This is part 2 of a talk presenting how innovative large Japanese companies are harnessing Silicon Valley. It is a review of the fireside chats and panels presented at the Silicon Valley – New Japan Summit last November at Stanford, which was in Japanese. The talk adds some historical context, and introduces through many of the company cases from the summit, including Panasonic, Fuji Film, Itochu, Rakuten, Obayashi, Nomura Holdings, Sourcenext, Komatsu, SMBC, and Toyota Research Institute.

The current surge of large Japanese companies into Silicon Valley is focused on firms aiming to identify new opportunities to collaborate with the startup ecosystem in order to understand future technological and industry trajectories, to facilitate new forms of “open” innovation within the company, and in some cases to even redefine how to add value to their core offerings. However, given a vast differently economic context from their core operations in Japan, many of the large Japanese firms’ initial forays tend to fall into patterns of “worst practices” that are ineffective. Yet, a small but growing number of innovative Japanese companies are producing novel and valuable collaborations with a variety of Silicon Valley firms, investors, and ecosystem players. The talk will survey a range of strategic options available to Japanese companies, with implications for how to better adapt companies from Japan to Silicon Valley, and more broadly from different political economic systems.

SPEAKER:

Kenji Kushida, Research Scholar, Shorenstein APARC Japan Program and Stanford Silicon Valley-New Japan Project Leader

BIO:

Kenji E. Kushida is the Japan Program Research Scholar at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University (APARC), Project Leader of the Stanford Silicon Valley – New Japan Project (Stanford SV-NJ), research affiliate of the Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy (BRIE), International Research Fellow at the Canon Institute for Global Studies (CIGS), and Visiting Researcher at National Institute for Research Advancement (NIRA). He holds a PhD in political science from the University of California, Berkeley, an MA in East Asian studies and BAs in economics and East Asian studies, all from Stanford University.

Kushida’s research streams include 1) Information Technology innovation, 2) Silicon Valley’s economic ecosystem, 3) Japan’s political economic transformation since the 1990s, and 4) the Fukushima nuclear disaster. He has published several books and numerous articles in each of these streams, including “The Politics of Commoditization in Global ICT Industries,” “Japan’s Startups Ecosystem,” “Cloud Computing: From Scarcity to Abundance,” and others. His latest business book in Japanese is “The Algorithmic Revolution’s Disruption: a Silicon Valley Vantage on IoT, Fintech, Cloud, and AI” (Asahi Shimbun Shuppan 2016).

He has appeared in media including The New York Times, Washington Post, Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Nikkei Business, NHK, PBS NewsHour, and NPR.

He is also a trustee of the Japan ICU Foundation, a fellow of the US-Japan Leadership Program, an alumni of the Trilateral Commission David Rockefeller Fellows, and a member of the Mansfield Foundation Network for the Future.

AGENDA:

4:15pm: Doors open
4:30pm-5:30pm: Talk and Discussion
5:30pm-6:00pm: Networking

RSVP REQUIRED:

Register to attend at http://www.stanford-svnj.org/12819

This event is co-sponsored with The Abbasi Program in Islamic Studies.

Abstract:

Severe polarization is a global threat that has detrimental effects on democracy and well-being. What can citizens and collective actors such as political parties do to reverse polarization and to sustain democracy in affected polities? The triggers of current polarizations across the world often are political and thus intentional: they exemplify various forms of “the politics of transforming through polarizing,” which are aimed at achieving wide-scale transformations in political-economic institutions and policies. Yet, as these polarizations take a life of their own, the causal mechanisms that render them pernicious gain a structural nature. They lock in both the incumbents and the oppositions in a downward spiral of polarization-cum-democratic erosion, generating many unintended consequences. With comparative examples from various polities, this talk will discuss a political and relational notion of polarization, the dilemmas faced by opposition actors who want to reverse polarization and democratic backsliding, and implications for theory and policy.

Speaker Bio:

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Murat Somer is a Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Koç University and a Visiting Scholar at the Abbasi Program in Islamic Studies at Stanford University. His research on democratization and autocratization, polarization, ethnic conflicts, religious and secular politics, political Islam, and the Kurdish question have been published in books, book volumes and journals such as Comparative Political Studies and Democratization. His book on the Turkish and Kurdish Question won a Sedat Simavi Social Sciences Prize in 2015 and he recently co-edited two special journal volumes on polarization, democracy and democratic erosion across the world. Among other visiting appointments, Somer was a Democracy and Development Fellow at Princeton University, a Senior Visiting Scholar at Stockholm University, and a Visiting Scholar at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University. He has been a frequent contributor to Turkish and international media and he is working on a research and book project that explores the multiple paths through which polarizing politics lead to authoritarianism, and what pro-democracy citizens and political actors can and cannot do to sustain democracy.

