Stanford University

History Wars in Northeast Asia

Authors
Gi-Wook Shin
Daniel C. Sneider
News Type
Commentary
Date
Paragraphs

From territorial disputes in the East China Sea to heated propaganda wars across the region, peace in northeast Asia seems increasingly tenuous. At the heart of rising tensions are unresolved historical issues related to World War II, which drive a wedge between the United States’ two main allies in the region, Japan and South Korea, and fuel a revived rivalry between Japan and China. As the main victor in World War II, the United States has some responsibility for these disputes. It constructed the postwar regional order and has been largely content since then to view the matter as settled, even though issues of territory, compensation, and historical justice were left unresolved. During the Cold War, when the region’s main players were cut off from each other, the United States’ approach worked well. But as the region democratizes and grows increasingly integrated, long-buried issues are coming to the surface. As U.S. President Barack Obama heads to Japan and South Korea this month, it is time for the United States to tackle wartime history in Asia head on.

American officials were confronted by the uncomfortable realities of wartime issues last year, when Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, without warning, made an official visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, which honors Japan’s war dead, including some who had been convicted and executed as Class-A war criminals. The Japanese leader certainly understood that his decision would irk China and South Korea, which see such visits as signals of Tokyo’s embrace of an unapologetic view of Japan’s wartime aggression. What was even more troubling was that the visit came only a few weeks after U.S. Vice President Joe Biden apparently received assurances from Abe that Tokyo would avoid any such provocations. Biden subsequently encouraged South Korean President Park Geun-hye to sit down with the Japanese leader, although Park questioned whether he could be trusted to hold his historical revisionism in check -- a concern that was clearly justified.

Japan and South Korea have made repeated efforts over the past two decades to resolve their wartime history issues, but progress has always proved short-lived. South Korean officials now openly plead for the United States to step in. That would be anathema to Japan, which fears being isolated. Obama managed to convene a brief meeting of the Japanese and South Korean leaders recently at the nuclear safety summit in Europe, but the agenda focused solely on North Korea. For its part, the United States simply urges restraint and dialogue, consistently refusing to intervene directly into disputes over the wartime past. American diplomats understandably argue that the subject is a minefield and that any U.S. involvement will be viewed with suspicion in China, Japan, and South Korea alike.

Even so, China’s bid for regional domination makes it nearly impossible for the United States to continue to stay out of the fray; Beijing has already started to position itself as sympathetic to South Korean fears about Japan and has embarked on a global propaganda campaign against Japanese “militarism,” pointing with undisguised glee at any evidence of Japanese nostalgia for its wartime past.  By taking a leading role in dealing with the wartime past, the United States could make it difficult for Beijing to use it for political gain.

[...]

The first few paragraphs of this article have been reproduced with permission of Foreign Affairs. The complete version may be accessed on Foreign Affairs online.

Hero Image
4191 small 2012 China anti Japanese demonstrations in Beijing LOGO
All News button
1

Insider threats biggest challenge to nuclear security

Authors
Date
Paragraphs

The greatest dangers to nuclear facilities are sabotage and theft from insiders, according to political scientist Scott Sagan. Analysis of past incidents can help boost safeguards at these sites.

A diesel generator at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station in Southern California was possibly sabotaged, likely by an insider, in 2012.

Insider threats are the most serious challenge confronting nuclear facilities in today's world, a Stanford political scientist says.

In every case of theft of nuclear materials where the circumstances of the theft are known, the perpetrators were either insiders or had help from insiders, according to Scott Sagan and his co-author, Matthew Bunn of Harvard University, in a research paper published this month by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

"Given that the other cases involve bulk material stolen covertly without anyone being aware the material was missing, there is every reason to believe that they were perpetrated by insiders as well," they wrote.

And theft is not the only danger facing facility operators; sabotage is a risk as well, said Sagan, who is a CISAC senior fellow and professor of political science.

While there have been sabotage attempts in the United States and elsewhere against nuclear facilities conducted by insiders, the truth may be hard to decipher in an industry shrouded in security, he said.

