorees—Ellen Nema (Junior and Senior High School Affiliated to Showa Pharmaceutical University), Hirotaka Onishi (Kaisei Gakuen High School), and Mia Yakushiji (Murasakino Municipal High School)—will be recognized for their coursework and exceptional research essays that focused respectively on “Breaking the Chain of Poverty in Okinawa: Educational Approaches and Foundations,” “A Time for Reconsideration: Toward a New International Monetary Order,” and “Dual Citizenship in Japan.”

Lynne Mizushima (Keio Shonan Fujisawa Junior & Senior High School) and Kan Sugimi (Isahaya High School) each received an honorable mention for their coursework and research papers on “The Lack of Female Political Leaders in Japan: A Cultural Glass Ceiling” and “Should Bilingual Parents in the U.S. Raise Bilingual Children?”

In the Spring 2024 session of Stanford e-Japan, students from the following schools completed the course: Akita High School (Akita); Chiba Prefectural Kashiwa High School (Chiba); Crimson Global Academy (Tokyo); Doshisha International High School (Kyoto); Hiroshima Global Academy (Hiroshima); Hiroshima International School (Hiroshima); Hokkaido Asahikawa Higashi High School (Hokkaido); Ikeda Senior High School Attached to Osaka Kyoiku University (Osaka); Kadokawa S High School (Ibaraki); Kanazawa University Senior High School (Ishikawa); Keio Shonan Fujisawa Junior & Senior High School (Kanagawa); Kindai University Toyooka Junior and Senior High School (Hyogo); Kyoto Municipal Saikyo Senior High School (Kyoto); La Salle High School (Kagoshima); Matsumoto Fukashi High School (Nagano); Okayama Prefectural Tsuyama Senior High School (Okayama); Saitama Municipal Urawa High School (Saitama); Seiko Gakuin High School (Kanagawa); Senior High School at Komaba, University of Tsukuba (Tokyo); Senior High School at Otsuka, University of Tsukuba (Tokyo); Shibuya Kyoiku Gakuen Shibuya Junior and Senior High School (Tokyo); Soka Senior High School (Tokyo); Tajiminishi High School (Gifu); Tokyo Gakugei University International Secondary School (Tokyo); Tokyo Jogakkan High School (Tokyo); Tokyo Metropolitan Kokusai High School (Tokyo); Tsuchiura Nihon University High School (Ibaraki); and Yokohama International School (Kanagawa).

In the Fall 2024 session of Stanford e-Japan, students from the following schools completed the course: Daiichi High School (Kumamoto); Hachinohe St. Ursula Gakuin High School (Aomori); Hiroo Gakuen High School (Tokyo); Hiroshima Global Academy (Hiroshima); International Christian University High School (Tokyo); Isahaya High School (Nagasaki); Joshigakuin Senior High School (Tokyo); Kaetsu Ariake Senior High School (Tokyo); Kaisei Gakuen (Tokyo); Kanazawa Nishigaoka High School (Ishikawa); Kawawa Senior High School (Kanagawa); Keio Girls Senior High School (Tokyo); Keio Shonan Fujisawa Junior & Senior High School (Kanagawa); Kurume University Senior High School (Fukuoka); Matsuyama South High School (Ehime); Meikei High School (Ibaraki); Murasakino Municipal High School (Kyoto); Nagasaki Nishi High School (Nagasaki); Niigata Prefectural Niigata High School (Niigata); Okayama Prefectural Okayama Asahi Senior High School (Okayama); Ritsumeikan Keisho Senior High School (Hokkaido); Ritsumeikan Uji High School (Kyoto); Sapporo Kaisei Secondary School (Hokkaido); Senior High School at Otsuka, University of Tsukuba (Tokyo); The Junior and Senior High School Affiliated to Showa Pharmaceutical University (Okinawa); Tokyo Gakugei University Senior High School (Tokyo); and Tokyo Metropolitan Nishi High School (Tokyo).

Stanford e-Japan is one of several online courses for high school students offered by SPICE, including the Reischauer Scholars Program, the China Scholars Program, the Sejong Korea Scholars Program, Stanford e-China, Stanford e-Entrepreneurship Japan, as well as numerous local student programs in Japan. For more information about Stanford e-Japan, please visit stanfordejapan.org.

To stay informed of news about Stanford e-Japan and SPICE’s other programs, join our email list and follow us on Facebook, X, and Instagram.

The following is a guest article written by Shotaro Yoshida, who traveled to the San Francisco Bay Area with other graduate students from the University of Tokyo—under the leadership of Professor Hideto Fukudome—in January 2025. Shotaro is also a Project Assistant Professor at the University of Yamanashi. SPICE/Stanford collaborates closely with the Graduate School of Education at the University of Tokyo and met with the students during their visit to the Bay Area.

In 2024, the number of foreign residents in Japan increased by approximately 5 percent from the previous year, reaching about 3.6 million and constituting roughly 3 percent of the total population. As diversity grows, university education is placing greater emphasis on diversity initiatives. However, discussions in Japan are also being influenced by increasing headwinds against diversity promotion due to the 2025 change in government.

Despite demographic changes, Japan persists in the myth of “ethnic homogeneity” and the “absence of racial discrimination.” Although discrimination against Koreans, Ainu, and Okinawans in Japan has been recognized as racial discrimination, and a comprehensive anti-discrimination law has been recommended, this reality is often ignored. This may reflect historical amnesia and a tendency to perceive diversity as “foreign values.”

The U.S. experiences of Chinese immigrant exclusion (1882) and Japanese American internment during World War II, as discussed in this SPICE-supported program, provide valuable perspective for reflecting on Japan’s own history. This highlights that Japan has its own history of similar discrimination and exclusion.

The discriminatory structures formed during Japan’s modernization since the Meiji period developed a unique concept of “ethnicity” to counter Western classifications of Japanese as the “yellow race.” This concept functioned to differentiate Japanese from Chinese people.

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Since Yokohama’s sea port opened in 1859, Chinese immigrants were important trade intermediaries, and bridged the West and Japan. By 1899, however, Japan created systems to clearly separate “inside” from “outside” through immigration and nationality controls, with discriminatory rules targeting Chinese laborers. This blood-based system became the model for Japan’s current foreign resident management. Photo above of Chinatown, Yokohama, courtesy Shotaro Yoshida.

During the Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923, not only Koreans but also many Chinese residents were killed. During World War II in 1944, approximately 40,000 Chinese were forcibly transported to harsh labor environments including mines and ports in Japan. At the Port of Tokyo alone, about 29 percent of these transported Chinese died within a short period. During the same period, civilian internment of “enemy nationals” also occurred. These historical facts have long been overlooked in Japanese society and inadequately addressed in history education.

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In the San Francisco Bay Area, the history of Angel Island Immigration Station and Japanese American internment is preserved in museums, with educational programs communicating these experiences to future generations. For instance, SPICE Instructor Jonas Edman delivered lectures on Chinese exclusion at Angel Island, while SPICE Director Dr. Gary Mukai, who has developed educational materials on Japanese American internment, guided us through his hometown San Jose’s Japantown, and we also had a tour of the Japanese American Museum of San Jose. This appears to serve as a foundation for contemporary diversity discussions, in stark contrast to Japan, which has few facilities or educational initiatives documenting histories of discrimination and exclusion against Chinese immigrants and others. Photo above of graduate students from the University of Tokyo, courtesy Shotaro Yoshida.

The prerequisite for meaningful diversity discussions in Japan is confronting its history of discrimination and exclusion. Engaging with the diversity that already exists in Japan and these historical facts through college education is both an exercise of academic freedom and our responsibility.

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