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Is it really "a democratic transition" that is taking place in the aftermath of Suharto's overthrow? Is it something else? Something more? Can Pramoedya's analysis of movements in Indonesian history, in his novels and other writings, help us understand what is happening in and to the country now? And what is the answer to Pramoedya's question: How did the young generation succeed so impressively in ousting a military-backed dictator, yet fail to produce a national political leadership to replace him? In his analysis Max Lane will draw linkages between seemingly disparate events and trends: emerging "Pramism"; burgeoning demonstrations (aksi); the controversy over "rectifying history"; the new alliance of Sukarnoist parties; rapid decentralization; and the longer-term dynamics of Indonesian history.

Max Lane is affiliated with the Centre for Asia Pacific Social Transformation Studies at the University of Wollongong, Australia. He has been writing about Indonesian politics and history since 1972. His highly regarded translations include novels by Pramoedya Ananta Toer, plays by W. S. Rendra, and writings by other Indonesians. Recently he finished translating Arok Dedes and The Chinese In Indonesia by Pramoedya and The Social Sciences and Power in Indonesia by Daniel Dhakidae and Vedi Hadiz. Presently he is completing a book of his own, Aksi, the Fall Of Suharto and the Next Indonesia, while preparing a PhD at the University of Wollongong on class consciousness in modern Indonesia and lecturing at the University of Sydney.

Co-sponsored with the Center for Southeast Asian Studies at UC-Berkeley

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Max Lane Translator of Pramoedya's four-novel Buru Quartet and founding editor of Inside Indonesia Speaker
Seminars
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After a decade of gloom, the sun seems at last to be shining brightly on Japan. Its economy has now grown at a respectable pace for four years and the clouds of deflation seem finally to have broken. International factors were the proximate cause of this improvement, but below the surface fundamental changes have also started to occur in the structure of the domestic economy. These changes are largely benign in nature, though they do raise questions about Japan's fiscal health, its ability to fund the twin US deficits, and the trajectory of its relations with its neighbors. The purpose of this speech is to explain how these dynamices will unfold and what they mean for Japan, East Asia, and the United States.

Robert Madsen is a Senior Fellow at MIT's Center for International Studies. He also advises such private equity firms as Unison Capital and the Robert M. Bass Group and was Asia Strategist at Soros Private Funds Management, which undertook leveraged buyouts and corporate restructuring in Europe and East Asia. From time to time he consults for several government agencies, including in the past year an economics ministry, a foreign ministry, an intelligence agency, and a central bank. Madsen graduated summa cum laude and Phi Beta Kappa from Harvard University's Department of East Asian Languages and Civilizations and then attended Oxford University as a Rhodes Scholar, where he earned a Masters Degree, with Distinction, and a Doctorate in International Relations. He additionally holds a J.D., with Distinction, from Stanford Law School and is a member of the California State Bar.

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Robert Madsen Senior Fellow Speaker Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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About the series: The year 2005 marked the 60th anniversary of the end of Pacific War and Japan's unconditional surrender. Post-war Japan has embraced a new constitution that renounced war as a right of the nation and for the past six decades pursued economic growth under democratic government. Ironically, the years leading to this anniversary were filled with various disputes over territorial and historical issues with China and Korea and questions from neighboring countries whether Japanese society is shifting towards the right. Triggered by Prime Minister Koizumi's official visits to Yasukuni Shrine, which enshrines "A" class war criminals, anti-Japan sentiment is widely spreading among its neighboring countries, accompanied by strong nationalism, and is posing a potential threat to the political stability of the region.

This colloquium series will focus on Japan's relationship with China and Korea and the historical controversies that are central to their deteriorating political relationship. The series speakers will address the following questions: What are the historical roots of these controversies? How did post-war Japanese foreign policy effect and was effected by Japan's handling of its militaristic past? What is the nature of domestic politics of these three countries that politicizes these historical issues and influences their responses to one another?

Each of the speakers in this series has been asked to address a specific aspect of Japan's relations. Professor Iriye will address how Japan's post war relationship with its neighboring countries was greatly influenced by the international politics of the time, especially the looming rivalry between Soviet Union and U.S.