"We usually lack good and unclassified information about the details of such nuclear incidents," Sagan said.

The most recent known example occurred in 2012, an apparent insider sabotage of a diesel generator at the San Onofre nuclear facility in California. Arguably the most spectacular incident happened at South Africa's Koeberg nuclear power plant (then under construction) in South Africa in 1982 when someone detonated explosives directly on a nuclear reactor.

Lessons Learned

In their paper, the authors offered some advice and insights based on lessons learned from past insider incidents:

  • Don't assume that serious insider threats are NIMO (not in my organization).
  • Don't assume that background checks will solve the insider problem.
  • Don't assume that red flags will be read properly.
  • Don't assume that insider conspiracies are impossible.
  • Don't assume that organizational culture and employee disgruntlement don't matter.
  • Don't forget that insiders may know about security measures and how to work around them.
  • Don't assume that security rules are followed.
  • Don't assume that only consciously malicious insider actions matter.
  • Don't focus only on prevention and miss opportunities for mitigation.
 

The information for the research paper emanated from an American Academy of Arts and Sciences project on nuclear site threats, Sagan said.

"It was unusual in that it brought together specialists on insider threats and risks in many different areas – including intelligence agencies, biosecurity, the U.S. military – to encourage interdisciplinary learning across organizations," he said.

Sagan explained that the experts sought to answer the following questions: "What can we learn about potential risks regarding nuclear weapons and nuclear power facilities by studying insider threat experiences in other organizations? What kinds of successes and failures did security specialists find in efforts to prevent insider threats from emerging in other organizations?"

'Not perfect'

He noted that only a few serious insider cases in the U.S. nuclear industry have arisen, thanks to rigorous "personal reliability" programs conducted by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the U.S. military for people with access to sensitive nuclear materials.

But there is room for improvement, Sagan said.

"These programs are effective," he said, "but they are not perfect. And relative success can breed overconfidence, even complacency, which can be a major cause of security breaches in the future."

For example, the nuclear industry needs to do more research about how terrorist organizations recruit individuals to join or at least help their cause. It also needs to do a better job on distributing "creative ideas and best practices" against insider threats to nuclear partners worldwide.

Sagan said the U.S. government is not complacent about the danger of insider threats to nuclear security, but the problem is complex and the dangers hard to measure.

"Sometimes governments assume, incorrectly, that they do not face serious risks," he said.

One worrisome example is Japan, he said.

"Despite the creation of a stronger and more independent nuclear regulator to improve safety after the Fukushima accident in Japan, little has been done to improve nuclear security there," said Sagan.

He added, "There is no personal reliability program requiring background checks for workers in sensitive positions in Japanese nuclear reactor facilities or the plutonium reprocessing facility in Japan."

Sagan explained that some Japanese government and nuclear industry officials believe that Japanese are loyal and trustworthy by nature, and that domestic terrorism in their country is "unthinkable" – thus, such programs are not necessary.

"This strikes me as wishful thinking," Sagan said, "especially in light of the experience of the Aum Shinrikyo terrorist group, which launched the 1995 sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway."

Hero Image
1 Screen Shot 2014 04 09 at 2 22 10 PM
All News button
1

From Paris to Sacaca: A Human Rights Genealogy

-

Abstract
The trajectory of human rights in the contemporary world is one in which ideas and cultural practices constitute each other in ways that can bedevil theorists and empirical researchers alike. The conventional wisdom is that this dynamic interaction, or “vernacularization,” must be understood as the inevitable, if (to some) lamentable, result of the rapid expansion of international and transnational human rights after the end of the Cold War. This talk challenges the conventional wisdom by tracing the genealogy of one such idea—that of universality—from the work of a mysterious, though highly consequential, UNESCO committee in 1947 and 1948 to the practical human rights advocacy of a peasant intellectual living in a remote region of the Bolivian Andes. Doing so allows us to reframe a key moment in the history of the birth of the modern human rights movement after the Second World War; appreciate the extent to which the narrative of universal human dignity does important cultural work as a matter of practical ethics; and realize that a critical approach to both the promises and dilemmas of human rights does not stand apart from mainstream human rights advocacy, but is rather woven into the very fiber of its history.

