The conquest of the Americas produced a radical transformation of pre-colonial Empires and City States. Europeans established a new institution, the Encomienda, which “entrusted” indigenous communities to individual conquistadores, which resulted in the dismemberment and fragmentation of prior political authority. Using a simple model of temporal horizons and rent extraction, I explore demographic change and epidemic disease after the conquest of Mexico. Data is drawn from the legal and census records of Tepetlaoztoc, a polity within the Acolhua Kingdom, one of the three parts of the Aztec Empire. This rich dataset allows for the reconstruction of demographic change and the calculation of individual and household level epidemiological models. The analysis suggests that the dramatic demographic decline of the 16th century in Mexico, rather than an inevitable result of exposure to unknown pathogens or epidemic diseases beyond human control, was a consequence of colonial rent extraction and the loss of political autonomy and sovereignty.

ABOUT THE SPEAKER

Alberto Díaz-Cayeros joined the FSI faculty in 2013 after serving for five years as the director of the Center for US-Mexico Studies at the University of California, San Diego. He earned his Ph.D at Duke University in 1997. He was an assistant professor of political science at Stanford from 2001-2008, before which he served as an assistant professor of political science at the University of California, Los Angeles. Diaz-Cayeros has also served as a researcher at Centro de Investigacion Para el Desarrollo, A.C., in Mexico from 1997-1999. His work has focused on federalism, poverty, and violence in Latin America and Mexico in particular. He has published widely in Spanish and English. His book Federalism, Fiscal Authority and Centralization in Latin America was published by Cambridge University Press in 2007 (reprinted in 2016). His latest book (with Federico Estevez and Beatriz Magaloni) is The Political Logic of Poverty Relief Electoral Strategies and Social Policy in Mexico. His work has primarily focused on federalism, poverty and economic reform in Latin America, and Mexico in particular, with more recent work addressing crime and violence, youth-at-risk, and police professionalization.

Virtual to Public. Only those with an active Stanford ID with access to Willliam J. Perry Conference Room in Encina Hall may attend in person.

Professor Federico Fabbrini will discuss his new book, which examines the EU’s responses to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. From a legal perspective, Fabbrini evaluates how the EU has addressed the conflict and identifies options for improving the EU’s constitutional set-up amidst growing geopolitical challenges and risks.

In his book, Fabbrini analyses the EU’s response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, particularly focusing on how the EU (a peacetime organization) has adapted to the challenges posed by war. From a legal perspective, it examines EU action across five policy areas: 

• Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)

• Fiscal and Economic Policy Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ)

• Energy and Industrial Policy

• EU Enlargement and Reform 

The author argues that the EU’s constitutional framework proved flexible enough to enable unprecedented institutional responses to the conflict. However, the book also addresses how structural shortcomings in the EU’s constitution have, in some cases, hampered the EU’s response, while in others, they have occasionally failed to sufficiently constrain EU action. 

The book concludes by exploring potential reforms to the EU’s constitutional set-up, emphasizing the need for improvement in a time of ever-greater geopolitical risks.

This event is co-sponsored by the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, the Stanford Program in International and Comparative Law, and the Stanford Center on International Conflict and Negotiation.

The Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) will be accepting applications from eligible juniors from any university department who are interested in writing their senior thesis on a subject touching upon democracy, economic development, and rule of law (DDRL). 

Join CDDRL faculty and current honors students on Wednesday, January 22, at 12:00 pm, to discuss the program and answer questions.

The application period opens on January 6, 2025, and runs through February 14, 2025.

For more information on the Fisher Family CDDRL Honors Program, please click here.

This past summer, Venezuela's presidential election was overshadowed by Nicolás Maduro's attempt at large-scale electoral fraud. Despite these efforts, the Venezuelan democratic movement successfully provided evidence showing that their candidate, Edmundo González Urrutia, had won with nearly 70% of the vote. In response, the Maduro regime has escalated its repression of opposition leaders and advocates of democratic reforms, deepening political tensions and raising serious concerns about the country's democratic future.

On Monday, November 18, the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law is honored to host María Corina Machado, the leader of the Venezuelan pro-democracy movement and the main architect of the July 28 electoral victory, for a video address to the Stanford community sharing her experiences and perspectives on sustaining democratic resilience in the face of authoritarianism. The conversation will be moderated by Larry Diamond, the Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI). Together, they will explore Venezuela’s current political challenges, the critical role of civic engagement, and strategies for fostering democratic transitions in restrictive environments.

The event will conclude with an interactive Q&A session, allowing students, faculty, and the greater Stanford community to engage directly with Ms. Machado and gain deeper insights into her experiences.

This event is co-sponsored by the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) and the Neukom Center for the Rule of Law.

Patronage — the selection of government officials at the discretion of a political actor — is ubiquitous among democracies. Yet, some countries managed to curb it over time while others failed. Under what circumstances do democratic governments reduce patronage and establish professional bureaucracies? The paper argues that the success of bureaucratic reform is rooted in the type of patronage regime. Although all countries had some form of patronage, substantial differences in their firing practices can significantly impact the reform’s outcome by creating opportunities for the emergence of political entrepreneurs interested in bureaucratic reform or precluding such opportunities. Drawing on state-building scholarship in comparative politics and political development in American politics, I introduce a theoretical framework that accounts for successful and failed bureaucratic reform attempts. I apply the theory to the U.S. and Argentina, providing original archival evidence. The article elucidates the longstanding puzzle of bureaucracy professionalization in democratic contexts, generating new insights for contemporary debates on state-building.

ABOUT THE SPEAKER

Julieta Casas is the Einstein-Moos Postdoctoral Fellow in Rule of Law at the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) at Stanford University. Her research lies at the intersection of comparative political development and political economy with a substantive focus on the state bureaucracy, political parties, and democracy. Her projects address fundamental questions regarding the causes and effects of state capacity, concentrating geographically on Latin America and the U.S. Her research includes retrieving and digitizing original archival materials to produce new datasets.

Virtual to Public. Only those with an active Stanford ID with access to Encina E008 in Encina Hall may attend in person.