Platts Coal Trader International
Vol. 11, Issue 67, Pages 5-6

Australia faces serious challenges over the next 20 years in maintaining its hard-won place as a leading coal exporting country and capturing new market share, according to a research paper published by Stanford University's Program on Energy and Sustainable Development April 5.

Following earlier papers on China, Indonesia and South Africa's coal industries, the latest PESD paper, entitled Australia's Black Coal Industry: Past Achievements and Future Challenges, has been written by coal industry expert Bart Lucarelli.

The paper sketches the development of Australia's export coal industry, from its shaky start in the aftermath of the Second World War amid a glut of cheap oil, to the "phenomenal success story" of today.  The renaissance of Australia's coal industry was assisted by the discovery of vast deposits of high-quality coking coal and thermal coal in Queensland's Bowen Basin and the

Hunter Valley of New South Wales respectively, along with new mining technologies and the economic expansions of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, Lucarelli said.

During the Australian coal industry's competitive phase - 1987 to 2003 - export coal prices were relatively stable, but the growth rate of Australia's coal industry slowed as Indonesia became a significant coal exporter.  Since 2003, Australia's coal industry has been in a "volatile price phase," as export coking and thermal coal prices have soared to record highs with the entry of China and latterly India into the international seaborne market, while weather events have affected supplies from coal exporting countries.

Looking to the next 20 years, Lucarelli forecasts serious challenges to the preeminence of Australia's export coal industry in the shape of infrastructure constraints, regulatory risks and under-investment in railways and ports by government-owned companies.  "The most pressing and immediate technical challenge to the black coal industry of Australia is the shortage of rail and port infrastructure to support its further growth," said Lucarelli in the research paper.

‘Chronic infrastructure shortages' Governments in Queensland and New South Wales have proposed projects for expanding their rail and port networks to support a significant increase in Australian coal exports, which are forecast to grow to 540 million mt by 2020 from 240 million mt in 2010.  "Part of the reason that chronic infrastructure shortages are likely to persist has to do with the type of technology being implemented - large rail and fixed land port systems," Lucarelli explained.  Large port and rail projects are required for economies of scale, but involve long lead times, high upfront costs and complex regulatory clearances. 

"A second reason for the chronic shortage of infrastructure has been the reliance on state-owned entities to make the necessary investments in the rail and port systems," Lucarelli said. Government-owned rail and port companies tend to be less nimble and entrepreneurial in their decision-making than the private sector, though some port and rail companies have been privatized recently - most notably Queenslandbased rail company QR National and the port of Brisbane.  Regulatory uncertainty stemming from the Australian government's stop-start policy on curbing carbon emissions and its proposed Mineral Resource Rent Tax on coal-mining profits are additional factors clouding the expansion of Australia's coal industry.  "Potential coal mining projects most at risk due to regulatory uncertainty are the massive new steam coal projects planned for the Galilee, Gunnedah and Surat basins," Lucarelli said.  Illustrating the potential for expansion within Australia's coal industry, Lucarelli said that if only two of the advancedstage projects in the Surat Basin in Queensland started production on schedule, they could add 110 million mt/year of thermal coal exports by 2015.  This is almost as much thermal coal as Australia exported for the whole of 2008, at 115 million mt. 

 

Japan's massive earthquake and tsunami three weeks ago and the challenging recovery process continue to make news headlines around the world. It is difficult to separate fact and reasonable speculation about the future from the terror-filled coverage about radiation leaking from the Fukushima nuclear complex. In an effort to make sense of recent events, the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) convened a panel of experts for a discussion about the possible future implications arising from this complex and emotionally charged situation for Japan's energy policy, economy, and politics.

Addressing an audience of one hundred students, faculty, and members of the general public on March 30, Shorenstein APARC associate director for research Daniel C. Sneider expressed the center's deep sympathy for those affected by the natural disasters and its profound admiration for the way in which the people of Japan are dealing with the aftermath. Members of the panel echoed these sentiments throughout the event.