 

Mark Goodale is currently Professor of Conflict Analysis and Anthropology at George Mason University and Series Editor of Stanford Studies in Human Rights. He is the author or editor of nine books, including Human Rights at the Crossroads (Oxford UP, 2013), Mirrors of Justice: Law and Power in the Post-Cold War Era (with Kamari Maxine Clarke, Cambridge UP, 2010), Human Rights: An Anthropological Reader (Blackwell, 2009), Surrendering to Utopia: An Anthropology of Human Rights (Stanford UP, 2009), Dilemmas of Modernity: Bolivian Encounters with Law and Liberalism (Stanford UP, 2008), and The Practice of Human Rights: Tracking Law Between the Global and the Local (with Sally Engle Merry, Cambridge UP, 2007). Forthcoming volumes include Human Rights Encounters Legal Pluralism (with Eva Brems and Giselle Corradi, Hart/Oñati International Series in Law and Society, 2014). His writings have appeared in Current Anthropology, American Anthropologist, American Ethnologist, Law & Society Review, Law & Social Inquiry, Social & Legal Studies, Current Legal Theory, and the Journal of Legal Pluralism, among others. He is at work on several new research projects, including an NSF-funded empirical study of the relationship between human rights and radical political and social change in Bolivia and a set of essays that examine the culture, contested politics, and phenomenology of human rights after the post-Cold War.

Encina Ground Floor Conference Room

Mark Goodale Professor of Conflict Analysis and Anthropology Speaker George Mason University
Seminars
Program on Human Rights

Violence and Policing in Latin American and US Cities

pg wp 2
The global cities of Latin America - Rio de Janeiro, Ciudad Juarez, Tijuana, Mexico City and Medellin - have become engines of economic growth. These cities attract remarkable talent across all levels and build extensive networks that allow for innovation and the circulation of ideas. But crime, violence and the dissolution of the social fabric threaten the main attraction of these cities and significantly undermine development prospects. The challenge of providing policing that protects citizens, especially those living in the poorest neighborhoods where gangs and other criminal organizations tend to concentrate, is daunting. The conference on violence and policing in Latin America and US cities brought together academics, policy makers, NGOs, and citizens to reflect on how cities in Latin America are meeting the challenges of rising criminal violence. Particular focus was given to the “policing” processes in cities that have experienced and successfully reduced civil war-like levels of violence. The goal was to reflect on the dynamics and varieties of security strategies, police reform and efforts to rebuild the social fabric of major cities.
 
The conference was hosted by the Program on Poverty and Governance (PovGov) at Stanford's Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL). Other centers and institutions at Stanford University that co-sponsored the conference include the Center for Latin American Studies (CLAS), the Bill Lane Center for the American West, the ‘Mexico Initiative’ at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), and the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC).
 

 

April 28 (Day 1)
Bechtel Conference Room
Encina Hall
616 Serra St.
Stanford, CA 94305-6055

April 29 (Day 2)
Frances C. Arrillaga Alumni Center
326 Galvez Street
Stanford, CA 94305-6105

Conferences
CDDRL Conferences

Growing crops on photovoltaic solar farms is a 'win-win' situation

Authors
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs
A new model for solar farms that “colocates” crops and solar panels could result in the harvesting of valuable biofuel crops in addition to sunlight.

Growing agave and other carefully chosen plants amid photovoltaic panels could allow solar farms not only to collect sunlight for electricity but also to produce crops for biofuels, according to new computer models by Stanford scientists.

This colocation approach could prove especially useful in sunny, arid regions such as the southwestern United States where water is scarce, said Sujith Ravi, who is conducting postdoctoral research with professors David Lobell and Chris Field, both on faculty in environmental Earth system science and senior fellows at the Stanford Woods Institute for the Environment. David Lobell is associate director and Chris Field is a core faculty affiliate at the Center on Food Security and the Environment.