Akira Iriye was born in Tokyo, Japan in 1934 and graduated from a Tokyo high school in 1953. He received a B.A. from Haverford College in 1957 and a Ph.D. in U.S. and East Asian History from Harvard in 1961. Prof. Iriye was an Instructor and Lecturer in history at Harvard following receipt of his Ph.D. He then taught at the University of California at Santa Cruz, the University of Rochester, and the University of Chicago before accepting an appointment as Professor of History at Harvard University in 1989, where he became Charles Warren Professor of American History in 1991. Professor Iriye has written widely on American diplomatic history and Japanese- American relations. Among those works are Pacific Estrangement: Japanese and American Expansion, 1897-1911(1972); Power and Culture: The Japanese-American War, 1941-1945 (1981); Fifty Years of Japanese-American Relations (in Japanese, 1991); China and Japan in the Global Setting (1992); The Globalizing of America (1993); and Cultural Internationalism an World Order (1997).

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Akira Iriye Charles Warren Research Professor of American History, Emeritus Speaker Harvard University
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David Kang
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Visting Professor David Kang comments in the Christian Science Monitor on the ongoing spat between Korea and Japan over disputed isles, just as the United States hopes to renew progress on the North Korean nuclear problem.

President Bush could hardly have picked a more critical time to host China's President Hu Jintao at the White House.

A flare-up in troubled waters between South Korea and Japan, faltering trilateral cooperation among the US, Japan, and South Korea, and the failure to persuade North Korea to come close to terms on its nuclear-weapons program all make China a pivotal player -- while raising questions about US strength and influence in the region.

"The United States can play a more profound role in stabilizing the region," says Moon Jung In, international relations professor at Yonsei University in Seoul. "China may be happy to see what's happening."

While the United States tries to persuade China both to reduce its yawning trade surplus with the US and get North Korea to return to six-party talks, a potentially explosive quarrel between South Korea and Japan is frustrating Washington's efforts to join its two northeast Asian allies in common cause on the nuclear issue.

"High-ranking officials of the South Korean government have been talking about Korean-US cooperation rather than trilateral cooperation," says Kim Sung Han, director of North American studies at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, affiliated with South Korea's Foreign Ministry.

"Trilateral cooperation is vital to resolving the North Korean problem," he says.

The tendency in Korea is to blame Japan for somehow wishing to assert its own role in the region, reminding both Koreans and Chinese of the history of Japanese imperialism in Asia, culminating in the conquest of much of the Chinese mainland and 35 years of colonial rule over the Korean peninsula.

Who lays claim to islands?

Memories of that history have leaped into the headlines as a result of a stand-off midway between Korea and Japan in what Koreans call the East Sea and the much of the rest of the world knows as the Sea of Japan.

The focal point is a cluster of 34 islets, basically uninhabitable, that both Korea and Japan claim as part of their national territory.

Korea calls the cluster "Dokdo," or "Solitary Island," while Japan calls it "Takeshima," or "Bamboo Island," and Japan also wants to give Japanese names to undersea rock formations surrounding the islands, basically volcanic rock thrust up from the sea.

The issue, simmering for years, reached a boiling point this week when Japan said it was sending two survey vessels to chart the waters around the islands, held by a garrison of Korean troops seen on Korean television manning anti-aircraft weapons and machine-guns as if to stave off enemy invasion.

Eager to prove his fearlessness in the face of the Japanese, South Korea's President Roh Moo-Hyun has ordered 18 patrol boats to form a blockade against the survey vessels.

"Some people are claiming territorial rights to former colonies that were once acquired through war and aggression," he told Christian leaders at a breakfast Thursday. Not just "good will," he said, as if preparing for war, but "wisdom and courage" were needed in such a crisis.

Shinzo Abe, Japanese government spokes-man, says the vessels are going there in defiance of a pledge of "stern action" by Korea's foreign minister, Ban Ki Moon, against any "provocation" by Japan.

Mr. Kim, of the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, accuses Mr. Abe, an outspoken conservative who aspires to succeed Junichiro Koizumi as Japan's prime minister, of playing to the right-wing in refusing to address Korean sensitivities.

"Shinzo Abe has his own agenda," says Kim. "The Japanese are trying to increase their own role in the area of security. This is sending conflicting messages."

The sense here is that the US could rein in Japan but is reluctant to do so while cooperating closely with Japan on North Korea.

"The United States has been rather silent on these issues," says Kim Tae Hwan, research professor at Yonsei University. "Koreans have been very uncomfortable with the Japanese posture of aligning with the United States. Japan seems to disregard expectations from Korea."

While playing into the hands of China, the standoff over the islands also comes at an opportune moment in terms of South Korea's policy of rapprochement with North Korea.

