This study examines the influence of voter heterogeneity, measured as religious fractionalization, on how the introduction of elections affects public goods in rural China. We document religious composition and the introduction of village-level elections for over two hundred villages and examine the interaction effect of average heterogeneity and the introduction of elections on village-government provision of public goods. We find that the increase in public goods due to elections declines with heterogeneity of villages, which we interpret as evidence that voter heterogeneity constrains the potential benefits of introducing elections.
This paper draws on evidence from loosely structured interviews and data from original surveys of 5,130 delegates in township, county, and municipal congresses to argue that congressional representation unfolds as authoritarian parochialism in China. It makes three new arguments. First, popularly elected local congresses that once only mechanically stood in for the Chinese mass public, through demographically descriptive and politically symbolic representation, now work as substantively representative institutions. Chinese local congressmen and women view themselves and act as “delegates,” not Burkean trustees or Leninist party agents. Second, this congressional representation is not commonly expressed in the quintessentially legislative activities familiar in other regime types. Rather, it is an extra-legislative variant of pork barrel politics: parochial activity by delegates to deliver targeted public goods to the geographic constituency. Third, this authoritarian parochialism is due to institutional arrangements and regime priorities, some common to single-party dictatorships and some distinct to Chinese authoritarianism.
Authoritarian governments produce internal assessments of the quality of governance that allow them to identify and address brewing problems before they threaten regime stability. This paper provides a theory of how the information necessary to produce such assessments is gathered. The empirical focus of the paper is on China, which is used to illustrate how information-gathering channels in communist autocracies differ from those used in electoral autocracies. In particular, petitions rather than elections function as the main channel for gathering information on popular perceptions about governance problems in communist autocracies. The paper argues that information compiled through the analysis of petitions is valued in China because it allows the leadership to identify problems with policy implementation; to track corruption; and to monitor the level of popular trust in the regime. Therefore, petitions serve as a barometer of public opinion regarding governance problems. The paper is based primarily on archival sources and on internal-circulation (neibu) materials collected in China.
Encina Hall
616 Serra Street
Stanford, CA 94305-6055
Jessie Jin-Jen Leu a government official from the Republic of China (Taiwan), was a visiting scholar at the Stanford Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) in 2012-13.
Ms. Leu is a senior economic officer who worked in various positions at the Ministry of Economic Affairs of R.O.C. She is experienced on the import management and multilateral trade related to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Currently she is working as an associate researcher to the National Security Advisor for economic affairs.
Ms. Leu graduated from Taiwan’s Tam-Kang University with a Bachelor's degree of International Trade in 1989. She continued her Master’s degree at University of Wyoming, United States in 1995. Ms. Leu also participated in the WTO negotiation and leadership Program at the Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government in 2003.
This talk will focus on the impact of the decision in 2003 to revive mediation as a key method of labor dispute resolution. In the context of changing economic and social conditions, including tighter labor markets, the Chinese state has pushed for more protection labor legislation, which has increased the number and severity of disputes. At the same time, the state has deemphasized legal channels for resolution, encouraging workers and employers to bypass adversarial litigation, reviving mediation as the preferred method of settlement. This case demonstrates the uses and limitations of “rule of law” under authoritarian rule and the contradiction of stronger laws with a resolution method that tends to deemphasize law and legal rights in favor of harmony and conciliation will be explored.
Stanford Center at Peking University
We surveyed 800+ engineering students at top universities in China and the US and while they all dreamed of starting their own firm, only 3% of Chinese students said they would actually take the plunge. Why? Our study points to a wide gap in perceptions on the availability of financing, mentorship and other innovation resources.
Read more in today's WSJ article here.
Grant Miller will discuss the results of his SAPARC-funded research in rural China, supplementing a large NIH-funded project about pay-for-performance to improve health. The research was designed to test the effect of offering school principals small incentives for anemia reduction on the health and academic performance of primary school students – potentially leading to substantially more cost-effective health policies.
Grant Miller, PHD, MPP, is an Associate Professor of Medicine at the Stanford School of Medicine, a Core Faculty Member at the Center for Health Policy/Primary Care and Outcomes Research, and a Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). He is also a Faculty Fellow of the Stanford Center for International Development and a Faculty Affiliate of the Stanford Center for Latin American Studies. His primary areas of interest are health and development economics and economic demography.
Miller's current research focuses broadly on behavioral obstacles to health improvement in developing countries. One line of studies investigates household decision-making underlying puzzlingly low adoption rates of highly efficacious health technologies (like point-of-use drinking water disinfectants and improved cookstoves) in many poor countries. Another vein of research investigates misaligned macro- and micro-level incentives governing the supply of health technologies and services. He has conducted these and other research projects at institutions including the National Bureau of Economic Research, the Urban Institute, and the University of California-San Francisco's Institute for Health Policy Studies. He received a BA in psychology from Yale College, a master's degree in public policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, and a PhD in health policy/economics also from Harvard.
Philippines Conference Room
Encina Commons Room 101,
615 Crothers Way,
Stanford, CA 94305-6006
As a health and development economist based at the Stanford School of Medicine, Dr. Miller's overarching focus is research and teaching aimed at developing more effective health improvement strategies for developing countries.
His agenda addresses three major interrelated themes: First, what are the major causes of population health improvement around the world and over time? His projects addressing this question are retrospective observational studies that focus both on historical health improvement and the determinants of population health in developing countries today. Second, what are the behavioral underpinnings of the major determinants of population health improvement? Policy relevance and generalizability require knowing not only which factors have contributed most to population health gains, but also why. Third, how can programs and policies use these behavioral insights to improve population health more effectively? The ultimate test of policy relevance is the ability to help formulate new strategies using these insights that are effective.