Michio Harada, Deputy Counsel General at the Consulate General of Japan in San Francisco, cited official government figures indicating that, as of March 28, twenty-eight thousand people were dead or missing and one-hundred-and-eighty thousand people were still in evacuation shelters. Faced with such staggering figures, Japan remains in a rescue and recovery phase, he said, but is receiving a tremendous amount of global support. More than one hundred and thirty countries have provided financial assistance, and eighteen countries and regions have sent rescue teams. Collective public spirit is currently very strong, Deputy Counsel Harada emphasized. Japan's challenge moving forward, he suggested, will be to adopt pragmatic measures to fund reconstruction projects in the areas destroyed or damaged by the natural disasters.

Understanding the situation at the Fukushima nuclear power facility and the information circulating about the potential health risks of radiation exposure is complicated, stressed Siegfried S. Hecker, co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation. He described the intricate design and structure of the reactors and outlined the sequence of events up to the present, explaining the immediate, crucial challenge of continuing to cool the reactors and deal with the leakage of radiation from them. While there are definite and potentially very serious health threats from radiation exposure and contamination, Hecker said, fear and stress about the situation could also negatively affect mental and physical wellbeing. It is too soon to know the long-term implications for energy policy in Japan and other countries, he suggested, emphasizing the significance of learning from this experience in order to improve any future use of nuclear power.

Robert Eberhart, a researcher with the Stanford Program on Regions of Innovation and Entrepreneurship, proposed that the global supply chain is flexible enough to absorb any manufacturing disruptions in Japan. He noted that in the past twenty years most of Japan's heavy manufacturing has moved overseas, and that the components made there are a comparatively less significant part of the supply chain. In terms of the overall impact on Japan's economy, Eberhart suggested that the net effect on the GDP would be neutral over the next two years, explaining that the imminent loss of business and investment in some areas would be offset by the growth of firms involved in the reconstruction process.

Phillip Lipscy, a center fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and an assistant professor with the Department of Political Science, stated that events and immediate needs during the early stages of reconstruction may have long-term affects on policymaking and the government structure in Japan. For example, the continued use of nuclear energy—a relatively clean and efficient source of power accounting for 30 percent of Japan's total energy consumption—will face public opposition due to rising concerns about safety and pressing energy needs. In addition, while Prime Minister Naoto Kan's prompt response after the natural disasters helped boost popular sentiment for him and the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), how they fare in the long term—especially with regard to the DPJ's relationship with the opposition Liberal Democratic Party and reconstruction-related modifications to its key economic policies—remains to be seen, Lipscy said.

Sneider closed the event with a comparison between the events in Japan and the April 2010 Gulf of Mexico oil spill, pointing to criticism that the Obama and Kan administrations have received for not regulating large corporations closely enough. A prompt resolution to the dangerous—and contentious—situation at the Fukushima nuclear complex is the most immediate concern, and one that will help foretell the long-term political implications for Japan's government, he concluded.

Although there is still a long road ahead in Japan—especially until the accident at Fukushima's nuclear reactor is contained and the actual after-effects of radiation are better understood—the underlying message during the panel discussion was that Japan will indeed recover and that the terrible events of the past weeks have brought people—and even the competing political parties—closer together.

North Korea conducted its first nuclear weapons test in October 2006, prompting the UN Security Council to establish military and economic sanctions in an effort to block further development of the country's nuclear program. After North Korea conducted another test in May 2009—a move that U.S. President Barack Obama described as "directly and recklessly challenging the international community"—the UN Secretary General, at the request of the Security Council, convened a Panel of Experts to advise and assist the UN committee that enforces the sanctions (the "1718 Committee," after the UN Security Council Resolution that brought it into being).

John Everard, 2010-2011 Pantech Fellow with the Stanford Korean Studies Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) and former UK Ambassador to North Korea, left Stanford at the end of March to take up a position with the panel.