“Colocated solar-biofuel systems could be a novel strategy for generating two forms of energy from uncultivable lands: electricity from solar infrastructure and easily transportable liquid fuel from biofuel cultivation,” said Ravi, lead author of a new study published in a recent issue of the journal Environmental Science & Technology that details the idea.

Photovoltaic (PV) solar farms run on sunlight, but water is required to remove dust and dirt from the panels to ensure they operate at maximum efficiency. Water is also used to dampen the ground to prevent the buildup and spread of dust. Crops planted beneath the solar panels would capture the runoff water used for cleaning the PV panels, thus helping to optimize the land. The plants’ roots would also help anchor the soil, and their foliage would help reduce the ability of wind to kick up dust.

Computer simulations of a hypothetical colocation solar farm in California’s San Bernardino County by Ravi and colleagues suggest that these two factors together could lead to a reduction in the overall amount of water solar farms need to operate. "It could be a win-win situation," Ravi said. “Water is already limited in many areas and could be a major constraint in the future. This approach could allow us to produce energy and agriculture with the same water.”

But which crops to use? Many solar farms operate in sunny but arid regions that are very not hospitable to most food crops. But there is one valuable plant that thrives at high temperatures and in poor soil: agave. Native to North and South America, the prickly plant can be used to produce liquid ethanol, a biofuel that can be mixed with gasoline or used to power ethanol vehicles. "Unlike corn or other grains, most of the agave plant can be converted to ethanol," Ravi said.

The team plans to test the colocation approach around the world to determine the ideal plants to use and to gather realistic estimates for crop yield and economic incentives.

“Sujith’s work is a great example of how thinking beyond a single challenge like water or food or energy sometimes leads to creative solutions,” said Lobell, who is a coauthor on the new study. “Of course, creative solutions don’t always work in the real world, but this one at least seems worthy of much more exploration.”

Ker Than is associate director of communications for the School of Earth Sciences.

Contact: Sujith Ravi, 703-581-8186, sujith@stanford.edu; Ker Than, 646-673-4558, kerthan@stanford.edu 

Hero Image
Solar panel cleaning logo
All News button
1

Ryo Sahashi

Walter H. Shorenstein Asia Pacific Research Center
Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Encina Hall, Rm. E313
616 Serra Street
Stanford, CA 94305-6055

(650) 725-5781
0
Visting Associate Professor
PhD

Ryo Sahashi is a visiting associate professor of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) from April 2014 to March 2015. He joins APARC from Kanagawa University, where he concurrently serves as an associate professor of international politics. He will be writing a book on U.S. strategy toward China, Taiwan, and Northeast Asia since the Cold War.

Sahashi is a specialist on the regional security architecture in East Asia and Japan’s international relations. His articles are published in Chinese, English, and Japanese, including “Security Arrangements in the Asia-Pacific: a Three-Tier Approach,” William T. Tow and Rikki Kerstain (eds.); Bilateral Perspectives on Regional Security: Australia, Japan and the Asia-Pacific Region, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012, pp.214-240; “Security Partnership in Japanese Asia Strategy: Creating Order, Building Capacity, and Sharing Burden,” ifri Policy Papers, February 2013; “The rise of China and the transformation of Asia-Pacific security architecture,” William T. Tow and Brendan Taylor (eds.); Contending Cooperation: Bilateralism, Multilateralism, and Asia-Pacific Security, London and New York: Routledge, 2013, pp.135-156. His newest articles on Japan-Taiwan relations and on Japan’s foreign policy since DPJ era (2009-) will soon be available.

He also serves as Research Fellow at Japan Center for International Exchange. In the past, he was the visiting researcher at the Japanese House of Councilors and German Fund of the United States. His early academic career as faculty started with the University of Tokyo and Australian National University.

He is an active commentator and contributor to international media, including NHK (Asian Voice & Newsline), CCTV, APF, Newsweek, Defense News, Stars and Stripes, Global Times, China Dairy, Asia Pacific Bulletin, and East Asia Forum.