Offensive cyber operations have become increasingly important elements of U.S. national security policy. From the deployment of Stuxnet to disrupt Iranian centrifuges to the possible use of cyber methods against North Korean ballistic missile launches, the prominence of offensive cyber capabilities as instruments of national power continues to grow. Yet conceptual thinking lags behind the technical development of these new weapons. How might offensive cyber operations be used in coercion or conflict? What strategic considerations should guide their development and use? What intelligence capabilities are required for cyber weapons to be effective? How do escalation dynamics and deterrence work in cyberspace? What role does the private sector play?

In this volume, edited by Herbert Lin and Amy Zegart—co-directors of the Stanford Cyber Policy Program—leading scholars and practitioners explore these and other vital questions about the strategic uses of offensive cyber operations. The contributions to this groundbreaking volume address the key technical, political, psychological, and legal dimensions of the fast-changing strategic landscape.

ABOUT THE EDITORS

Dr. Herb Lin is senior research scholar for cyber policy and security at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and Hank J. Holland Fellow in Cyber Policy and Security at the Hoover Institution, both at Stanford University. He is chief scientist emeritus for the Computer Science and Telecommunications Board at the National Academies. He served on President Barack Obama’s Commission on Enhancing National Cybersecurity.

Dr. Amy Zegart is the Davies Family Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, senior fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, and professor of political science, by courtesy, at Stanford University. Her previous books include Political Risk: How Businesses and Organizations Can Anticipate Global Insecurity, with Condoleezza Rice; and Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11.

ABOUT THE EDITORS

Dr. Sameer Bhalotra is the Co-founder & Executive Chairman of StackRox, and is a CISAC affiliate. He is also affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), UC Berkeley’s Center for Long-Term Cybersecurity (CLTC), and Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government. He previously worked in cybersecurity at Google and as COO at Impermium (acquired by Google). In government, he served as Senior Director for Cybersecurity on the National Security Council staff at the White House, Cybersecurity & Technology Lead for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and in various roles in the Intelligence Community.

Abstract: My research focuses on the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster and on the release of radioactive contamination throughout Japan. Based on 14 months of fieldwork in Japan, the research examines the crisis of expertise that ensued when many citizens became wary of state institutional experts, especially in their capacities to explain and manage the problems engendered by residual radioactivity.In this context of public skepticism, I ask the following: how does the Japanese state attempt to govern the hazards of radioactive contamination, and ultimately, the reconstruction of normality in the aftermath of a nuclear disaster? I argue that the management of radiation hazard after Fukushima includes an important reorganization of state expertise, which now moves beyond traditional forms of risk communication and institutional experts.My research advances policyand public-relevant understandings of repliesto radioactive contamination by highlighting the needs of appropriate educational infrastructure around radiation risk, while emphasizing democratic opportunity for citizen-government collaboration. Within post-Fukushima Japan, anthropological investigations of the governance of radiation hazards are essential for understanding the configurations of cultural schemas, social relationships, and technological interplays that led individuals to “accept” life amidst toxicity and other to refuse it.

Speaker's Biography: Maxime Polleri is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Anthropology at York University. His current research focuses on the 2011 Fukushima Dai’ichi nuclear disaster and on the crisis of expertise that ensued, in which many citizens have become wary of state institutional experts, especially in their capacities to manage the problems engendered by residual radioactivity. In such a context, his dissertation is concerned with how the Fukushima crisis has participated in the formations of new forms of expertise and consequently, new means of governing toxicity. It asks: How is radioactive hazard being governed in the wake of a crisis of legitimacy against state institutional expert? Based on 14 months of ethnographic fieldwork throughout Japan, the dissertation argues that averting the crisis of expertise and managing the reconstruction of what “normality” involves in a post-Fukushima Japan include a fundamental reorganization of state governance, where the dissemination of radiation hazards cannot simply rest on dry, clinical manner in which government-packaged expertise about radiation was initially promulgated to a former lay public. In particular, these shift in the governance of radioactive risk are increasingly being enacted by promoting a state-sponsored affective embodiment toward nuclear matter, as well as by encouraging the endeavor of citizen science, where former lay citizens now track and monitor residual radioactivity in their environment. His fieldwork was funded by the Japan Foundation and the Canada Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council. His work has been published in Anthropology Now, Anthropology Today, and Medical Anthropology Quarterly Second Spear.