The seven-member panel comprises independent experts from the Security Council's five permanent member countries—China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States—and from South Korea and Japan. Some experts come from academic institutions while others have been lent to the panel by national governments. As part of its efforts to advise the 1718 Committee, the panel often travels to inspect banned goods—such as materials that could be used for nuclear purposes—in intercepted cargo shipping to or from North Korea. 

During his diplomatic service in North Korea from 2006 to 2008, Everard closely observed and took photographs of the details of everyday life, discovering that the mindset of ordinary people frequently does not match official government ideology. "There is an openness toward warm relations with Americans if political relations improve," he says. Everard is currently working on completing a book describing his observations of the everyday life of non-elite North Koreans, as well as his experience as a foreigner living in North Korea. It also addresses how North Korea as a country has evolved over the past sixty years and provides suggestions for how better to deal with its government.

Although Everard looks forward to his new position with the Panel of Experts, he will not soon forget his time at Shorenstein APARC. "It has been a great experience," he emphasizes. "It has been a real delight to be surrounded not just by this beautiful architecture and the wonderful facilities that Stanford has, but also by the very friendly, very intelligent people here."

As events unfold at Japan's troubled nuclear power plants, CISAC researchers past and present discuss the future of nuclear energy, regulation, and what could happen next.

When major political change in North Korea will occur is difficult to predict, but it is inevitable, suggests David Straub, associate director of the Stanford Korean Studies Program. In a March 21, 2011, Seoul Shinmun op-ed, Straub urges, "Since we cannot predict exactly when or how change will come to North Korea or what its nature will be, South Koreans and their allies and friends abroad need to begin to prepare now for many possibilities." English- and Korean-language versions of the text are both available. The op-ed is part of a continuing series on this issue.

Sooner or later, I believe, there will be major change in North Korea. The system may be very strong, but it is also very brittle. Without democratic electoral processes and free speech, smooth and gradual adjustments cannot be made to meet changing circumstances and the needs of the people.

-David Straub
Korean Studies Program
In the mid-1990s, after the death of Kim Il Sung, I heard many top U.S. officials, speaking privately, predict that the North Korean regime would collapse in a matter of just a few years, if not months. I was younger then and assumed they knew what they were talking about. They didn't. They didn't know much about North Korea. They simply compared it to the situation in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, where communist regimes had just collapsed, and thought the same thing would happen in the very different circumstances of North Korea. Everyone was saying it would happen, so it must true, people assumed. Americans don't like the North Korean regime, so wishful thinking also contributed to this consensus among Americans.

These days, as another leadership succession is underway in North Korea, many people again are speculating about the "collapse" of the Pyongyang regime. The fact of the matter is that no one, not even in Pyongyang, really knows what is going to happen there. I believe there could be dramatic change in the regime in North Korea even as you are reading this, but I also believe it is possible that the regime could last many decades more.

A former colleague, Bill Newcomb, recently compared the situation in North Korea to the buildup of pressure along a fault zone. No one, he noted, can predict when a particular earthquake will occur and how large it will be, but scientists today can say with confidence that a major earthquake will inevitably occur in a certain area eventually. Pyongyang is indeed like that.

Sooner or later, I believe, there will be major change in North Korea. The system may be very strong, but it is also very brittle. Without democratic electoral processes and free speech, smooth and gradual adjustments cannot be made to meet changing circumstances and the needs of the people.

Whether the political earthquake in Pyongyang occurs sooner or later, it is only prudent to prepare thoroughly. The United States and other countries will help the Republic of Korea when dramatic change occurs in North Korea, but it will be the Republic of Korea and the people of North and South Korea who, inevitably, will bear the most risk and stand to gain the most.