Ministerial talks between North and South

South Korea's unification minister, Lee Jong Seok, goes to Pyongyang Friday for the first ministerial-level talks between North and South Korea in five months. He and his North Korean opposite number will have no trouble agreeing on the need to fend off what North Korea has already denounced as a "shameless" attempt at expansion.

It's a "very clear win-win" for both North and South Korea, says David Kang, a professor at Stanford University's Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. In the process, he says, the ruckus at sea "makes it look a lot as if Korea and China are cooperating more since they're both upset by Japan's moves."

Mr. Kang sees the standoff as "a distraction" that probably will not have "a fundamental effect on North-South Korean relations," but adds to the sense that six-party talks on North Korea's nuclear weapons are not likely to go anywhere.

"The US doesn't expect to make any progress on six-party talks," says Kang. "Nobody has a face-saving way out."

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Daniel C. Sneider
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Despite chatter about "the Chinese threat" during Chinese President Hu Jintao's recent visit to Washington, neither China nor the United States seeks to confront the issues plaguing their complex relationship. Pantech fellow and San Jose Mercury News foreign affairs columnist Daniel Sneider considers the muscular side of "China's peaceful rise."

The visit of China's President Hu Jintao to the United States this week is yet another opportunity for chatter about the "Chinese threat.'' In the lead-up to his arrival, we have heard rising voices from Congress and from the administration on everything from China's currency manipulation and piracy of intellectual property to its military buildup.

Do not be deceived. There is no real appetite in either Washington or Beijing for confrontation over any of these issues, much less a serious exploration of the challenge that China presents to American global leadership.

Neither government can afford an escalation of tensions. Economically, we are too intertwined. Strip away the packaging on the $200 billion trade deficit with China and you will find American companies running global assembly lines that begin in Ohio, pass through Malaysia, and end up in southern China.

Strategically, the United States is painfully dependent on China to try to cope with the greatest security challenge in northeast Asia: North Korea's nuclear program.

Beijing is wedded to its doctrine of "China's peaceful rise.'' First formulated three years ago, it aims to keep things calm with the United States and most of its neighbors, buying time to manage the tightrope act of continuing high growth while preserving domestic stability.

In any case, Washington is too bogged down in the Middle East to do more than bark now and then about China.

"At the strategic level, the United States is really focused like a laser on the Middle East,'' and the Chinese like it that way, said Asian security expert Kurt Campbell. "They appreciate the fact that with the U.S. attention focused elsewhere, it allows China to play a larger role in Asia as a whole,'' he told a gathering last week at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.

Typically, while Washington is focused on Hu's visit, the Chinese defense minister is in the midst of an unprecedented Asian tour that will take him to North and South Korea and to Singapore, Malaysia and Vietnam. China's prime minister has just finished a swing through Australia, New Zealand, Fiji and Cambodia.

In my own travels through Asia recently, from South Korea and Japan in the northeast down to Singapore, Vietnam and Hong Kong in Southeast Asia, I found a stunning growth in China's influence. The question of how to deal with China's rise is high on every agenda.

Everywhere people are looking over their shoulder, worried about China's burgeoning strength and presence. They are equally fearful that the United States is abandoning the field to China. But they also don't want to choose between these two powers.

That is even true in Japan, where the popular media and politicians are full of talk about the Chinese threat. But look a little closer and you will also find a growing counter-movement, particularly in elite policy circles, warning against becoming separated from the rest of Asia. The battle for succession to Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, who is stepping down in the fall, is now being shaped around this issue.

The China-Japan rivalry tends to reveal the more muscular side of China's "peaceful rise,'' one that Americans rarely glimpse. In Vietnam, senior foreign policy officials recounted what happened when the Japanese came courting to gain Vietnam's backing for a resolution to give them permanent membership in the U.N. Security Council, a key goal of Japan's foreign policy. Japan is Vietnam's largest aid donor and a major source of foreign investment.

China and Vietnam have a long and stormy history as neighbors, including wars that go back centuries and -- more recently -- a brief invasion in 1979 that ended in defeat for the Chinese. Relations these days are relatively good, however, fed by growing trade, heavily in China's favor.

Hu, in his role as leader of the Chinese Communist Party, sent a special envoy to talk to the leadership of the ruling Vietnamese Communist Party. Sometimes, a Vietnamese official told me, the Chinese can be very indirect. Not this time. The message was simple: "Don't do it!'' The ``or else'' was left unspoken.

The Vietnamese compromised, supporting Japan's membership but refusing to co-sponsor the resolution. China was not pleased, but apparently accepted it.