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Abstract: Nuclear disarmament treaties are not sufficient in and of themselves to neutralize the existential threat of the nuclear weapons. Technologies are necessary for verifying the authenticity of the nuclear warheads undergoing dismantlement before counting them towards a treaty partner’s obligation. A team of scientists working at MIT has developed two novel concepts which leverage isotope-specific nuclear resonance phenomena to authenticate a warhead's fissile components by comparing them to a previously authenticated template.  Most actinides such as uranium and plutonium exhibit unique sets of resonances when interacting with MeV photons and eV neutrons. When measured, these resonances produce isotope-specific features in the spectral data, thus creating an isotopic  "fingerprint" of an object. All information in these measurement has to be and is encrypted in the physical domain in a manner that amounts to a physical zero-knowledge proof system. Using Monte Carlo simulations and experimental proof-of-concept measurements these techniques are shown to reveal no isotopic or geometric information about the weapon, while readily detecting hoaxing attempts. These new methodologies can dramatically increase the reach and trustworthiness of future nuclear disarmament treaties.  The talk will discuss the concepts and recent results, and will give a general overview of nuclear security research pursued at MIT.

Bio: Areg Danagoulian is an Assistant Professor of Nuclear Science and Engineering at MIT.  He did his PhD research in Experimental Nuclear Physics at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Areg’s PhD thesis focused on experiments that used real Compton scattering on the proton at 2-6 GeV, allowing to probe the proton's internal structure and understand how it couples to external excitations. After his PhD Areg worked at Los Alamos as a postdoctoral researcher, and then as a senior scientist at Passport Systems, Inc. (PSI). At PSI Areg focused on the development of Prompt Neutron from Photofission (PNPF) technique, which allows to rapidly detect shielded fissionable materials in the commercial cargo traffic. Areg's current research interests focus on scientific applications in nuclear security, such areas nuclear nonproliferation, technologies for treaty verification, nuclear safeguards, and cargo security. Current specific research areas include:  warhead verification using nuclear resonances;  use of nuclear reactions for high precision radiography in nuclear security applications.

Abstract: The American Lab, published by Johns Hopkins University Press in 2018, tells the story of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (the Lab) from the events leading to its founding in 1952 through its transfer to private status in 2008 (after 66 years of sole University of California management). It highlights the important episodes in that journey beginning with the invention of Polaris, the first submarine launched ballistic missile, continuing through the Lab’s controversial role in the Star Wars program, and helping lead the development of the stockpile stewardship program after the cessation of nuclear testing. It describes the intense focus on-laboratory-scale thermonuclear fusion with early work in magnetic fusion to the world’s largest effort on laser fusion that ultimately resulted in the construction of the National Ignition Facility. It includes a number of smaller projects ranging from its participation in founding the Human Genome Project (and its subsequent effort in biodefense) to its array of activities on global climate and basic research. Throughout, the book emphasizes the national security environment in which the Lab existed and the increasing role of politics in “big science”.

Bio: C. Bruce Tarter is a theoretical physicist with a BS from MIT and a PhD from Cornell. He began as a researcher at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in 1967 and eventually served as its Director from 1994-2002. Since that time as Director Emeritus he has served on a number of Boards and Task Forces including the National Academy study of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States. He is a Fellow of the American Physical Society and the American Association for the Advancement of Science.

Speaker Bio: Sarah Kreps is an Associate Professor of Government and Adjunct Professor of Law at Cornell University. In 2017-2018, she is an Adjunct Scholar at the Modern War Institute (West Point). She is also a Faculty Fellow in the Milstein Program in Technology and Humanity at the Cornell Tech Campus in New York City.

Dr. Kreps is the author of four books, including, most recently, Taxing Wars: The American Way of War Finance and the Decline of Democracy (Oxford University Press, 2018), which deals with the causes and consequences of how advanced industrialized democracies such as the US, UK, and France pay for its wars.  She has also written two books on drones, including Drones: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford University Press, 2016) and Drone Warfare (Polity Press, 2014; with John Kaag).  Her first book was called Coalitions of Convenience: United States Military Interventions after the Cold War (Oxford University Press, 2011) and analyzed military interventions carried out over the last decade.