Since we cannot predict exactly when or how change will come to North Korea or what its nature will be, South Koreans and their allies and friends abroad need to begin to prepare now for many possibilities. I understand that some South Koreans are concerned that such a discussion will offend and anger Pyongyang and may cause its own problems. But the consequences of not preparing could be far worse. This should not be a matter of pushing for collapse, much less risking war, but for preparing prudently to meet real dangers and real opportunities.

South Koreans need to pool their wisdom and their resources, so that they will be able to respond quickly and effectively no matter what eventually happens in North Korea. There needs to be much more thorough study and debate, both within the government and among the citizenry, about how to deal with various possible crises on the Korean Peninsula, including unification.

I worked on German affairs in the U.S. State Department shortly after German unification, and observed as the government in Bonn, while making heroic efforts, made many serious mistakes. Policies regarding currency unification, wages and pensions, property claims and many other issues caused human suffering and national problems that linger today, twenty years later. How great is the understanding in South Korea among government officials and the public about these issues?

One of the things that many South Koreans seem to have concluded from German unification is that unification will be too risky and too costly. There certainly will be risks and the costs will be great when unification occurs. But unification may occur whether all South Koreans want it or not, and whether they are ready or not. And most costs, if carefully planned, will actually be investments. Moreover, there will not only be risks; there will be opportunities for enormous gain. Unified Korea could be stronger, safer, more prosperous, and happier, not just for the people of North Korea but for all Koreans.

We all remember the earthquake that hit a very poor and unprepared Haiti last year, killing at least 100,000 people and leaving a million homeless. The terrible earthquake that Japan has just experienced was 1,000 times more powerful. Just imagine the consequences if Japan had not prepared as well as it had. It is time for the Republic of Korea to begin to prepare seriously for the eventual political earthquake on the Korean Peninsula.

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[나와 통일]4. 스트라우브 스탠퍼드대 부소장

1994년 김일성이 사망한 뒤, 나는 미국의 많은 고위관리들이 사견으로 북한 정권이 몇 개월내 혹은 몇년 내 붕괴할 것이라고 예측하는 것을 들었다. 그때 나는 그들 스스로가 무엇을 얘기하고 있는지 알고 있다고 추측했다. 그러나 그들은 몰랐다. 그들은 단순히 북한을, 공산주의 정권이 붕괴됐던 소련과 동유럽의 상황과 비교했고, 이 같은 상황이 매우 다른 환경의 북한에서도 발생할 것이라고 생각했다. 미국인들은 북한정권을 좋아하지 않기 때문에 (북한이 망할 것이라는) ‘희망적 생각'(wishful thinking)도 이런 일치된 예측에 기여했다.
▲ 데이비드 스트라우브 스탠퍼드대 아태연구소 한국학 부소장은 남북한의 통일 비용이 결국은 투자가 될 것이라고 강조했다.

요즘 북한에서 권력 승계가 진행되면서, 많은 사람들이 북한 정권의 ‘붕괴'에 대해 다시 추측하고 있다. 이 문제와 관련해 명확한 사실은, 누구도, 심지어 평양에 있는 사람도, 거기서 실제 무슨 일이 일어나고 있는지 정확히 모른다는 것이다. 나는 북한 정권에 상당한 변화가 있을 수 있지만, 그 정권이 수십년 더 지속하는 것이 가능하다고도 생각한다.

●北시스템 강한만큼 깨지기도 쉬워

전직 동료인 윌리엄 뉴콤(전 미 재무부 경제자문관)은 최근 북한 상황을 ‘단층대를 따라 고조되는 압력'에 비유했다. 그는, 누구도 어떤 특별한 지진이 언제 발생할 것이고 얼마나 클 것인지 예측할 수 없지만, 오늘날 과학자들은 대규모 지진이 불가피하게 어느 지역에서 결국 발생할 것이라고 확신을 갖고 말할 수 있다고 지적했다.