For the Vietnamese, a senior official explained, they must engage in a "lot of fine balancing.'' Vietnam "can't stop engaging China'' but wants to make sure China becomes a "predictable'' power.

In Washington, when the cloud of rhetoric clears, that formula pretty much sums up the reality of U.S.-China relations, too.

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In his recent book, Daniel Kliman argues that the years following September 11, 2001, have marked a turning point in Japan's defense strategy. Utilizing poll data from Japanese newspapers as well as extensive interview material, he chronicles the erosion of normative and legal restraints on Tokyo's security policy, and he notes that both Japanese elites and the general public increasingly view national security from a realpolitik perspective. Japan's more realpolitik orientation has coincided with a series of precedent-breaking defense initiatives: Tokyo deployed the Maritime Self-Defense Force to the Indian Ocean, decided to introduce missile defense, and contributed troops to Iraq's post-conflict reconstruction. Kliman explains these initiatives as the product of four mutually interactive factors. In the period after 9/11, the impact of foreign threats on Tokyo's security calculus became more pronounced; internalized U.S. expectations exerted a profound influence over Japanese defense behavior; prime ministerial leadership played an instrumental role in high-profile security debates; and public opinion appeared to overtake generational change as a motivator of realpolitik defense policies. However, the author rebuts those who exaggerate the nature of Japan's strategic transition. Evaluating potential amendments to Article 9, he demonstrates that Tokyo's defense posture will remain constrained even after constitutional revision. Dan will discuss his recent book and his research.

Daniel M. Kliman is pursuing a Ph.D. at Princeton University in New Jersey. He was a Fulbright Fellow in the Faculty of Law at Kyoto University. While there he prepared a book manuscript for publication with the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He has been affiliated with the Institute for Defense Analyses in Washington, D.C., the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University in California, and the Institute for International Policy Studies in Tokyo.

Daniel I. Okimoto Conference Room

Daniel M. Kliman Ph.D. candidate Speaker Princeton University
Seminars

Philippines Conference Room

Shorenstein APARC
Stanford University
Encina Hall, Room E301
Stanford, CA 94305-6055

(650) 724-6402 (650) 723-6530
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Visiting Scholar
PhD

Stella Quah, (PhD, University of Singapore; M.Sc [sociology], Florida State University) is professor of sociology at the National University of Singapore. She was a Fulbright Hays scholar from 1969 to 1971. Since 1986 she has spent academic sabbaticals as research associate and visiting scholar at the Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California Berkeley; the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; the Department of Sociology at Harvard University; the Harvard-Yenching Institute, Harvard University; the Stanford Program in International Legal Studies, Stanford University; and the National Centre for Development Studies, Australian National University.

Professor Quah was elected vice president for research of the International Sociological Association (ISA); chairperson of the ISA Research Council for the session 1994-98; and served as associate editor of International Sociology (1998-2004).

Among her professional activities, Professor Quah serves on two institutional review boards; is member of the Society for Comparative Research; member of the International Advisory Board of the British Journal of Sociology; member of the Editorial Advisory Board of Health Sociology Review, the journal of the health section of the Australian Sociological Association; member of the editorial board of Marriage & Family Review; member of the International Advisory Board of Asian Population Studies; editor of the Sociology in Asia Series; and editor of the Health Systems Section, Encyclopedia of Public Health (Elsevier Inc).

Professor Quah's main areas of research are medical sociology, social policy, and family sociology. The complete list of her publications is at http://profile.nus.edu.sg/fass/socquahs.

Stella Quah Visiting Scholar, Shorenstein APARC, Stanford and Professor, Department of Sociology National University of Singapore Speaker
Jim Whitman Director, MA Programme, Department of Peace Studies, School of Social and International Studies, Speaker University of Bradford, United Kingdom
Chris Beyrer Director, Johns Hopkins Fogarthy AIDS International Training and Research Program, Director, Johns Hopkins Center for Public Health and Human Rights, Speaker Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health
Graham Scambler Director, Unit of Medical Sociology, and Deputy Director,The Centre for Behavioural and Social Sciences in Medicine, Department of Medicine, Faculty of Clinical Sciences Speaker University College London
Kari Hartwig Division of Global Health, Dept of Epidemiology and Public Health Speaker Yale School of Medicine
DK Owens Speaker
Gabriel M. Leung Department of Community Medicine, Faculty of Medicine Speaker University of Hong Kong
Workshops
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The US-ROK alliance has come under increasing strains in the past few years. Often this is attributed to emotion: a naive young generation of Koreans or perhaps resentment over Apollo Ohno's victory in the past winter Olympics. However, the strains arise from deeper, more enduring reasons. One factor that is not often discussed is how China's rise is affecting the US-ROK alliance. South Korea, once again, is caught between powers much larger than itself. There are no easy answers, but an understanding of the real pressures on the Korean peninsula is a way to begin.