Sahashi is a graduate from International Christian University, spending junior year at University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, and earned his LL.M. and Ph.D. from the Graduate Schools for Law and Politics at the University of Tokyo.

Journalism and Democracy in Korea: The First Year Presidential Jinx

-
South Korean voters have chosen six presidents since the country’s democratization in 1987. Unlike the United States, where newly elected presidents pass signature legislation thanks to a "honeymoon" with Congress, new South Korean presidents immediately face parliamentary obstructionism. Korea’s current president, Park Geun-hye, who recently completed her first year in office, has not been an exception. During the past year, the ruling and opposition parties did not even engage in genuine dialogue, much less reach substantial compromises in the National Assembly. The damage to national governance is all the more serious as Korean presidents may serve only a single, five-year term. 
 
What explains this first year "jinx" for Korean presidents? While the causes include deficiencies in governmental and political institutions, 2013-2014 APARC Fellow Guem-nak Choe argues that a primary factor is the role played by Korean journalism. Himself a former senior journalist and the top public relations aide to the previous Korean president, Mr. Choe will compare Korean and American journalism and offer recommendations for Korean media reform.

Philippines Conference Room

Guem-Nak Choe

Shorenstein APARC
Stanford University
Encina Hall C332
Stanford, CA 94305-6055

(650) 725-0938 (650) 723-6530
0
2013-2014 APARC Fellow
CHOE,_Guem-Nak_1_3x4.jpg

Gordon Guem-nak Choe joins the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center as an APARC Fellow for the 2013-14 academic year. He will be involved with our Korean Studies Program. 

His research encompasses the relationship between media and politics. During his time at Shorenstein APARC, Gordon will work on a comparative study on communication skills between presidents of Korea and the United States.

Choe has over 25 years of experience as a journalist, reporting with Korea’s major broadcasting stations including MBC (Munhwa Broadcasting Company) and SBS (Seoul Broadcasting System). He was SBS's chief correspondent to Washington, DC during the Clinton admistration. He also worked as editor-in-chief and vice president for news and sports at SBS. Later he joined the public sector as Senior Secretary for Public Relations to then-South Korean President Lee Myung-bak. Choe holds a BA in economics from the Seoul National University.

Guem-Nak Choe 2013-2014 APARC Fellow Speaker the Shorentein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University
Seminars

Optimization, resilience, and risk for distributed satellite systems

-

Abstract: The start of the 21st century has included multiple demonstrations of national capabilities to disrupt or destroy satellites. Kinetic anti-satellite weapons, in particular, can create debris with long-term consequences for all space actors. The United States relies on satellites for a broad array of civil, scientific, and national security capabilities. There are several possible ways for the U.S. to help build a more secure environment in Earth-orbit, and manage future risks to space systems. This talk will focus on a technical option that can be pursued unilaterally by the U.S.: the use of distributed satellite architectures for certain critical sensing capabilities. This talk will provide some context for space security in 2014, describe existing frameworks for quantifying risk to satellite constellations, and present a framework for analyzing satellite architecture choices for systems like weather and strategic warning satellites.

About the Speaker: Matt Daniels is an engineer at NASA's Ames Research Center, a predoctoral fellow at CISAC, and a Ph.D. candidate in decision and risk analysis at Stanford. He joined CISAC as a predoctoral fellow in September 2012. At Stanford, Matt's research is in dynamic programming models of distributed satellite constellations. His work focuses on developing probabilistic models to assess the viability of constellations of small, networked satellites for scientific and national security missions. At NASA Ames, Matt is an engineer in the Mission Design Center and works with the Office of the Director on international technical collaborations. He has helped create NASA-DARPA partnerships on new space projects and has been a member of NASA delegations to Europe, South America, and the Middle East.

 

CISAC Central Conference Room, 2nd floor

Matthew Daniels Predoctoral Science Fellow, CISAC Speaker
Seminars
Subscribe to The Americas