평양은 정말로 이런 상황과 같다. 나는 조만간 북한에 큰 변화가 있을 것이라고 생각한다. 북한의 시스템은 매우 강할 수 있지만 역시나 매우 깨지기 쉽다. 민주주의적 선거 과정과 표현의 자유 없이, 사람들의 수요와 변하는 환경을 충족시키기 위한 평탄하고 단계적인 조정은 불가능하다.

평양에서 ‘정치적인 지진'이 조만간 일어나든 아니든, 철저하게 대비하는 것이 현명하다. 미국과 다른 나라들은 북한에 극적인 변화가 일어날 경우 한국을 도울 것이다. 그러나 남한과 남북한 사람들이 불가피하게 가장 위험을 감수하고, 가장 많은 이득도 얻게 될 것이다.

우리는 변화가 언제 어떻게 올지, 그것의 모습이 무엇일지 정확하게 예측하기 어렵다. 때문에 남한 사람들과 동맹국들, 우방들은 지금부터 많은 가능성에 대해 준비해야 한다.

나는 일부 남한 사람들이 그런 논의가 북한을 화나게 할 것이고 북한 내 문제를 유발할 것이라고 걱정하는 것을 알고 있다.

그러나 준비하지 않는 것의 결과는 훨씬 나쁠 수 있다. 이것은 붕괴를 재촉하는 문제가 아니라, 실제로 맞닥뜨릴 위험과 기회에 대해 신중하게 준비해 나가야 하는 문제다.

남한 사람들은 북한에 결국 무슨 일이 발생하든 신속하고 효과적으로 대응할 수 있도록 지혜와 자원을 공유할 필요가 있다. 정부와 민간에서 통일을 포함, 한반도에서 발생 가능한 다양한 위기들에 대해 어떻게 대처할 것인지에 대한 더 많은 철저한 연구와 논쟁이 필요하다.

나는 독일 통일 직후 미 국무부에서 독일 담당 업무를 했다. 당시 독일 정부가 용감하게 노력했지만 심각한 실수를 많이 한 것을 관측했다. 화폐 단일화, 임금, 연금, 재산권 등과 관련된 정책들이 20년이 지난 오늘날에도 맴돌고 있는 국민 고통과 문제를 야기했다. 한국의 관료들과 대중 가운데 이런 문제들에 대해 얼마나 이해하고 있는가?

●신속 대응위한 지혜·자원 공유를

많은 남한 사람들이 독일 통일로부터 결론을 내린 것으로 보이는 것들 중 하나는, 통일은 매우 위험하고 비용이 많이 들 것이라는 것이다. 통일이 이뤄질 때 위험과 비용은 당연히 클 것이다.

그러나 통일은 남한 사람들이 원하든 원치 않든, 준비가 돼 있든 아니든 일어날 수 있다. 그리고, 대부분의 비용은, 주의 깊게 계획된다면, 실제로는 투자가 될 것이다. 게다가 위험만 있는 것은 아니다. 엄청난 이득을 위한 기회도 있을 것이다.

통일된 한국은 단지 북한 사람들뿐 아니라 모든 한국인들을 더 강하고, 안전하고, 번영하고, 행복하게 할 수 있다.

우리는 지난해 준비되지 않은 아이티를 강타한 지진의 엄청난 피해를 기억한다. 최근 일본의 대지진은 아이티 지진보다 1000배 강력했다. 일본이 준비하지 않았다면 어떤 결과가 발생했을지 상상해 보라. 이제 남한은 한반도의 정치적 지진에 대해 심각하게 준비해야 한다.

번역·정리 김미경기자 chaplin7@seoul.co.kr

●약력

▲57 세 ▲미 루이빌대·하버드대 박사과정 ▲주서독 미대사관 근무 ▲주한 미대사관 근무 ▲주일 미대사관 근무 ▲미 국무부 독일팀장 ▲주한 미대사관 공사참사관 ▲미 국무부 한국과장·일본과장 ▲미 존스 홉킨스대·서울대 강의 ▲현재 미 스탠퍼드대 아태연구소 한국학 부소장