Beyond these books, her work has appeared or is forthcoming in the American Political Science Review, World Politics, Journal of Politics, International Security, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Security Studies, Journal of Strategic Studies, Political Science Quarterly, International Studies Perspectives, Foreign Policy Analysis, Polity, African Security Review, the Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law, the International Journal of Sustainable Development and World Ecology, Intelligence and National Security, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, and Polity. Her opinions have been featured in a series of media outlets including The Washington Post, International Herald Tribune, New York Times, Christian Science Monitor, USA Today, CNBC,and Reuters.

Dr. Kreps has held fellowships at the Council on Foreign Relations (and is a life member), Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, and the University of Virginia’s Miller Center for Public Affairs. She has a BA from Harvard, MSc from Oxford, and PhD from Georgetown. Between 1999-2003, she served on active duty in the United States Air Force.

Abtstract: Although the 2016 election highlighted the potential for foreign governments to employ social media for strategic advantages, the particular mechanisms through which social media affect international politics remain underdeveloped.  Building on insights from American politics, in particular the “democratic dilemma,” I observe that many issues of foreign policy are complex and the public is insufficiently informed to offer well-reasoned opinions. To resolve the knowledge deficits and ambivalence, they seek information from their media environment, which is where social media—as platforms that are open access and amplify content that is extreme either in their positive or negative valence—can cue individuals and tilt the balance of support.  In this context, the open media environment of a democracy is a particularly susceptible environment for foreign influence whereas the comparatively closed media environment of a non-democracy provides efficient ways for these governments to censor, cut, or counter social media in ways that promote regime survival.  The research has important implications for the role of media, technology, and persuasion in international politics.

Abstract: Europe and the United States have sharply divergent regulatory regimes and public perceptions on the benefits and risks of genetically modified foods. I draw on the history and factors behind this divergence, including the concept of regulatory precaution, to highlight how institutional design choices, contingent events and policy entrepreneurs can shape how societies absorb new technologies, with particular application to artificial intelligence, machine learning, and automation. The story of GMO governance is a precautionary tale for technologists and policy makers about possible governance futures for AI. 

Bio: Andrew J. Grotto is a William J. Perry International Security Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and a Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution, both at Stanford University.

Grotto’s research interests center on the national security and international economic dimensions of America’s global leadership in information technology innovation, and its growing reliance on this innovation for its economic and social life. He is particularly interested in the allocation of responsibility between the government and the privater sector for defending against cyber threats, especially as it pertains to critical infrastructure; cyber-enabled information operations as both a threat to, and a tool of statecraft for, liberal democracies; opportunities and constraints facing offensive cyber operations as a tool of statecraft, especially those relating to norms of sovereignty in a digitally connected world; and governance of global trade in information technologies.

Before coming to Stanford, Grotto was the Senior Director for Cybersecurity Policy at the White House in both the Obama and Trump Administrations. His portfolio spanned a range of cyber policy issues, including defense of the financial services, energy, communications, transportation, health care, electoral infrastructure, and other vital critical infrastructure sectors; cybersecurity risk management policies for federal networks; consumer cybersecurity; and cyber incident response policy and incident management. He also coordinated development and execution of technology policy topics with a nexus to cyber policy, such as encryption, surveillance, privacy, and the national security dimensions of artificial intelligence and machine learning. 

At the White House, he played a key role in shaping President Obama’s Cybersecurity National Action Plan and driving its implementation. He was also the principal architect of President Trump’s cybersecurity executive order, “Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure.”

Grotto joined the White House after serving as Senior Advisor for Technology Policy to Commerce Secretary Penny Pritzker, advising Pritzker on all aspects of technology policy, including Internet of Things, net neutrality, privacy, national security reviews of foreign investment in the U.S. technology sector, and international developments affecting the competitiveness of the U.S. technology sector.

Grotto worked on Capitol Hill prior to the Executive Branch, as a member of the professional staff of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. He served as then-Chairman Dianne Feinstein’s lead staff overseeing cyber-related activities of the intelligence community and all aspects of NSA’s mission. He led the negotiation and drafting of the information sharing title of the Cybersecurity Act of 2012, which later served as the foundation for the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act that President Obama signed in 2015. He also served as committee designee first for Senator Sheldon Whitehouse and later for Senator Kent Conrad, advising the senators on oversight of the intelligence community, including of covert action programs, and was a contributing author of the “Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program.”

Before his time on Capitol Hill, Grotto was a Senior National Security Analyst at the Center for American Progress, where his research and writing focused on U.S. policy towards nuclear weapons - how to prevent their spread, and their role in U.S. national security strategy.

Grotto received his JD from the University of California at Berkeley, his MPA from Harvard University, and his BA from the University of Kentucky.