David Kang is associate professor of government, and adjunct associate professor and research director at the Center for International Business at the Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth. He has scholarly interests in both business-government relations and international relations, with a focus on Asia. At Tuck he teaches courses on doing business in Asia, and also manages teams of MBAs in the Tuck Global Consultancy Program that conduct in-country consulting projects for multinational companies in Asia.

Kang's book, Crony Capitalism: Corruption and Development in South Korea and the Philippines (Cambridge University Press, 2002), was named by Choice as one of the 2003 "Outstanding Academic Titles". He is also author of Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies (co-authored with Victor Cha) (Columbia University Press, 2003). He has published scholarly articles in journals such as International Organization, International Security, Comparative Politics, International Studies Quarterly, and Foreign Policy.

Philippines Conference Room

Shorenstein APARC
Stanford University
Encina Hall E301
Stanford, CA 94305-6055

(650) 725-6392 (650) 723-6530
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Visiting Professor
David_Kang.jpg PhD

David Kang is associate professor of government, and adjunct associate professor and research director at the Center for International Business at the Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth. He has scholarly interests in both business-government relations and international relations, with a focus on Asia. At Tuck he teaches courses on doing business in Asia, and also manages teams of MBAs in the Tuck Global Consultancy Program that conduct in-country consulting projects for multinational companies in Asia.

Kang's book, Crony Capitalism: Corruption and Development in South Korea and the Philippines (Cambridge University Press, 2002), was named by Choice as one of the 2003 "Outstanding Academic Titles". He is also author of Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies (co-authored with Victor Cha) (Columbia University Press, 2003). He has published scholarly articles in journals such as International Organization, International Security, Comparative Politics, International Studies Quarterly, and Foreign Policy. He is a frequent radio and television commentator, and has also written opinion pieces in the New York Times, the Financial Times, the Los Angeles Times, Chosun Ilbo (Seoul), Joongang Ilbo (Seoul), and writes a monthly column for the Oriental Morning News (Shanghai). Kang is a member of the editorial boards of Political Science Quarterly, Asia Policy, IRI Review, Business and Politics, and the Journal of International Business Education.

Professor Kang has been a visiting professor at Stanford University, Yale University, Copenhagen Business School (Denmark), the University of Geneva IO-MBA program (Switzerland), Korea University (Seoul, Korea) and the University of California, San Diego. He received an AB with honors from Stanford University and his PhD from University of California, Berkeley.

David Kang Speaker
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Peter Lorentzen's research addresses informal institutions that arise where formal institutions are absent. The paper to be presented at the seminar considers the high levels of popular unrest in contemporary China. Lorentzen argues that "regularized rioting" serves as a useful tool of the central government in solving two important information problems - it helps to monitor and limit corruption by local officials, and it helps the government to identify discontented groups, resolve their concerns, and maintain political stability.

Peter Lorentzen is a pre-doctoral Fellow at CDDRL in 2005-2006.

Encina Basement Conference Room

Peter Lorentzen Pre-Doctoral Fellow (Economics/GSB) Speaker CDDRL
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Professor Kotkin is involved in a number of Princeton, academic and corporate activities. At Princeton, Professor Kotkin is currently the director of the Program in Russian Studies, Princeton University. He is also a member of the Advisory Board, Center of International Studies (2002), the Editorial Board and Trustees, Princeton University Press (2003) and a host of other organizations on campus.

In the academic field he is a member of the Social Science Research Council, Committee on Russia and Eurasia (2001) and has long been an editorial board member for International Labor and Working Class History (ILWCH, 1994), as well as acting in a number of other positions in Rem Koolhass Harvard Project on the City (2001), Kritika: Explorations in European and Eurasian History (1999), and many other organizations.

He is currently writing a book entitled Lost in Siberia: Dreamworlds of Eurasia. It's a study of the Ob River valley -- which runs from the Altai Mountains to the Arctic -- over seven centuries, based on local archives, and it combines approaches from the Annales school and from the twentieth-century avant-garde. His research interests range across Eurasia, from Japan to Britain, in the modern period, and include topics such as empire, nation building, political corruption, modernity and modernism.

Encina Basement Conference Room

Stephen Kotkin Speaker Princeton University
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